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In the Alexander Gardens in Moscow, next to the Kremlin walls, stands a granite memorial 
obelisk. It was erected in 1914 to commemorate the three hundredth anniversary of the 
Romanov dynasty, but its intended eternal endurance proved short-lived. In 1918, as the Civil 
War raged across the territory of the former Russian Empire, the obelisk received a makeover. 
It was refashioned to correspond to the idols of the fledgling Socialist state: the Imperial dou-
ble-headed eagle at its crown was removed, and the inscribed names of the Romanov tsars 
were replaced with those of socialist revolutionaries and philosophers. Then, in 1966, it was 
relocated to the centre of the gardens to make room for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier – a 
symbolic affirmation of the emerging myth of the Second World War. And thus the obelisk 
stood, as the politically and socially revered idols of the Soviet state ceased to be worshipped 
and eventually that very state ceased to exist. By then, the names inscribed on the obelisk 
sounded foreign to the average person’s ear; indeed, many belonged to Western European 
thinkers and proponents of the socialist cause.1 On the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the 
Romanov dynasty in 2013 – a manifestly artificial anniversary that was nonetheless exten-
sively marked – the obelisk was restored to its original state. On 4 November, the Day of 
National Unity, the monument was unveiled and blessed by the Patriarch of Moscow and All 
Russia Kirill (Gundiaev). In his speech, the Patriarch emphasised the symbolic significance of 
the restoration for the consolidation of national unity and, by extension, for the future exist-
ence of the Russian state:  
We cannot live divorced from our history, we cannot think that our state is little more than 80 years old or, as 
is sometimes said, little more than 20 years. We are heirs to a thousand-year history, and if we acknowledge 
this linkage to history, to times past, if we acknowledge our connection with the heroes of the past, then we 
are imbued with national consciousness and a sense of dignity, without which a nation [narod] cannot exist 
(Самсонова 2013).2  
A similar sentiment was expressed by Sergei Ivanov, the Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Administration. He commented: “In commemorating this date today, and in unveiling this 
                                                 
1  The names inscribed were the following: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Ferdinand 
Lassalle, August Bebel, Tommaso Campanella, Jean Meslier, Gerrard Winstanley, Thomas More, Henri de 
Saint-Simon, Édouard Vaillant, Charles Fourier, Jean Jaurès, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Nikolai 
Chernyshevskii, Petr Lavrov, Nikolai Mikhailovskii, and Georgii Plekhanov. 
2 “Мы не можем жить в отрыве от нашей истории, мы не можем считать, что нашему государству 
немногим более 80 лет, или, как иногда говорят, немногим более 20 лет. Мы - наследники тысячелетней 
истории, и если мы сознаем эту связь с историей, с прошлыми временами, если мы сознаем свою связь с 
героями прошлого, то мы проникаемся национальным самосознанием и чувством достоинства, без 
которого не может существовать народ.” 
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stele, we pay tribute to the Romanov dynasty and return to our roots…. It is the continuity of 
history” (Мельников & Мальцев 2013).3  
The history of the memorial obelisk and the framing of its recent renovation exemplify the 
three aspects of contemporary Russian memory politics4 that are central to my argument in 
this study. The first aspect is the emphasis on the continuity of Russian history. In direct re-
sponse to the definite break with the past favoured by Boris Yeltsin’s regime during the 
1990s, Vladimir Putin’s memory politics in the new millennium has sought to reintegrate the 
Russian Federation into an extended historical narrative. Second, the memorial obelisk illus-
trates the palimpsestic layering of this memory politics – how contemporary memory culture 
(implicitly and explicitly) engages with and builds upon previous symbolic practices and their 
visual, narrative and material traces. In this particular case, the act of restoration was actually 
presented as an “un-layering” of memory, as a correction of the (supposedly unrighteous) 
Soviet appropriation of the monument. In the words of Patriarch Kirill, by restoring the names 
of the Russian tsars to the obelisk, “the most historically unjust action [was] corrected” 
(Самсонова 2013).5 The Patriarch’s phrasing brings me to the third aspect, namely that, in 
contemporary Russia, memory politics goes beyond claiming the existence of a state-oriented 
tradition to legitimise the current political regime. It is equally preoccupied with reclaiming 
lost traditions of remembrance. By framing essentially new symbolic acts as the continuation 
of commemorative practices that were forcibly abolished in Soviet and post-Soviet times, the 
state pretends to undo past damages rather than impose its own memory regime. 
Memory Politics Beyond the Walls of the Kremlin 
The rhetorical use of the past has increasingly become a defining characteristic of Russian 
politics since Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000 (e.g., Laruelle 2009; Miller 2012; 
Sherlock 2007; Sherlock 2011; Vázquez Liñán 2010).6 The historical narratives created and 
supported by the Russian government are overtly meant to establish political legitimacy in the 
present and to create a historical foundation for the regime’s emphasis on a strong state and 
centralised leadership. Its strategy of memory politics has aimed to create a continuous 
                                                 
3 “Чествуя сегодня эту дату, открывая эту стелу, мы отдаем дань династии Романовых и возвращаемся к 
своим корням… Это преемственность истории.” 
4 Scholars have proposed various concepts to describe the political practice of engaging with history, such as 
politics of history, history politics and historical politics. Within the context this study, however, I feel it is most 
appropriate to speak of memory politics (see also Chapter 2). 
5 “Вот то самое исторически неправедное действие сегодня исправлено.” 
6 Russia is not unique in this respect, however. A similar revival of memory politics can be observed across 
Eastern Europe. See, e.g., Miller & Lipman (2012); Mink & Neumayer (2013). 
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narrative of a Great Russia (velikaia Rossiia) that has been under constant threat from domes-
tic and foreign enemies. The Soviet past has become an integral part of this overarching 
narrative, in which the Putin era is presented as the logical next episode.  
The way that scholars approach Russian memory politics – that is, through analysis of how 
the state employs references to history to support its legitimacy and frame its political course 
– suggests that the state is a proactive and dominant player in these “memory games” (Mink 
and Neumayer 2013). Moreover, these studies allow the impression to persist that there has 
been no societal, political or cultural resistance to the regime’s claims. However, in every 
society, state and non-state actors at various levels contest with one another in efforts to pro-
vide that society with meaning in the present through representations of the past, and thus, 
with guidance to determine its political and ideological orientation towards the future. The 
same applies to twenty-first-century Russia. The state does not act in isolation. It is part of a 
complex socio-political process of negotiating the contemporary meaning of history and the 
political implications resulting from that meaning. The role played by non-state actors on the 
national level, both as accomplices in and as opponents to official memory politics, has thus 
far been insufficiently addressed. Moreover, in view of the decline since 2000 in the freedom 
granted to the media – including television (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009; Hutchings & Tolz 
2015) – it is imperative to explore how memory politics extends into the domain of mass me-
dia and popular culture. It is here, in television and cinema, that state efforts to control public 
opinion are most pronounced; they have been much less stringent, for instance, towards litera-
ture. To avoid oversimplifying the means through which (authoritarian) political regimes 
mediate their views, it is essential to critically examine cultural productions about history 
aimed at a mass audience. To gain strength, an interpretation of history has to be mediated on 
multiple levels of society. It is precisely the interplay between these levels, official and unof-
ficial, that influences the potential effect of government-supported cultural memories. In this 
study, I seek to address these gaps. My analysis covers the years 2000 through 2012 and re-
fers to earlier and subsequent developments whenever relevant. 
To accommodate the inclusion of non-state actors and the sphere of popular culture, I de-
velop an alternative approach to memory politics. Here, I define the latter concept as the 
mobilisation of cultural memory to put forward political claims and, in particular, to propa-
gate historically informed visions on what constitutes “traditional Russian” state governance. 
Memory politics is thus conceived as not just a political but a social process of negotiating the 
meaning of the past, a process in which the state, one must add, has a disproportionately large 
stake. I seek to move away from static conceptualisations of memory politics – like those that 
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guide studies that chronicle acts of memory politics and explain their meanings – towards a 
dynamic model: a conceptualisation that includes other societal and cultural actors operating 
on the national level, and that can shed light on the dynamic development of memory politics 
over time and across the political and socio-cultural spectrum. I offer an alternative approach 
that, looking beyond the Russian state’s apparent hegemony on memory in the public domain, 
can uncover divergent or competing voices in the national public discourse. Proceeding from 
the concerns outlined above, I aim to answer the following set of interrelated questions: In 
what way have various groups in Russian society, as well as the state, mobilised cultural 
memory to legitimise, question or challenge the political regime? Which cultural memories 
have been employed, by whom and to what end? How have these actors drawn upon existing 
interpretations and representations of the respective cultural memories to shape their contribu-
tions to the debate on history and political legitimacy? On the basis of four extensive case 
studies, I demonstrate, first, how the state has relied on memories with rich histories of cul-
tural representation and political instrumentalisation to portray itself as traditional. Yet the 
accumulated meanings of these constellations of memory greatly increases their subversive 
potential by providing access points for the formulation of a historically framed political cri-
tique. Second, I argue that non-state actors have played a highly significant role in memory 
politics during this period. Moreover, the behaviour of the government in this respect should 
in some cases be characterised as reactive rather than proactive, and shows clear signs of con-
tinuous re-evaluation and adaptation. 
Two important media domains fall beyond the scope of my investigation. With regard to 
television, I have chosen to exclude television journalism. Journalistic coverage of historical 
topics, for instance concerning exhibits or special events, or around commemorative dates, is 
controlled from the top down to a fairly large extent. Therefore, I only note when coverage 
deviates in important ways from the state-supported narrative. Moreover, the relation between 
the Kremlin and national media outlets is extensively covered in the literature (e.g., Oates 
2006; Arutunyan 2009; Beumers et al. 2009; Hutchings & Rulyova 2009; Burrett 2011; 
Schimpfossl & Yablokov 2014; Hutchings & Tolz 2015). The role of non-journalistic televi-
sion in memory politics, such as the television series and documentaries analysed in this 
study, has largely been neglected. Yet these programmes’ characteristics – their longer play-
ing time, which allows for the development of an argument, their rich associations of genre, 
extensive use of stylistic devices and an emotionally persuasive soundtrack to support particu-
lar interpretations of historical events, and so on – make them particularly adept at creating 
lasting memory images. At the same time, these precise characteristics can introduce ambigui-
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ties and make it difficult to control the exact meaning of their messages. This merits in-depth 
examination. Second, my analysis of online memory discourses is limited. I use online forums 
to (retrospectively) assess audience reception of the cinema and TV productions that I am 
analysing. Yet since my research is focused on the competition between the state and the var-
ious non-state actors who operate on the national level – the political and cultural elite, if you 
will – rather than with local or grassroots developments, a comprehensive examination of 
these online memory discourses lies beyond the scope of this study. 
In what follows, I will first sketch the development of memory politics as the Russian state 
has practiced it since 1991. This brief discussion of the main trends in governmental policy 
serves as a necessary introduction and background to the multi-actor analyses in the case stud-
ies. Then, I will summarise the most important trends in historical programming for both the 
big and small screens, as well as key developments in state policy regarding television and 
film production. The final section describes this study’s methodology and outlines its over-
arching structure. 
Memory Politics in the Russian Federation 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union made suddenly obsolete the Communist meta-narrative 
that had previously guided all aspects of political, economic, cultural and personal life. State 
collapse created a rupture between the Soviet past and the still unknown path to the future. 
The historic events that the population had commemorated and the Soviet myths that had 
guided their interpretation of the world and themselves were rejected, but they were not re-
placed by new substitutes. For many Russians, their newly acquired democratic freedoms 
were scant consolation for the loss of state-sponsored services, overall stability and societal 
solidarity. Having lost its Soviet empire, Russia found itself still at the beginning of the pro-
cess of building a nation. That the Communist meta-narrative was essentially a historical 
narrative, based on the assumption that communism was the final stage of historical develop-
ment, intensified the cultural impact of its being disavowed (Yurchak 2006). The loss of 
Communist teleology occasioned an acute search “for its substitute, for another convincing 
plot of Russian development that will help make sense of the chaotic present” (Boym 2001: 
59). During the 1990s, political and cultural elites proved unable to fill this void with new 
coherent narratives of national identity (Tolz 2001; Smith 2002). The regime of Boris Yeltsin, 
in fact, based its political legitimacy on historical discontinuity by rejecting the Soviet period 
in its entirety. With a lack of historical examples to draw on (the autocratic tradition repre-
sented by tsarist Russia was thought to be as unsuitable as Soviet communism), the 
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government framed the extensive reforms of the 1990s within a narrative of Western ideals of 
capitalism and democracy.  
Only in response to the increasing popularity of the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, who actively mobilised the Soviet past in its campaigns, did the state reluctantly 
become involved in memory politics. The fiftieth anniversary of the victory in World War II 
was publicly commemorated in 1995, albeit modestly in comparison to similar celebrations 
staged more recently.7 Following Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996, the government took more 
concrete steps. Acknowledging that social cohesion needed a “national idea” to compensate 
for a lack of ideology, the government established a commission to formulate an “idea for 
Russia.” The initiative, which was unable to produce a viable result, is indicative of the over-
all failure of the state to coherently and effectively engage history to its benefit (Smith 2002: 
178).  
As Kathleen Smith notes, “toward the end of his second term […] Yeltsin wanted to pro-
mote stability and reconciliation, but without encouraging historical amnesia” (idem: 179). 
His successor, Vladimir Putin, held on to the former of these elements, but took a far more 
permissive stance towards the latter. Cherry-picking his way through recent and distant histo-
ry alike, he set as the main goal of governmental memory politics the restoration of national 
pride. Tapping into, on the one hand, persistent popular sentiments of uncertainty and national 
inferiority (Oushakine 2009) and, on the other, increasing nostalgic tendencies with regard to 
both the Soviet and the Imperial pasts, the regime now showed itself to be acutely aware of 
the political usefulness of historical symbolism. Within Putin’s first year in office, he settled 
all the major disputes over state symbolism, which had dragged on for most of the 1990s. 
Most significantly, the Soviet national anthem was reinstated. Its new lyrics were written by 
Sergei Mikhalkov, who also composed the original lines dating to the 1940s, as well as their 
de-Stalinised version from the 1970s. This symbolic act set the tone: rather than harking back 
to one particular period in history, the various and seemingly incompatible stages of the de-
velopment of Russian statehood – tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet – were reconceived as 
integral parts of its history. As Marlène Laruelle rightly points out, 
While the desire to regain the geopolitical power lost in 1991 is obvious, these symbols have not been re-
stored purely and simply for their ideological value – communism itself has not been rehabilitated – but 
because they are part of a cultural background common to the entire population and are seen as an indication 
of normalcy (Laruelle 2009: 155). 
                                                 
7 On the memory of the October Revolution, the “Great Patriotic War” and Stalinism in the public discourse of 
the 1990s, see Копосов (2011); Langenohl (2000); Lutz-Auras (2012). 
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In other words, the recognisability of the constitutive elements of state symbolism is key. 
Memory politics intensified especially around 2005 (Horvath 2013; Miller 2012). This was 
part of the state’s response to the colour revolutions that ended in several regime changes in 
and beyond the region, including in neighbouring Georgia and Ukraine. The Kremlin took 
notice as a wave of peaceful protest swept across the former Soviet space and, fearing that 
something similar would happen in Russia, responded accordingly. It initiated a “preventive 
counter-revolution” that repressed societal groups that could potentially form a support base 
for revolution (most notably, non-governmental organisations) and, at the same time, engaged 
in proactive mobilisation – for instance, by means of patriotically oriented youth movements 
(Horvath 2013: 5-7).8 The campaign’s ideological underpinning was the idea that “Russia’s 
sovereignty was menaced by Western efforts to foment a revolution and impose ‘external 
rule’” (idem: 6). In this narrative, opposition groups were branded as cat’s-paws of foreign 
forces seeking to undermine and destroy the Russian state. The intensity of this wave of offi-
cial memory politics peaked between 2007 and 2010. Among other measures, the government 
supported the 2007 textbook History of Russia: 1945-2006 written by Aleksandr Danilov and 
Aleksandr Filippov, which caused an international scandal for referring to Stalin as an “effec-
tive manager,” and, in 2009, Medvedev signed a decree to set up a Presidential Commission 
to Counter Attempts to Falsify History (Miller 2012; Sherlock 2016). This commission was 
dissolved in early 2012. During this period, conflicts concerning the interpretation of history 
regularly flared up between Russia and neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe.9 
Nikolay Koposov correctly points out that, as relations with the West improved, “aggres-
sive memory politics [became] inappropriate” (Koposov 2011). President Medvedev now 
“unambiguously condemned Stalin’s crimes, declared the memory of the repressions to be as 
‘sacred’ as that of the heroic exploits during the Second World War, and attempted to liberate 
the story of the war from the taint of neo-Stalinism” (ibidem). The repositioning with regard 
to Stalin did not mean, however, that there was an abandonment of memory politics. Quite the 
contrary. The 2010 Victory Day Parade in Moscow, marking the 65th anniversary of the end 
of World War II, was the largest parade held in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. While the format of the parade changes somewhat from year to year,10 it has since 
retained its symbolic importance as (one of) the principle patriotic events of the year (Lutz-
Auras 2012). In addition, with several convenient memorial dates to draw from in 2012, and 
                                                 
8 On state-sponsored youth movements and the promotion of state patriotism, see Hemment (2015); Lassila 
(2014); Mijnsen (2014). 
9 See, e.g., Torbakov (2011); Etkind et al. (2012); Brouwer (2016a). 
10 See, e.g., Oushakine (2013). 
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signs of brewing societal unrest becoming ever more evident, the Kremlin again turned to 
history to underpin its legitimacy, as will be addressed in chapters 3 and 5. Although this 
study covers the years 2000-2012, it should be emphasised that the intensity of memory poli-
tics has not abated since then. On the contrary, the state has stepped up its mobilisation of 
history, in particular the memory of the Second World War, in the context of the conflict in 
Ukraine. This marked departure in the state’s mobilisation of memory substantiates my deci-
sion to view the start of Putin’s third presidential term as a breaking point in the development 
of memory politics and to limit my analysis to the years 2000-2012.  
Main Trends in Governmental Memory Politics 
Various historical references have been used to demonstrate both the historical necessity and 
the traditionally Russian character of what has come to be known as “managed democracy,” 
the “vertical of power,” and so on. To some extent, politically useful cultural memories have 
been employed interchangeably; different historical images or narrative frameworks were 
employed to deliver more or less the same political message. Still, as will become clear from 
the case studies (in particular, those of chapters 3 and 5), one can discern significant shifts in 
preference for certain cultural memories. Moreover, the state’s use of history can be catego-
rised according to two (at times, interconnected) core ideas. The first constellation of 
narratives aimed to promote the concept that, under the new president, political order and sta-
bility had been restored following a period of intense political, economic, social and spiritual 
turmoil. The promise of (continued) economic prosperity and the return of Russia as a great 
power in the international arena complemented this narrative of Russia’s rebirth from its 
ashes.  
A second group of narratives established a lineage of “great Russian reformers.” This line-
age includes familiar faces, such as Peter the Great and Aleksandr II, but also newcomers 
such as the prerevolutionary Prime Minister Petr Stolypin (see Chapter 3). Connected to the 
latter trend is the much wider debate concerning “Russian” models for modernisation. The 
paradoxical central claim of the state’s memory politics can thus be summarised as moderni-
sation through restoration and preservation. Despite the apparent simplicity and appeal of 
such an aim, it is by no means self-evident what it actually means to reform and modernise 
the state in a way true to Russia’s “natural” predisposition to a certain type of governance. 
However much the Kremlin would prefer it to be otherwise, it has not been the only one to 
put forward its views on how Russia can be modernised “in a Russian way.” Competing 
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views abound, albeit with differing measures of sophistication, leverage and general political 
and societal impact (see Chapter 4 and, in particular, Chapter 6).  
The understandings of the development of Russian history underlying official memory pol-
itics on the one hand, and oppositional narratives about the (predestined) nature of governance 
in Russia on the other, are predicated on different dichotomies. While the state interprets the 
dramatic turns in history to be alternations of periods of chaos and order, its opponents view 
them as cycles of relative freedom (e.g., the Thaw, Perestroika) and repression (e.g., Stalin-
ism, Stagnation and, by extension, “Putinism”). 11  The tension resulting from these 
diametrically opposed interpretations of historical development lies at the heart of the debates 
I discuss in the case studies: order and repression appear to be two sides of the same coin. The 
fragile balance between the two is what is at stake in virtually all discussions about current 
and future Russian politics. 
History on the Small and Big Screens 
From the beginning of Putin’s first presidential term, the state has steadily expanded its con-
trol over the media (Beumers et al. 2009; Hutchings & Tolz 2015). While journalism 
remains the primary target of such restrictive measures, historical fiction and nonfiction have 
also been affected as the state’s efforts to promote patriotism have intensified. Indeed, as 
Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz argue, 
One of the Kremlin’s key motivations for imposing its grip on television broadcasting was to promote its 
own vision of a powerful Russian state with a unity of patriotic purpose and an enviable cultural history 
spanning the imperial and the Soviet periods (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 73). 
The reason why television in particular was chosen to serve “as the propaganda tool of a 
powerful, centralizing state” (idem: 73) is self-evident: for an overwhelming majority of 
Russians, television continues to be the main source of information. According to polls con-
ducted by the Levada Centre, 71 per cent of respondents listed state TV channels as their 
primary news source in 2012, while an additional 7 per cent relied on private TV channels, 
including NTV, a channel loyal to the state (Левада-Центр 2015: 123).12 When respondents 
were permitted to mention multiple sources of information, the percentage is even higher: 94 
per cent mentioned television among their primary sources in 2009, a figure that has since 
decreased somewhat yet remains high at 85 per cent in 2015 (Левада-Центр 2016: 166). 
                                                 
11 For an example of the latter opinion, see Beard (2015). 
12 The Levada Centre uses the following categorisation of TV channels. State TV channels: Channel One, 
Rossiia, Kul’tura, and regional channels that are part of VGTRK. Private channels: NTV, Ren-TV and other 
non-state-owned and commercial channels, including local and regional channels. 
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During the period covered by this study, the influence of the Internet was limited. In 2011, 
only 6 per cent of respondents listed the Internet as their primary source of information, a 
share that increased to 15 per cent by 2012 (Левада-Центр 2015: 123). Although state efforts 
to influence film production have long tended to be more covert and indirect, a marked ten-
dency towards establishing far-reaching control over the industry can be observed (I will 
return to this point shortly).  
State-aligned TV channels and the Russian film industry have been prolific suppliers of 
historical narratives.13 Driven by the popularity of historically themed productions with the 
Russian audience, this development was facilitated by increasing budgets – in part attributable 
to advertising revenue – and the rapid professionalisation of the industry. Various formats and 
genres have been used to delve into the Russian past: from blockbusters and arthouse films, 
documentaries and docudramas to TV series, documentary series and talk shows. While a 
significant portion of these productions concern the Soviet period, other periods of Russian 
history have been far from neglected. The television and cinematic interest in Russian history 
during the years 2000-2012 consists of several themes:14 Russian rulers;15 Imperial Russian 
history; 16  the Tatar yoke and other Eurasian themes; 17  military history and its heroes; 18 
                                                 
13 Books have also been a particularly prolific medium. Bookstores abound with (non-specialist) historical works 
of varying academic quality as well as historical fiction. A number of fiction writers, most notably Boris Akunin, 
are extremely popular and have gained significant social status and influence. Several of Akunin’s works have 
been adapted to the screen, for instance Turkish Gambit [Турецкий гамбит] (Dzhanik Faiziev, 2005) and The 
State Counsellor [Статский советник] (Filipp Iankovskii, 2005). 
14 The following overview is based on the online databases Kinopoisk.ru and Ruskino.ru, and additional Google 
and Yandex searches. 
15 E.g., Prince Vladimir [Князь Владимир] (animation film, Iurii Kulakov, 2006); Aleksandr: The Neva Battle 
[Александр. Невская битва] (film, Igor’ Kalenov, 2008); Tsar [Царь] (film, Pavel Lungin, 2009); Ivan the 
Terrible [Иван Грозный] (TV series, Andrei Eshpai, 2009); Iaroslav. A Thousand Years Ago [Ярослав. Тысячу 
лет назад] (film, 2010, Dmitrii Korobkin); Peter the First. The Testament [Петр Первый. Завещание] (TV 
series, Vladimir Bortko, 2011); Boris Godunov [Борис Годунов] (film, Vladimir Mirzoev, 2011). 
16 E.g., The Romanovs. An Imperial Family [Романовы. Венценосная семья] (film, Gleb Panfilov, 2000); 
Russian Ark [Русской ковчег] (film Aleksandr Sokurov, 2002); Poor, Poor Pavel [Бедный, бедный Павел] 
(film, Vitalii Mel’nikov, 2003); The Sovereign’s Servant [Слуга государев] (film, Oleg Riaskov, 2007); The 
August Ambassador [Августейший посол] (TV series, Sergei Vinokurov, 2008). 
17 E.g., Mongol [Монгол] (film, Sergei Bodrov sr., 2007); The Secret of Chengis Khan [Тайна Чингис Хаана] 
(film, Andrei Borisov, 2009); The Horde [Орда] (film, Andrei Proshkin, 2012). 
18  E.g., 1612: Chronicles of the Time of Troubles [1612: Хроники смутного времени] (film, Vladimir 
Khotinenko, 2007); The Admiral [Адмиралъ] (film, Andrei Kravchuk, 2008); We Are from the Future [Мы из 
будущего] (film, Andrei Maliukov, 2008); 1941 [1941] (TV series, Valerii Shalyga, 2009); 1942 [1942] (TV 
series, Valerii Shalyga, 2010); Burnt by the Sun 2: Exodus [Утомленные солнцем 2: Предстояние] (film, 
Nikita Mikhalkov, 2010); Burnt by the Sun 2: Citadel [Утомленные солнцем 2: Цитадель] (film, Nikita 
Mikhalkov, 2011); The Brest Fortress [Бресткая крепость] (film, Aleksandr Kott, 2010,); White Tiger [Белый 
тигр] (film, Karen Shakhnazarov, 2012); Zhukov [Жуков] (TV series, Aleksei Muradov, 2012); The War of 
1812. The First Information War [Война 1812 года. Первая информационная] (documentary, Aleksei  
Denisov, 2012). 
 21 
terrorism and the secret police in late Imperial Russia;19 and religious history.20 With regard 
to Soviet history, distinctions can be made among productions touching on the Russian 
Revolution and Lenin,21 topics connected to Stalinism,22 the Thaw,23 the Era of Stagnation24 
and Perestroika,25 and stories about Gagarin and other Soviet heroes.26 Finally, the tumultuous 
experiences of the 1990s have been revisited,27 and there has been a minor spark of interest in 
                                                 
19 E.g., Empire under Attack [Империя под ударом] (TV series, Sergei Gazarov, Andrei Maliukov, Viacheslav 
Nikiforov and Zinovii Roizman, 2000); The Rider Named Death [Всадник по имени смерть] (film, Karen 
Shakhnazarov, 2003); The Fall of the Empire [Гибель империи] (TV series, Vladimir Khotinenko, 2005); 
Stolypin…The Undrawn Lessons [Столыпин…Невыученные уроки] (TV series, Iurii Kuzin, 2006); Retro-style 
Terror [Террор в стиле ретро] (documentary series, Boris Sobolev, 2006). 
20 E.g., The Wanderer [Странник] (film, Sergei Karandashov, 2006); The Island [Остров] (film, Pavel Lungin, 
2006); The Fall of an Empire. The Lesson of Byzantium [Гибель империи. Византийский урок] (documentary, 
Ol’ga Savostianova, 2008); The Priest [Поп] (film, Vladimir Khotinenko, 2009); The Schism [Раскол] (TV 
series, Nikolai Dostal’, 2011). 
21 E.g., Taurus [Телец] (film, Aleksandr Sokurov, 2001); Diamonds for the World Revolution [Бриллианты для 
мировой революции] (documentary, Dmitrii Demin, 2001); The Russian Exodus [Русский исход] (documen-
tary, Aleksei Denisov, 2002); Who Funded Lenin? The Secret of the Century [Кто заплатил Ленину? Тайна 
века] (documentrary, Galina Orgurnaia, 2004); The Storming of the Winter Palace. On the Occasion of the 90th 
Anniversary of the October Revolution [Штурм Зимнего. 90-летию Октябрьской революции] (documentary, 
Galina Ogurnaia, 2007); Iakov Sverdlov – The Evil Demon of the Revolution [Яков Свердлов - злой демон 
революции] (documentary, Sergei Kraus, 2007); Lev Trotsky. The Secret of World Revolution [Лев Троцкий. 
Тайна мировой революции] (documentary, Galina Ogurnaia, 2007); Morphine [Морфий] (film, Aleksei 
Balabanov, 2008); The White Guard [Белая гвардия] (TV series, Sergei Snezhkin, 2012). 
22 E.g., Stalin’s Wife [Жена Сталина] (TV miniseries, Oleg Massarygin and Mira Todorovskaia, 2006); Stalin: 
Live [Сталин: Live] (TV series, G. Liubomirov, B. Kazakov and D. Kuzmin, 2006); Liquidation [Ликвидация] 
(TV series, Sergei Ursuliak, 2007); Svetlana [Светлана] (documentary, Irina Gedrovich, 2008); Holodomor-33. 
The Undrawn Lessons [Голодомор-33. Невыученные уроки] (documentary, Aleksei Denisov, 2008); The Edge 
[Край] (film, Aleksei Uchitel’, 2010); Comrade Stalin [Товарищ Сталин] (TV series, Irina Gedrovich, 2011); 
The Roulette of the Great Terror. The Reds and the Whites [Рулетка большого террора. Красные-белые] 
(documentary, Elena Lapenkova, 2012).  
23  E.g., How They “Finished off” Chrushchev [Как “добивали” Хрущева] (documentary, Vasilii Pichula, 
2004); Hipsters [Стиляги] (film, Valerii Todorovskii, 2008); Black Wolves [Черные волки] (TV series, Dmitrii 
Konstantinov, 2011). 
24 E.g., Brezhnev [Брежнев] (TV series, Sergei Snezhkin, 2005); And Leonid Ilich Personally [И лично Леонид 
Ильич] (documentary series, Leonid Parfenov and Elena Kaliberda, 2006); Galina [Галина] (TV series, Vitalii 
Pavlov, 2008); The Hot Summer of 1968 [Жаркое лето 68-го] (documentary, Vadim Gasanov, 2008); Vanished 
Empire [Исчезнувшая империя] (film, Karen Shakhnazarov, 2008). 
25  E.g., Ninth Company [9 Рота] (film, Fedor Bondarchuk, 2005); Innocent Saturday [В субботу] (film, 
Aleksandr Mindadze, 2011). 
26 E.g., Dreaming of Space [Космос как предчувствие] (film, Aleksei Uchitel’, 2005); First on the Moon 
[Первые на луне] (mockumentary, Aleksei Fedorchenko, 2005); Paper Soldier [Бумажный солдат] (film, 
Aleksei German jr., 2008); Gagarin’s Smile [Улыбка Гагарина] (documentary, Natal’ia Gugueva and Arkadii 
Kogan, 2009); Chkalov [Чкалов] (TV series, Igor’ Zaitsev, 2012); Legend No 17 [Легенда No 17] (film, Nikolai 
Lebedev, 2012). 
27 E.g., Brother 2 [Брат 2] (film, Aleksei Balabanov, 2000); The Roaring 90s [Лихие 90-е] (documentary series, 
Elena Petrova, Aleksandr Novikov, Sergei Kholodnyi, Oleg Smin and Aleksandr Kuprin, 2007); 13 Months of 
Egor Gaidar [13 месяцев Егора Гайдара] (documentary, Nikolai Svanidze, 2010); Generation P [Generation 
П] (film, Viktor Ginzburg, 2011). 
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early Russian history.28 This latter group of narratives about Slavic tribes and Russian folk-
lore appears to follow Western trends to a large extent (e.g., the popularity of the Lord of the 
Rings trilogy).29 
With regard to television, the genre of the historical documentary series deserves specific 
mention. Some of these series ran for several years. Historical Chronicles with Nikolai 
Svanidze (Istoricheskie khroniki c Nikolaem Svanidze, 2003-2013), for instance, was broad-
cast by the Rossiia channel for over a decade. Each episode was dedicated to one year in 
Russian history, covering the years 1900-1993. The historical investigation series The 
Searchers (Iskateli) has been running weekly episodes on the Kul’tura channel since 2010. 
Until he was dismissed from NTV, the journalist Leonid Parfenov produced a popular and 
influential documentary series called The Other Day 1961-2003: Our Era (Namedni 1961-
2003: Nasha era, 1997-2003). Finally, the historical talk shows The Trial of Time (Sud 
vremeni, 2010) and its successor The Historical Trial (Istoricheskii protsess, 2011-2012) were 
as controversial as they were popular (and, for that reason, will be discussed in Chapter 6 and, 
as a case in their own right, in Chapter 7). 
Opinion polls conducted by the Levada Centre give us insights into the popularity of the 
different genres of history television and film, and their potential impact on popular opinion. 
Respondents were asked what types of shows they watched “often/most often.” Comparing 
the results from, respectively, 2002 and 2011, 81 (61) per cent of Russian viewers often 
watched TV films;30 68 (37) per cent regularly tuned into Russian-produced TV series; and 24 
(14) percent of viewers frequently watched shows about history (Левада-Центр 2012: 262).31 
                                                 
28 E.g., Wolfhound of The Grey Hound Clan [Волкодав из рода Серых Псов] (film, Nikolai Lebedev, 2006); 
Young Wolfhound [Молодой Волкадав] (TV series, Oleg Fomin, 2007); Rusichi [Русичи] (film, Adel Al-
Khadad, 2008); Alesha Popovich and Tugarin the Serpent [Алеша Попович и Тугарин Змей] (animation film, 
Konstantin Bronzit, 2004); Il’ia Muromets and the Nightingale-Robber [Илья Муромец и Соловей Разбойник] 
(animation film, Vladimir Toropchin, 2007); The Three Bagotyrs and the Shamakhan Queen [Три богатыря и 
шамаханская царица] (animation film, Sergei Glezin, 2010). 
29 To this overview one could add themes connected to the history of Russian culture, and specifically literature. 
A discussion of productions about great Russian writers, playwrights, composers, dancers etc., as well as con-
temporary screen adaptations and remakes of literary classics is, however, beyond the scope of this research. 
30 This figure includes both domestic and foreign film productions. On the basis of one of the follow-up ques-
tions, the proportion of domestic films appears to be greater than of foreign films. Comparing results from 2002 
and 2011, 69 (59) per cent of respondents indicated a preference for Soviet films shown on television, while 
Russian films were similarly preferred by 66 (59) per cent. Foreign TV films were less popular: 37 (29) per cent 
of respondents indicated a preference for American films, 21 (10) per cent for Western European productions, 9 
(6) per cent for Arabic and Indian films and 3 (2) per cent for Eastern European films (Левада-Центр 2012: 
263). 
31 Although these percentages show a marked decrease between 2002 and 2011, this does not appear to be relat-
ed to the particular genres: with the notable exception of the news (similar percentage) and genres that were not 
listed in 2002 (e.g., court shows and “Dancing with the Stars” types of programmes) all genres show a 
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Among the Russian TV series, historical topics were quite popular: in 2011, 17 per cent of 
respondents enjoyed watching “historical/historical-action/costume melodrama,” 15 per cent 
regularly watched melodramas set in the recent Soviet past, while another 12 per cent turned 
on their televisions for historical series about Russian history, historical events and personali-
ties. TV series set in the past were still surpassed in popularity, though, by police detective 
shows (32%), contemporary melodramas (21%) and criminal dramas (20%) (Левада-Центр 
2012: 264). Regarding film, in 2009 and 2011 respectively, 20 (21) per cent of respondents 
indicated a preference for historical and costume films, 9 (7) per cent enjoyed films about 
heroes and important individuals, while 9 (10) per cent indicated that they watched scholarly-
educational films about history, culture or art. By comparison, 35 (36) per cent of respondents 
expressed their liking for detective movies and action films, 32 (34) per cent for romantic 
films or melodramas, while 37 (33) per cent mentioned comedy among their favourites 
(Левада-Центр 2012: 252). 
The ways the state has tried to promote the output of historical film and television produc-
tions, as well as to influence the particular interpretations of the historical events they depict, 
roughly fall into two categories: measures aimed to stimulate and measures aimed to restrict. 
For both strategies, controlling the flow of funds is the most evident and efficient means to 
achieve their aims. Yet changes to the institutional conditions of production (e.g., measures 
that impact distribution and broadcasting) can also greatly influence the types of projects that 
make it onto the big screen. Jasmijn van Gorp has analysed the correlation between the gov-
ernment’s film policy, which includes state subsidies, and the production of “national” films – 
that is, films that contribute to nation-building – from 1991 to 2005 (Van Gorp 2011). She 
demonstrates that in the period 2000-2005, the state actively tried to stimulate the production 
of such national films through a five-year plan issued by the Ministry of Culture. On occa-
sion, the Ministry organised competitions to solicit films on particular topics (a type of 
goszakaz). Van Gorp argues that these measures were effective primarily through how they 
influenced filmmakers’ “common sense.” Provided with an economic incentive, they were 
tempted to make films that would satisfy the Ministry’s criteria and therefore be eligible for 
state support. Paradoxically, the direct calls did not always result in the actual production of a 
film. For example, as Van Gorp illustrates, while during the years 2001-2005, eleven films 
were produced about the Second World War (of which seven received state support), an ad-
vertised commission for a film commemorating the war in 2004 failed to produce a result. 
                                                                                                                                                        
significant to dramatic drop in percentage. A possible explanation for this fact could be the diversification of 
television programming since 2002. 
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The availability of state funding, she concludes, therefore appears to have worked as an indi-
rect system of state commission.  
The voluntary pragmatic conformity to governmental preferences identified by Van Gorp 
persisted after 2005 and indicates how state control over film production during these years 
can be difficult to prove. Indeed, as Greg Dolgopolov asserts,  
Although the attraction of conspiracy theories is undeniable, it would be wrong to consider that all these 
positive subjects are “ordered” from the top as the outcomes tend to be authorially messy and “dirty.” […] 
Putin-era cinema and television drama is best defined by a heterogeneous “dirty” base that supports broad 
genre variety, an indigenization of Western formats, a decline in experimental art house cinema, and a resur-
gent populism based on retro-oriented blockbusters and a banal, domesticated national consciousness in tele-
serials and soap operas (Dolgopolov 2008). 
My analyses of a wide variety of TV and cinema productions in the case studies support 
Dolgopolov’s assertion. 
In 2009, the system of financial support for the film industry was drastically reformed. The 
newly established Federal Fund for Social and Economic Support to National 
Cinematography, or Fond Kino, was assigned the allocation of most of the available funds. 
The remainder is allocated by the Ministry itself in support of the so-called leaders of national 
film production (whose criteria determining ranking is unclear) and through competitive the-
matic calls (Зиборова 2013). In both 2010 and 2011, the call mentioned, for instance, “films 
of historical, military and patriotic content, developing a sense of pride in one’s country,” as 
well as a similar theme regarding documentary film (Министерство культуры Российской 
Федерации 2010; Министерство культуры Российской Федерации 2011).32 The structural 
reorganisation involved a significant change in the composition of the councils overseeing the 
distribution of funds. After the restructuring only a few film professionals were left among 
their ranks, their places now occupied by bankers, vice-ministers, chairmen of the boards of 
directors for major media holdings and other people “wielding substantial financial and polit-
ical leverage” (Зиборова 2013: 74).33 The council at the Ministry of Culture responsible for 
the allocation of funds was headed by (then) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, leaving little 
doubt about the direct correspondence between political preferences and subsidised projects. 
For a film to be completely free from the implicit and explicit restrictions that are now con-
                                                 
32  “темы фильмов исторического, военного и патриотического содержания, воспитывающие чувство 
гордости за свою страну.” 
33 “имеющих в своих руках влиятельные финансовые и политические рычаги.” 
 25 
nected to these streams of state funding, it has to be produced with exclusively private funds 
(Зиборова 2013: 75).34 
In addition to direct funding and the stimulation of pragmatic self-censorship, the state has 
also exerted indirect control, for instance by placing individuals loyal to the Kremlin as heads 
of significant production and distribution companies (Pomerantsev 2014: 43-45).35 Moreover, 
film and television production are increasingly mutually interdependent in Russia. Major his-
torical films, in particular, are often released (in extended versions) as TV miniseries, 
premiering on TV not long after their cinematic releases. By producing and financing such 
productions, state TV channels have become yet another means to promote the release of 
films on certain topics. Simultaneous release on the big and small screens dramatically in-
creases the audience reached by such productions. Stylistically, their impact has been 
exceedingly important. As Il’ia Kalinin correctly argues, Channel One and the All-Russia 
State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGRTK, owner of, e.g., Rossiia 1 and 2 
and Kul’tura) have “shaped the commercial format of patriotic cinema that now dominates 
domestic screens” (Калинин 2013).36 
The lack of alternative sources of funding (that is, of funds not connected in any way to 
state-aligned production companies, TV channels and other sources of direct and indirect 
governmental support) seriously restricts the number of independent productions. In Chapter 
5, I analyse one such independent film, Boris Godunov (2011, Vladimir Mirzoev). For now, it 
suffices to say that the person who sponsored this politically sensitive film funded it on the 
condition that his name would not be disclosed. The film also encountered some difficulties 
with distribution. The system of financing has thus acted as a restrictive tool within Russia’s 
increasingly state-owned media landscape in this period.  
There has, though, been some opposition to the evident loyalty to the Kremlin shown by 
key individuals in the industry. The most significant development in this respect is the deci-
sion of a group of filmmakers to leave the Union of Cinematographers of the Russian 
                                                 
34 Until recently, the restructuring of the system did not necessarily preclude the production of state critical 
films, as is evidenced by the case of Andrei Zviagintsev’s Leviathan (Левиафан, 2014) about the pervasiveness 
of corruption within the Russian bureaucracy, legislature and Russian Orthodox Church. Minister of Culture 
Vladimir Medinskii has made it very clear, however, that such “anti-Russian” films will no longer be supported 
by state funds, regardless of the potential international success of a given project (promoting the international 
competitiveness of the Russia film industry is one of the explicit aims of film policy). See, “Владимир 
Мединский: ‘Левиафан’ запредельно конъюнктурен” (2015). 
35 Peter Pomerantsev’s widely discussed journalistic account about the structure of (in)direct control of media 
was confirmed by several of my interviewees. 
36  “сформирован коммерческий формат патриотического кино, господствующий сейчас на 
отечественных экранах.” 
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Federation and establish their own independent union, Kinosoiuz, in 2010. In their founding 
statement “We don’t like it,” which collected more than 150 signatories, the protesting 
filmmakers explicitly oppose the Union of Cinematographers’ “imposed agreement of opin-
ion, official patriotism and lackey-ness” (“История Киносоюза” n.d.).37 Their discontent was 
directed mainly at the Union’s long-serving chairman, Nikita Mikhalkov, an Academy Award 
winner and a personal friend of Putin (on Mikhalkov, see also Chapter 3). Among 
Kinosoiuz’s founders are the (internationally) acclaimed directors Aleksei German, Aleksandr 
Sokurov and Boris Khlebnikov.38 While this split among filmmakers created a stir at the time 
it emerged, its overall effect upon the industry appears to be limited.39 
Methodology and Structure of the Dissertation  
In order to be able to study memory politics as а socio-cultural process involving govern-
mental politics, societal actors of national importance and the sphere of cultural production, I 
adopt a case-study approach. Each case is dedicated to the remediation and political instru-
mentalisation of a particular cultural memory across the three domains. As will be described 
in detail in the next chapter, I depart from the theoretical conceptualisation of cultural 
memory developed by Jan and Aleida Assmann to frame and analyse the interdisciplinary 
subject at hand. In addition, I build upon the concept of remediation as it has been adapted for 
the study of cultural memory by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney (see Chapter 2). The selection of 
the cases is motivated, first, by the aspects of memory dynamics they allow me to explore. 
Taken together, the four major case studies represent as wide a variety of political, social and 
cultural actors as possible. The memory of the Time of Troubles formed the central narrative 
of state memory politics and has a particularly rich history. Putin himself advocated that the 
figure of Petr Stolypin be regarded as an exemplary political figure, but did so only after tele-
vision productions had prepared the ground. Stolypin’s case is particularly revealing since, 
unlike other historical references used by the regime, there were no previous memory texts to 
build upon. The case of Aleksandr Nevskii provides insights into the memory politics of the 
                                                 
37 “Нам не нравится”; “насаждаются единомыслие, казенный патриотизм и холуйство.” 
38 The remaining founding members are: El’dar Riazanov, Iurii Norshtein, Daniil Dondurei, Aleksandr Gel’man, 
Vladimir Dostal’, Vitalii Manskii, Andrei Proshkin and Aleksei German Jr. The current number of members 
exceeds 200. 
39 This conclusion was supported by two of the persons I interviewed (Interviewee A; Interviewee D). Still, sign-
ing the petition was a highly symbolic act that, in turn, could translate into real world consequences. Interviewee 
G, for example, related the story of a film director who was supposed to take part in the Moscow Film Festival 
as a special guest. However, when his name appeared among the signatories, the invitation was withdrawn; 
someone who is openly defiant of Nikita Mikhalkov cannot appear as a special guest at the festival of which 
Mikhalkov is the director. The tragedy of the situation was that the film director claimed his name was included 
erroneously: he had not signed the petition. 
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Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the coinciding interests of the ROC and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in favouring the medieval prince. Finally, the memory of Ivan the Terrible 
and the oprichnina offers a case that allows an exploration of how ultranationalist and funda-
mentalist Orthodox groups use cultural memory to put forth visions of Russian statehood that 
undermine current political structures. 
My selection of cultural productions includes documentary and feature films, television se-
ries and TV shows. They were each chosen on the basis of one or more of the following 
criteria: 1) the example is a major project that involved substantial investment and/or was 
presented as an important event; 2) the persons and/or organisations involved warrant particu-
lar attention; and/or 3) the production had significant societal impact or sparked controversy. 
Consequently, my research is limited to TV channels with national coverage. 
Since this study is also an investigation of the balance between the political arena, on the 
one hand, and television and cinema production, on the other, I have selected cases that were 
sufficiently prominent in both domains. As a result, some important names did not make the 
cut. Catherine the Great has largely been absent on the cultural front, though this lack has 
recently been addressed with two major television series in the wake of the annexation of 
Crimea.40 From time to time, political statements made reference to Peter the Great, but his 
memory was never as explicitly instrumentalised as, for instance, Petr Stolypin’s was.41 One 
major TV series was broadcast about Peter in 2011, but this should be seen as the exception 
that proves the rule, as it were, of a further lack of symbolic investment.42 Since my main ob-
jective is to gain insight into the various actors involved in memory politics and their 
interaction with one another, an examination of the reasons why these and other specific cul-
tural memories were for the most part absent in this period is beyond the scope of this study. 
The attentive reader will have noticed that the selected case studies all concern prerevolu-
tionary Russian history. Obvious case studies, on Stalin or the memory of the Second World 
                                                 
40 Catherine [Екатерина] (Aleksandr Baranov and Ramil Sabitov, 2014); The Great [Великая] (Igor’ Zaitsev, 
2015). Catherine the Great is typically included in the manifold TV documentary series about the Russian tsars, 
yet since she is not singled out among them in any particular way this does not warrant a case study. Moreover, 
while she did make it to the finals of the TV show The Name Is Russia her memory did not prove popular (see 
Chapter 4). 
41 The traditional image of Peter the Great as the ruler who sought to integrate Russia into Europe and modernise 
the country in emulation of the West is the most likely obstacle in this case. The way that his legacy is 
commonly perceived was too pro-Western to be of use to the Putin regime’s narrative of Russia’s “unique path” 
of historical development. 
42 Peter the Great: The Testament [Петр Первый. Завещание] (Vladimir Bortko, 2011). During this period, 
Peter the Great appeared in a small number of films, such as The Sovereign’s Servant [Слуга государев] (Oleg 
Riaskov, 2011) and Russian Ark [Русский ковчег] (Aleksandr Sokurov, 2002), but was never featured as their 
main subject. 
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War, are missing. This decision, as well as being informed by my overarching aim of achiev-
ing a diverse sample of governmental, nongovernmental and cultural actors, results from the 
following considerations. First, the existing literature on Russian memory politics in the new 
millennium somewhat overstates the importance of these memories in this particular 
timeframe and often fails to place the regime’s attitude towards the Soviet past in the contexts 
of other instrumentalised periods in history. The evidence provided by my case studies chal-
lenges the argument made by, for instance, Graeme Gill, that “the pre-Soviet past has not 
been a major source of either symbolism or enthusiasm in post-Soviet Russian discourse (Gill 
2013: 143). Contrary to Gill’s assertion that, “[w]hile it may be an era of general interest, pre-
Soviet Russia has not generally been seen as a relevant model or guide for contemporary or 
future development” (Gill 2013: 143), I have found a pronounced political interest in the pre-
revolutionary period both for framing policy decisions and for informing future policy. 
Second, the various episodes of Soviet rule tend to be conflated in order to argue that the 
Putin regime has taken an overall justificatory stance towards the Soviet past. While, indeed, 
the memory of the Second World War makes up one of the primary elements of patriotic 
symbolism (as Ludmila Lutz-Auras explores in her excellent study of its politicisation),43 the 
state has been much more hesitant in associating itself with Stalin.44 Moreover, I would argue 
that the prominence awarded to the victory of 1945 represents a revival of memory culture 
from the Brezhnev era, when the myth first came to serve this purpose (see Gill 2011), rather 
than sincere praise for Stalinism. Triumphs in war have proved to be particularly useful in 
serving as the basis for patriotic celebrations, and the victory in the Second World War just so 
happens to be the one that Russians were used to celebrating. 
The regime’s failure to come to terms with the crimes committed by the Soviet state con-
tinues to be a cause for concern (one that many excellent scholars have addressed). While I do 
not directly address this issue, the question of the permissibility of state violence against its 
own people occupies centre stage in the chapters on Ivan the Terrible and Stolypin. The 
legacy of the Soviet past features indirectly in yet another way. Indeed, one of my main ar-
guments is that the rationale behind the recirculation of prerevolutionary memory, e.g. by the 
Russian state, lies in the fact that these historical narratives had been actively used during the 
Soviet period (see Chapter 2). Thereby, this study also sheds light on a particular aspect of the 
reworking of the Soviet past that has not received enough attention: the reappropriation of 
                                                 
43 Lutz-Auras (2012). On the symbolic meaning of Putin’s personal involvement (or, “performance”) in the cele-
brations connected to the memory of the Second World War, see Wood (2011). 
44 For an analysis of films about World War II, see, e.g., Лидерман (2007). 
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elements of Soviet history propaganda. Three of the cultural memories that I examine in the 
case studies had been instrumentalised by the Soviet state, and yet, as will become clear, con-
temporary memory politics engages differently with this legacy in each case. But with regard 
to the memory of Stolypin, the opposite is true. Lacking pre-existing symbolic representation, 
his political actions were, in fact, almost unanimously evaluated negatively by Soviet histori-
ans and politicians (see Chapter 3). The contrasts among the cases therefore allow me to 
reflect on the importance of Soviet-era prefiguration. 
Because this thesis is an interdisciplinary study, I use a wide variety of primary sources 
that roughly fall into the following categories: official governmental documents (including 
presidential decrees, policy documents and public statements); newspaper and journal publi-
cations accessed via the websites of their respective media outlets and the Integrum World 
Wide database; radio transcripts from Ekho Moskvy; documentary and feature films; various 
genres of television production; and online forums. My assumptions about the television and 
film industry and, in particular, the ways the state influences them have also been informed by 
a number of interviews I conducted in Moscow in late 2014 and early 2015 (see List of 
Interviews). My multidisciplinary and cross-media methodology enables me to accommodate 
both conformity to and contestation of official memory politics. This study thereby makes a 
contribution to the understanding of memory politics and, in particular, of how governmental 
memory politics relates to societal and cultural memory practices and, to a certain extent, is 
constrained by them. 
The structure of the dissertation is straightforward. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical and 
conceptual framework of the research. The subsequent chapters present the four case studies, 
each governed by a similar structure. Part I of each case study first provides an overview of 
the historical development of the particular memory under consideration, including its repre-
sentation in the arts, then analyses the political, social and cultural actors involved in its 
contemporary mobilisation. Part II is dedicated to a discussion of key television and cinema 
productions, encompassing their production history and reception. Chapter 7 presents an addi-
tional small case study about the talk show The Trial of Time, used as a prism to examine the 
politics of television programming. Building upon the thematic case studies that precede it, 
this final chapter employs an analysis of the societal debate generated by the show as a step-
ping stone for a reflection on the interaction between the different levels of memory politics: 
the state and media and non-state actors, on the one hand, and the general audience whose 
perceptions they aim to influence, on the other. Finally, the Conclusion sums up my main 
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conclusions and places them within the context of more recent developments in Russian 
memory politics. 
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2. The Remediation of Russian Cultural Memory 
Political, Intertextual and Audiovisual 
 
 
Cultural Memory and Political Legitimacy 
In contemporary Russia the past is omnipresent. Traces of history and narratives describing 
its events and main characters permeate all spheres of society and cultural life: politics, holi-
days, traditions, education, popular culture, arts, architecture, the blogosphere45 and so on. 
The everyday presence of the past finds expression through a wide range of media and in di-
vergent contexts – from the tangible remnants of periods long gone (the Muscovite Kremlin, 
the architectural splendour of tsarist Saint Petersburg, the high-rise main building of Moscow 
State University) to vehement television debates on national history between politically op-
posed individuals (for example, The Trial of Time that will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7) 
and nostalgic marketing strategies (“Alenka” chocolate bars). These historical traces are part 
of acts and processes of remembering in multiple ways. Some historical references are closely 
connected to the memory of individuals, evoking memories of lived experience or orally 
transferred life-stories of relatives and friends. Such, for instance, is the case with the Soviet 
past and the turbulent events following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 
majority of historical references, however, pertain to areas of common knowledge, culture or 
education. One has come to know what they represent and how their contemporary relevance 
should be viewed via a learning process, a transfer of knowledge. In other words, they are 
evidence of collective remembrance.  
To conceptualise the ways that individuals “remember” collectively, Jan and Aleida 
Assmann distinguish between communicative and cultural memory. Communicative memory 
refers to shared memories that exist in embodied form, literally in someone’s memory:  
Communicative memory is non-institutional; it is not supported by any institutions of learning, transmission, 
and interpretation; it is not cultivated by specialists and is not summoned or celebrated on special occasions; 
it is not formalized and stabilized by any forms of material symbolization; it lives in everyday interaction and 
communication and, for this very reason, has only a limited time depth which normally reaches no farther 
back than eighty years, the time span of three interacting generations (J. Assmann 2008: 111). 
                                                 
45 Blogosphere is an umbrella term referring to the network of online communities, blogs and social media. On 
the Russian-language Internet, or RuNet, blog platform LiveJournal (Zhivoi Zhurnal) has been particularly popu-
lar and influential. 
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Cultural memory, on the other hand, is the part of collective remembering that exists in dis-
embodied form and is mediated in carriers of memory such as novels, monuments and 
pictures. 
Cultural memory is a kind of institution. It is exteriorized, objectified, and stored away in symbolic forms 
that, unlike the sounds of words or the sight of gestures, are stable and situation-transcendent: They may be 
transferred from one situation to another and transmitted from one generation to another (J. Assmann 2008: 
110-111). 
The line separating communicative from cultural memory is not absolute. Shared memo-
ries of lived experience can coexist with institutionalised, symbolic representations of related 
events, as will be discussed in greater detail towards the end of this chapter.  
Cultural memory can further be divided into two domains that, through their interaction, 
shape the dynamics of the memory process (A. Assmann 2008). The first is the active cultural 
memory of a society, or its canon. These are those memories that are in circulation in a socie-
ty at a given moment. The archive, on the other hand, refers, in both the literal and 
metaphorical senses, to those memories no longer in active circulation that have been pre-
served in an inert state. Consider, for example, memories captured in novels that are no longer 
read or in statues of no-longer-revered heroes. That these memories have been embodied in an 
artefact or text means that they can be rediscovered and brought back into active cultural 
memory. Such re-activation is very much a deliberate process, governed by the question of 
which images of the past have been chosen to bolster or complement a present condition:  
At the other end of the spectrum, there is the storehouse for cultural relicts. These are not unmediated; they 
have only lost their immediate addressees; they are de-contextualized and disconnected from their former 
frames which had authorized them or determined their meaning. As part of the archive, they are now open to 
new contexts and lend themselves to new interpretations (A. Assmann 2008: 99).  
The basic premise that memory is shaped to fit the needs of the present (Rigney 2005: 14) 
implies that memory practices provide us with insights into present-day cultural, political and 
social developments; indeed, they function in this fashion to an extent far greater than the way 
they may shed light on a “factual” past. Therefore, what is of interest in this study is the move 
from archive to canon, the selection, reworking and circulation of narratives about the past 
that aim to relate such narratives to the Russia of today. What exactly happens to memory 
when it is moved from the archive to the canon? How can we conceptualise the re-activation 
of memory and the (possible) changes that occur in the process of re-activation? And how do 
we define the relation between the “new” (version of the) memory and its “original(s)”? The 
second part of this chapter will put forward the conceptual framework that will guide the 
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case-study analyses in order to answer these questions. Before proceeding, however, it is nec-
essary to consider how cultural memory is linked to political legitimacy, and what (groups of) 
actors are involved in the process of political memory making. 
The Politics of Memory: Conformity and Contestation 
For politicians and political movements, history can be an important source of framing 
devices. The rhetorical use of historical references can establish a line of tradition – an evi-
dent aim of the politics of memory of Putin regime’s, which, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, has focused on creating a historical foundation for its emphasis on a strong state 
and centralised leadership. Political actors can contextualise their connection to the political 
entity they seek to represent by indicating a historical analogy between the present and a 
given historical occurrence (including appeals to tradition and collective identity); alternately, 
they can place themselves in opposition to a set of characteristics embodied by a historical 
individual, event or movement. Simultaneously, historical framing helps stress their 
singularity, the leadership qualities or policy objectives that set them apart from competing 
political groups. Scholars apply diverse concepts to describe this political practice: the politics 
of history, history politics, historical politics, memory politics, and so on. To speak of history 
politics or historical politics is somewhat problematic, at least within the terms of this study, 
since it implies that political historical framing is about history and consequently is aimed 
towards truth-finding and the establishment of facts (or, for that matter, the refutation of ac-
cepted historical facts). I would argue that, on the contrary, political uses of historical 
references are symbolic in aim and therefore not about history but about memory. Therefore, I 
will speak of memory politics and the politics of memory (phrases I use interchangeably), and 
will do so in instances when political actors purport to be speaking about historical facts or 
the distortion of history by others.  
Since the aim of the politics of memory is to orient notions about the shared past towards 
the endorsement of current policies, a regime may seek to exert as much control as possible 
over public expressions of collective remembrance. Political statements, state symbols and 
holidays are the most salient form of such endeavours, but state control over memory 
practices, depending on the degree of state centrism, can extend to all spheres of society: edu-
cation, academic research, museum exhibitions and journalism, but also, and this is the sphere 
under consideration in this research, television and cinema. Russian memory politics and the 
influence of the state on cultural production are often interpreted in an unequivocal way by 
journalists and scholars alike. The state is seen as promoting a monolithic, unchanging 
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interpretation of Russian cultural identity, fixated on sustaining its power and eliminating 
domestic opposition, while non-state actors are depicted as seeking to undermine and tarnish 
that power. However, state control over cultural memory in the public sphere is by no means 
comprehensive. Nor is it univocal. First, the politics of memory takes part in a larger cultural 
dynamic of meaning-making. “Memory texts” involve not only senders (who shape the mes-
sage to their advantage) but also the circulation of their messages in a medium (which leaves 
a trace on the message) and a recipient (who interprets the messages and decides whether to 
adopt new interpretations). Any analysis of the political elite’s pragmatic motivations to ex-
press certain views on history in isolation would not sufficiently reflect the complexity of 
cultural meaning-making that occurs through memory practices. By choosing a certain politi-
cal myth to valorise, the regime reveals its belief that the public will associate itself with it. 
But the regime may be mistaken and, consequently, the myth may lose its legitimating power. 
Moreover, the dynamics of memory incorporates a wide range of actors, both within and 
outside the government, each having their own interests and objectives, each exercising a dif-
ferent measure of influence. Therefore, as already indicated, this study extends its sources 
beyond official speeches, texts and policies to avoid oversimplifying the means through 
which political regimes mediate their views. This is also the reason why the source material is 
not limited to either cinema or television, as tends to be the scholarly practice, and why the 
case studies are defined thematically. As a result, the scope is broadened to assess the dissem-
ination of connected narratives in different media, and to place the analysed audiovisual 
memory products in their societal context. To exclude non-official texts would also be to 
overlook or insufficiently value challenges to the dominant actor in the process of cultural 
memory formation. Especially within the context of democratisation and underdeveloped civil 
society structures in contemporary Russia, such signs can provide additional insights into the 
development of Russian society and politics. Conversely, this decision also helps to avoid 
conceptualising a strict opposition between the state and the so-called cultural elite. While the 
central government may indeed exercise a certain degree of hegemony on memory claims, 
cultural memory should not restrictively be seen as the product of manipulation and decep-
tion. In their memory practices, political and cultural elites are to a certain extent limited and 
influenced by the socio-cultural environment. Non-state actors are motivated by a multitude 
of different considerations to act and express themselves in ways that support the state, rang-
ing from their actual support of the state, or the belief that there is no political alternative to 
the current regime, to a desire to maintain social status or reap financial gains. 
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Roughly sketched, the (groups of) actors specifically involved in shaping historical repre-
sentation in television and cinema include cultural policymakers (involved in the legal 
framework of cultural policy, state financing, and the official structure of produc-
tion/distribution), the Union of Cinematographers, production and distribution companies 
(including state TV channels), scriptwriters, directors, historical advisors, societal actors and 
private parties involved on the commissioning side or with funding (e.g., foundations and 
religious organisations). Furthermore, the participation of a certain host (in case of a TV show 
or documentary) or actor (in case of fictional dramatisations) can lend authority to the inter-
pretation of history presented, or increase the popularity of a production (and hence augment 
its societal reach and potential impact). This study aims to provide insights into the complexi-
ties of the interactions among these actors, and examine the dynamics of contestation of and 
conformity to the state-supported line. TV and cinema are thus approached simultaneously as 
an extension of the political sphere and as a space of (restricted) dialogue, of which the out-
comes are determined by the interplay of political, cultural and societal actors. 
Finally, it has to be stressed that memory politics is not static. Historical narratives deemed 
politically relevant have to be repeatedly circulated and are continuously subject to redefini-
tion in response to challenges (for instance, the circulation of competing memories) or 
societal changes. If a narrative appears to be losing its rhetorical power and risks becoming 
obsolete, it can be altered, recontextualised or abandoned. As a result, memory culture is in 
continuous flux, and for a memory construct to gain dominance (or maintain the dominance it 
already enjoys) – that is, societal acceptance as a relevant frame of interpretation – it has to be 
actively supported and promoted by one or more of the actors named above. We can try to 
identify “memory sponsors,” a variation on the concept “frame sponsor”46 (Van Gorp 2007: 
64). Who is working to popularise a given memory, a particular interpretation of events, and 
why? 
Memory Politics on Screen 
How can we define the position and importance of TV and cinema in the process of creating a 
politically “useful past”? In his introduction to the seminal work Television Histories: 
Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age (2001), Gary Edgerton outlines seven assump-
tions about the role played by television in shaping (collective) notions about history. First, he 
emphasises the importance of recognising television as “the primary way that children and 
                                                 
46 The concept refers to those, actively advocating a particular framework for interpretation such as politicians 
and interest groups. 
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adults form their understanding of the past” and foregrounds the medium as “the principal 
means by which most people learn about history today” (Edgerton 2001: 1). Because histori-
cally oriented nonfiction programming is often as popular as fictional television programmes, 
while being “relatively cost-effective to produce,” historical programmes have become “big 
business” (idem: 2). This second assumption would not entirely hold if we were to include 
historical fiction (as this study does). While period dramas, for example, may indeed be very 
popular with television audiences, they are not necessarily cheaper to produce. A similar ex-
ception can be made for screenings or television adaptations of full-length historical feature 
films. Third, Edgerton argues that such historical productions are strongly influenced by the 
“technical and stylistic features of television as a medium,” most notably the emphasis on 
narrative (“well-constructed plot structure”) and biography (“personalizing all […] historical 
matters” and “viewer-involving” in the presentation of the events) (ibidem). 
The fourth assumption adheres to one of the premises of this study, namely television’s 
“affinity and ability to embody current concerns and priorities within the stories it telecasts 
about the past” (Edgerton 2001: 3). Indeed, according to Edgerton, the producers of history on 
screen “tacitly embrace presentism through the back door by concentrating only on those 
people, events, and issues that are most relevant to themselves and their target audiences” 
(ibidem). They allow contemporary values to determine what image of the past is rendered, 
rather than seeking to establish a (more) truthful reconstruction of a past reality. This 
tendency underscores the difference between this form of popular history and the works of 
academic historians. Building upon the previous assumption, Edgerton states that this merg-
ing of past and present happens in almost a methodological fashion and flows from TV 
producers and audiences being “similarly preoccupied with creating a ‘usable past,’ a long 
standing tenet of popular history, where stories involving historical figures and events are 
used to clarify the present and discover the future” (Edgerton 2001: 4). Sixth, “collective 
memory is the site of mediation where professional history must ultimately share space with 
popular history” (idem: 5). And, finally, while popular historians may be accused of engaging 
in presentism, the opposite may be said about professional historians when they fail to 
acknowledge the place of popular history and “declare the past off limits to nonscholars” 
(Edgerton 2001: 6). 
While Edgerton formulated his views about the role of “television as a historian” some 
time ago and with the American television system in mind, the greater part of his insights also 
applies to the contemporary Russian context. As I indicated in the Introduction, historical 
subjects are quite prevalent in Russian TV programming, ranging from talk shows to 
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documentaries and fictional TV series. Different formats can be discerned, each with their 
own stylistic characteristics (Зверева 2004): academic presentations, in which experts eluci-
date detailed accounts of history to their uninformed or underinformed audience; 
documentaries akin to sensational journalism, filled with scandals, intrigues and secrets; 
investigations of history that explain the origins of current (political) events and present a 
political argument; or simply the staging of history as entertainment, where an abundance of 
visual trickeries and rapid editing ensures that the viewer remains engaged. Yet another type 
is exemplified by The Name Is Russia, aired in 2008 by the Rossiia TV channel in imitation 
of foreign examples such as the BBC’s 100 Great Britons. Through multiple online and tele-
phone voting rounds, leading up to twelve TV shows presenting the finalists, the Russian 
public could vote for their favourite Russian of all time. The interactivity of the project and 
the way it engaged several media platforms set it apart from the kinds of historical 
programmes described above (for a detailed analysis of The Name Is Russia, see chapters 4 
and 5).  
While television is often disregarded for being a medium for mere popular culture and 
therefore an inferior type of cultural production, or for being simply the mouthpiece of the 
Russian government, its importance and societal influence remains significant. Indeed, the 
“post-Soviet television genre [is] the supreme locus for the negotiation of control over 
cultural meaning” (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009: 219-220). Although Internet access has pro-
liferated rapidly in Russia and is now widespread, achieving a penetration of 66 per cent of 
the adult population in 2015 (TNS 2015), opinion polls conducted by the Levada Centre show 
that television continues, by far, to be the most important source of information for Russians 
(Волков & Гончаров 2014). This is not to say, of course, that the audience accepts or agrees 
with everything it is told. Ellen Mickiewicz has shown that Russian viewers are exceptionally 
adept at extracting information from television; they are critical viewers who scrutinise televi-
sion coverage in a way that goes beyond reading between the lines. As a result of their 
“particularly effortful engagement with the news to extract the maximum amount of data in an 
environment of limited information,” Russian viewers are able to, for example, recognise TV 
channels by their “content, tone, or approach” (Mickiewicz 2008: 33). Their characteristically 
sceptical attitude of viewing, Mickiewicz suggests, is partly attributable to the “Soviet legacy” 
that “has shaped the repertoire of methods of extraction of news unintended and uncued from 
broadcast” (Mickiewicz 2008: 104). This sceptical viewing strategy enables viewers to differ-
entiate among the constitutive elements of a narrative, to appreciate the influence of the 
narrative’s source on its representation and to be aware of the possibility of multiple “truths.”  
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Vera Zvereva notes a particular, rather drastic shift in the representation of history on 
Russian TV since the 1990s drew to a close. Historical programming in the late 1980s and for 
most of the 1990s was preoccupied with disclosing previously unknown facts and hosting 
heated debates about topics that had been off limits to public inquiry before Perestroika. As 
the turn of the millennium approached, the public appeared to have grown tired with the dis-
closure of yet more archival documents about the (Soviet) past, and its enthusiasm for new 
interpretations waned. Also, since the late 1990s, “Russian media are increasingly turning to 
the forms and rhetorics of Soviet culture” (Зверева 2004).47 Simpler, more comprehensible 
and, moreover, familiar explanations appeared to better suit the shifting preferences of the 
viewing audience, who had grown tired of the negativities and uncertainties of the first post-
Soviet decade.  
Where exactly such a shift originates is difficult to pinpoint, as is also evident from 
Edgerton’s seven assumptions: The type of programmes that are aired and the way their con-
tents are presented derive from the professional and economic considerations of those 
involved in their production and distribution, even as these actors simultaneously attempt to 
sense viewer preferences and anticipate and respond to any changes among them. Even with a 
“big player” such as the state involved, as is the case with the state-owned TV channels, it 
would be mistaken to assume direct or complete control over TV’s content. Anna Novikova, 
for example, puts forward the following explanation when she comments on the tendency to 
positively re-evaluate Soviet practices noted by Zvereva: 
By the end of the 1990s people were disillusioned and critical of government policies that were aimed at 
shaping pro-European identity. This enabled the new Russian government (V. Putin in particular) to change 
the state’s strategy at the beginning of a new century and to return to the model of a paternalist state. Russia’s 
state channels – never free from state pressure – supported new government policies. As a result, various tel-
evision shows began to rehabilitate the Soviet past through the use of recycled Soviet myths (Novikova 2014: 
282). 
Several studies have shown, however, that state control over the Russian media in this period, 
and television in particular, is a complex matter and should not be overestimated. Stephen 
Hutchings and Natalia Rulyova aptly speak of “remote control” (2009: 3). Although media 
freedom has declined and “government control over the content and style of television pro-
grammes” has increased since Putin took office in 2000, effective control is restricted by the 
drastically altered environment in which the Russia media system now operates. Indeed, “pre-
cisely because of the recent changes wrought upon Russian society, a blanket return to the 
                                                 
47 “в последнее время российские СМИ все чаще обращаются к формам и реторике советской культуры.” 
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totalitarianism of the Soviet media has not occurred” (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009: 3).48 
Efforts to exert control over television broadcasting, on both the production and reception 
sides, were impeded in several ways: 
1. The disjunction between official pronouncements emanating from central government and the confused 
interpretation of those pronouncements by national television channels 
2. The global media environment in which national television now operates 
3. The fickle tendencies of television audiences, aided by new media forms less supine in their relation-
ships with state government, to ignore officially preferred meanings (Beumers et al. 2009: 7) 
It should also be noted that Novikova appears to (incorrectly) assume that “pro-European 
identity” and “a paternalistic state” act as opposite poles, which allow little space for alterna-
tive modes of political organisation between them.  
In line with Hutchings and Rulyova’s analysis, Anna Amelina argues that the relationship 
between state and television during Putin’s first two presidencies can be characterised as one 
of asymmetrical interdependence. She formulates her “These der asymmetrischen 
Interdependenz” (Amelina 2008) as follows: 
Von Interdependenz kann gesprochen werden, weil in der Tat Massenmedien auch in Russland auf neue 
politische Themen, auf politische Skandale und auf heiße Diskussionen angewiesen sind. Auch die 
politischen Instanzen sind gezwungen, besondere Formen medialer Funktionsweise zu übernehmen, um vom 
medialen Popularitätsbonus zu profitieren. Doch dieses Interdependenzverhältnis ist asymmetrisch, weil das 
politische Bedürfnis nach Anpassung an die mediale Logik von partieller Einschränkung massenmedialer 
Thematisierungsleistungen begleitet wird und sich zum Teil in Eingriffen in die redaktionelle 
Entscheidungsfreiheit niederschlägt (idem: 31-32). 
Amelina emphasises the importance of self-censorship to state control over TV journalism: 
Die Entwicklung der journalistischen Selbstzensur im neuen russische Fernsehen deutet darauf hin, dass die 
Aktualisierung der staatlichen Kontrollmechanismen nicht direkt die von “Neophilie” geprägte mediale 
Logik auflöst. Stattdessen werden die Kontrollversuche der politischen Instanzen in der medialen 
Kommunikation transformiert: Sie werden zwar als Störung wahrgenommen, jedoch in der redaktionellen 
Entscheidungspraxis durch Selbstzensur verarbeitet (Amelina 2008: 41). 
                                                 
48 Hutchings and Rulyova go on to name the precise factors that determine this development: “The fact that tele-
vision now operated in a global ‘infosphere’; the inherently porous boundaries between television texts and their 
contexts; the growing ‘conversationalisation’ of media discourse; the influence of the market imperative; televi-
sion’s twin, and contradictory, national-centripetal and local-centrifugal emphases; the lack in post-Soviet 
Russia of an established mechanism for mediating between public and private spheres; and the persistently low 
cultural status that the medium enjoys in Russia all conspire to ensure that the control that Putin nominally exer-
cises remains remote and less than wholly effective” (2009: 3. Italics in original). 
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The issue of self-censorship, I would add, is of equal significance with respect to historical 
programming. Amelina indeed signals that TV fiction can also be affected by considerations 
determined by current politics: “Dabei muss die Selbstzensur im Fernsehen nicht unbedingt 
nur die Nachrichtensparte betreffen. Auch Fernsehfilme oder -serien, die auf den 
Tschetschenien-Konflikt verweisen, können entsprechend ‘umgestaltet’ werden” (idem: 41). 
More recent research, as well as the interviews I have conducted, support these findings 
(Schimpfossl & Yablokov 2014). 
Cinema’s influence in shaping people’s knowledge and beliefs about history has also be-
come a subject of scholarly scrutiny, as has the use of cinema as a means of political 
propaganda.49 The degree of historical accuracy adhered to by films set in the past varies 
greatly, as do opinions about whether accurate reconstruction – or, to use an even more objec-
tionable term, representation50 – is a valid criterion by which to judge the merit of this 
cinematic genre.51 Both the meticulously recreated, fetishised historical “real” of a period 
piece based on true events – often with a recapitulation before the closing titles informing the 
viewer what has become of its characters “after the film ended” – and the romantic drama 
recounting the lives of fictional characters loosely framed in a historical context endeavour to 
make the past, or at least some elements of it, accessible to its viewer who is located in the 
present (recall Roland Barthes’ amazement at the use of a signature haircut – fringes – as “the 
label of Romanness” in Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar [Barthes 1973]). It is fair to argue that 
Edgerton’s assumption that television is “the primary way that children and adults form their 
understanding of the past” (Edgerton 2001: 1) to a large extent holds true for cinema as well. 
The popularity of a film may well tell us more about its potential societal impact than a re-
viewer’s evaluation of its quality as a historical document. Even in those cases where a film’s 
principle aim is to keep its audience entertained, its effect can nonetheless be educational via 
                                                 
49 With regard to Russian and Soviet cinema, see e.g., Youngblood (2007); Dobrenko (2008); Taylor & Spring 
(1993); Roberts (1999); Norris (2012). 
50 Jean Baudrillard’s description of the relation between history and its representation in historical film is illumi-
nating here: “Today, the history that is ‘given back’ to us […] has no more of a relation to a ‘historical real’ than 
neofiguration in painting does to the classical figuration of the real. Neofiguration is an invocation of resem-
blance, but at the same time the flagrant proof of the disappearance of objects in their very representation: 
hyperreal. Therein objects shine in a sort of hyperresemblance (like history in contemporary cinema) that makes 
it so that fundamentally they no longer resemble anything, except the empty figure of resemblance, the empty 
form of representation” (Baudrillard 1998. Italics in original. Quoted in Hughes-Warrington 2009: 190). 
51 In its effort to immerse the viewer in a historical “reality,” historical cinema in fact adds yet another layer of 
fictionality to the fiction film: “In an ordinary fiction film the actors portrays a character who he or she is not, 
but that character never existed; in a historical film, the actor portrays a referential figure who he or she is not. 
Therefore, although the historical film may claim to deal with real events, it is actually more artificial with re-
spect to a spectator’s desire to believe in the reality of the image” (Rosen 2001: 180. Italics in original). 
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its contribution to the individual viewer’s memory repertoire of stock images, phrases and 
other associations connected to the historical figure, event or period portrayed. 
In addition to political coverage on TV, history education and the use of historical refer-
ences in political statements, Russian cinema in particular has been recognised as an 
important means of popularising and consolidating public support for the strengthening of the 
power vertical since the turn of the millennium (Laruelle 2009; Vázquez Liñán 2010). Histor-
ical fiction has provided a suitable vehicle for quasi-nationalist narratives instilling a sense of 
state patriotism in their viewers. Stephen Norris argues that there is a clear link between the 
political line of the Putin regime and the messages spread through historical feature films, 
especially those of the Hollywood-style Russian historical blockbuster that has recently 
emerged: 
The birth of blockbuster history – or the way American cultural practices could be adapted to make Russian 
historical epics – parallels the rise of Putin and the resurgence of Russian political nationalism. These links 
and processes […] are far from coincidental but not always connected […]: patriotism and the past sell 
(Norris 2012: 5). 
Commenters often explain the popularity of many of the historical feature films released 
since 2000, especially those related to the Second World War, by framing it as a response to 
the total rejection of history by political elites in the 1990s and the troublesome process of 
redefining Russian collective identity. Re-envisionings of the past filled the void of Russians’ 
“negative identity” (Гудков 2000): 
Russian blockbuster history offered a chance for audiences to escape into alternative histories: the tsarist era 
to the Russia we lost, Great Patriotic War films to the patriotism displayed by their parents’ generation, late 
socialism to the values of stable socialism and a lost childhood, and fantasy history to an invented past with 
clear values (Norris 2012: 17). 
Despite the parallel rise of state-sponsored nationalism and the boom in (politically relevant) 
historical feature films, this tendency to search for political guidance in the national past 
should not be attributed wholly to the state, as Norris also suggests. As already argued above, 
the process of cultural production involves a multitude of actors, notwithstanding limited me-
dia freedom. Furthermore, filmmakers explored cinematic genres other than the Hollywood-
inspired blockbuster to pursue historical themes as well. For instance, Boris Mirzoev’s Boris 
Godunov (2011), a screen adaptation of Pushkin’s eponymous play set in twenty-first century 
Moscow, appeals more to an “art-house” audience (see Chapter 5). Perhaps it is more produc-
tive to approach nationalist feature films produced after 2000 as “an expression of a 
prevailing common sense whereby filmmakers and other stakeholders were preoccupied with 
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a national identity” (Van Gorp 2011: 243) rather than as a “light” version of state propaganda. 
The equivocality or ambiguity that tends to characterise historical productions (evident in 
their implicit meanings and irony) renders it even more difficult for complete control to be 
exerted over the end product.  
To conclude, it should be emphasised that in the Russian case, much more so than else-
where, TV and cinema are overlapping spheres of cultural production (as was briefly 
mentioned in the Introduction) and are thus best analysed together: 
Because of the way television came to dominate Russian cinema in the zero years – the largest producers of 
feature films are television stations – blockbuster history played out on both large and small screens. The 
people behind this production of the past and its subsequent screening of memory were not just film directors 
– television producers, businessmen, and even popular authors all played a role in the behind-the-scenes de-
velopment of the historical blockbuster (Norris 2012: 15). 
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail below, cultural memory has to be actively 
and repeatedly circulated for a given interpretation of history to gain or maintain dominance. 
When similar narratives are expressed in multiple media simultaneously, they can reach a 
larger audience and can compound their signifying potential. Increased exposure can lend 
credibility to historically framed claims and help them gain acceptance as relevant signposts 
for the present and future. Therefore, when either TV or cinema is categorically excluded 
from our analyses, we may fail to appreciate the importance of these intermedial memory 
dynamics. 
Remediation 
In the introduction to the volume Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural 
Memory (2009), Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney adapt the concept of remediation, which had 
been introduced for the study of new media by David Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999), 
to the study of cultural memory. They chose to adapt this concept out of a specific concern 
about the conceptualisation and analysis of memory practices: 
the dynamics of cultural memory can only be fully understood if we take into account, not just the social fac-
tors at work, but also the “medial framework” of remembering and the specifically medial processes through 
which memories come into the public arena and become collective (Erll & Rigney 2009: 2. Italics in origi-
nal). 
The concept of remediation highlights the “mediatedness” of collective memories that is 
central to the authors’ “dynamic” concept of cultural memory, in which texts and artefacts 
function as media of circulation rather than as “static” lieux de mémoire (cf. Pierre Nora). 
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Furthermore, it draws attention to relations between media and to the reshaping of memory in 
the process of remediation. Central to the concept of remediation is its underlying “double 
logic,” based on the fact that “[our] culture wants to multiply its media and erase all traces of 
mediation; ideally it wants to erase its media in the very act of multiplying them” (Bolter & 
Grusin 1999: 5). Remediation, then, is determined simultaneously by the opposed tensions of 
immediacy, which provides a mediation that is somehow more “real,” and hypermediacy, 
which highlights the fact of its mediation through its embedded recognition of its precur-
sor(s): 
Although each medium promises to reform its predecessors by offering a more immediate or authentic expe-
rience, the promise of reform inevitably leads us to become aware of the new medium as a medium (idem: 
19). 
Jean Baudrillard points out a similar characteristic in the historical development of cinema: 
Cinema plagiarizes itself, recopies itself, remakes its classics, retroactivates its original myths, remakes the 
silent film more perfectly than the original, etc.: all of this is logical, the cinema is fascinated by itself as a 
lost object as much as it (and we) are fascinated by the real as a lost referent (Baudrillard 2009 [1998]: 192. 
Italics in original). 
According to Bolter and Grusin, media can exist only in relation to other media. Conse-
quently, remediation creates complex intertextual (or intermedial) webs as each new medium 
“responds to, redeploys, competes with, and reforms other media” (Bolter & Grusin 1999: 
55). The relation between subsequent mediations, between the new mediation and the medium 
it “borrowed” its content from, depends on the perception and interpretation of its receiver: 
With reuse comes a necessary redefinition, but there may be no conscious interplay between media. The in-
terplay happens, if at all, only for the reader or viewer who happens to know both versions and can compare 
them (idem: 45). 
Consequently, the audience’s viewing attitudes and pre-existing knowledge are of great sig-
nificance.  
Erll and Rigney argue that remediation is a central characteristic of the creation and circu-
lation of cultural memory: 
Just as there is no cultural memory prior to mediation there is no mediation without remediation: all repre-
sentations of the past draw on available media technologies, on existing media products, on patterns of 
representation and medial aesthetics (Erll & Rigney 2009: 4). 
The “double logic” of immediacy and hypermediacy described by Bolter and Grusin equally 
applies to the way that memories are mediated: 
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On the one hand, most memorial media strive for ever greater “immediacy”. The goal is to provide a seem-
ingly transparent window on the past, to make us forget the presence of the medium and instead present us 
with an “unmediated memory”. On the other hand, this effect is usually achieved by the recycling and multi-
plication of media (ibidem). 
The emphasis on remediation, rather than mediation as such, highlights another aspect of the 
dynamic concept of cultural memory proposed in this study, which I assume as one of its 
premises: cultural memory does not exist in isolated texts or carriers of memory but, rather, is 
the result of repeated mediations that disperse particular cultural memories among the mem-
bers of a society and allow them to perceive these memories as part of their shared past and 
(collective) identity. The object of analysis, then, is texts not in individual isolation but rather 
in their function as media of circulation, as part of a cloud of media touching upon the same 
memory theme and together constituting the constantly evolving cultural memory itself. 
When we look at the emergence and “life” of memory sites, it becomes clear that these are based on repeated 
media representations, on a host of remediated versions of the past which “converge and coalesce” into a lieu 
de mémoire, which create, stabilize and consolidate, but then also critically reflect upon and renew these sites 
(Erll & Rigney 2009: 5. Italics in original). 
This makes it possible to reconstruct a genealogy of cultural memories that can also en-
compass those periods when the memory retreats into the archive, to be rediscovered and 
remediated at a later time.  
As the above discussion already suggests, the social frameworks of collective remem-
bering (which Maurice Halbwachs has called attention to) are as important as its media forms. 
Indeed, “[it] is the public arena which turns some remediations into relevant media versions 
of the past, while it ignores and censors others” (ibidem). A study of cultural memory “at the 
intersection of both social and medial processes” (ibidem), as the authors propose, affords 
insights into the genealogy of a given memory by mapping available remediations (both syn-
chronically and diachronically) and their respective similarities and differences. In addition, 
by embedding these same media in their socio-cultural and historical contexts, one can dis-
cern which “versions” gained a hegemonic meaning and which were ignored, and one can 
attempt to explain the varying societal responses to them. Through this process, one can gain 
a greater understanding of the memory practices of a society within a given timeframe. 
Before proceeding, let us briefly consider the different ways that memory can be re-
activated. First, an existing memory text can be recirculated via, for example, a rerun of a 
television series or the republication of a novel. While the text is circulated integrally and 
appears to remain intact, the meaning attributed to it by its readers can change substantially. A 
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film from the 1930s (e.g., Sergei Eisenstein’s Aleksandr Nevskii [1938]) will most likely elicit 
substantially different interpretations from its audience today than it did from its contempo-
raries. Apart from such a temporal displacement, we could also imagine the possible 
implications of a geographical displacement (a screening of the same Eisenstein film in the 
United States in the 1930s) and even further social displacements (the 1930s American audi-
ence consisting either of proponents for or opponents of communism). 
Another possibility is quotation, the use of (an element from) an original text within a new 
(con)text. Apart from the literary quotation of text, this would also apply to the use of film 
footage (historical and fictional), images, music and so on. The result is a new memory text 
that makes explicit reference to another memory text (thus creating an intertextual reference), 
in which case certain qualities of the quoted original are retained. Quotations can amount to 
the reproduction of a mere fragment of the original (a film scene or melody) or of an integral 
original (for images in particular). As suggested above, such quotations establish intertextual 
links that (can) influence the meaning of the new text. The possible intermediality of quota-
tion should be noted, since memory cultures encompass not just texts and visuals but also 
memory artefacts, such as buildings and monuments, and performances of memory, such as 
national holidays, celebrations and memorials. Quotation, then, can become quite complex. 
Consider, for example, a documentary that uses a scene from a historical feature film that 
shows an actual statue of a national hero. Such intermedial “double quotations,” in this in-
stance a statue quoted in a feature film quoted in a documentary, can pose a serious challenge 
for describing and interpreting the respective meanings of these different layers within a 
memory text. 
Finally, an existing memory (a historical person or event, story or myth) can be used to 
create a new, original memory text. Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (2008, see Chapter 4), to cre-
ate its historical epic, drew upon the same national mythology as Eisenstein had, but this 
recent film is an independent memory text. Nevertheless, by using the same memory, it be-
comes part of an intertextual web consisting of other memory texts and artefacts that refer to 
the same myth. It is this kind of “re-make” or “re-cycling” of memory that scholars often ap-
pear to have in mind when discussing the re-activation of cultural memory. 
Most of the historical figures, periods and phenomena that have been brought into active 
circulation in Russian memory culture since 2000 and that were, in the process, adapted to 
suit their contemporary target audiences can boast rich genealogies of cultural representations 
and political appropriations alike. Invoking prerevolutionary memory images in particular 
involves the creation of intricate intertextual webs, and, depending on the knowledge and in-
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terpretation of the viewer, invests the historical narrative that is presented with additional 
meaning. In this study, the concept of cultural memory remediation as described above is fur-
ther developed and is used in two complementary ways to describe how history is employed 
to discuss issues pertaining to contemporary politics. The first way concerns the remediation 
of existing stories about the past and the extent to which they are reinterpreted. This under-
standing of the concept largely overlaps with the definition of remediation as “the act of 
reworking a story […] with an eye toward calibrating it for its new historical moment and 
audience” (Figge & Ward 2010: 10). The second way this concept is understood involves the 
remediation of existing images or (feature) film footage about particular historical figures and 
events. 
When we connect these two aspects of remediation to the topics of our case studies, the 
analysed cultural productions and the dynamics of cultural memory in contemporary Russia 
in general, two characteristics become apparent. First, manifestations of cultural memory do 
not exist independently of each other but rather behave as if they form a constellation. These 
clusters of memory are shaped by synchronic connections and are composed of associated 
memories or narratives. For example, the memory of Stolypin belongs to a memory cluster 
that comprises, among other figures and events, Tsar Nicholas II and his family, Rasputin, the 
Socialist Revolutionaries, Russian terrorism in the early twentieth century in general and 
Lenin. Historical factors (persons and events from a given time period) and topical factors 
(the end of empire, revolutionary tensions, [failed] attempts at reform) – in short, the cultural-
historical timeframe that dominates the cluster and forms the tissue connecting its constituent 
elements – define which narratives belong to a memory cluster. 
The existence of such clusters has implications for the dynamics of remediation. It means 
that a reinterpretation of or even a challenge to an established memory can occur not only via 
an altered version of a particular narrative. Such revisions can also take the form of a shift in 
focus from one person or event to another within the same cluster, which then has its own 
connotations, associations and mediation history. In addition, the cultural or political preva-
lence of one narrative can help “prepare the ground” for the introduction of another narrative 
associated with it, thereby increasing the likelihood it will gain in popularity. For example, 
the memory of Stolypin was a relatively new addition to the Russian symbolic vocabulary. 
Yet, at the moment of its introduction, it benefited potentially from not one but two support-
ing lines of narration that had recently become quite popular among the public: narratives 
about early-twentieth-century terrorists and the police detectives who pursued them (including 
the detectives’ present-day equivalent of anti-terrorist special forces working for the secret 
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police), and often nostalgically inclined tales about the last Romanov family and the fall of 
the tsarist empire (see Chapter 3). 
The second characteristic involves the layered nature or even the explicit layering of 
memory. These diachronic connections can manifest themselves in a way very similar to the 
concept of remediation described above, namely in the repeated mediation of the same 
memory (cluster) over a long period of time – for example, when a given memory has been 
revisited and circulated under several tsars, in the Soviet period and again in the post-Soviet 
period. What results is “akin to a snowball that gathers layers over time as it rolls across his-
torical terrain, without losing its original core” (Figge & Ward 2010: 10). 52  The act of 
repetition establishes a certain connection among these periods, since it forces a positioning 
against previous interpretations. This form of layered memory can be implicit or explicit, con-
scious or unconscious. But what is striking about the materials that underlie this study is their 
widespread tendency to create links binding different periods in time, in an attempt to actively 
create a chain of memory in a rather explicit way. This layering of memory often takes the 
shape of cyclical historical parallels or analogies that extend through the present and thereby 
embed present-day reality in a diverse yet coherent and extensive history. Therefore, the ge-
nealogies of remediation and the layered meanings invested in these cultural memories are not 
just hypothetical. Their interconnectedness is frequently made explicit; memories can actually 
be presented as being layered. For instance, the historical linkage of the years 1612-1812-
2012 has become common enough to have even made it onto a banner carried during the pro-
test march on Manezhnaia Square on 18 December 2011 (“Лучшие лозунги народного 
протеста на Манежке” 2011; Brouwer 2016b).  
The prevalence of memory chains appears to be connected to the complex reworking of the 
Soviet past in post-Soviet Russia. I want to suggest that these memory chains do not seek to 
work around and exclude the Soviet period from the history of Russia being constructed, as 
was prevalent during most of the 1990s. Rather, by combining the prerevolutionary and 
Soviet periods into one narrative, or enclosing it within a larger historical analogy – such as 
the 1612-1812-2012 chain mentioned above – the memory of the Soviet past is neutralised to 
                                                 
52 Serguei Oushakine has noted something similar with regard to the St. George Ribbon that has become one of 
the most potent symbols of patriotism and remembrance of the Second World War in recent years: “The St. 
George Ribbon is […] a mnemonic object that has little known history of its own but helps to manifest a certain 
link with history. It presents a very particular trajectory of remembering whose structure is fundamentally rooted 
in various operations of dedifferentiation, historical blurring, temporal amalgamation, and semantic ambiguity. 
The familiar sequential order of the linear narrative is replaced […] by the logic of palimpsest, which allows the 
retention of incompatible or contradictory meanings within one framework. The layered – “laminated” – history 
of the ribbon helps one to refrain from any resolute political or historical differentiation” (Oushakine 2013: 286). 
 48 
a certain extent and presented as a “natural” occurrence in the cyclical development of Rus-
sian history. The creation of a memory chain makes it possible to reintegrate the memory of 
the Soviet past, in its positive and negative elements, into narratives of national belonging 
(see also Brouwer 2016b). It remedies anxieties flowing from the perception of the Soviet era 
as a disruption of historical development and, consequently, of historical time. As such, pre-
revolutionary memories, and the layered way they are represented, in fact forms an integral 
part of how contemporary Russia seeks to come to terms with its more recent past. 
While repetition is essential for memory to be consolidated and therefore to be able to ful-
fil its potential as a political frame of reference, the product of remediation is necessarily 
complex and to a certain extent ambiguous. The implicit meanings of historical representa-
tions, resulting from their repeated mediations and reworkings, are hard to control. With 
regard to Nazi Germany, Linda Hutcheon explains: 
Like parody, adaptation is politically versatile – or, perhaps more accurately, politically ambivalent. It can be 
used to subvert or to contain the power of its adapted work; it can exploit that power to new or nostalgic 
ends. The National Socialists were adept at using adaptations to tame or even remedy/rehabilitate what they 
saw as dangerous or threatening in Weimar culture; what they couldn’t control, they discovered, was the con-
tinuing power of the evoked work, persisting through any of their deliberate modifications. The past is never 
fully erased even in an adaptation that consciously aims to construct a new and dominant normalcy; it lingers 
on, for better or worse (Hutcheon 2010: vii-viii). 
What is relevant to this study is that remediation appears to be just as important for chal-
lenging the dominant line of interpretation as it is for consolidating it. The product of 
remediation already contains in itself the potential for questioning or undermining the official 
line of interpretation. Referring to Rachel Epp Buller’s study of Weimar-era women photo-
montage artists included in the edited volume Reworking the German Past, Hutcheon states 
that their “counter-narratives of resistance, like those of the various experimental documen-
tary and fictional filmmakers […], were made possible specifically by the act of adapting a 
prior narrative loaded with historical meaning” (Hutcheon 2010: viii). The photomontages by 
artists Marianne Brandt and Alice Lex analysed by Buller employ the meanings invested in 
their source material – news images from printed media – to create contrasts and tension in 
their montages. By drawing upon familiar visual imagery, they were able to visually formu-
late a powerful societal and political critique that was nevertheless understandable 
(“readable”) to the general public (Buller 2010). 
The dual concept of remediation, as it has been outlined above, draws attention to a key 
distinctive feature of Russian memory politics: the fact that the selection of cultural memories 
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has been motivated by the potential of such memories to establish a connection to early peri-
ods in Russian history; they have been chosen because of their long reach and accumulated 
meanings. Within these remediation genealogies, (political) historical narratives and cultural 
productions from the Soviet era are of particular significance for two reasons. When drawn 
upon, they have the potential to directly connect to a person’s existing knowledge about histo-
ry and to what that individual learned at a young age (via formal education, but also through 
the transfer of knowledge and traditions within the family sphere). This pre-established 
knowledge, and possibly also a personal appreciation of particular stories, films and imagery, 
make the (re)introduction of latent cultural memories easier to accept. This effect is, of 
course, limited by the turn of generations.  
In addition, the Soviet era exerts influence over contemporary representations of prerevo-
lutionary Russian history through the abundance of intertextual references to Soviet-era 
interpretations of these cultural memories and the inclusion of (audio-)visual materials in con-
temporary productions. Irina Shcherbakova aptly points out the inconspicuous way that 
Soviet-era historical representations continue to influence, for instance, contemporary (fic-
tional) historical television programming: 
What we see in television series […] resembles an onion, where each of its layers reminds one of something 
the authors have seen on [the television] screen in their childhood or teens. You could peel off layer after 
layer, but still fail to uncover anything that is actually related to the depicted historical era. You have to keep 
in mind that the Soviet examples were created under conditions of censorship – this concerned everything, 
including the stage properties. Therefore it is highly amusing to hear contemporary creators of historical TV 
films remark that they have carefully watched feature films from the ’60s (Щербакова 2014).53 
Many who today are making TV programming received their historical education during 
the Soviet era, which (literally) formed an image of their national past. But this is only one of 
the ways that Soviet historiography lives on in contemporary Russian TV and cinema. The 
frequent use and recontextualisation of excerpts from Soviet historical productions, and the 
(indirect) influence of Soviet-era historical productions on the way topics have been concep-
tualised by contemporary figures, have received little scholarly attention (except for those 
instances where the object of analysis is a contemporary remake of a Soviet production). Giv-
en the exceptionally complex dealings with the memory of the Soviet Union and the various 
                                                 
53 “То, что мы видим в телесериалах [...] похоже на луковицу, где каждый слой напоминает о чем-то 
увиденном авторами на экране в детстве или юности. Можно снимать слой за слоем, так и не 
обнаруживая ничего, что бы в самом деле имело отношение к изображаемой исторической эпохе. Надо 
учитывать, что советские образцы создавались в условиях цензуры - это касалось всего, в том числе и 
реквизита. Поэтому очень забавно слышать ссылки нынешних создателей исторических телефильмов на 
то, что они внимательно смотрели игровые фильмы 60-х.” 
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periods and aspects of its existence, attitudes towards Soviet interpretations and representa-
tions of Russian history merit particular notice. I will return to this question in Chapter 5, 
where I provide a brief consideration of the hermeneutic effect of the remediation of visual 
representations of history on the basis of a sample of television documentaries on the Time of 
Troubles. Yet when assessing the impact of remediation of Soviet audiovisual materials on 
the interpretation of history, one should always be aware of the viewing strategies of the audi-
ence. As mentioned earlier, it is never a given that viewers accept as valid what they are 
shown. While Ellen Mickiewicz’s findings concern viewer engagement with television news, 
I would argue that the Russian audience applies these same sceptical viewing strategies to 
other television genres and to cinema as well, albeit to a greater or lesser extent in each case. 
An ability to recognise the likely origin of a given story, and the possible interests involved in 
portraying a topic in this or that way, most certainly shapes how Russian viewers engage with 
other types of media as well. We must account for this critical, at times even cynical viewing 
attitude when we make assumptions about the effect of television discourse on political views 











3. Stability “Stolypin-style”54 




Stolypin in the Russian Historical and Political Imagination 
On 27 December 2012, President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev un-
veiled a 4.6-metre-high bronze statue of Petr Stolypin in downtown Moscow. The statue, by 
sculptor Salavat Shcherbakov, was placed at the intersection of Novy Arbat and 
Koniushkovskaia ulitsa in sight of the House of Government of the Russian Federation. The 
unveiling marked the end of the yearlong commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the pre-
revolutionary politician’s birth. Stolypin served as minister of the interior and subsequently as 
prime minister from 1906 until his assassination by Socialist Revolutionary and secret police 
agent Dmitrii Bogrov in 1911. Stolypin’s name is generally associated with his agrarian re-
forms and his efforts to repress the terrorist movement in the wake of the 1905 revolution. He 
is also noted for his rhetorical skills. Stolypin’s speeches before the Duma have become a 
frequently mined source of political one-liners, most popularly among them “They are in need 
of great upheavals, but we are in need of a Great Russia”55 and “Give the state twenty years of 
internal and external peace, and you will not recognise present-day Russia.”56 Stolypin has 
come to symbolise a political system characterised by top-down reform and the suppression 
of the opposition, combined with the aims of creating stability and stimulating economic 
growth. The degree of authoritarianism this system implies is portrayed as a necessary evil in 
achieving the higher goal of restoring and maintaining Russia’s greatness. In addition, it is 
often justified by pointing out Stolypin’s unique visionary leadership, a tendency that bears 
resemblance to the personification of state power in the figure of Putin over the ongoing peri-
od of his rule as president and prime minister. This chapter will analyse the making and 
meaning of the myth of “stability Stolypin-style” (stabil’nost po-Stolypinski) (Надеин 2012a) 
under Putin, and the interplay among different actors in the political, societal and cultural 
                                                 
54 “стабильность по-Столыпински” (Надеин 2012а). 
55 “Им нужны великие потрясения, нам нужна Великая Россия.” 
56 “Дайте Государству 20 лет покоя, внутреннего и внешнего, и вы не узнаете нынешней Poccии.” 
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spheres and, more specifically, between politics and television in the process of this myth’s 
creation and dissemination. 
The political myth of Stolypin and its institutionalisation as an exemplary image for 
Russian politics has emerged relatively recently. Contrary to the political myths that will be 
discussed in the later case studies, this particular myth had not been actively used by a previ-
ous political regime. In fact, the image of Stolypin in Soviet historiography was explicitly 
negative. In their appraisals, historians followed Lenin, who “denounced the prime minister as 
the ‘hangman-in-chief,’ or simply as a hangman, tyrant, reactionary, or ‘pogrom-maker’” 
(Ascher 2001: 3). The statue of Stolypin in Kiev, erected in 1913, was taken down following 
the 1917 revolution and, quite symbolically, replaced by one of Karl Marx. The bust of 
Stolypin in present-day Ulianovsk met a similar fate. Stolypin’s name became associated es-
pecially with two images: “Stolypin’s necktie” (Stolypinskii galstuk) and the “Stolypin 
carriages” (Stolypinskie vagony). The first phrase refers to a quote by Cadet Duma member 
Fedor Rodichev, who coined the term in 1907 to criticise the field courts-martial established 
under Stolypin to put terrorist revolutionaries on trial (idem: 218). In Soviet historiography, 
and consequently history education, the expression came to symbolise the cruel, repressive 
character of Stolypin’s politics. As for the second term, referring to the railway carriages used 
to transport peasant migrants to Siberia, it also acquired a negative connotation in later years. 
Although the colonisation of the Far East was actively promoted and supported by the tsarist 
state under Stolypin, people moved there on a voluntary basis, and the migrants were trans-
ported on newly built, ordinary trains (idem: 323). In the Stalinist era, however, the same 
route was traversed by trains equipped with bars that transported convicts to the region’s 
prison camps. Today, the term “Stolypin carriage” is still used to refer to trains specially 
equipped to transport convicts.  
The Perestroika period saw renewed interest in prerevolutionary Russia and a positive re-
appraisal of Stolypin’s politics. Abraham Ascher speaks of “an avalanche of publications” 
about the era when Stolypin held his position of power (Ascher 2001: 4). In 1991 the publish-
ing house Molodaia Gvardiia, for example, released a complete collection of Stolypin’s 
speeches in the Duma and State Council, subtitled “We are in need of a Great Russia” (Nam 
nuzhna Velikaia Rossiia), the second half of his famous quote and a telling indication why the 
volume was published in the Soviet Union’s final days. The preface outlines the radically 
opposed interpretations of the tsarist prime minister’s importance and the “myths and leg-
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ends”57 associated with his name, and expresses hope that this volume of collected speeches 
will provide professional historians with material for them to reconsider and correct prevalent 
views (Столыпин 1991: 7-8). In essence, the Soviet argument was turned inside out: during 
the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, advocates of his memory re-framed Stolypin, 
who now came to be seen as “a farsighted statesman whose policies were precisely the ones 
Russia needed to develop into a prosperous, stable, and powerful country” (Ascher 2001: 5). 
This position was often accompanied by the belief that had Stolypin not been assassinated, the 
implementation of his reforms in full would have averted the revolution. The two seemingly 
irreconcilable assessments of Stolypin as a statesman – one Soviet, the other counter-Soviet – 
mark the inherent complexity of the memory: the man was at once a despotic tyrant and a 
visionary leader who would have saved Russia from the horrors of revolution and war, had it 
not been for his tragic death. Vladimir Nadein aptly summarises how proponents of Stolypin 
have attempted to merge both aspects into a positive image: “Cruel, but far-sighted. For the 
good of the country. For the sake of a radiant future. He hanged [convicts], but also raised 
[the country] from its knees. He hanged, but also gave the country [a higher] GDP. All of 
Great Britain spread our Siberian butter onto their sandwiches in the morning. The rouble 
became heavier than gold. The export of grain increased several-fold” (Надеин 2012a).58 It is 
hard to miss how much these arguments echo those heard in contemporary Russia in defence 
of Stalin’s reign. 
Historians and politicians may have “rediscovered” the legacy of Stolypin as the Soviet 
Union disintegrated, but indicators of public opinion in Russia paint a rather different picture 
emerging over the past twenty years. Polls conducted by the Levada Centre over this period 
indicate that Stolypin was never especially popular (Гудков 2010: 39). When asked to give 
the names of five to ten names individuals from all nations whom they believed to be the most 
outstanding persons of all time, less than one per cent of the respondents named Stolypin in 
both the 1989 and 1991 surveys. In 1994, the figure rose to eight per cent then dropped back 
to one per cent in 1999, and rose to four per cent in 2008. Considering these figures, it is sur-
prising that Stolypin was selected as the second most popular Russian of all time in 2008 in 
the nationally televised competition The Name Is Russia (Imia – Rossiia, to be discussed in 
detail below). This chapter aims to reconstruct how the memory of Stolypin was mediated in 
this recent period and, in this process, was continually reinterpreted to such an extent that the 
                                                 
57 “мифы и легенды.” 
58 “Жестоко, но дальновидно. Во благо страны. Ради светлого будущего. Вешал, но и поднимал с колен. 
Вешал, но и давал стране ВВП. Вся Британия по утрам вмазывала в свои сэндвичи наше сибирское 
масло. Рубль тяжелел золотом. Экспорт зерна возрос в разы.” 
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government felt confident enough to officially endorse it. I will also reflect on the particulari-
ties of the Stolypin myth that contributed to its popularisation and institutionalisation in this 
particular period, as compared to earlier periods. The chapter is structured as follows. The 
first section analyses the myth’s political appropriation and institutionalisation and considers 
earlier indicators of political interest in this image. Then I discuss the appearance of Stolypin 
in Russian cultural productions, on television in particular. Here I also point out certain pre-
cursors to the Stolypin myth, closely connected historical narratives that nevertheless do not 
feature him (or in which he plays a subsidiary part). The mediation of such narratives helped 
facilitate the emergence of our central myth; instead of the introduction of a brand-new 
memory, what transpired was rather a shift in focus and perspective. The chapter discusses 
three productions in detail: the TV series Stolypin…the undrawn lessons (Stolypin…Nevy-
uchennye uroki, 2006), the above-mentioned televised competition The Name Is Russia 
(2008) and the television documentary Petr Stolypin. A shot at Russia (Petr Stolypin. Vystrel 
v Rossiiu, 2012). 
Institutionalisation of Stolypin’s Memory 
Stolypin has been part of Putin’s political vocabulary from the very beginning of his presi-
dency. In his first Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2000, 
Putin referred to Stolypin while discussing the difficulty in striking a balance between state 
interests and the rights of the individual. He stated: 
Over the past decade, fundamental changes have taken place in the country – rights and freedoms of the indi-
vidual are guaranteed by the Constitution, a democratic political system has formed, and a multi-party system 
has become reality. […] 
However, the letter of the law and real life are often quite different things. Only the framework of a civil so-
ciety has been formed in Russia. Collective, patient work is now required for it to become a full partner of 
the state. We are not always able to combine patriotic responsibility for the destiny of our country with what 
Stolypin once called “civil liberties.” So it is still hard to find a way out of a false conflict between the values 
of personal freedom and the interests of the state (Putin 2000). 
Other commentators have also indicated a connection between the challenges faced by Putin 
at the start of the new millennium and those confronting Stolypin in the wake of the 1905 
revolution. In discussions from the early 2000s of Stolypin’s reforms, and more specifically in 
the appraisal of why Stolypin would have been exceptionally adept at carrying them through, 
we can even trace parallels to the characterisation of Putin himself. V. Loginov, for example, 
notes the following four characteristics: first, Stolypin “came, as it were, ‘out of nowhere’”; 
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second, “he was young – forty-four years old”; third, “he gave the impression of being a 
tough and decisive individual, a ‘strong personality’ capable of imposing ‘order’”; and 
finally, “he was able to express his thoughts in a precise and laconic manner” (Loginov 2004 
[2001]: 22). In the concluding paragraph of his essay Loginov embeds the discussions on 
Stolypin in the context of contemporary Russian politics. He states: 
In today’s discussions of the mature, overblown, but still-unresolved problems of national life, the most fre-
quently expressed fears are of a ‘new dictatorship.’ This is not what we should fear. It is, rather, the 
unwillingness to take into account popular sentiments and the people’s will that marks the high road to 
sweeping grass-roots upheavals (idem: 27). 
In other words, the establishment of a strong state should not be judged negatively, as 
(Western) observers of the process of democratisation in Russia have done for most of Putin’s 
and Medvedev’s presidencies, as long as the dominant political line does not conflict with the 
sentiments of the general public. 
If we consider societal actors beyond the ruling elite who sponsored the emergence of the 
memory of Stolypin early on, we should note the Petr Stolypin National Prize for the 
Agrarian Elite (Natsional’naia premiia imeni Petra Stolypina ‘Agrarnaia elita Rossii’). The 
award was established in 2002 as a private initiative (“История премии” n.d.), and the first 
awards given in 2003. Its purpose is to honour those who are successful in the agricultural 
sector along with those who “with their work revive Russian traditions, help our rural areas”59 
(ibidem). In 2012, the awards ceremony was included in the official program of festivities 
connected to the Stolypin commemorative year and thereby implicitly adopted by the state. 
The foundation behind the Petr Stolypin National Prize for the Agrarian Elite had already 
been one of the main initiators responsible for the celebration of a previous Stolypin year in 
2006 (ibidem); marking the 100th anniversary of the beginning of Stolypin’s reforms, the 
commemoration was supported by the Russian government. On 20 October 2006, Prime 
Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed a directive establishing an organising committee, chaired by 
Dmitrii Medvedev (Правительство Российской Федерации 2006). While the government 
thus endorsed the 2006 Stolypin year, it did not allocate funds to the activities that had been 
organised. Another organisation involved was the Fund for the Study of P.A. Stolypin’s 
Legacy (Фонд Изучения Наследия П.А. Столыпина 2006a). This fund was established in 
2001 by historian Pavel Pozhigailo, who held the position of state secretary of culture and 
mass communication between 2006 and 2008 (Фонд Изучения Наследия П.А. Столыпина 
                                                 
59 “своим трудом возрождает российские традиции, помогает нашему селу.” 
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n.d.), which may well have contributed to the government’s decision to support the anniver-
sary festivities. The program consisted of, amongst other things, a requiem in Stolypin’s 
honour at the Church of Christ the Saviour in Moscow and the scholarly conference “The 
Stolypin model of the modernisation of Russia. 1906-2006.”60 
During the final meeting of the organising committee, Medvedev highlighted the parallels 
between the Stolypin era and the present: “Today, Russia is faced by similar problems. 
Therefore, the general interest in Stolypin as a figure is no coincidence. Many of his ideas and 
plans are indeed as relevant as before” 61  (Фонд Изучения Наследия П.А. Столыпина 
2006b). It is important to note that the basis for the link between the two eras, as expressed by 
Medvedev, lies in the question of agricultural reform. The use of Stolypin’s image is princi-
pally connected to specific policy issues rather than personal characteristics, a particular type 
of leadership that he represents or an autocratic style of governance, as we will see later on. 
This emphasis is consistent with the function of the historical analogy made between Stolypin 
and Putin that Caroline Humphrey has described with regard to agricultural reform and the 
efforts to “deconstruct” the remains of Soviet collectivities in the post-Soviet period:  
What historical analogy does is to draw a parallel between Stolypin’s attempt to get more independent-
minded peasants to leave their communes and set up as private farmers and Yeltsin’s and Putin’s policies of 
disbanding collective farms and promoting ‘fermery’ today. Stolypin, in a famous phrase, said that Russia 
must now ‘place a wager on the strong’. In brief, since both Stolypin and Putin attempted to impose private 
individual ownership of agricultural land, what they both represent is the destruction of the commune 
(Humphrey 2009: 234. Italics in original).  
According to Humphrey, the generally accepted basis for the analogy is that Stolypin and 
Putin represent “strong proponents of centralized state power”; each was “in charge of the 
secret police” and “pushed through, against fierce opposition, a series of reforms introducing 
private property in agricultural land in Russia” (idem: 235). While the importance of these 
elements cannot be denied, and indeed continue to inform the use of Stolypin’s image, I will 
argue that since the time of Humphrey’s writing the relevance of Stolypin has undergone a 
shift – from indicating parallels in policy to serving as a symbolic personification of autocrat-
ic leadership.  
Humphrey, in fact, would have been surprised to see the Stolypin myth become institution-
alised in 2012: she notes that “the Stolypin-Putin analogy has died away in the last few years” 
(idem: 240), which she attributes to unresolved contradictions implicit in his remembrance, 
                                                 
60 “Столыпинская модель модернизации России. 1906-2006.” 
61 “Сегодня перед Россией стоят схожие задачи. Отсюда неслучаен общий интерес к Столыпину как к 
фигуре. Многие из его идей и замыслов действительно по-прежнему актуальны.” 
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such as the alleged involvement of the secret police and the Tsar in his death and the contra-
dictory appraisals of his repressive policies. She argues that Putin and Stolypin might be too 
similar in this respect, which makes it difficult for Stolypin to be shaped into the sort of his-
torical image that would allow his contemporary incarnation to be seen in a positive light: 
[T]he whole personalized tangle (the rigid Stolypin, the jealous Tsar, the corrupt secret police, the double-
dealing revolutionary) is reminiscent of the environment of secret police ‘provocations’ that also surround 
Putin. It is another layer of meaning hovering around the historical analogy – one, like the assassination it-
self, of course, that the present Russian executive would have to eliminate from public consciousness if the 
analogy is to work in a positive way for the leader (Humphrey 2009: 239-240). 
Already in 2008 we can see Stolypin’s memory shifting away from historical analogy and 
moving towards the assumption of a more symbolic function. In his first Address to the 
Federal Assembly as president in 2008, Medvedev referred to Stolypin in his plea for consti-
tutional democracy and increased respect for individual freedoms. He stated: 
The Constitution paves the way for Russia’s renewal as a free nation and a society that holds law and the 
dignity of each individual as its highest values. 
The cult of the state and the illusory wisdom of the administrative apparatus have prevailed in Russia over 
many centuries. Individuals with their rights and freedoms, personal interests and problems, have been seen 
as at best a means and at worst an obstacle for strengthening the state’s might. This view endured throughout 
many centuries. I would like to quote Pyotr Stolypin, who said, “What we need to do first is create citizens, 
and once this has been achieved civic spirit will prevail of its own accord in Russia. First comes the citizen 
and then the civic spirit, but we have usually preached the other way round” (Medvedev 2008). 
Here, the Stolypin era comes to represent the development of a young democracy undergo-
ing a process of stabilisation following a period of severe turmoil, paralleling the process of 
democratisation that has taken place in post-Soviet Russia. It points to the difficulties in-
volved in establishing a representative system of government, and to the issues that can arise 
when the government and the Duma are forced to learn how to engage in constructive cooper-
ation as they try to implement necessary reforms. The balance between the collective and the 
rights of the individual, implicit in this discussion, tends to tilt towards the individual, which 
also corresponds to the hope that Russia would take important steps toward democratisation 
under Medvedev. 
In May of that year, the Russian government issued a decree that created the Stolypin 
medal. Divided into first and second degrees, the medal was first awarded in 2009 by Prime 
Minister Putin. In the decree, the purpose of the medal is outlined as follows: 
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The P.A. Stolypin medal is an encouragement for the contribution to solving strategic problems connected to 
the social-economic development of the country, including the realisation of long-term projects of the gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation in the fields of industry, agriculture, construction, transportation, science, 
education, healthcare, culture and other fields of work (Правительство Российской Федерации 2008).62 
The medal features a relief portrait of Stolypin and the inscription “To the glory of Russia, 
for the good of the Russians” (Vo slavu Rossii, vo blago Rossiian). Recipients have included 
the former Minister of Finance Aleksei Kudrin (1rst degree, 2010), former Minister of Defence 
Sergei Ivanov (2nd degree, 2011) and Vladimir Zhirinovskii, leader of the ultranationalist 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (2nd degree, 2012). 
During his period as prime minister, Putin has quoted and paraphrased well-known state-
ments by Stolypin. The elements of Stolypin’s legacy connected to democratisation found at 
the beginning of Medvedev’s presidency quickly lost ground, replaced by a symbolic charge 
similar to that of the myth of the end of the Time of Troubles (see Chapter 5). Stolypin has 
become yet another wrapper, as it were, to enclose the promise of stability and economic 
prosperity that the Putin regime has been selling the Russian electorate for over a decade. 
Consider, for instance, the statement Putin made during a session of the Duma on 20 April 
2011 – evidently, as Pavel Aptekar’ points out, an echo of Stolypin’s assertion that he needed 
twenty years of peace to transform Russia beyond recognition: “The country needs a decade 
of stable, peaceful development without various kinds of rushing, [and] thoughtless experi-
ments, entangled in, at times unwarranted, liberalism or, on the other hand, in social 
demagogy”63  (Аптекарь 2011). On the investment forum “Russia calling!” Putin quoted 
Stolypin to substantiate his claim that Russia was an “island of stability” and “safe haven” for 
foreign investors. Putin’s remark, “We do not need great upheavals, we need a great Russia,” 
altering the first words of the original Stolypin quote only slightly, made headlines in the 
Russian media (“Путин заговорил языком Столыпина” 2011). The main difference be-
tween the “end of the Time of Troubles” wrapper and the Stolypin wrapper lies in how each 
defines the purported threat that Russia continues to face. Whereas the Time of Troubles 
                                                 
62 “Медаль Столыпина П.А. является поощрением за заслуги в решении стратегических задач 
социально-экономического развития страны, в том числе реализации долгосрочных проектов 
Правительства Российской Федерации в области промышленности, сельского хозяйства, 
строительства, транспорта, науки, образования, здравоохранения, культуры и в других областях 
деятельности.” 
63 “Стране необходимы десятилетия устойчивого, спокойного развития. Без разного рода шараханий, 
необдуманных экспериментов, замешанных на неоправданном подчас либерализме или, с другой 
стороны, социальной демагогии.” 
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narrative places its enemies outside of Russia, the Stolypin narrative shifts attention to ene-
mies within the country. 
Putin defended the choice of Stolypin as a role model at the All-Russian forum of the agri-
cultural professional class in November 2011 (“Путин ответил на критику Столыпина и 
его реформ” 2011). One of the participants challenged the political endorsement of 
Stolypin’s legacy by arguing that Stolypin’s reforms were, in fact, unsuccessful, which thus 
casts doubt on whether someone like him should be made into a guiding figure for contempo-
rary politics. In his reply, Putin addressed in particular the criticism of Stolypin’s repressive 
measures by claiming that such actions had been necessitated by the tumultuous situation fol-
lowing the 1905 revolution. Paraphrasing Stolypin, he added: “I hope that [his] descendants 
can distinguish between the blood on the hands of a doctor and the blood on the hands of a 
hangman” (ibidem).64 Putin also contradicted the allegation that a one-sided picture of the 
great reformer was being painted. He stated: “We do not want to idealize the figure of 
Stolypin, but we want history to know all sides of this process [of reform] and all sides of this 
individual” (ibidem).65  
The decree establishing the Stolypin year was signed by President Medvedev on 10 May 
2010 (Президент Российской Федерации 2010). The organising committee was headed by 
Putin himself and consisted of several members of the government (“Путин возглавил 
комитет по подготовке празднования юбилея Столыпина” 2011). While the year of com-
memoration comprised numerous events, the erection of the statue was its most public 
manifestation. This monument was the subject of extensive commentary in the press from its 
announcement in mid-2011 up through its unveiling in December 2012. It would not, it was 
decided, receive state financing; rather, the necessary funds would be collected from Russian 
businesses and individuals. Putin, for his part, encouraged all members of the government to 
follow his example and donate a share of their salaries towards its financing (“Путин 
предложил членам кабмина внести деньги на памятник Столыпину” 2011), thereby urg-
ing them to buy into the memory of Stolypin not only symbolically, by endorsing the decision 
in their capacity as politicians, but also literally, through financial support. About the rele-
vance of Stolypin, Putin offered the following comment during one of the organising 
committee’s meetings:  
                                                 
64 “Надеюсь, что потомки отличат кровь на руках врача от крови на руках палача.” 
65 “Мы не хотим идеализировать фигуру Столыпина, но мы хотим, чтобы история знала все стороны 
этого процесса и все стороны этой личности.” 
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As a true patriot and wise politician, [Stolypin] understood that different kinds of radicalism are equally dan-
gerous for the country as standing still, [as] refusing reorganisation [and] necessary reforms; [he understood] 
that only a strong, capable state power, supported by the private, civic initiative of millions of people, can 
provide for the development, [can] guarantee the order and stability of a vast, multinational power, [can] 
guarantee the inviolability of its borders (“Путин предложил членам кабмина внести деньги на памятник 
Столыпину” 2011).66 
The design for the statue was subject to a competition in which both established and young 
artists took part (Краснов 2011). The final decision was based on popular voting and the 
judgement of a professional jury.67 Pavel Pozhigailo, the director of the Fund for the Study of 
P.A. Stolypin’s Legacy mentioned above and a man who was involved in the organisation of 
the Stolypin year, has commented on how they managed to raise the required funds (“В 
Москве установили памятник Петру Столыпину” 2012). He revealed that more than 1500 
people in total, from all over the country, made contributions. This group of donors consisted 
of about one hundred politicians, political representatives and businessmen, with the rest 
being average citizens “of modest means”68 such as pensioners and teachers, who, Pozhigailo 
claims, donated on average half their monthly income. Pozhigailo emphasises that the fund-
raising was not actively propagated and that the influx of donations therefore demonstrates 
that the memory of Stolypin is very much cherished by the Russian population as a whole. 
This latter claim can be questioned, however, since all the traditional media outlets had picked 
up on the plans to erect the statue and on Putin’s call to follow his example and make a dona-
tion. Even so, the idea of employing popular fundraising instead of allocating state funds has 
a highly symbolic import, of course, as it would imply that the statue was erected by the Rus-
sian people rather than being imposed from above by the state. Its location next to the House 
of Government is no less symbolic, emphasising the close connection between the public dis-
play of honour for Stolypin and the ruling political regime. 
Erecting a statue of Stolypin in central Moscow was, in fact, not a completely new idea. It 
had already been proposed in 2001 by none other than Nikita Mikhalkov, a renowned film 
director and a highly influential figure in Russian cultural affairs. He is also a personal friend 
                                                 
66 “Настоящий патриот и мудрый политик, он понимал, что для страны одинаково опасны, как разного 
рода радикализм, так и стояние на месте, отказ от преобразований, от необходимых реформ, что только 
сильная, дееспособная государственная власть, опирающаяся на деловую, гражданскую инициативу 
миллионов людей, способна обеспечить развитие, гарантировать спокойствие и стабильность огромной, 
многонациональной державы, гарантировать нерушимость ее границ.” 
67 The Committee on architecture and city planning of Moscow (Moskomarkhitektura) hosted an exhibition of 
the 42 competing designs where visitors could cast their votes for their favourites. The Ministry of Culture re-
warded the three most popular designs with a prize of 400,000 roubles. A jury of experts had the final say in 
selecting the winning design. 
68 “обычных людей, как правило, небогатых.” 
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and supporter of Putin, and one of the main sponsors of the memory of Stolypin, as will be-
come clear from the remainder of this chapter. Mikhalkov suggested placing Stolypin on 
Lubianka Square to replace the highly controversial statue of Felix Dzerzhinskii that had been 
taken down in 1991 (“Кто должен стоять на Лубянке?” 2011). The city of Moscow’s com-
mission on monumental art considered the suggestion in 2002 but decided not to endorse it 
because they believed “one monument of the reformer in St. Petersburg was sufficient” (“В 
Москве установят памятник Столыпину” 2011). That same year the city of Saratov, where 
Stolypin served as governor before being appointed minister of the interior, erected its statue 
of the reformer to mark the 140th anniversary of his birth (“В Саратове открыт памятник 
П.А. Столыпину” 2002). The square that is home to the monument was named in his honour 
as well. Several years later, in 2011, the city of Krasnodar also unveiled a statue (“В 
Краснодаре открыли памятник Столыпину” 2011). This time, the occasion was the 100th 
anniversary of Stolypin’s assassination rather than his year of birth, as had been the case with 
the other celebrations.  
The largest number of Stolypin-related events and commemorations so far, however, oc-
cured in 2012. On 26 September 2012, a statue of Stolypin was unveiled at the State Agrarian 
Academy near Ulianovsk, which had borne Stolypin’s name since February of that same year 
(“Зураб Церетели открывает в Ульяновске персональную выставку и памятник Петру 
Столыпину” 2012). Its sculptor, Zurab Tsereteli, is one of Russia’s best-known artists, a fig-
ure who, on account of his close relationship with the former Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov, 
has left a (severely criticised) mark on the post-Soviet transformation of the Russian capital 
(Goscilo 2011). Indicative of Tsereteli’s favourable position vis-à-vis the Kremlin is his im-
mortalisation of Putin via a larger-than-life-size bronze sculpture of the Russian leader 
dressed in a judo outfit. Tsereteli actually submitted a design for the Moscow monument, cor-
responding to that of his statue of Stolypin in Ulianovsk. Several sources have suggested that 
Tsereteli, after failing to win the bid for Moscow, offered the statue of a seated Stolypin to 
Kiev, whose officials declined it, stating that the memorial plaque on the building where 
Stolypin drew his last breath is sufficient (“Церетели подарил Ульяновску памятник 
Столыпину, от которого отказались в Киеве” 2012; “Киев не хочет принимать от РФ в 
дар памятник Столыпину” 2012). For that reason, the statue ended up at the academy that 
then made Tsereteli honorary professor in return for his generous gift (“В Ульяновской 
области открыли памятник, изготовленный Зурабом Церетели” 2012). In addition, there 
were plans to place a bust of Stolypin, again by Tsereteli, in the city centre of Ulianovsk 
(Чиликова 2012; “Церетели пообещал продублировать Столыпина” 2012), but as of 
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December 2015, the monument was still in preparation.69 Other events connected with the 
celebration of the Stolypin year included an exhibition in the State Historical Museum entitled 
“The last knight of the empire”70; renamings of the Moscow city university of management, a 
street, and a vessel of the Russian navy; a silver two-rouble coin bearing Stolypin’s image 
(Центральный Банк Российской Федерации 2012); and a special commemorative stamp 
(Филатический Обзор 2012). Furthermore, the Ministry of Education provided suggestions 
on how to dedicate a class to the theme of “the lesson of Stolypin”71 in secondary schools 
(Министерство образования и науки Российской Федерации 2012). 
How can we explain this political institutionalisation of the Stolypin myth as sketched 
above? Russian historian Igor’ Froianov asserts that the process of “Stolypinisation” 
(stolypinizatsiia) should be seen in parallel to the renewed efforts at de-Stalinisation 
(Фроянов 2011). While I do not endorse Froianov’s views (he goes on to argue how, in fact, 
the memory of Stolypin can never measure up to the memory of Stalin and is a mere “pigmy” 
when compared to the Soviet “giant”72), the parallel development he points out is an interest-
ing observation. The peak in attention for Stolypin (2011-2012) indeed came after the greatest 
leniency shown by the state towards a positive re-evaluation of Stalin’s legacy abated (for a 
more detailed discussion on the figure of Stalin in Russian memory politics, see the 
Introduction). As the previous discussion has shown, and as will become clear from the 
analyses that follow, it would be mistaken, however, to see the Stolypin myth as, first, a new 
phenomenon and second, a mere consequence of the need to fill the void left by the memory 
of Stalin. It is also more fruitful to consider the myth of Stolypin together with the myth of the 
Time of Troubles, rather than to focus on the limited number of characteristics shared by 
Stolypin and Stalin.  
                                                 
69 In addition to an initial delay in Tsereteli’s completion of the sculpture, the selected location proved adminis-
tratively problematic. The bust is a remake of a monument to Stolypin that was unveiled in 1913 and torn down 
quickly after. However, the plan to “return” Stolypin to the center of Ulianovsk requires the relocation of the 
statue of writer Ivan Goncharov that currently occupies the space. 
70 “Последний витязь империи.” 
71 “ Урок П.А. Столыпина.” 




Both during the 1990s and the 2000s, Russian cinema and television showed a lively interest 
in the prerevolutionary period, and the first two decades of the twentieth century in particular. 
Two themes connected to this period cleared the way for the emergence of productions about 
Stolypin. The first theme concerns reflections on the period leading up to the 1917 revolutions 
in relation to the last Romanovs. This imperial theme, often tinged with a hint of nostalgia, 
was very much present in the 1990s (Govurukhin’s The Russia That We Lost [Rossiia, 
kotoruiu my poteriali, 1992] is an obvious example) and continued into the 2000s, with for 
example The Romanovs. An Imperial Family (Romanovy. Ventsenosnaia sem’ia, 2000), di-
rected by Gleb Panfilov. Because of Stolypin’s position close to the Tsar, it was possible to 
insert a narrative about him into this established narrative framework. His allegedly tense re-
lationship with the monarch, and the claims that Stolypin could have saved the empire and 
thereby the lives of the royal family, increased the appeal of this combination.  
Yet the second theme into which the Stolypin myth could have been fitted, and indeed has 
been, appears to be more significant: TV series and films about the Combat Organisation of 
the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (whose members were the terrorists whom Stolypin came 
down on) and the efforts of the Okhrana, the secret police, to repress it. This group of produc-
tions should be seen in the context of the popularity of TV series on the police and the secret 
services in general in the 2000s. Examples include the film The Rider Named Death (Vsadnik 
po imeni smert’, 2004), directed by Karen Shakhnazarov73 and the TV series Empire under 
Fire (Imperiia pod udarom, 2000) and The Sins of Our Fathers (Grekhi ottsov, 2004). When-
ever Stolypin makes an appearance in such a production, he is but one of many historical 
characters and receives little particular attention. Moreover, he is a person in need of protec-
tion, rather than someone who takes positive action to protect others from harm. The single 
focus on Stolypin in the TV series under discussion in the next section, therefore, was unu-
sual, a marked departure from previously existing representations. 
                                                 
73 The scenario of the film was based on Boris Savinkov’s loosely autobiographical novel The Pale Horse (Kon’ 
blednyi, 1909). For an analysis of the film and its production history, see Norris (2012): 251-68. 
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Petr Stolypin…The Undrawn Lessons 
The historical dramatisation Stolypin…the Undrawn Lessons, a series broadcast in 2006 by 
NTV, was the first fiction feature to have Stolypin as its leading character.74 Consisting of 
fourteen episodes, the series covers the period from when Stolypin was governor in Saratov 
up until his assassination in Kiev in 1911. The scenario was written by Eduard Volodarskii, 
who also wrote a historical novel, published in 2007, with the same title to accompany the 
series. Drawing extensively on detective series’ tropes, it depicts the constant struggle be-
tween, on the one hand, the Russian state as it attempts to accommodate the outcomes of the 
1905 revolution while preserving the tsarist empire and, on the other hand, the Socialist Revo-
lutionaries (SR) who continue to attack the state’s representatives with the aim of 
undermining the empire’s stability. However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the 
state is not conceived of as a unitary actor. Rather, it is an intricate political maze of conflict-
ing interests among the Tsar, the State Council, the Duma and the Okhrana, through which 
Stolypin struggles to find his way in order to implement his vision of what Russia should be.  
The series’ timing was significant: it aired in the wake of the colour revolutions in neigh-
bouring Georgia and Ukraine, among other states. As was explained in the Introduction, the 
Kremlin initiated a “preventive counter-revolution” to prevent a similar scenario unfolding in 
Russia. The TV series reflects elements of this discourse, which intimated close cooperation 
between Western states and Russian opposition groups in an effort to undermine the Russian 
state. In many ways, the series laid the groundwork for the thematic constructions that have 
since become associated with Stolypin’s memory. The narrative’s central aim is to demon-
strate Stolypin’s personal and political superiority and the tragedy of his untimely death, 
which, it is implied, had consequences equally tragic for Russia itself. According to the se-
ries’ director, Iurii Kuzin, Stolypin…the Undrawn Lessons is about “a person, who was killed 
by mistake” (Эпанчина 2006).75 He explains: “Stolypin was killed by [Dmitrii] Bogrov, who 
was the son of a Kievan petty bourgeois, a Jew by the way. But Stolypin actually defended 
the rights of minority groups, including Jews. Therefore, Bogrov was mistaken. He killed the 
                                                 
74 In the years preceding 2006, several minor TV documentaries on this topic were broadcast, e.g., The Life and 
Death of Petr Arkadevich Stolypin [Жизнь и смерть Петра Аркадьевича Столыпина] (Viacheslav Khotulev, 
2002); Historical Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze: 1911. Petr Stolypin [Исторические хроники с Николаем 
Сванидзе: 1911. Петр Столыпин] (Sergei Gusev, 2003); The Searchers: The Murder of Stolypin [Искатели: 
Убийство Столыпина] (Lev Nikolaev, 2004). The 2006 TV series, however, was the first production in which 
Stolypin’s life took centre stage and that was aimed at entertainment instead of historical enquiry (and could 
therefore potentially appeal to a much wider audience). 
75 “О человеке, которого убили по ошибке.” 
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wrong person” (Эпанчина 2006).76 It would have been better if Bogrov had shot the Tsar, 
who was present in the theatre as well, instead of Stolypin. It is quite remarkable how the se-
ries, which advocates an exemplary role for Stolypin for contemporary Russia, portrays those 
involved in the attacks. Their characters, especially those of Evno Azef, his right-hand man 
Boris Savinkov77 and Bogrov, have considerable depth and are sometimes depicted even more 
emphatically than several of Stolypin’s political adversaries. While their actions are not en-
dorsed, these characters are endowed with complex emotions of anger, love, remorse and 
spite, and are passionate in the pursuit of their ideals. 
The central leitmotiv of the series is that Stolypin had been the single figure capable of 
leading Russia, the one man who could have prevented its political and social crises on the 
eve of the revolution and, ultimately, the revolution itself; but adversaries on multiple fronts 
prevented him from fully implementing his reforms. The argument is well summarised in the 
words of Empress Mariia Fedorovna, the mother of the Tsar, when she presses her son not to 
accept Stolypin’s resignation. She argues that Stolypin is genuine, while other high-ranking 
politicians (such as his predecessor Vitte) are hypocritical. The Empress warns her son: “If 
you lose Stolypin, revolution will break out in two years’ time and all those who surround you 
now will betray you.”78 A few scenes later in this episode, Stolypin has an audience with the 
Empress and she stresses her point once more: “only you can save Russia from times of trou-
bles and poverty, and set her on the right path.”79 The series emphasises the idea that had 
Stolypin’s political adversaries not focused on their personal gains and ambitions but, instead, 
conceded that Stolypin’s policies were correct, the state would not have collapsed. This is not 
to say that the series completely ignores the political and societal problems existing in late 
tsarist Russia. It acknowledges those tensions between the governing elite and the majority of 
the agrarian population, which culminated in the socialist revolution. But Stolypin’s reforms 
are nevertheless presented as the unacknowledged alternative that could have addressed these 
                                                 
76 “Столыпина убил Богров – сын киевского мещанина, еврей, между прочим. А Столыпин отстаивал 
права малых народов, включая и евреев. Выходит, Богров ошибся. Он убил не того, кого следовало.” 
77 Contrary to Stolypin, Boris Savinkov was featured in several Soviet films, both as member of the CO and in 
his capacity as member of the Provisional Government. E.g., The Vyborg Side [Выборгская сторона] (Grigorii 
Kozintsev & Leonid Trauberg, 1938); Extraordinary Assignment [Чрезвычайное поручение] (Stepan Kevorkov 
& Erazm Karamian, 1965); The Collapse [Крах] (Vladimir Chebotarev, 1968) and its television remake 
Sindicate 2 [Синдикат 2] (Mark Orlov, 1981); No Distinguishing Features [Особых примет нет] (Anatolii 
Bobrovskii, 1978) and its sequel The Collapse of Operation “Terror” [Крах операции “Террор”] (Anatolii 
Bobrovskii, 1980). 
78 “Если ты потеряешь Столыпина, через год два грянет революции и все те, кто тебя сейчас окружают, 
предадут тебя.” 
79 “вы один можете спасти Россию от смуты и бедности и вывести на верный путь.” 
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issues along more gradualist lines; they represented the golden mean between (extreme) con-
servatism and revolutionary tendencies. 
Stolypin the reformer and his political opponents 
Petr Stolypin, played by Oleg Klishin, is a Janus-faced figure. On the one hand, he is the con-
fident statesman, endowed with persuasive rhetorical skills. On the other hand, he is the 
dedicated family man, revealing a tender and sensitive character hidden behind his stern out-
ward appearance. In each of these roles Stolypin excels. His superiority emphasises how the 
opposition towards his reforms as well as his assassination should be interpreted as a tragedy 
for Russia, and underlines Stolypin’s exemplary function for contemporary Russia, a role 
suggested by the series’ title. Kuzin describes his Stolypin as “a Renaissance man”: “he is a 
reformer, like Luther, like Peter the First… Therefore he has different faces: with enemies he 
is severe, with friends he is gentle, with his wife and children he is childlike and mischie-
vous” (Эпанчина 2006).80 
Stolypin’s introduction in the very first scene is crucial for his establishment as a person of 
noble character. A young Stolypin rushes to a field where his brother lies dying as a result of 
a duel. To uphold his brother’s honour, he then challenges his brother’s murderer to another 
duel. Stolypin is shot in the arm but, when his turn comes to fire, he deliberately misses his 
target. The duelling motif is later repeated and again signifies Stolypin’s noble personality. 
One of the members of the Duma, the constitutional democrat (Kadet) Fedor Rodichev, criti-
cises the field courts-martial that the prime minister has authorised to counter the 
revolutionaries. Rodichev gives the hangman’s rope the nickname “Stolypin’s necktie,” an 
expression that has stuck to the memory of Stolypin ever since. Stolypin takes offence and 
challenges him to a duel. After repeated public apologies by Rodichev, Stolypin eventually 
forgives his opponent for the offence. In another scene from the first episode, Stolypin single-
handedly disperses a revolutionary uprising in Saratov, which demonstrates his natural ability 
to exercise authority over people. Outpacing his security guards, Stolypin walks into a square 
where a young man is inciting a crowd to revolt against the monarchy. He climbs the platform 
to join the revolutionary and, after taking off his coat, he summons the now confused agitator 
to hold it for him. Not in the least intimidated, Stolypin proceeds to declare his achievements 
as governor and, slowly but surely, wins over the crowd. While the assembled people are on 
his side, the insulted revolutionary takes revenge by throwing a bomb that misses the gover-
                                                 
80  “Столыпин – человек Возрождения, он реформатор, как Лютер, как Петр Первый…Поэтому он 
разный: с врагами – суров, с друзьями – мягок, с женой и детьми – ребячлив и шаловлив.” 
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nor but injures some of the spectators. The outcome of the scene adumbrates the challenges 
that Stolypin will face in the rest of the series when dealing with the terrorist movement on 
the national level as prime minister. At the same time, the scene establishes him as a resolute 
and fearless leader. 
Explicit criticism can also be heard, mainly from the side of Stolypin’s political adver-
saries. He is repeatedly accused of being a dictator, of concentrating power in his own hands 
and of bypassing the State Council and the Duma in order to implement his reforms. Their 
criticism is undermined by the constant idealisation of Stolypin already indicated above, and 
by the expressly negative portrayal of those expressing these reproaches. Their hostility to-
wards Stolypin is motivated not by a sincere renunciation of his policies, it is suggested, but 
rather by the fear of losing political influence and privileges. Because they lust for power and 
behave in ways that are indifferent to the people’s needs, these reproaches are cast as hollow 
and self-serving accusations. Furthermore, some government officials, most notably General 
Vladimir Trepov, a member of the State Council, attempt to undermine the Tsar’s confidence 
in Stolypin by deliberately misrepresenting the accomplishments of his reforms, such as the 
level of economic growth in their aftermath. During one of Trepov’s audiences with the Tsar, 
Nicholas II dismisses the State Council’s proposal to discharge Stolypin on these very 
grounds, stating that the recommendation is not based on sincerely held views but rather de-
rive from a personal feud against the reformist prime minister. 
There is a grain of truth, however, in the claim that Stolypin transgressed the powers in-
vested in his position as prime minister. Taking advantage of article 87 of the Fundamental 
Laws of the Empire, Stolypin, with the cooperation of the Tsar, twice dissolved the State 
Council and the Duma for a period of three days, thus allowing the Tsar to directly approve 
his reform measures.81 Bending the law and circumventing the state’s representative bodies 
are justified on two grounds in the series. First, it is claimed that Stolypin is the only person 
who is not guided by his personal ambitions and desire for gain and who knows precisely how 
Russia must be reformed in order to prevent social upheaval and state collapse. Second, it is 
justified since the State Council and the Duma continue to obstruct all proposals for reform 
without offering any vision of an alternative path, despite Stolypin’s efforts to cooperate with 
the members of these bodies. Thus, the series appears to justify a high measure of autocracy 
in carrying out reforms. Opposition within the political system, and especially that of the 
                                                 
81 Officially, laws implemented by the tsar under article 87 (when the Duma was not in session) had to be sub-
mitted to the Duma within two months. Because of the failure to act accordingly, the dissolution of the Second 
Duma in 1907 is also referred to as the Coup of 3 June. 
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popularly elected members of the Duma, is renounced as being self-centred, short-sighted and 
obstructive. 
It should be noted that Stolypin’s reforms are rejected both by conservative monarchists in 
the State Council and the Duma and by liberals and socialists. The former fear the undermin-
ing of the Russian Empire, while the latter find the reforms insufficiently far-reaching. 
Stolypin’s vision therefore comes across as a middle course, the golden mean between (ex-
treme) conservatism and revolutionary tendencies. The idea that far-reaching reforms can be 
implemented while political stability is nevertheless maintained is very attractive to the con-
temporary viewer. Indeed, it sounds familiar. Numerous elements of the programme’s outlook 
can be interpreted as drawing parallels with Putin’s Russia. First and foremost, the series pre-
sents an intransigent Duma whose lack of cooperation with the prime minister is attributed to 
the former’s obstructiveness, not the latter’s lust for power. What is more, it justifies a certain 
degree of authoritarianism via the claim that autocratic rule is necessary in order to revive the 
country. The way Stolypin addresses the Duma – using blunt language and much expressive-
ness, and making jokes at the expense of Duma members – is reminiscent of Putin’s 
appearances before parliament as well. 
The way the series’ writers have rewritten, combined and added to well-known passages 
from Stolypin’s speeches to construct arguments that carry particular resonance with contem-
porary Russia provides important clues about the political programme promoted by the 
production. Consider, for example, Stolypin’s address to the Duma towards the end of the 
third episode: 
A weak Russia – that is what our enemies dream of. We, among other strong and powerful nations, are ad-
vised to turn Russia into a wreck. In order to then build on these ruins a Fatherland that is unfamiliar to us 
(1). The Russian state developed on its own yeast [drozhzha] (2): The Scythians, Byzantium with its emper-
ors [basilevsy], the Horde and Europe…Who did not knead the dough from which the coarse rye bread of 
Russian history was baked? But our path, gentlemen, is still different from the path of Western democracies. 
Their fate is eternal movement, our fate is eternal repose. You, gentlemen of the SR and Social Democrats, 
are in need of great upheavals, but we, gentlemen, are in need of a great Russia! (3).82 
                                                 
82 “Слабая Россия – вот о чем мечтают наши враги. Нам предлагают, среди других крепких и сильных 
народов, превратить Россию в развалину. Чтобы на этих руинах строить неведомое нам Отечество. 
Русское государство росло на собственных дрожжах: Скифы, Византия с ее басилевсы, Орда и 
Европа…Кто только не замешивал тесто из которого выпечен грубый, ржаной хлеб русской истории? Но 
наш путь, господа, все же иной чем путь западных демократий. Их удел – вечное движение, наш удел – 
вечный покой. Вам, господа СР-ы и Социал-Демократы, нужны великие потрясения, а нам, господа, 
нужна великая Россия!” 
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Most of what is delivered here can be traced back to actual speeches given by Stolypin in 
1907 and 1908 (printed in italics in the quote above). Extract 1 has been incorporated with 
minor adaptations but is placed in a new context. The original passage is taken from a speech 
on the structure of agrarian life and the farmers’ right to property and, thus, concerns 
explicitly internal matters.83 However, in its new context, the word “enemies” in the first line, 
which extract 1 refers back to, appears to refer to foreigners. This is confirmed by the sen-
tence on the Russian path being different from that of the Western democracies. The direct 
address to the SR and SD in the final sentence draws attention to the claim that there are also 
internal enemies who threaten to undermine the stability of the Russian state. Hereby, the im-
personal construction “we are advised” (predlagaiut nam) takes on a different connotation 
and is connected to the strong notion of “enemies” lurking within and outside Russia. 
In the second extract, the final words have been changed, though the sentence retains its 
tenor. Again, the context has shifted. In the original, the idea of Russia’s own unique roots is 
linked to the argument that Russia is predisposed to be a monarchy. The roots of the Russian 
state are traced back to the autocracy of the Muscovite rulers, to Peter I, Catherine II and 
Aleksandr II, each of whom represents a different stage in the development of supreme impe-
rial power.84 Stolypin’s speech in the series lifts just one sentence from the original and then 
invokes a quite different definition of Russia’s roots, derived from the Scythians,85 Byzanti-
um, the Golden Horde and European influences. This conception makes explicit appeals to 
such ideas as Eurasianism, Russia as the Third Rome and the Europeanisation of Russia by 
Peter I. The subsequent passage goes on to appeal to the idea that Russia’s historical path is 
unique. Stolypin indeed expressed a similar position in a speech from 1908, when he stated: 
                                                 
83 The original quote reads: “Ведь тут, господа, предлагают разрушение существующей государственности, 
предлагают нам среди других сильных и крепких народов превратить Россию в развалины для того, 
чтобы на этих развалинах строить новое, неведомое нам отечество. Я думаю, что на втором тысячелетии 
своей жизни Россия не развалится. Я думаю, что она обновится, улучшит свой уклад, пойдет вперед, но 
путем разложения не пойдет, потому что где разложение — там смерть!” (Столыпин 1991: 90). 
84 The original quote reads: “Ведь Верховная власть является хранительницей идеи русского государства, 
она олицетворяет собой её силу и цельность, и если быть России, то лишь при усилии всех сынов её 
охранять, оберегать эту Власть, сковавшую Россию и оберегающую её от распада. Самодержавие 
московских Царей не походит на самодержавие Петра, точно так же, как и самодержавие Петра не 
походит на самодержавие Екатерины Второй и Царя-Освободителя. Ведь русское государство росло, 
развивалось из своих собственных русских корней, и вместе с ним, конечно, видоизменялась и 
развивалась и Верховная Царская Власть. Нельзя к нашим русским корням, к нашему русскому стволу 
прикреплять какой-то чужой, чужестранный цветок” (Столыпин 1991: 107). 
85 The Scythians return in one of the final episodes when Stolypin has boarded a train to Siberia to investigate 
the economic development there. His servant has failed to pack his work papers (since Stolypin is not allowed to 
work on the way there because of health issues), therefore they are “forced” to eat ham and drink wine like “an-
cient Scythians.” 
 72 
Our eagle, an inheritance of Byzantium, is a double-headed eagle. Of course, single-headed eagles are also 
strong and powerful, but by cutting off the head of our Russian eagle that is directed towards the east you 
will not turn it into a single-headed eagle; you will only make it bleed (Столыпин 1991: 129).86 
The speech ends with Stolypin’s most famous statement (extract 3). The often quoted and 
paraphrased sentence is taken from the speech on agrarian reform, just like extract 1. The sen-
tences that precede it are markedly different than the original speech, but the two texts are 
largely comparable in meaning.87 The elements that cannot be retraced to Stolypin’s actual 
words are explicit references to the discourse on what or who constitutes a threat to Russia in 
contemporary politics. Russia’s enemies, it is intimated, fear the country’s return to strength. 
Through obstruction and criticism they attempt to keep the state weak. The sentence arguing 
that Russia’s path is very different from that of the Western democracies explicitly responds 
to the Western critique of the stalled process of democratisation and the centralisation of 
power in Russia under Putin. 
It is not wholly tenable, however, to assert a direct correspondence between the two peri-
ods and make Stolypin a stand-in for Putin: Stolypin functioned as a prime minister subject to 
the will of the tsar, whereas Putin was president at the time the series aired. More generally 
speaking, it is to be doubted whether it is productive to search for such one-to-one analogies 
with the aim of understanding the political relevance of (fictional) television productions. And 
even if direct correspondence (which would allow us to pinpoint which character has been 
shaped to resemble which contemporary politician) is lacking, this by no means forecloses the 
possibility that a historical narrative can put forth a message about governance. In this par-
ticular case, the incompleteness of the analogy between Stolypin and Putin does not undo the 
fact that the leadership qualities that the series puts forward can be transferred onto the Russia 
of the 21th century, even more so since Nicholas II is portrayed as an incapable leader who, in 
fact, depends on Stolypin to steer Russia towards salvation from revolutionary harm. An in-
decisive ruler, he is easily influenced by government officials as well as his personal inner 
circle (his mother, wife and Rasputin). Furthermore, Nicholas appears preoccupied by affairs 
                                                 
86 “Наш орел, наследие Византии, — орел двуглавый. Конечно, сильны и могущественны и одноглавые 
орлы, но, отсекая нашему русскому орлу одну голову, обращенную на восток, вы не превратите его в 
одноглавого орла, вы заставите его только истечь кровью.” 
87 The original quote reads: “Пробыв около 10 лет у дела земельного устройств, я пришел к глубокому 
убеждению, что в деле этом нужен упорный труд, нужна продолжительная черная работа. Разрешить 
этого вопроса нельзя, его надо разрешать. В западных государствах на это потребовались десятилетия. 
Мы предлагаем скромный, но верный путь. Противникам государственности хотелось бы избрать путь 
радикализма, путь освобождения от исторического прошлого России, освобождения от культурных 
традиций. Им нужны великие потрясения, нам нужна великая Россия!” (Столыпин 1991: 96). 
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that have nothing to do with the state, such as photography and the illness of his son Aleksei. 
His highly emotional nature also causes him to have a distorted judgement of Rasputin, who 
takes advantage of his fatherly worries. But though the Tsar is hardly Stolypin’s equal when it 
comes to leadership abilities, Stolypin remains loyal and subservient, placing himself in the 
service of the state. This makes the relationship between Stolypin and the Tsar quite complex. 
Nicholas is both an ally and an enemy. He is an ally because, in the face of political pressure 
from multiple fronts, he nonetheless refuses to dismiss the prime minister. Moreover, he dis-
solves the State Council and Duma, an action which allowed Stolypin’s reforms to be adopted 
directly. His conservative tendencies nevertheless severely restrict the speed and scope of the 
implementation of the proposed reforms, and Stolypin must continually persuade him about 
what needs to be done. 
The series depicts the process of “democratisation” following the 1905 revolution, a 
movement towards a system where governmental powers are to some extent restricted by rep-
resentative bodies. Yet the government is still allowed to set aside the opinion of these bodies 
in order to directly implement reforms. The argument that justifies this (increased) level of 
autocracy stems from the pressing need to counter subversive actions by oppositional forces 
both within and outside the state apparatus, in order to preserve the condition of stability that 
has been achieved and to prevent the weakening of the state. Before delving into the depiction 
of Stolypin’s political adversaries and, more specifically, their ties with foreign enemies, the 
second group of opponents has to be introduced. 
The Bombisty 
The Combat Organisation (Boevaia Organizatsiia), hereafter CO, the branch of the Party of 
Socialist Revolutionaries involved in terrorist attacks against state officials, is presented as 
Stolypin’s main opponent. One of the policies most readily associated with Stolypin, both in 
Soviet times and today, is indeed his harsh repression of terrorist revolutionaries and the field 
courts-martial he established to more quickly put individuals suspected of revolutionary activ-
ities on trial (thus “Stolypin’s necktie,” referred to above). The series follows the CO 
extensively in its preparation and execution of several attacks, amongst others on Prime 
Minister Von Pleve, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich and Stolypin himself. Its members 
meet in smoke-filled, dimly lit drinking cellars, in private apartments and in luxury restau-
rants where they indulge in champagne and decadent suppers. The organisation consists 
mostly of young, idealistic men inspired by nihilist, socialist or maximalist ideologies. They 
argue passionately about who should be assassinated next, but are far removed from the 
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ordinary people whose interests they purportedly seek to defend. While their ideals and moti-
vation for joining the CO vary, they agree that terrorism is a legitimate means of political 
action – indeed the only effective means of challenging the tsarist state and bringing about 
substantial social change. Fatal attacks are political deeds, not murders. They regard the loss 
of innocent lives a necessary price to pay for the achievement of their goals. At the same time, 
the series includes several episodes that argue that the revolutionaries are mostly opportunists 
who will not stand by their ideals when faced with resistance or when offered financial bene-
fits. The recruiting of terrorists as informers was a customary practice in the fight against the 
revolutionary movement. The series includes several such double agents, including one of the 
main characters, Evno Azef. 
The case of Evno Azef has become legendary. In the period covered by the series, Azef 
headed the CO and was deeply involved in the planning and execution of attacks. But he sim-
ultaneously leaked information about the CO to the Okhrana. The pay he received in return 
for his inside information allowed him to enjoy a lavish lifestyle. Furthermore, his links to the 
police enabled him to eliminate enemies within the CO and maintain his position. Azef, 
played by Aleksandr Stroev, is first and foremost a person of excess. He is smartly dressed, 
extroverted, engaging – a smooth talker who can turn every situation to his advantage. He is a 
selfish opportunist who does not care whether his actions inflict damage on Russia or on the 
terrorist movement he claims to believe in. Despite Azef’s confident appearance, his way of 
life, which requires him to play two opposing roles at the same time and run the imminent 
risk of being unmasked, does not leave him unaffected. He is tormented by an inner struggle 
that manifests itself through severe drinking and frequent nightmares. He wakes up crying out 
to his imagined opponents to let him go, begging his internal fiends to leave him in peace. 
The revolutionaries who share an apartment in Moscow with him are driven to sleep-deprived 
desperation, unable to rest because of Azef’s nocturnal screaming. To the outside world and 
especially to his contacts within the Okhrana he conceals his anxiety, and claims to actually 
enjoy his double role: “I love to play games.” 
Most of what we learn about Azef’s motives and his opinions about terrorism is expressed 
in his discussions with Bogrov. He repeatedly emphasises Bogrov’s Jewish background, link-
ing it to his terrorist ambitions, and even philosophises about the difference between Russians 
and Jews. Jews are too sceptical, he thinks, while Russian have too much faith in Orthodoxy 
and the tsar. Quite unexpectedly, Azef offers up Stolypin as an example of this “weakness” 
found in Russians. Whereas Bogrov speaks degradingly about Stolypin (since he is only a 
governor at that time), Azef is more impressed with him and even foresees that Stolypin will 
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soon become a minister. But he also predicts that if indeed Stolypin rises in power, terrorism 
will be done for. In another discussion we learn that Azef is critical towards traditional reli-
gions and the materialist ideology of the Social Democrats (the future Bolsheviks) alike, and 
believes only in fate and death. This view is also expressed in the way he speaks about the 
victims of terrorist acts. He ridicules Bogrov’s scruples about trying to ensure that no inno-
cent bystanders lose their lives in the attacks; he sees their deaths as the necessary evil of 
terror. Indeed, the absolutist state cannot be changed without the killing of innocents. 
The motif of Jewishness is strongly expressed throughout the series. Indeed, in the first ep-
isode, not only is Bogrov’s religious background emphasised, but Interior Minister Von Pleve 
actually calls upon a group of rabbis to stop their youth from committing terrorist attacks. He 
dismisses their suggestion that the situation can change only when Jews are given rights equal 
to those of Russians (as Stolypin later attempts to do), and he warns that there will be nation-
wide pogroms if they fail to control their followers. The anti-Semitic undercurrent that 
intimates a direct relation between Judaism and revolutionary inclinations has been discussed 
and criticised (Цыркун 2006; Качкаева 2006) by, among others, the writer of the original 
script, Eduard Volodarskii. In an interview in the renowned journal Iskusstvo kino 
(Баландина 2007), Volodarskii distances himself from the series’ anti-Semitism via a direct 
offensive against Kuzin, whom he claims heavily rewrote the script without consulting him, 
to such an extent that he can no longer agree with its content (ibidem). Kuzin has responded 
angrily to this interview in several posts on his LiveJournal blog. He denies having excluded 
Volodarskii from the project. Quite the contrary: he claims that Volodarskii himself failed to 
comment on the extensive adaptation of the script he proposed (Кузин 2007a; Кузин 2007b). 
Kuzin describes the script in exclusively negative terms, calling it a “scenario that fell into a 
fainting-fit, swollen like a case of dropsy” (Кузин 2007b).88 Kuzin’s defence makes it clear 
that Volodarskii might have been correct in claiming that he did not recognise his writing in 
the end result: 
The scenario E.R. Volodarskii wrote was incoherent and wordy and it was impossible to fit it to the format of 
15 episodes. For starters, I cut it in half. After substituting the official jargon with words from the contempo-
rary lexicon, I reworked the sluggish and archaic monologues; I gave the scenes taken from Savinkov's book 
an original look, placing emphasis on the characters of the historical personalities, their personal lives. And 
                                                 
88 “бухнувшийся в обморок, раздутый, как при водянке, сценарий.” 
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all I have done was not out of a desire to annoy Eduard Volodarksii, but because of the reluctance of the lat-
ter to cooperate with the director (Кузин 2007a).89 
Kuzin avoids the issue of Judaism and fails to address the accusation that he added an 
“anti-Semite subtext.” 
Azef’s right-hand man Savinkov is, unlike Azef himself, truly committed to the revolu-
tionary cause and to terrorism. He is emotionally involved in his mission and considers Azef 
to be his close friend: together they will shake the foundations of the monarchy. The accusa-
tions against his boss lead him to endure much anguished doubt, and he is unwilling to accept 
the unmasking of Azef as a double agent for quite some time. According to Kuzin, Savinkov 
is “conscientious. He is tormented with doubt, he feels the urge to get even with himself” 
(Эпанчина 2006).90 When Vladimir Burtsev mounts his accusations against Azef and the SR 
decides to investigate the case, Savinkov is repeatedly shown taking a shower in an attempt to 
clear his head. The voice-over of Azef reading a letter to Savinkov, in which he declares that 
he is loyal to the state and not the revolution,91 and the intersecting shots of the proceedings 
of the SR trial demonstrate how he cannot shake off his doubts about the loyalty of his pur-
ported friend. While the family background of Bogrov is made explicit and, to a certain 
extent, is presented as an explanation for his revolutionary tendencies, Savinkov is not given a 
past. That Boris Savinkov was actually Polish never comes up, even though the proposed law 
on zemstvos in the Western provinces, aiming to decrease the political influence of the Polish 
elite, features extensively in the conflicts between Stolypin and the parliament. So while the 
overrepresentation of Poles is seen as a threat to the position of ethnic Russians in the empire, 
they are not linked to the revolutionaries. The possibility that the Polish region might secede 
nevertheless returns explicitly in the political testament dictated by Stolypin in the final epi-
sode (to which I will return shortly). 
Enemies of the State as “Foreign Agents” 
The CO’s foreign financing and the terrorists’ frequent travels to Western Europe are instru-
mental for the representation of their activities as a threat to the Russian state. Indications of 
                                                 
89 “Сценарий, который написал Э.Я. Володарский, был рыхлым и многословным, и никак не укладывался 
в формат 15 серий. Для начала я сократил его вдвое. Монологи – вялые и архаичные – я передал, заменив 
канцеляризмы современной лексикой, сценам, взятым из книг Савинкова – придал оригинальный вид, 
сделав акцент на характерах исторических лиц, их личной жизни. И все что я совершил не из желания 
насолить Эдуарду Яковлевичу, а по причине нежелания последнего сотрудничать с режиссером.” 
90 “человек совестливый. Он мучим сомнениями, его подмывает желание поквитаться с самим собой.” 
91 The letter is not included in the published compilation of Azef’s letters (Павлов & Перегудова 1994). 
Therefore, it appears to be a fiction that was most likely added to the scenario to support the claim that Stolypin 
judged Azef’s loyalty correctly, and successfully persuaded him to choose the side of the law. 
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the links between foes abroad and domestic enemies (the revolutionaries) can be found in 
almost every episode. Azef frequently boards trains with their destinations explicitly shown, 
and the live music played in the restaurants indicates which country they find themselves in. 
Berlin, Zurich, and Paris are favourite hideouts as they plan future attacks beyond the reach of 
the Okhrana, so the series tells us. Finland is another case in point. At the time, it was a Grand 
Duchy in the Russian Empire and therefore enjoyed a considerable level of autonomy. In the 
series, the CO uses Finland as a safe haven for dynamite workshops and as a retreat to evade 
the police. Because of Finland’s autonomous status, the imperial police forces were not al-
lowed to perform their duties on Finnish territory. In response to successful attacks, the CO 
receives sizeable donations from (foreign) sympathisers with the struggle against the Russian 
monarchy. The series indicates two more sources of funding: attacks on money transports and 
funds received from Western Freemasons.  
Freemasonry, a classic bogeyman in Russian culture, not only finances terrorist actions 
from the West. It turns out the organisation threatens the state from inside its governmental 
apparatus as well. Indeed, Stolypin’s starkest political adversaries are exposed as Freemasons. 
The masonic conspiracy among high-profile government representatives is introduced in a 
scene in which a group of men, seated around a large oval glass table, roll a crystal ball across 
the tabletop to call upon someone to speak. For the duration of the entire scene, the camera 
follows the crystal ball as it passes from speaker to speaker, showing the distorted reflections 
of the speakers’ faces in the glass. Close-ups of the silver ring worn by one of the speakers 
indicate whom we are dealing with here. Similar scenes follow in subsequent episodes and 
eventually, the faces of the speakers are revealed. Among those involved in the conspiracy are 
General Trepov and Pavel Kurlov, the head of the police department. These men are also 
shown to be conspiring against Stolypin during a church Mass in the presence of the royal 
family and of Stolypin himself, testifying to their audacity. In their final meeting around the 
glass table, the group reaches the decision that Stolypin has to be eliminated, and Kurlov in-
troduces his plan (see below). 
The significance of the Freemasons as an enemy of the state is underlined by the efforts of 
both the Tsar and Stolypin to investigate the extent to which Freemasonry is active in Russia, 
as well as masonic involvement in the revolutionary movement and its threat to the Russian 
state. Stolypin sends his close friend Ivan Alekseev, who is State Counsellor with the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, to Western Europe to investigate the threat of war and the link between 
domestic and foreign Freemasons. In France, Alekseev discusses Freemasonry with a profes-
sor at the Sorbonne. He intimates that there might be a link to Russians who have lived 
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abroad in France and England, and mentions the names of Herzen and Chernyshevskii. When 
his interlocutor questions his claim that Chernyshevskii has lived abroad, Alekseev accuses 
him of knowing nothing about Russian Freemasons. An interesting twist follows when the 
Frenchman subsequently (“A propos…”) introduces Alekseev to Lev Trotskii who has just 
wandered past, thus subtly reiterating linkages among Freemasonry, revolutionaries and 
émigré Russians. In Germany Alekseev is told that France is planning to go to war against 
Germany, but England is reluctant to join the effort without the involvement of Russia. If they 
are successful in their concerted provocation, Russia would be forced to clash with the 
German army. A meeting in a masonic lodge in Berlin supports Alekseev’s impression that 
the threat of war on Russia is imminent. Furthermore, he has discovered that Russian Freema-
sons keep in contact with their foreign counterparts through international organisations.  
Stolypin reports Alekseev’s findings to the Tsar. For whom, the Tsar asks, would drawing 
Russia into war be beneficial? “The revolutionary parties,” Stolypin replies. “They need war 
like oxygen.”92 The Tsar appears to be taken aback by the desire of the Western nations to 
engage Russia in war, but he remembers a line his father used to say: “they are frightened by 
our immensity.”93 Thus, again, internal and external enemies of the Russian state are present-
ed as working in tandem. If we place the series in the context of the year it was broadcast, it 
can be argued that for the Russian viewer the argument described above would bring to mind 
the law on non-commercial organisations that was adopted on 10 January 2006. The law re-
quired the majority of NGOs active in Russia, including both domestic and foreign 
organisations, to re-register. This process involved the submission of extensive information 
about their activities, financial sources and the organisations they had cooperated with, there-
by giving the state the opportunity to directly curtail the activities of human rights 
organisations (Human Rights Watch 2008). In a similar fashion, the Freemasons and the revo-
lutionaries are presented as part of a complex network of groups who seek to undermine the 
state; having permeated society, this network must now be subjected to state control. 
Enemies of Stolypin as Enemies of the State 
The scenes in Stolypin’s office introduce the viewer to a scale model of a palace that Stolypin 
is building. This motif can be interpreted as offering an indication of Stolypin’s enemies and 
allies within the government. The model is located in Stolypin’s office and, depending on the 
person he is receiving there, the interaction with the model differs. Some visitors (Kurlov, 
                                                 
92 “Революционным партиям”; “Им война нужна как воздух.” 
93 “их пугает наша огромность.” 
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Azef) do not interact with it at all. With others (Kokovtsev), the scene ends when Stolypin 
walks over to the model and the visitor joins him. Alekseev is somewhat more interested and 
either shakes hands with Stolypin above the model or follows Stolypin’s example of kneeling 
beside it to take a closer look at its details. The only person actually involved in building the 
model is Aleksandr Gerasimov, the head of the Okhrana in St. Petersburg and the contact per-
son for Azef. The scale model makes its final appearance after Stolypin’s death, when a group 
of clerks is shown carefully documenting and archiving the possessions left in his office. Still 
unfinished, the model is stacked away without special notice. The way that the motif of the 
scale model recurs suggests that it symbolises Stolypin’s vision for Russia. Over the course of 
several episodes, he continues carefully and meticulously to work on it, and only a select few 
support him in this process. His death means that the project of constructing a new Russia has 
been halted prematurely – and, like the scale model itself, his plans were discarded by his 
successors. Stolypin’s palace under construction can be contrasted with the model of a high 
tower kept by Nicholas II in a bell jar, reflecting his conservative attitude towards the Russian 
state. 
The series has the two groups of Stolypin’s enemies, the CO and the masonic conspiracy 
within the Russian government, unite to commit their fatal attack on the prime minister in 
Kiev. Although Bogrov has intended to kill Stolypin for most of his time as a member of the 
CO, for reasons that never fully become evident, only when he comes into contact with 
Kurlov does the perfect opportunity arise for him to execute his wish. Kurlov has come up 
with an intricate scheme in which Bogrov will pretend to infiltrate a group of terrorists plan-
ning to assassinate Stolypin. In reponse to his claim to prevent the bogus attack, Bogrov will 
be given access to the theatre to point out the terrorists. On the basis of this scheme, Bogrov is 
provided with a ticket in the capacity of an Okhrana agent. During the first act of the opera 
being performed in the theatre, Bogrov leaves the hall in evident distress. He paces up and 
down the hallway, puts his hands on his head and retreats to the bathroom to wash his face. 
When the bell rings signalling the commencement of the second act, Bogrov returns to the 
hall as the audience members return to their seats. He walks up to Stolypin, who is standing 
near the stage with his back turned to him. Bogrov takes a first shot that misses and injures a 
member of the orchestra. His second shot hits Stolypin in the chest. Bogrov is seized by 
members of the audience while the Tsar disbelievingly watches the events unfold from his 
loge. In the midst of the tumult, Stolypin looks up to the Tsar and crosses himself as a final 
testimony of his loyalty. The audience starts to sing the national anthem as Stolypin is carried 
out of the theatre. He dies in hospital a few days later.  
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Throughout the series Stolypin is given numerous warnings about the personal danger his 
political actions expose him to. Rasputin even twice foretells his death in Kiev. Despite all 
this, Stolypin refuses to allow the Okhrana to guard him and seems determined not to let him-
self become intimidated. But the scene where he says goodbye to his family before departing 
on his fateful journey to Kiev suggests that he sensed he would not return. This premonition is 
confirmed by the fact that, while in Kiev, he orders his servant to write down his political 
testament, to be given to the Tsar in case of his assassination. His perseverance in issuing re-
forms in the face of these explicit threats emphasises the idea that he has (literally) dedicated 
his life to safeguarding Russia from imminent collapse.  
The series implies that the empire’s people are deeply moved and shocked by Stolypin’s 
assassination. It is reported that as he clings to life, all the churches in Kiev are packed with 
believers praying for him to survive. The Tsar’s response is less equivocal and does not recip-
rocate the sort of loyalty towards Stolypin that the prime minister had expressed toward him 
moments after the shooting. Despite the dire condition of his loyal servant in his last hours, 
the Tsar arrives at the hospital only after Stolypin has already passed away. Somewhat hesi-
tantly, he enters the room where Stolypin lies in state. Before leaving him by himself, 
Stolypin’s wife remarks: “Your Highness. Susanins still exist in Rus’,”94  indicating that 
Stolypin has given his life to serve the Tsar. At first, Nicholas II remains unmoved, but when 
the nurses have left the room he kneels before the bed, crosses himself several times and, 
breathing heavily, he whispers, “forgive me, forgive me, forgive me.” What exactly the Tsar 
is apologising for is not made explicit. A first possibility would be that he regrets that he was 
unable to prevent an attack upon his prime minister, as had happened before with Von Pleve. 
The apology would then serve to reiterate his failings as the head of state. But one of the final 
scenes suggests a possible second interpretation, namely that the Tsar was informed before-
hand about the planned attack and had acquiesced in it, or might even have authorised it. In 
this scene, the Tsar consults with Kokovtsev, the new prime minister, who informs him that 
the investigation into Stolypin’s death has not yet been completed. Yet the Tsar has already 
closed the investigation. The Tsar’s refusal to approve a continuation of the investigation de-
spite Kokovtsev’s insistence that this be done suggests a cover-up. Evidently, he wants to 
leave the case behind him as soon as possible. 
                                                 
94 “Ваше Величество. Не перевелись еще Сусанины на Руси.” According to popular belief, peasant Ivan 
Susanin sacrificed his life for the tsar by leading the Polish troops, looking for Mikhail Romanov, into the forest 
under false pretences and thereby saved the newly elected Tsar from certain death. See also Chapter 5. 
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The closing scene of the final episode, and thus of the series as a whole, vividly shows the 
consequences of Stolypin’s death for Russia. It reiterates the frequently uttered claim that had 
Stolypin not been killed, Russia would not have become involved in the First World War and 
the Bolshevik revolution and subsequent civil war would not have happened. At several 
points in the series such an outcome is predicted by, among others, Rasputin and Empress 
Mariia Fedorovna. In the concluding scene, the royal family and Rasputin are watching a film 
screening. The fragments show military parades, religious processions and images of the 
royal family. Then, the sound of a church Mass signals a shift in the images from those of 
peaceful Russia to those of the First World War. As the Tsar continues to watch the projec-
tion, it displays images of warfare: explosions, trenches, cannons, tanks, zeppelins, crashing 
airplanes and funerals. The intersecting close-ups of the face of the Tsar show emotions of 
confusion and distress. At the image of a sinking ship he closes his eyes. The subsequent im-
ages are evidently meant to indicate the destruction wrought by the revolutions of 1917 and 
the civil war. They show a series of Orthodox churches as their cupolas are being pulled 
down. The succession of images argues that Russia became involved in the First World War 
as a consequence of the death of Stolypin. Moreover, it suggests his death entailed the de-
struction of the monarchy and the Orthodox foundations of the Russian state. 
What, then, are the undrawn lessons of Stolypin? Several questions addressed in the series, 
either in the parliamentary discussions or through the representation of the revolutionaries, 
remain relevant today. Consider, for example, the (political) relations between Russians and 
other ethnic groups within the empire and the justification of Russian political supremacy, 
and the attempts to develop and populate Siberia. The apparent need for effective governmen-
tal control over the entire territory of the empire to prevent subversive or secessionist 
movements, exemplified by Finland, finds overt parallels with contemporary Russia and the 
terrorist threats from within the country’s territory. The two most telling lessons the series 
puts forward, however, are the following. First, there is its characterisation of visionary lead-
ership combined with a high level of authoritarianism, which are asserted as being essential to 
the proper governance of the new “democracy.” The negative representation of the Duma as 
being first and foremost an obstruction to the implementation of much-needed reforms, 
instead of an indispensable representative of the people’s interests, is a further critique of the 
superiority of a democratic system for Russia. Second, the series reiterates the argument that 
the state’s domestic enemies, either within or outside the government, are facilitated or even 
guided by enemies in the West who envy or fear the strength and potential of Russia. To 
counter these threats the state is allowed to take strong measures. As Stolypin states in his 
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defence of the Azef affair: a surgeon, to heal a sick person, must sometimes pick up a scalpel 
and draw blood. While it is difficult to prove that the representation of the CO in Stolypin... 
the Undrawn Lessons was intentionally shaped to correspond to and consolidate the notion 
that “foreign agents” are insidiously working against Russia’s interests, it is fair to argue that 
the portrayal of Stolypin’s (and by extension, the Russian state’s) enemies resonates with po-
litical issues dominating the public debate at the time when the series was first broadcast. 
Furthermore, this portrayal was the result of deliberate choices by those involved in the pro-
duction: it is quite possible to entertain other interpretations of the historical material in 
question.  
Apart from these implicit lessons, the final episode also presents the viewer with 
Stolypin’s political testament. In Kiev, as noted, Stolypin orders his servant, Kazimir, to tran-
scribe a message to the Tsar about how Russia should be reformed should he be assassinated. 
From the scene in which Stolypin’s possessions are archived, we learn that this political tes-
tament has mysteriously disappeared. The letter to the Tsar was in Stolypin’s briefcase, which 
was collected from the Okhrana. But its contents have gone missing. One of the men remarks 
tellingly that someone must have gotten there before them. The scene also implies that, 
although early-20th-century Russia was not spared the tragedies that Stolypin’s visionary 
leadership would have prevented, 21st-century Russia can learn from the memory of Stolypin 
and thus should not make the same mistakes. The way that state power (or, at least, the sensi-
ble assertion of it for the benefit of Russia) becomes personalised in the figure of Stolypin in 
the series is very similar to the personalisation of power under Putin. Therefore, the series 
appears to subscribe to the view that proper state leadership is not dependent on a type of 
government or a group of statesmen, but rather is connected to a singular extraordinary leader. 
In a discussion programme on Radio Svoboda commenting on the TV series, the journalist 
and television critic Sergei Varshavchik concluded that its director had a single idea in mind, 
namely “that the strengthening of the vertical of power is impossible without intelligent, tal-
ented reformers” (Качкаева 2006),95 an idea that was evidently aimed to draw a parallel with 
contemporary politics. This linkage ties in with the genealogy of great Russian reformers that 
was introduced earlier. Historian Nikita Sokolov, also taking part in the discussion, added in a 
similar vein that the modern style of language used in the series, not at all faithful to that of 
the time period portrayed, was explicitly chosen to encourage the viewer to connect past and 
present: 
                                                 
95 “что укрепление вертикали власти невозможно без умных, талантливых реформаторов.” 
 83 
I […] believe that this [the simplification of the language in the dialogue, M.W.] was done completely inten-
tionally in order to pull it together with the external situation as much as possible, and to embed a certain 
ideology in the mind of the viewer: that this represents a strong power, and that it should not be interfered 
with in any way but, rather, be allowed to operate. The TV series […] The Undrawn Lessons of Stolypin [sic] 
appears to say that one should not interfere with a great reformer. Not interfere with a great man who as-
sumes responsibility (Качкаева 2006).96  
There is little need to clarify whom Varshavchik’s immediate reply “Even for a third term 
in office” refers to.97 
The TV series was broadcast on state television well before President Putin began to refer 
to Stolypin as an exemplary figure on a regular basis, which started around 2008. While a 
significant number of the thematic constructions developed in the series continued to be asso-
ciated with Stolypin’s memory (as will become clear below), certain connotations did not. 
The more extreme, conspiratorial elements, especially those implicating Freemasonry, did not 
carry over into subsequent TV portrayals or into the official political discourse. 
The Name is Russia: Petr Stolypin 
The cross-media project The Name Is Russia, which set out to elect the greatest Russian of all 
time, prompted much Russian and even international discussion in 2008, as is explored in 
depth in the chapter on Aleksandr Nevskii. While it came as a surprise to many when Nevskii 
was crowned the winner, the runner-up may have raised even more eyebrows. Before the pro-
ject, Petr Stolypin was a familiar name among historians and politicians but his political 
legacy was little known beyond these professional circles. As noted earlier, opinion polls in-
dicate that Stolypin has never been very popular (Гудков 2010: 39), which makes it all the 
more surprising that Stolypin was elected the second most popular Russian of all time by the 
programme’s vote. The following analysis limits itself to the arguments that were put forward 
in the live show about Stolypin concerning his candidacy and to the way the project contrib-
uted to the discursive and visual consolidation of his memory image (see Chapter 4 for a 
comprehensive analysis of the project). The broadcast exemplifies the crucial role of remedia-
tion in the construction of new cultural memories. In this case, the TV series examined above 
                                                 
96 “Мне […] кажется, что это совершенно намеренная акция для того, чтобы сблизить по возможности и 
внешне ситуации, и внедрить в сознание зрителя некоторую идеологему о том, что это сильная власть, и 
ей надо никоим образом не мешать, а дать ей действовать. Сериал […] 'невыученные уроки Столыпина' 
выглядят так, что не надо мешать великому реформатору. Не надо мешать великому человеку, который 
берет на себя ответственность.” 
97 “Даже третий срок.” 
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provided the visually appealing material needed to boost the public’s familiarity with the 
long-dead politician. 
It is fair to assume, though, that the TV series about Stolypin reached only a limited audi-
ence when it was broadcast.98 Stolypin’s candidacy on The Name Is Russia, therefore, was an 
important event in the efforts to popularise his memory that had the potential to decisively 
shape the public’s perception of his political legacy. How the politician was characterised and 
portrayed in the opening statement and clip is particularly significant because of the authorita-
tive tone adopted by the programme: the introductory clip, a recurring feature in all episodes, 
comes across as a more or less factual summary of what is known about the person and what 
has shaped our understanding of his or her acts (e.g., films). It also outlines the themes and 
parameters for the subsequent discussion. The introduction of host Aleksandr Liubimov reit-
erates the frequently heard argument that Stolypin’s reforms might well have averted Russia’s 
involvement in the First World War and the 1917 revolutions: Stolypin was the person “about 
whom it was often said and continues to be said: if he had lived, […] three or four years 
would have sufficed and our country would have would taken a completely different path.”99 
The clip argues that Russia was in a state of crisis following the 1905 revolution and that 
times of crisis require a special type of leader: someone who possesses a thorough under-
standing of urgent problems and is always ready to act vigorously, someone who does not 
allow himself to be intimidated by any kind of resistance. Tsar Nicholas II recognised these 
capacities in Stolypin and appointed him minister, overruling Stolypin’s initial rejection of the 
offer. The state of affairs when he took office is characterised as a moment of political dead-
lock. Social unrest (high levels of unemployment, revolutionary tendencies, strikes, pogroms) 
was severe enough to warrant drastic measures, yet neither the Tsar nor the (democratic) op-
position was willing to grant the population civil rights and both tended instead towards the 
dictatorship of the state. Only Stolypin, it is claimed, acknowledged that dictatorship was a 
dead end (tupik) and reform was necessary to resolve the crisis; this, it is claimed, was also 
why he refused to cooperate with the opposition. Stolypin implements his reforms in the face 
of fierce political resistance and several attempts on his life, and the country starts to reap the 
rewards of his bold action. As we see archival footage of streets bustling with activity, 
                                                 
98 The actual reach of the series is difficult to estimate but may well be greater since the episodes were, and con-
tinue to be (as of 30 June 2016) widely available online for download or streaming on websites such as Youtube 
and Vkontakte. On the basis of the comments on download websites, it appears The Name Is Russia project 
actually provided an impetus to watch the 2006 TV series.  
99 “О нем часто говорили, и продолжают говорить: если бы он остался жив, […] то достаточно было трех, 
четырех лет и наша страна пошла по совершенно другому пути.” 
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railways, industry and long lines of women working efficiently, the voice-over enumerates the 
excellent results of Stolypin’s reform package: agricultural production increased dramatically 
and Russia’s economic position as well as its industrial production improved significantly. In 
fact, it is claimed, the brief period under Stolypin was the most productive period of the entire 
twentieth century in Russia. 
His policies’ evident success was nevertheless insufficient to stifle adverse criticism or halt 
terrorism. Failure to recognise the efficiency of his reforms came from all directions, the clip 
asserts: Stolypin was portrayed as the oppressor of revolution by forces on the left, as the de-
stroyer of the privileged position of the nobility in state structures by those on the political 
right, and the Empress, for her part, felt that Stolypin undeservedly overshadowed the Tsar. 
As the camera slowly zooms in on a photograph of Stolypin as he lies in state, his phrase that 
twenty years of stability would transform Russia beyond recognition is reiterated with the 
addition that he was given less than five. It is concluded, somewhat spitefully, that Stolypin 
did not receive the posthumous honour he deserved, neither in the final years of the tsarist 
empire nor thereafter. A modest monument, it is stated, was erected with funds raised by Altai 
farmers, but was soon destroyed in 1917. As the voice-over summarises: “The new Russia did 
not need Stolypin.”100 
The introduction incorporates extensive clips from the TV series: scenes of Stolypin before 
the Duma and the State Council, his fearless confrontation with revolutionaries in Saratov and 
the subsequent attempt on his life, Bogrov aiming his pistol at the prime minister in the Kiev 
opera house and Stolypin looking at his bloodstained hand after he has been shot. The scenes 
are played in slow motion, without the original sound and with two scenes superimposed onto 
each other. The theme of the scale model under construction as a visual metaphor of 
Stolypin’s efforts to (re)build Russia returns. But while in the TV series the model was left 
unfinished and forgotten, here it is effectively destroyed. The narrative telling of Stolypin’s 
political acts is interspersed with close-up shots of a hand piling up wooden blocks, placing a 
knight to protect it and showing a toy train effortlessly weaving its way through the newly 
built fortress of wooden houses, symbolizing the beneficence of Stolypin’s reforms. Follow-
ing his assassination, however, the train derails. The knight-figure is tipped over and brings 
down several towers in its fall. A panning shot shows the model built by Stolypin as it lies in 
ruins. As we return to the studio, Liubimov mentions the Fund for the Study of P.A. 
Stolypin’s Legacy, whose activities were discussed above. He holds up one of their 
                                                 
100 “Новой России Столыпин был уже не нужен.” 
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publications on Stolypin and discloses that the Fund was closely involved in the production of 
the show.  
In his plea for Stolypin, Mikhalkov emphasises four elements: first, he addresses how the 
opinions of most viewers about the prime minister were shaped by Soviet education and, 
therefore, are currently pronouncedly negative. Here, he emphasises Russia’s dire situation at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the extensive threat posed by terrorists and the fact 
that the number of people tried by the field courts-martial is small compared with how many 
endured Soviet repression. Second, Stolypin was a visionary who foresaw the rapid rise of 
China and completed the agrarian reforms initiated by Aleksandr II (e.g., the actual transfer of 
land to farmers). The effect of these reforms was far-reaching since, according to Mikhalkov, 
the population growth achieved under Stolypin of some thirty million people over the course 
of a decade resulted from a renewal of faith among the people in their potential and their fu-
ture prospects. Finally, only Stolypin took action to strengthen the Russian state, instead of 
engaging in liberal talk or arousing an insurgency among the population. Mikhalkov con-
cludes by stating that Stolypin surpasses other great heads of state, such as Aleksandr 
Nevskii, Aleksandr II, Catharine the Great and even Peter the Great, in his ability to combine 
a visionary capacity with decisiveness: “He foresaw and was able [to correct the country’s 
course, M.W.] and for that he paid with his life.”101 
Mikhalkov explicitly calls for reading the turmoil of 1905 in parallel to that of the Russia 
of the 1990s. After outlining the ailments of state and society and summarising the time when 
Stolypin took office as the “roaring 1900s”102 in clear analogy to the common catchphrase 
“the roaring 1990s” (likhie 90-e), he points out how this era was very similar to the Russian 
experience of the preceding twenty years. The statement is met with applause. The argument 
about population growth is paired with the statement that, from 1994 to 2004, there was zero 
population growth in Russia. According to Mikhalkov, the solution to overcome such a state 
of crisis, both then and now, is first to stabilise the country and then to implement extensive 
reforms: firm action against crime and corruption should be paired with a systemic reform 
package. 
(Then) Metropolitan Kirill endorses Mikhalkov’s plea and provides a religious and spiritu-
al rephrasing of its main points. He mentions that Stolypin’s efforts at religious reform, in 
parallel to European examples, was grounded in the notion of freedom of religion. At the 
same time, however, he continues, Stolypin understood the importance of Russian Orthodoxy 
                                                 
101 “Он предвидел, и мог, за что и поплатился жизню.” 
102 “лихие девятисотие.” 
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to the Russian people and the nation’s future, and regarded it as the first among religions. 
Metropolitan Kirill reiterates the idea that Stolypin was, anachronistically, a highly contempo-
rary politician. In fact, he states, his reforms should have been the foundation for Russia’s 
restructuring following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in particular with regard to its 
spirit (dukh): reforms that fail to take into account the needs and wishes of the people will not 
succeed, because the national character – the nation’s “thousand-year old form” (tysiachiletnii 
vid) – cannot be altered. 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, the late politician who served as prime minister from 1992 to 1998, 
echoes the claim that no other historical figure suits the current era as well as Stolypin, who, 
he states, uniquely combined being a reformer and a patriot (on par with Peter the Great and 
Aleksandr II). Stolypin’s reforms, he adds, continue to be relevant to all aspects of economics 
and governance, yet their implementation requires courage. Their effects could be drastic. 
Indeed, the implementation of Stolypin’s reforms in full would have averted not just the revo-
lutions of 1917 but the First World War as well. Poet Iurii Kublanovskii goes so far to say 
that where Pushkin is considered the zenith of Russian literature, Stolypin occupies this posi-
tion in politics. The tragedy of his death, he continues, equals that of the great poet. 
Renowned painter Il’ia Glazunov praises the agrarian reforms and Stolypin’s measures seek-
ing to stimulate migration to Siberia. To underpin his views, he recounts an anecdote from his 
visit to a village in Siberia founded around that time. A local granny, he asserts, recalled how 
farmers had received as much land as they could farm. 
A recurrent theme is how, in Russian history, reformers tend to be misunderstood by their 
contemporaries. The late physicist and television host Sergei Kapitsa argues that in Russian 
history, reformers are tragic figures and the occupation of prime minister is a dangerous one. 
The lesson to take away from the memory of Stolypin, he concludes, is how urgently the rela-
tion between reformers and the state apparatus needs to change. Andrei Sakharov, the director 
of the Instituut of Russian History, relates how opinion polls demonstrate continued societal 
dissensus about reformers such as Stolypin. This, he adds, is part of the “grievous path” 
(tiazhkii put’) they are fated to follow: reformers occupy the vanguard and have concrete 
ideas about addressing pressing matters, yet their actions are more rapidly transformative and 
far-reaching than society and the establishment are willing to accept – a fact that many had to 
pay for with their lives. According to Dmitrii Rogozin, the then representative of the Russian 
Federation to NATO, Stolypin exemplifies the certain failure of reforms in the absence of 
public support. As a direct result of his policies, which simultaneously advanced liberalisation 
and “crushed” (zakhimal) the political elite, Stolypin lacked the political and societal backing 
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he needed. For those viewers who failed to notice that the discussion about Stolypin and the 
fate of reformers in general is to be understood in reference to Putin, host Liubimov at one 
point reminds the viewer that there is a link between the two men. Somewhat out of place and 
without evident relevance to the ongoing discussion, he points out that Putin used to work and 
live in Dresden, the German city where Stolypin was born.  
In the discussion, there are remarkably few arguments opposed to Stolypin. One person 
who disagrees with the general sentiment of approval is Ziuganov, who, as chairman of the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, upholds Lenin’s assessment of Stolypin as the 
hangman-in-chief. This is not so surprising, since within the format of the show there is an 
obvious need for a dissenting voice to make the programme interesting. Ziuganov is the obvi-
ous candidate for this role. Yet his criticism is relatively mild. He contradicts the claim that 
the revolutionaries caused more bloodshed than Stolypin’s repressive measures and quotes 
Lev Tolstoi’s negative appraisal of him. He also argues that Stolypin should not have disman-
tled the obshchina – the traditional peasant communes – but should rather have taken its form 
to be the foundation for a new structuring of the state, since it constituted a genuinely Russian 
type of societal organisation. But Ziuganov actually praises Stolypin on several points, nota-
bly on his recognition of the necessity of addressing the agrarian population’s living 
conditions and of actively developing Siberia. In addition, he raises the popular conspiracy 
theory that the Tsar had been at odds with his prime minister and the fatal attack on Stolypin’s 
life was actually carried out by the Okhrana. Dmitrii Rogozin cites the example of Sergei 
Vitte, Stolypin’s predecessor, to frame his argument that, indeed, there is occasion for criti-
cism. In the opinion of Vitte, Stolypin’s liberal reputation by no means corresponded with the 
reality of his actions. Mikhalkov objects to Rogozin’s remark on the grounds that Vitte har-
boured a grudge against his successor and therefore does not constitute a neutral source of 
information. Sergei Kapitsa voices another reservation. He points out that Mikhalkov mistak-
enly idealises the economic progress achieved under Stolypin: in the 21th century, he states, 
the most successful economies are structured in a fundamentally different way, with an em-
phasis on service industries, not agriculture. To imitate Stolypin’s reforms in any way would, 
therefore, be erroneous. 
Despite these instances of criticism, Mikhalkov takes advantage of his position as chair to 
summarise the discussion in a positive light. He asserts that of all the candidates, the discus-
sion regarding Stolypin was most concerned with debating the state of contemporary Russia 
and the problems it faces. This is the case, he asserts, because Stolypin “concretely” (real’no) 
demonstrated the country’s potential for rapid development. He repeats the claim that had 
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Stolypin been given fifteen or twenty years in power, Russia would have become an entirely 
different country. And therefore, he concludes, Russia needs the memory of Stolypin “like 
oxygen” (kak vozdukh). The significance of Mikhalkov’s sponsorship of the Stolypin myth 
should not be underestimated. According to a 2008 poll commissioned by Kommersant and 
conducted by the independent Levada Centre and VTsIOM, Mikhalkov ranked seventh in the 
top 100 of the Russian elite, a list topped by Putin, Medvedev and singer Alla Pugachova 
(Алексеев 2008). Polls by the Levada Centre have shown that Mikhalkov was considered to 
be the most influential person of the societal and cultural elite of Russia in 2010 and 2011, 
ranking above Patriarch Kirill (“Россияне назвали представителей элиты страны” 2012). 
In the overall list, including politicians, businessmen, cultural figures, journalists, stars of 
popular culture and high-profile athletes, Mikhalkov has been ranked the eighth (2010) and 
seventh (2011) most influential person in Russia (“Россияне назвали представителей элиты 
страны” 2012). Moreover, his position as chair of the jury allowed Mikhalkov to significantly 
influence the course of the discussions and authoritatively summarise the meaning and rele-
vance of the candidates at the end of each episode. There is, however, reason to suspect that 
Mikhalkov had a say in the production of the show in ways that go beyond what is customary 
for a panellist. When, in the first show, Mikhalkov is instituted as chairman by unanimous 
vote, the host substantiates his capacities to occupy the position by referring to the role 
Mikhalkov played in his film 12 (2007). Incongruous to the flow of the show, a clip from the 
film is shown: an obvious case of improper advertising.  
In an interview published on the project’s website, Mikhalkov answers questions from 
viewers and again emphasises that “Petr Arkadevich stood before the exact same problems we 
face today” (“Режиссер Никита Михалков отвечает на вопросы зрителеи проекта ‘Имя 
Россия’” 2008).103 Here it becomes clear that Mikhalkov’s perception of the nature of Rus-
sian politics and culture is more closely interwoven with religious elements than had been 
apparent in the TV show. One of the questions concerns how to form highly educated indi-
viduals with high moral standards in today’s religiously and nationally multifaceted world. 
The answer, Mikhalkov claims, lies in an “Orthodox upbringing” (pravoslavnoe vospitanie): 
“Not in the sense of a parish school, but in the sense of attachment to those cultural traditions, 
roots, and moral criteria familiar to a Russian person” (“Режиссер Никита Михалков 
отвечает на вопросы зрителеи проекта ‘Имя Россия’” 2008).104 This Orthodox upbringing 
                                                 
103 “Петр Аркадьевич стоял абсолютно перед теми же проблемами, перед которыми сегодня стоим мы.” 
104 “Не в смысле церковно-приходской школы, а в смысле принадлежности к тем культурным традициям, 
корням, к тому привычному для русского человека чравственному критерию.” 
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should have as its aim the fostering of resilience, a kind of “national immunity” (natsional’nyi 
immunitet) that enables one to act and think freely. This national immunity, he continues, 
consists of: 
grandmother’s fairytales, of all that is absorbed together with the mother’s milk, including the words of the 
Divine Liturgy on Sunday that children and also adults do not always understand. But in this lies a mystical 
connection across the centuries, because Aleksandr Nevskii and Dmitrii Donskoi heard those exact same 
words. It is a sacred connection! It is the bond [underlying] our national genetic code (ibidem).105  
This “national genetic code” view closely resembles the “civilisational code” argument 
frequently used by (then) Metropolitan Kirill, including during The Name Is Russia broad-
casts. Mikhalkov invests great significance in The Name Is Russia and what a vote for 
Stolypin and, as is evident from his choice of words, for Putin would signify: “I believe that, 
in order to prevent such a disaster, we need enlightened conservatism and armed evolution – 
and Stolypin is exactly that. Therefore I vote for him and I advise you to do the same if you 
want to live a normal life” (ibidem).106 
On 26 December 2008, in the final days of voting, a discussion appeared on the project’s 
LiveJournal blog on the likelihood of Stolypin winning the competition. The author of the 
initial post firmly believed this would happen: the Russian people, he proclaimed, has under-
stood the importance of Stolypin and will cast their votes for him, despite the efforts of 
provocateurs to meddle with the results to have Stalin win (ratnik07 2008. See also Chapter 
4). One of the users responding to the post is equally convinced Stolypin will be chosen, yet 
for entirely different reasons. He summarises: 
1. N.S. Mikhalkov is used to being first (whenever possible) and would not have agreed to take part in the 
project The Name Is Russia if he had doubts about “the success” of his “defendant.” 
2. The voting results of this project are a peculiar “New Year’s present and parting words” for a person we 
all know. 
If this project had taken place in, say, 2006 then, I assume, N.S. Mikhalkov would have “defended” Peter I or 
Aleksandr II for reasons clear to all (“0987655” 2008).107 
                                                 
105 “бабушкины сказки, это все то, что впитывается вместе с молоком матери, в т.ч. и слова божественной 
Литургии в воскресенье, которые детишки да и взрослые не всегда понимают. Но в этом есть 
мистическая связь с веками, потому что те же слова слышал Александр Невский и Дмитрий Донской. 
Это сакральная связь! Это связь национального генетического кода.”  
106  “Я считаю, чтобы такого кошмара не было, нужен просвешенный консерватизм и вооруженная 
эволпция – а это и есть Столыпин. Поэтому я за него и голосую и Вам советую это сделать, если вы 
хотите нормально жить”. 
107 “1. Н.С. Михалков привык быть (где возможно) только первым и не согласился бы участвовать в 
проекте ‘Имя Россия’, если бы сомневался ‘в успехе’ своего ‘подзащитного’. 2. Итоги голосования этого 
проекта – своеобразный ‘новогодний подарок и напутствие’ известному всем лицу. Если бы этот проект 
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In the end, however, Stolypin failed to secure the victory. Whether the outcome of the pro-
ject was rigged and the project indeed was a New Year’s present for Putin remains difficult to 
prove (we will return to allegations of falsification in Chapter 4). What is certain, however, is 
that the project’s producers did their utmost to support the candidacy of Stolypin – the outsid-
er who was evidently meant to be associated with the (then) prime minister. Stolypin’s 
surprise appearance among the twelve finalists, along with his high-profile representative and 
unexpected (supposedly popular) success, serves as an indication that, in 2008, a high-level 
effort was underway to popularise Stolypin’s memory among the general public. To do so, the 
project built upon the previous TV series to shape and consolidate a visual and moving image 
of the great reformer. The Name Is Russia demonstrates a definitive reorientation of populari-
sation efforts from the intellectual and political elites, who were to take direct inspiration 
from Stolypin’s policies and ideas, to the mass audience, for whom the symbolic representa-
tion of exceptional leadership in times of crisis took precedence. The shift from the policy to 
the symbolic domain both necessitated and was facilitated by the creation of sufficient histor-
ical and visual literacy concerning Stolypin: a clear, accessible and relatable set of images, 
catchphrases and explicit analogies with current issues. The Name Is Russia catered to this 
need. 
Petr Stolypin: A Shot at Russia 
The documentary Petr Stolypin: A Shot at Russia. 20th Century, narrated and directed by 
Nikita Mikhalkov, was broadcast by Russia 1 in 2012. Many of the themes introduced in the 
2006 TV series and by Mikhalkov’s plea for him on The Name Is Russia reappear in the doc-
umentary. Two years before, Mikhalkov had explicitly mentioned Stolypin in his political 
manifesto propagating “enlightened conservatism” as one of the politicians who abided by its 
principles (Михалков 2010). The documentary reiterates the main tenets of the manifesto, 
which emphasised the importance of a strong vertical of power, gradual and state-guided re-
form, and the centrality of tradition and the Orthodox faith in safeguarding the Russian 
nation. The documentary was produced on the occasion of the Stolypin commemorative year 
and was broadcast in prime time on 14 April, Stolypin’s birthday.108 As can be expected of 
Mikhalkov, it is aesthetically pleasing and carries an emotionally persuasive soundtrack. To 
                                                                                                                                                        
проводился хотя бы в 2006 г., то, предполагаю, Н.С. Михалков 'защищал' бы Петра I или Александра II 
по понятным для всех причинам”. 
108 Reruns of the documentary aired on 3 and 4 July 2014. 
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increase its credentials, the documentary employs multiple experts.109 While the production 
had most likely been initiated at an earlier time (the plans for the Stolypin year were first an-
nounced in 2010), the concurrence of its premiere with the Russian protest movement of 
2011-2012 gives it particular relevance. As will become clear below, Mikhalkov has in fact 
commented directly on the link between the protesters and the power struggles faced by the 
prerevolutionary politician. Therefore, the documentary should be viewed in the context of 
the state’s response to the growing social unrest that culminated in street protests during the 
winter of 2011. 
The documentary describes Stolypin’s life from birth until death and comes close to pre-
senting him as a martyr. It is argued that after becoming minister of the interior, Stolypin 
sought to cooperate with the Duma but all attempts at collaboration were thwarted by the un-
willingness of (several of) the representative parties. Mikhalkov personally acts out several of 
the prime minister’s signature speeches in front of the Duma – that is, considerably abbreviat-
ed and edited versions of them, as had also been the case in the TV series. The image 
presented of Stolypin is an idealised one: apart from being a political visionary, Stolypin is 
modest, economical, pious, generous, dedicated to his country and the Tsar, and is a loving 
family man to boot. Repeated here is the idea, which we saw in the TV series, that an affec-
tionate character is hidden behind an outwardly stern appearance. The documentary by 
extension implies that the same holds for Putin, who is commonly characterised by his stern 
posture in public appearances. Meanwhile, as Stolypin is dedicating his life to reforming his 
country, his future assassin, Dmitrii Bogrov, is pursuing his studies in Europe, eagerly reading 
anarchist literature – and, as it turns out, he is not alone. According to Mikhalkov, cities like 
Munich and Paris were inhabited by extensive groups of high-born Russians who enjoyed 
criticising the state of Russian politics from a safe distance (“It was fashionable”110). To pro-
vide Bogrov’s character with some depth and explain how such a fortunate young man could 
be capable of committing political murder, the viewer is informed that he was Jewish, liked to 
gamble, and had the slightly morbid hobby of collecting insects (an actor playing Bogrov 
emotionlessly drives a pin through a beetle to attach it to a display board). Mikhalkov’s rea-
soning is, at times, flawed and founded on hindsight, for instance when he explains that 
                                                 
109 The experts are historians Valentin Shelokhaev (associated with the Fund for the Study of P.A. Stolypin’s 
Legacy), Aleksandr Logunov (Dean of the Faculty of History, Politology and Law at the Russian State 
University for the Humanities [RGGU]), Natal’ia Shatina (RGGU), and Kirill Solov’ev (RGGU). The latter has 
published extensively on Stolypin and also appeared on the talkshow The Trial of Time as expert on Tsar 
Nicholas II and his contemporaries. 
110 “Это модно.” 
 93 
Bogrov chose to kill Stolypin instead of the Tsar “because Stolypin was more dangerous than 
the emperor. Because precisely he represented what could have saved Russia from terrible 
revolution and bloody civil war.”111 
Implicitly and at times quite explicitly the documentary constructs the political opposition 
to be enemies of the state. As a result, it provides justification for repressive measures and the 
limitation of democratic rights. Members of the opposition are portrayed as materialistic, self-
ish individuals who lack a real or viable vision for Russia, block the leadership’s attempts at 
constructive reform and steer a path that will result in bloody revolution (again viewed retro-
spectively). But foremost, and this is where direct parallels with the contemporary political 
discourse come to the fore, members of the opposition are again depicted as “foreign agents” 
who receive funds from abroad and spend a lot of time in the West. In this sense, they are put 
on par with those fortunate Russian youth with anarchist inclinations who have been educated 
in the West, such as Bogrov. Moreover, it is intimated that they are willing to abandon the 
country as soon as they get the chance. In other words, all forms of opposition are equated 
with treason towards the national cause. This bears a striking similarity to the arguments used 
in some propagandistic non-historical TV programmes of the time. For instance, there are 
clear analogies between the representation of the early-twentieth-century opposition and ter-
rorist groups and the discursive strategies used to negatively depict the leaders of the Russian 
protest movement in the two documentaries broadcast by NTV in 2012 under the title Anato-
my of a Protest (Anatomiia protesta). Consider, for instance, the claim that Sergei Udal’tsov 
received funding from the Georgian state official Givi Targamadze, who allegedly was also 
behind the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, to attempt to overthrow the current regime in 
Russia. Furthermore, the documentary about Stolypin echoes the opinions expressed in one of 
the articles by Putin published in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections, in which he 
argues in favour of “stable development.” In addition to an exposition of the benefits of such 
a strategy, the article offers a character sketch of its main adversary:  
A constantly recurring problem in Russian history is the pursuit of part of its elite of rupture, of revolution 
instead of consistent development. Meanwhile, not just the Russian experience, but also the overall global 
experience demonstrates the malignancy of historical bursts: of rushing forward and subversion without 
creation (Путин 2012).112  
                                                 
111 “потому что Столыпин опаснее, чем император. Потому, что именно за ним стояло то, что могло бы 
избавить Россию от страшной революции и кровавой гражданской войны.” 
112 “Постоянно повторяющаяся в истории проблема России – это стремление части ее элит к рывку, к 
революции вместо последовательного развития. Между тем не только российский опыт, весь мировой 
опыт показывает пагубность исторических рывков: забегания вперед и ниспровержения без созидания.” 
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It is intimated that such “revolutionaries” do not represent the will of the majority of the 
population and, as a result, can rule only by making deceptive promises of a brighter future. 
Such a situation, Putin claimed, is untenable, even undemocratic:  
There can be no real democracy without the acceptance of politics by the majority of the population, without 
it reflecting the interests of this majority. Yes, it is possible to capture a significant part of society with ring-
ing slogans [and] images of a wonderful future for a short period. But when people do not see themselves in 
that future afterwards they will turn away from politics and societal challenges for a long time. This has oc-
curred multiple times in our history (ibidem).113 
Any kind of broad popular support for non-incremental change, even if achieved in a dem-
ocratic setting, should thus be seen as the result of the public being deceived. 
Despite Mikhalkov’s reputation as a monarchist, his depiction of Tsar Nicholas II is mark-
edly negative.114 The Tsar is characterised as an alienated ruler who has lost touch with his 
people and with the overall socio-political reality that surrounds him. Unlike Stolypin, he fails 
to recognise the severity and imminence of the revolutionary threat and its potential to disrupt 
the very foundations of the Russian Empire. As proof, Mikhalkov reads an inscription on one 
of the walls in the Winter Palace. Using Nicholas’ nickname, it reads: “Niki 1902. Looking at 
the Hussars. 7 March.” As he stands at the exact place where the Tsar looked out from the 
palace window, Mikhalkov fantasises about how it would have been that day, some two years 
before the birth of Aleksei, the heir to the throne. The inscription was made sixty days before 
the fatal attack on Interior Minister Dmitrii Sipiagin when, as Mikhalkov emphasises, “the 
terror” begins. As the soundtrack takes on a threatening tone and the viewer is presented with 
feature-film excerpts of terrorist attacks manipulated to appear aged, he claims that the in-
scription demonstrates how the Tsar was unaware of or blind to the impending upheavals. 
Melancholically, he sketches the years leading up to the 1905 revolution as the calm before 
the storm. Referring to Nicholas’ diaries, he claims that the Tsar lacked any interest in politi-
cal matters, conservatively prioritised the maintenance of stability and valued family life first 
and foremost. Following the attack on Stolypin’s dacha on Aptekarskii Island in 1906, the 
family moves to the Winter Palace where, Mikhalkov asserts, the imperial family has been “in 
hiding.” The palace, he continues, more closely resembled a crypt (sklep) for the Romanov 
                                                 
113  “Не может быть реальной демократии без того, чтобы политика принималась бы большинством 
населения, отражала бы интересы этого большинства. Да, возможно на короткий период увлечь 
значительную часть общества звонкими лозунгами, образами прекрасного будущего; но если потом 
люди не увидят себя в этом будущем – они надолго отвернутся и от политики, и от общественных задач. 
Так уже не раз бывало в нашей истории.” 
114 Mikhalkov appears to particularly admire Tsar Aleksandr III, whom he impersonated in his film Barber of 
Siberia [Сибирский цирюльник] (1998). 
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family at that time. The Tsar’s withdrawal from the people stands in direct opposition to 
Stolypin’s drive to continue to engage with the ordinary man, despite the risks this posed to 
his life.  
To enliven and underpin its argument, the documentary draws upon various types of doc-
uments, visuals and material objects, making extensive use of archival film and photographs 
as well as feature-film excerpts.115 Many of these visual materials have been manipulated in 
some way: feature-film is shown in black and white, photographs are altered to simulate 
depth. Mikhalkov follows in Stolypin’s footsteps and visits all the significant locations relat-
ing to his life and legacy (among others, the family estate, Saratov, the Kiev opera and the 
Kiev-Pechersk Lavra). A total of six letters by Stolypin and four by the Tsar are read aloud. 
Repeatedly, material links between past and present are highlighted: Mikhalkov touches the 
very desk at which Stolypin sat when the attack on the dacha occurred and shows the family 
mansion that has since turned into a ruin, the (now) empty grand ballrooms of the Winter 
Palace; the camera zooms in on the very chair in the Kiev opera where Stolypin was sitting 
moments before he was shot. The documentary continues to build upon the visual image of 
Stolypin that was first established in the TV series and remediated in the introductory clip on 
The Name Is Russia. Instead of using fragments from the TV series, however, Mikhalkov shot 
new scenes in which the same actor, Oleg Klishin, plays Stolypin. What is striking about 
these scenes is Stolypin’s silence. In a way, they function as the moving versions of the pho-
tographs that are shown, as an animation of memory images or evocations of the past. This 
effectively establishes and affirms temporal distance. The only occasions when Stolypin’s 
“voice” can be heard occur through the intermediary of Mikhalkov. In a metaphorical sense 
there are, then, two Stolypins in the documentary: a historical figure (in photographic image 
and silent impersonation) and an anachronistic presence who literally speaks to and from the 
present as Mikhalkov acts out key speeches. The high degree of adaptation in the speeches 
affirms the split of “Stolypin” into a past (historical) and current (memory) image: the origi-
nal appearance is left intact (photographs, the static impersonation by Klishin, the showing of 
the pedestal from where he delivered his speeches) even as its content is made more malleable 
(in the rephrasing of statements and how they speak about the present). Mikhalkov was not 
the first to climb onto the Duma’s pedestal and read a Stolypin speech on camera. In his his-
torical TV series The Russian Empire (Russkaia imperiia, 2000-2003), Leonid Parfenov opted 
for the same set-up. Yet Mikhalkov’s performance – his theatricality in acting out the speech-
                                                 
115 E.g., taken from A Rider Named Death [Всадник по имени смерть] (Karen Shakhnazarov, 2004). 
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es – in addition to his personal political ambitions create a potent association between him 
and the historical figure he is reanimating.  
Compared to Mikhalkov’s defence of Stolypin on The Name Is Russia, the documentary 
places far greater emphasis on the prime minister’s noble birth and religiosity. In fact, the 
documentary’s portrayal of Stolypin suggests that Mikhalkov strongly identifies with the poli-
tician on a personal level, as it echoes important aspects of the image Mikhalkov has created 
of himself: both are of noble descent, are intelligent and ostensibly good-intentioned men 
who, through circumstance and hard work, find themselves in positions close to the powers 
that be. They use their privileged position in society to support and strengthen the state in-
stead of acting in opposition to it. It is intimated that, in this respect, Stolypin, and by analogy 
Mikhalkov, differ from those members of the so-called intelligentsia who manoeuvre against 
state leadership as if by default. They represent a type of “serious” intelligentsia whose ac-
tions are truly beneficial to the nation as they balance, on the one hand, rubbing shoulders 
with those in power with, on the other hand, maintaining a constructive critical stance on po-
litical matters. A type of intellectual who is sympathetic to the well-being of the people, with 
a clear vision for the future development of the state and the nation. Mikhalkov has comment-
ed on the connection between himself and the prime minister in a local news item shot in 
Saratov, where he was recording scenes for the documentary (“Михалков ‘замахнулся’ на 
губернатора” 2012). In the interview he states that he has recently discovered he is directly 
related to Stolypin on his father’s side. When exactly and in what context this discovery was 
made (and whether he deliberately searched for this information) remain unclear. In the inter-
view, Mikhalkov reiterates the lesson to be drawn from Stolypin’s tragic fate, namely that it 
should be acknowledged that, in Russia, a strong vertical of power is a necessary protective 
condition, without which the country will slide into chaos. In apparent response to a direct 
question, Mikhalkov asserts that Putin is the leader who comes closest to Stolypin.  
On multiple occasions, Mikhalkov has demonstrated that his interest in the memory of 
Stolypin is not so much historical as it is symbolic. According to Mikhalkov, developments in 
contemporary Russia in many ways mirror those of Stolypin’s time; if we fail to recognise 
and learn from the mistakes made a century ago, history might well repeat itself. In a small 
article advocating the contemporary relevance of Stolypin, Mikhalkov vividly sums up the 
condition the Russian state was in when “the great reformer” took up office as prime minister 
in 1906: 
Corroded by the poison of Nechaev’s radicalism and liberal nihilism, Russian society was falling apart. It 
could and would not unite out of love for something. It united around hatred. 
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A weak power without authority that enabled a monstrous wave of terrorism. A state system eroded by cor-
ruption. The disgraceful defeat of the Russian army in the war with Japan. And even more disgraceful was 
the attitude of the Russian liberal intelligentsia towards this defeat, sending congratulatory telegrams to the 
Mikado. 
An immense budgetary deficit, impending financial collapse, halting business, outflow of capital abroad. Au-
thorities are begging Western governments and bankers for loans. 
Separatism in the borderlands. Suppression of the peasants. Societal feelings of hopelessness and disbelief, 
spiritual crisis, mass alcoholism, a decreasing birth rate. 
The tumultuous 1900s… It rings familiar, doesn’t it? (Михалков 2012)116 
The choice of words in the final sentence makes it abundantly clear that the characterisation 
of the first decade of the twentieth century is meant to refer to the “roaring 1990s” in equal 
measure. In Mikhalkov’s subsequent praise for how the prime minister managed to “save the 
country” from this state of despair in a mere five years, the name of Stolypin appears to be 
interchangeable with that of Putin. Furthermore, what Stolypin would have wanted for Russia 
in the 21st century is what Mikhalkov symbolically calls “the Russian cross”: “the organically 
connected vertical axis of state power and horizontal axis of culturе and civil society” 
(ibidem).117 
In this vision of Russia, inspired by Stolypin’s legacy, there is no place for an independent 
opposition. At this point in the argument, Mikhalkov abandons the metaphorical intermediary 
of Stolypin and voices direct criticism of the Russian protest movement, whose members he 
condescendingly refers to as “mink fur collars” and “our satiated, glamorous ‘revolution-
aries’” (Михалков 2012):118 
The self-appointed leaders of our cashmere opposition employ the affronted sense of justice felt by ordinary 
people for their own PR. But, when they return from the raving rallies and get back behind the tall fences of 
                                                 
116 “Разъедаемое ядом нечаевщины и либерального нигилизма, русское общество распадалось. Оно не 
могло и не хотело объединиться на любви к чему-либо. Оно сплачивалось вокруг ненависти. Слабая 
безавторитетная власть, допустившая чудовищный разгул терроризма. Разъедающая госаппарат 
коррупция. Позорное поражение русской армии в войне с Японией. И еще более позорное отношение к 
этому поражению русской либеральной интеллигенции, посылавшей поздравительные телеграммы 
микадо. Колоссальный бюджетный дефицит, опасность финансового краха, остановившиеся 
предприятия, отток капитала за границу. Власти клянчат кредиты у западных правительств и банкиров. 
Сепаратизм окраин. Бесправие крестьян. В обществе чувство безысходности и неверия, духовный 
кризис, массовый алкоголизм, падение рождаемости. Лихие 1900-е... Не правда ли, что-то знакомое?” 
117 “русский крест”; “органично соединяющий вертикаль государственной власти и горизонталь куль-
туры и гражданского общества.” 
118 “‘норковые воротнички’”; “наших сытых, гламурных ‘революционеров’.” 
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their Rublevskie dachas119 and London mansions, they are unlikely to ever give thought to how they them-
selves could help their not-as-loudmouthed and considerably less fortunate compatriots (ibidem).120 
Paraphrasing one of Stolypin’s most famous quotes, Mikhalkov drives home the point of 
his dislike of persons such as Aleksei Naval’nyi and Ksenia Sobchak: “Only they, who have 
somewhere else to go, are in need of great upheavals. But they, who want to live here, are in 
need of a great Russia” (ibidem).121 Interestingly, in the Saratov interview referred to earlier, 
he differentiates between the leaders of the protest movement (“loudmouths and […] political 
weathercocks and prostitutes”122) and the majority of protesters, who, he asserts, were simply 
demanding answers about certain issues and want to cooperate with the state (“Михалков 
‘замахнулся’ на губернатора” 2012). While the views of the first group should be dismissed 
outright, Putin should seriously reckon with the concerns of the latter body. Vladimir Nadein 
has aptly summarised the collapse of historical time that Mikhalkov seeks to achieve through 
the memory of Stolypin as follows:  
This is why Mikhalkov needed Stolypin. To make it appear as if we inherited identical legacies from the past 
and are therefore equally obliged to cherish them. To stir up [our] historical experience with non-systemic 
opposition: as if to say, Stolypin already cautioned the people about [Boris] Nemtsov and [Valeriia] 
Novodvorskaia. But the premier was shot and where are our two-three bedroom apartments, fur coats and 
“zhiguli” [type of car, M.W.] now? Watch out, well-behaved, genuine Russians, do not miss [the target] 
again (Надеин 2012b).123 
The message that Mikhalkov seeks to put across to the viewer in his documentary deviates 
little from his other statements about Stolypin and Russian politics in general made around 
the same time, although he does attempt to stay close to the historical parallel. In the final 
scene, he comes close to spelling out the contemporary political relevance of Stolypin’s 
legacy. In the scene, we see Mikhalkov standing in the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, where Stolypin 
lies buried. He explains how the Russian state collapsed and civil war ensued after Stolypin’s 
                                                 
119 Elite residential estates on Rublevskoe Shosse in Moscow. 
120  “Самозваные лидеры нашей кашемировой оппозиции используют живое оскорбленное чувство 
справедливости нормальных людей для собственного пиара. Однако, возвращаясь с тусовоч- 
ных митингов за высокие заборы своих рублевских дач и в лондонские особ- 
няки, они вряд ли хоть раз задумались – чем сами могли бы помочь своим не столь крикливым и гораздо 
менее благополучным соотечественникам.” 
121 “Великие потрясения нужны тем, кому есть куда уехать. А великая Россия – тем, кто хочет здесь 
жить.” 
122 “крикунов и […] политических флюгов и проституток.” 
123  “Вот зачем понадобился Столыпин Михалкову. Чтобы сделать вид, будто все мы получили от 
прошлого одинаковое наследство, а потому в равной мере обязаны им дорожить. Чтобы натравить 
исторический опыт на внесистемную оппозицию: вот, мол, еще Столыпин предостерегал народ против 
Немцова и Новодворской. Но застрелили премьера – и где теперь наши двушки-трешки, шубы и 
'жигули'? Смотрите, благонравные истинно-русские, не промахнитесь вновь.” 
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death. Millions died and millions more were displaced, leaving everything behind. Mikhalkov 
asks rhetorically: “Did these people think about how terribly their lives would change, all 
because they failed to listen to the one person who knew what to do and was capable of stop-
ping this destruction?” He cites examples of politicians who challenged Stolypin, only to die 
“in poverty” in exile, far from Russia. After a long, meaningful pause, Mikhalkov continues:  
But it was too late. And now, when we look back at that time, the feeling arises that, maybe, today we need 
to remember Stolypin more than ever before. It makes sense to remember this situation where everything was 
on the brink [of collapse] but could still be saved. […] I believe it makes sense to think about this and espe-
cially for those, who disdainfully, ironically, spit upon their past, their present, without considering what the 
future might hold for them after that. It is time to learn how to learn [from the past]. 
The message here is unspoken but clear: for Mikhalkov, learning from the past means that 
the power and position of Putin – Stolypin’s contemporary counterpart – should not be chal-
lenged. The memory of Stolypin provides him with the narrative material he needs to shape 
and spread his view of proper Russian governance. 
Given Mikhalkov’s longstanding admiration for Stolypin, as well as his reputation and his 
position in the film industry – e.g., the director of the major production company TriTe, the 
chairman of the Union of Cinematographers of the Russian Federation – it comes as no sur-
prise that he was the person to give shape to the principle documentary on Russian television 
that marked the government-backed celebrations of the Stolypin commemorative year.124 The 
political message put forward through his interpretation of Stolypin’s policies and personal 
characteristics is first and foremost a propagation of Mikhalkov’s own political manifesto. 
And while his ideas about “enlightened conservatism” are, to a large extent, compatible with 
the current government line – and the official interpretation of Stolypin as an exemplary polit-
ical figure – they are not the same thing. 
Conclusion 
With the incorporation of the memory of Stolypin into its symbolic repertoire, the Russian 
government deviated from the logic underpinning its memory politics in two ways. First, it 
put forth a new cultural memory with little remediation history or developed symbolism. Even 
the historical figure of Stolypin was hardly known among the general public. Second, it 
                                                 
124 In 2015, Putin awarded Mikhalkov with the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland,” “for his contribution to the 
development of Russian culture, cinematic and theatrical art, and his many years of creative activity”. He re-
ceived the highest class of the award, a First Class Order, which is also the highest civilian decoration of the 
state, having previously received the Fourth, Third and Second Class Orders (Президент Российской 
Федерации 2015). 
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exalted a person who had been perceived negatively in Soviet historiography. This negative 
appraisal of Stolypin had been disseminated via the history education of the Soviet period, 
and for a large part of the adult population constituted their only knowledge of the politician. 
Why, then, did the Kremlin embrace the memory of Stolypin? The explanation lies beyond 
the Kremlin’s walls. The appropriation of the memory of Stolypin, in fact, demonstrates how 
the Russian government’s memory politics is, in essence, opportunistic and reactive. It simply 
jumped on the Stolypin bandwagon, riding the societal momentum that other actors were cre-
ating. In this case, the momentum can be attributed to two memory sponsors. First, the efforts 
of the Foundation for the Study of the Legacy of P.A. Stolypin contributed significantly to-
wards stimulating (scholarly) interest in Stolypin and made resources available to the general 
public in the form of (e.g.) publications. The foundation actively lobbied the government to 
commemorate Stolypin’s achievements long before the latter demonstrated serious interest in 
them. Second and more decisive was the sponsorship by Nikita Mikhalkov. As one of the 
most influential figures in contemporary Russia, he consistently and continuously pushed the 
memory. Drawing upon his considerable network, societal standing and influence in the tele-
vision industry, he explored several platforms to reach a wide audience with his message. 
Some of these attempts turned out to be dead ends, at least temporarily. The plan to erect a 
statue, for instance, was realised in an actual monument only more than a decade after it had 
been proposed. Other efforts had great societal effect. Mikhalkov’s appearance as the repre-
sentative of Stolypin on The Name Is Russia should be regarded as a watershed moment in the 
development of the memory of Stolypin as a “political myth.” 
Stolypin’s success in The Name of Russia, I would argue, gave the government its final 
push to develop a public, state-sponsored image of the prerevolutionary politician in earnest. 
The establishment of the P.A. Stolypin Medal in spring 2008, as the initial online voting for 
the project had only just begun, as well as earlier references to Stolypin in speeches by both 
Putin and Medvedev, point to a pre-existing intention to move in this direction. Yet, even the 
medal was closely linked to specific policy areas. The initiative is likely to have been part of 
the liberal reorientation under Medvedev as he took office as president. That is, it acknowl-
edged the appreciation for Stolypin in political circles. There is little to suggest that the medal 
aimed for wide societal resonance. After The Name Is Russia, however, references to Stolypin 
in a symbolic rather than historical sense became ever more frequent. This was especially the 
case in statements by Putin. It was only then that the memory of Stolypin acquired a more 
broadly defined meaning: Stolypin as “the great reformer.” The main tenets of this memory 
image were not developed by the Russian government. They were taken from the cultural 
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memory image of Stolypin as it had been shaped on the television screen. This memory im-
age, with its roots in the immediate post-colour revolutions period, contained all the 
ingredients necessary for its use as an anti-opposition narrative. 
While the narrative of post-revolution, implicit in the myth of the End of the Time of 
Troubles (to be discussed later), suited the political circumstances of Putin’s first and second 
presidential terms, the shift from consolidating to maintaining political power required a re-
configuration of the regime’s historical vocabulary. The figure of Petr Stolypin, constructed 
here as the great but unrecognised visionary leader of his time, has filled this gap in memory 
symbolism. Stability “Stolypin-style” became the new brand of stability-oriented state patriot-
ism, which taps into the societal fears and insecurities that are connected to memories of the 
1990s but is geared to fit a situation in which recent achievements have to be safeguarded 
against the perceived or imagined threat posed by domestic rather than foreign enemies. In-
deed, for the Russian government, “[t]he constant threats of chaos and an internal ‘war of all 
against all’ were intended to curb its own intrinsic contradictions” (Penzin & Budraitskis 
2013: 122). It formed the core of its raison d’être, namely “stability based on catastrophes” 
(ibidem). Instead of promising a stable and prosperous future, the Stolypin myth cautions that 
recent achievements can all too easily be lost again. In this sense, the adoption of the myth of 
Stolypin, and the particular way it was shaped, indicate that the regime correctly anticipated 
that its next challenge would come from within in the form of increasing societal opposition – 
which, indeed, culminated in the street protests of 2011-2012.  
The Stolypin case study provides a significant example of how television preceded official 
memory politics in the process of shaping a new political memory figure in response to cur-
rent political challenges. The remediation among the three TV productions analysed above 
demonstrates how they all recognised the importance of visual and narrative repetition for 
shaping and consolidation a cultural memory where none had existed previously. If we look at 
the political arguments that can be derived from the productions, we can note that they (also) 
introduce arguments and associations that differ from the state-endorsed interpretation of the 
memory (both at the time and afterwards). The TV series Stolypin….The Undrawn Lessons 
draws upon the popular tropes of conspiracy theories and the detective genre to keep its audi-
ence engaged. Mikhalkov’s documentary Petr Stolypin. A Shot at Russia echoes the 
filmmaker’s own political manifesto of “enlightened conservatism.” These productions never-
theless support and propagate its central tenets: the importance of strengthening the vertical of 
power and implementing top-down reform to maintain stability and prevent revolution, paired 
with a justification of the (temporary) suspension of certain civic rights. In the case of the 
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memory of Stolypin, memory politics indeed extended beyond the political domain and onto 
the television screen, yet the actual shape taken by the narratives was not as strictly regulated 
as is often assumed. A measure of deviation from the official line was allowed, albeit within a 







4. Aleksandr Nevskii 




Nevskii in the Russian Historical and Political Imagination  
On the occasion of the Day of National Unity, Patriarch Kirill opened an exhibition called 
“My History. Riurikids.”125 He personally guided President Putin through the show’s exten-
sive multimedia displays (“Патриарх Кирилл открыл мультимедийную выставку” 2014). 
The exhibition, which ran from 5 to 20 November 2014 at the Moscow Manege, recounted 
the history of Rus’ from its founder Riurik to Fedor, the last ruler of the Riurik dynasty. Ac-
cording to Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov),126 one of the exhibition’s principal organisers, 
“[t]he era of the Riurik dynasty had a decisive influence on the formation of statehood and all 
aspects of life of Rus’,” yet few people today know its history (“Выставка ‘Рюриковичи’” 
2014).127 The exhibition aimed to address this lack of historical understanding, as well as 
provide “the attentive viewer with the unexpected key to understanding contemporaneity” 
(ibidem). 128  Its language and style were indeed firmly embedded in a contemporary 
worldview (I base my observations on my exhibition visit on 10 November 2014). For 
example, one of the displays argued that Ivan the Terrible fell victim to “the first information 
wars in the European press,” a clear reference to the portrayal of the events in Ukraine by 
Western and Ukrainian media.129 The display about Aleksandr Nevskii exemplifies the two 
political questions that his memory has been most closely associated with in recent years: the 
place of religion, and specifically the ROC, in the Russian state, and the political challenges 
that result from striking a balance between West and East and accommodating multiculturali-
ty within both the domestic and the international frameworks. The main part of the display 
highlights Nevskii’s battle against Western assaults on the state (military and religious alike) 
                                                 
125 “Моя история. Рюриковичи.” 
126 Archimandrite Tikhon is generally presumed to be Putin’s confessor. 
127 “Эпоха Рюриковичей оказала решающее влияние на формирование государственности и всех сторон 
жизни Руси.” 
128 “Известные и забытые страницы истории станут для внимательного зрителя неожиданным ключом к 
пониманию современности.” 
129 “Первые информационные войны в европейской прессе.” 
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and his decision to orient the state towards the East. At the top, Nevskii’s rule is summarised 
as follows: “Strengthen the defence to the West, and search for friends to the East.”130 Two 
banners flank this display, bearing quotes by Patriarch Kirill and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergei Lavrov that reflect the religious and political aspects of the Nevskii memory. In the 
words of the Patriarch:  
Aleksandr Nevskii embodies genuine patriotism, steadfast standing in the fatherly faith, the strategic vision 
of a statesman, [and] a sense of responsibility before God for the fates of the people, entrusted to him as 
earthly ruler.131  
Lavrov’s quote points out the prince’s political legacy by stating that “Aleksandr Nevskii laid 
the foundations of Russia’s multipronged diplomacy.”132 
Aleksandr Nevskii (1220-1263) became the Prince of Novgorod at the tender age of six-
teen and later also served as Grand Prince of Kiev and Grand Prince of Vladimir. He came to 
power at a decisive moment in the history of Kievan Rus’, in the wake of its subjection to the 
rule of the Golden Horde – commonly referred to in Russian as the “Tatar Yoke.” Along with 
the political pressure emanating from the East, the integrity of Novgorod was under threat 
from the West – notably, from the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights – who sought to extend 
their influence in both political and religious matters. The allegedly concerted efforts by the 
Pope of Rome to convert the Orthodox city-state to Catholicism133 are frequently quoted in 
today’s Russia to justify the adoption of a defensive stance vis-à-vis Europe. Nevskii’s best-
known military achievements are the Battle on the Neva (1240) against the Swedes, after 
which he was named, and the legendary Battle on the Ice (1242) on Lake Peipus against the 
knights of the Livonian Order. 
The remembrance tradition associated with Nevskii reaches back to the late thirteenth cen-
tury. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk (2004) has extensively explored its development up to 2000 
and has identified several stages: sacralisation (13-15th centuries), russification (15-17th 
centuries), stateification (18th century), nationalisation (19th century), dethronement (1917-
1937), recruitment (1939-1945), consolidation and criticism (1945-1985) and pluralisation 
(1985-2000). The following paragraphs will briefly summarise Schenk’s argument to trace 
back the origins of the concepts that Nevskii is associated with in contemporary Russia. In 
                                                 
130 “Крепить оборону на Западе, а друзей искать на Востоке.” 
131 “Александр Невский олицетворяет истинный патриотизм, твердое стояние в отеческой вере, 
стратегическую дальновидность государственного деятеля, чувство ответственности земного правителя 
перед Богом за судьбы людей, порученные ему.” 
132 “Александр Невский заложил основы многовекторной российской дипломатии.” 
133 This claim has, however, been questioned by historical research. See Schenk (2004: 50). 
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particular, Schenk’s interpretation of the evolution of the Nevskii memory during the 1990s is 
essential for determining the characteristics that are unique to the period after 2000.  
While the memorialisation of Nevskii had already started to develop at an earlier stage, in 
particular on the local level in Vladimir where the Saint lay buried, the political importance 
attributed to him peaked for the first time during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Subsequent 
peaks occurred under Peter the Great and Stalin – and I would add, to a minor extent during 
the 2000s. For Ivan the Terrible, Nevskii, posited as the founding father of the Riurik dynasty, 
served the construction of a genealogy of the Moscow state. Moreover, he was portrayed as 
the exemplary defender of the Orthodox state against its Catholic and heathen enemies. 
Around the same time, the religious image of Nevskii as a saintly figure was affirmed and 
definitively established with his canonisation by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1547. Thus 
a two-pronged cultural memory was formed, encompassing a religious and a state-oriented 
component. The development of a multifaceted memory in the 15th to 17th centuries reflected 
the complementary notions of society then prevailing: 
Während Aleksandr Nevskij im Kirchlichen Diskurs die Idee der Sakralgemeinschaft verkörperte, deutete er 
im dynastischen Diskurs auf ein Gemeinschaftskonzept, dessen konstitutives Element der Herrscher und sein 
Machtbereich war. Herrschaftsverband und Sakralgemeinschaft waren die beiden Bestandteile der ‘Rus’-
Konzeption’ (russkaja zemlja), die sich das Großfürstentum Moskau als eigenes Konzept kollektiver Identität 
vom Kiever Reich angeeignet hatte (Schenk 2014: 88. Italics in original). 
Peter the Great was the first to instrumentalise the memory for a specific political goal. He 
posited Nevskii as an imperial ruler and deflected the Prince’s glory onto himself and the 
capital city he founded. 
Nicht mehr die Würde der herrschende Dynastie oder die Heiligkeit der russischen Kirche prägten – wie 
noch im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert – die Ausrichtung des Aleksandr-Nevskij-Bildes. Im imperialen 
Petersburger Diskurs hatte er auf die Person und das Amt des aktuellen Zaren und Kaisers, auf die 
neugegründete ‘herrschende Stadt’ St. Petersburg und auf das Rußländische Reich als Imperium zuverweisen 
(Schenk 2014: 125). 
Nevskii became the northern capital’s patron saint and, to affirm the bond, Peter the Great 
ordered the construction of the Aleksandr Nevskii monastery, where Nevskii’s relics were 
transferred in 1724 from the Rozhdestvenskii monastery in Vladimir.  
In the 19th century the memory of Nevskii acquired a third connotation, reflecting the de-
velopment of nationalist discourse. Propelled by the intelligentsia and drawing upon a 
newfound interest in folklore, the nationalist image of Nevskii imagined him “nicht nur als 
Verteidiger des Landes und des Glaubens, sondern auch der russischen Kultur, insbesondere 
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der Sprache” (Schenk 2004: 179). This third associated image, of military commander and 
national hero would later resurface under Stalin to great effect. In the period following the 
October Revolution, the memory of Nevskii was viewed negatively because the political ideas 
associated with it were incompatible with the ideology of the nascent communist state – in 
particular, the sacral and imperial discourses. Under Stalin, however, Nevskii and other his-
torical figures134 were rehabilitated. The memory of Nevskii acquired exceptional political 
significance in the late 1930s since it could easily frame how the Soviet Union would success-
fully respond to the threat posed by Germany. The formerly multifaceted memory became 
fully desanctified, and the only part of it to be preserved involved Nevskii’s role as military 
commander. The Order of Aleksandr Nevskii was reinstated in 1942 as a military honour, 
differing little in name from its tsarist precursor, the Imperial Order of Saint Aleksandr 
Nevskii. In 2010, the military honour named after Nevskii underwent yet another transfor-
mation. Its badge was redesigned to more closely resemble the tsarist order and its purpose 
was reformulated as a civilian, rather than a military, award. 
In the Perestroika period, as constraints over historiography and – to a lesser extent – reli-
gion were relaxed, a process of re-sanctification began. Nevskii’s relics, which had been 
moved to the Museum of Religion and Atheism in St. Petersburg,135 were returned to the 
Aleksandr Nevskii monastery in 1989. Reflecting the manifold political ideologies and con-
cepts of national identity that were circulating in the late 1980s and especially the 1990s, the 
memory of Nevskii became subject to pluralisation. The respective 750th anniversaries of the 
Battle on the Neva and the Battle on the Ice in 1990 and 1992 heightened the already growing 
interest in the historical leader. The federal government, the ROC, academic and amateur 
scholars, historical-patriotic groups, the army and local governments all contributed to the 
post-Soviet re-evaluation of Nevskii. Schenk emphasises that contemporary memory images 
of Nevskii – the patriotic general, the local prince and the patron saint – coexist and comple-
ment rather than rival one another.  
Als Kollektivsymbol übernimmt Aleksandr Nevskij dabei eine wertvolle Brückenfunktion. Der Held von der 
Neva ist eine ideale Integrationsfigur im Sinne des ‘patriotischen Konsenses’. Er gilt sowohl als Zeichen der 
vorrevolutionären, als auch der sowjetischen Zeit. Er repräsentiert einen wehrhaften Staat und eine autoritäre 
politische Führung. Seine Biographie eignet sich als Projektionsfläche für Antiokzidentalismus und Anti-
islamismus. In der Erzählung von seinen Heldentaten kann die Wir-Gruppe sowohl als nationale, russische 
Gemeinschaft als auch als Gruppe orthodoxer Christen beschrieben werden (Schenk 2004: 468). 
                                                 
134 Notably, Peter the Great, Dmitrii Donskoi, Kuzma Minin and Dmitrii Pozharskii. 
135 Located in the Kazan Cathedral. 
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As will become clear later on, the religious element of identification has considerably 
strengthened since the turn of the twentieth century. 
The memory of Nevskii is intricately connected to the city of St. Petersburg, where the ma-
jority of the material traces dedicated to him are located. In 2002 the infrastructure of 
remembrance was complemented by a statue placed in front of the Aleksandr Nevskii monas-
tery (“Памятник Святому Благоверному Великому князю Александру Невскому” n.d.). 
The equestrian statue depicts the saint in full armour carrying a shield and spear. Its unveiling 
took place on Victory Day in the presence of the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, 
Vladimir, the governor of St. Petersburg Vladimir Iakovlev, and political and cultural repre-
sentatives. In 2005, two bas-relief plaques were added to the pedestal depicting the transfer of 
Saint Nevskii’s relics to the monastery by Peter the Great and the 1240 Battle on the Neva. 
The combination of the design of the statue, the bas-relief plaques, its location and its unveil-
ing taking place on Victory Day (rather than, for example, on the Saint’s feast day on 6 
December) all testify to the continued inseparability of the religious, military and political 
aspects of the memory. 
Such a long and rich tradition of remembrance, in combination with the lack of historical 
sources documenting Nevskii’s life, has resulted in a cultural memory that is largely mythic in 
nature, much more so than, for example, the memory of 1812 or Petr Stolypin. Within the 
cultural domain, Sergei Eisenstein’s Aleksandr Nevskii (1938) has been key in shaping the 
image contemporary Russians have of the medieval prince, both visually and narratively (the 
scene of the Battle on the Ice in particular).136 It is telling that the Stalinist classic was fa-
voured over a contemporary representation such as Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (2008) to 
represent Nevskii’s rule in the film festival accompanying the Riurikids exhibition (“На 
выставке ‘Моя история. Рюриковичи’ продолжается программа показов российского 
кино” 2014).137 
More recently, Aleksandr Nevskii has appeared in media other than film, sculpture and 
iconography. Over the course of three years, Unicorn Games Studio released the video games 
XIII Century: Glory or Death (2007),138 XIII Century: Rusich (2008)139 and History of War: 
                                                 
136 The film and its production history have been extensively studied, see, e.g., Bartig (2013): 74-104; Morrison 
(2009): 217-246; Dobrenko (2008); O’Mahony (2008): 160-174; Taylor (1998): 85-98; Goodwin (1993): 156-
178. 
137 The programme furthermore included the films Minin and Pozharskii [Минин и Пожарский] (Vsevolod 
Pudovkin & Mikhail Doller, 1939); Andrei Rublev [Андрей Рублев] (Andrei Tarkovskii, 1966); Iaroslavna. 
Queen of France [Ярославна, королева Франции] (Igor’ Maslennikov, 1978); Tsar [Царь] (2009, Pavel 
Lungin) and a selection of contemporary animation and documentary films. 
138 XIII Век: Слава или смерть. Released internationally under the name XIII Century: Blood of Europe. 
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Aleksandr Nevskii (2009).140 All three games allow players to engage in a classic battlefield 
video game in 13th-century style and differ little in terms of gameplay (Арбатский 2008; 
Хромов 2010). Nevskii, and in particular the Battle on the Ice, were featured in the 2013 su-
perhero comic The Monk.141 Its protagonist, Andrei Radov, travels back in time to take part in 
various historical battles to protect Orthodox civilisation from the numerous enemies (Mon-
gols, Christians, the devil) that seek to destroy it. In the comic, it is Andrei who purposefully 
causes the ice to crack underneath the feet of the Livonian army and thereby secures victory. 
A Beacon of Orthodox Morality in the Face of Globalisation 
The Russian Orthodox Church has been one of the principle driving forces behind the re-
newed actualisation of the memory of Aleksandr Nevskii in the post-Soviet era. This trend 
has continued and intensified in the 2000s. It has to be noted that the ROC is an internally 
diverse institution. It consists of a multitude of factions, each with their particular views on 
ecclesiastical matters as well as on political questions.142 In this chapter, I mainly address the 
views and actions of the ROC leadership, the Holy Synod and the Patriarch, whose position 
tends largely to coincide with the so-called traditionalists within the Church. The political 
orientation of the traditionalists can be described as “orthodox statism,” characterised by “the 
desire for a powerful Russian state, with the renewal of Orthodox values as the source of the 
country’s strength” (Papkova 2011: 47). In the chapter on Ivan the Terrible, I will turn my 
attention to “fundamentalist” tendencies within the ROC, through the example of Orthodox 
Brotherhoods and their views on (memory) politics. The lack of uniformity is an important 
factor when we seek to understand the ROC’s use of historical references to support its poli-
cies: while the official Church has increasingly been associated with the Kremlin and is 
perceived to be one of the pillars supporting the concept of traditional Russian statehood, the 
political views put forward by other, more fundamentalist movements are, in fact, oriented 
towards undermining the state as it has been shaped during the Putin era (see Chapter 6). 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ROC has successfully re-established itself as 
the principal religious organisation in Russia (Richters 2013). Both Yeltsin and Putin 
                                                                                                                                                        
139 XIII Век: Русич. The name “Rusich” is an archaic, poetic term to refer to the inhabitants of Rus’. 
140 История войн: Александр Невский. Released internationally under the name Real Warfare: 1242. 
141 Инок. Accessed 13 December 2015, http://ruscomix.ru/index.php?do=cat&category=inok. 
142 These factions can be roughly devided into three groups: “the traditionalist group that advocates a political 
ideology of orthodox statism and that overlaps in important ways with the formal positions of the patriarchate; 
the fundamentalist wing, which is clearly xenophobically nationalist in its orientations; and the liberal wing, 
which is markedly pro-western and supportive of liberal democracy” (Papkova 2011: 19). 
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supported the restoration of the Church and granted it significant privileges in return for the 
legitimation the association with the ROC bestowed on their positions of power. For Putin,  
the Church as a social institution turned into another "cultural institution’ that was useful for the state in order 
to demonstrate to foreigners its thousand years of tradition, to shore up its support for his xenophobic poli-
cies, and to channel pro-Russian sympathies among Russian émigrés in ways benefiting the government 
(Mitrokhin 2009: 319). 
The ROC has become a highly visible component of political symbolism, with high-
ranking representatives taking active part in political ceremonies such as the presidential in-
auguration ceremony. 
The ROC views itself as the moral compass of the Russian nation in a rapidly globalising 
world that threatens the foundations of Orthodoxy. Consequently, it envisages its political 
role as 
[helping the] post-Soviet regime build an effective means of weathering, if not outright resisting, the shocks 
of globalization, which is generally regarded as a western-inspired weapon against Russia. The task is de-
fined as a joint church-government project of ensuring the survival of a specific Russian national and 
religious identity in a rapidly changing and hostile world, through the spiritualization of Russian society 
(Papkova 2011: 48-49). 
From the perspective of the ROC, Church-state relations should ideally be fashioned in 
line with the “symphonic model” which implies close cooperation with the state, yet without 
state interference in the ROC’s internal affairs (Papkova 2011: 32), a relationship based on 
the theological notion of symphonia, or harmony, that strikes a precise balance between the 
opposing models of a state church and a secular society. The ideal of symphonia between 
Church and state is an ideal indeed, since it has never been fully realised. 
The ROC’s outlook on how the Russian state should be organised largely coincides with 
the priorities of the Putin regime. Yet with regard to certain matters, their opinions diverge 
significantly.  
Many of these priorities – the strict moral censorship of television, a ban on abortion, legislative restrictions 
on the activities of religious competitors, the introduction of catechism in state education, and state support 
of the institution of priests in social organizations – are not met with understanding on the part of the Russian 
government and actually clash with the current trends in domestic policy (Mitrokhin 2009: 319). 
Since Patriarch Kirill became head of the Church in 2009, and increasingly since Putin was 
re-elected president in 2012, these differences have become less pronounced. The government 
has shown itself more willing to accommodate concerns expressed by the ROC, for instance 
by responding to calls to intervene in cultural matters on the grounds that feelings of religious 
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people have purportedly been violated. The authorities have increasingly adopted spiritual and 
religious terminology and symbolism and have placed an emphasis on defending traditional 
values and the centrality of the nuclear family. During Putin’s first two terms in office, it ap-
peared that Orthodox beliefs could still be overruled by political objectives. Pragmatic 
considerations prevailed over an unwavering embrace of Orthodoxy as part of the state’s ide-
ology. Since then, however, there has been a considerable shift, as the neo-conservative turn 
in Russian politics that intensified after the annexation of Crimea has augmented the rele-
vance of and support for the agenda set by the ROC. 
The concept of tradition is of fundamental importance to the overlapping interests of the 
state and the Church. Yet, in addition to the occasional incongruence between their percep-
tions of what tradition actually entails, and how it can be combined with features of modern 
society (e.g., the Internet and social media), there exist diverging definitions of “traditional 
society” even within the ROC itself. The seemingly condensed constellation of Orthodox tra-
ditional values, upon closer scrutiny, turns out to be heterogeneous and at times at odds with 
itself. The Church’s recent attempts to adapt to contemporary society and its mediatised na-
ture have only enhanced some of its internal divergences (Tolstaya 2014). 
As it has sought to reconnect with the Russian diaspora and, more generally, with Ortho-
dox believers outside of the country, the ROC’s political objectives have reached beyond 
national borders. The concept “Russian world” (russkii mir) is generally used to denote this 
extended sphere of influence. For the state, cooperation in this sphere “for the purposes of 
expanding and consolidating the Russian world” (Payne 2010: 726) has been advantageous 
since it has added yet another means to define its transnational sphere of influence, especially 
in relation to the so-called Near Abroad: in addition to appealing to shared linguistic and eth-
nic categories (Russian speakers and ethnic Russians living outside of Russia), the (Russian) 
Orthodox religion could now function as a marker of association, suggesting the existence of 
an intrinsic connection between Russia and Orthodox believers worldwide. For the ROC, 
economic interests have been involved as well, since part of its concerted efforts with the for-
eign ministry have been aimed at the reacquisition of church property seized during or 
following the 1917 revolutions (idem: 726).  
Several scholars have pointed out that while the Church appears to hold a position of polit-
ical prominence, its ability to influence state politics remained limited during the timeframe 
under discussion here (Anderson 2007; Mitrokhin 2009; Papkova 2011). The state was the 
dominant partner in a relationship that Anderson characterises as one of “asymmetric sym-
phonia” (Anderson 2007). The Church’s limited political leverage reflects the state’s 
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perception of the ROC’s measure of societal authority143: “without overwhelming support 
from the people it claims to serve and represent, [the ROC] cannot have great authority with 
the state” (Mitrokhin 2009: 318). Its close association with the state is nonetheless advanta-
geous. For example, the Church has received government funding for certain of its research 
and media projects (idem: 308).144 In 2010, a law was passed requiring the restitution to the 
Church of property seized by the Soviet state. Furthermore, the ROC achieved a long-awaited 
success with regard to the inclusion of religious education in school curricula. The course 
“Fundamentals of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics” was first given as a trial offering 
from 2009 to 2011 and was subsequently included in the standard curriculum in 2012 
(Richters 2013: 46-47; Clay 2015). Parents have the option to choose among modules on one 
of the “traditional religions” – Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism and Islam – or on 
secular ethics or world religions. The trial of Pussy Riot for the performance of their “punk 
prayer” in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour (Ponomariov 2013) and the subsequent passage 
of a law making it a crime to insult religious feelings marked an increasing sensitivity con-
cerning religion in the public sphere and the increasing say of the ROC in matters touching on 
social values, which has intensified since 2012. 
The ROC and Cultural Memory  
Similar to its effect on Russian politics, the disintegration of the Soviet Union compelled the 
ROC to explicitly conceptualise its identity and place in society. Cultural memory has been an 
instrumental tool for substantiating the assertion that the contemporary ROC should be 
viewed as the heir of a long Orthodox tradition and that, therefore, it could now, as a religious 
organisation, reclaim its righteous position as the principal religion of the Russian state. Both 
the distant and the more recent past were effectively, yet not always uniformly, utilised to 
place Russian Orthodoxy at the heart of the Russian nation and to proclaim its importance as 
the principal driving force behind “the spiritual revival of the Fatherland” (Garrard & Garrard 
2008: 243).145 
                                                 
143 This is the result of, e.g., internal fragmentation, low attendance of Church services and repeated scandals that 
have damaged its reputation. 
144 Mitrokhin puts forward the example of the “Orthodox Encyclopedia” project: “Having received financing 
from the budget of the Russian Federation in the 1990s for the publication of a research encyclopedia on Ortho-
doxy, the project in the 2000s developed into a huge Internet project, and then into becoming the main supplier 
of Orthodox content for television, all at government expense. Currently all of the Church’s research and part of 
the Moscow Patriarchate’s media resources are being financed through this project” (Mitrokhin 2009: 308). 
145 On the ROC, patriotism in a broader sense and local patriotic church practices, see Rousselet (2015). 
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The ROC’s restorative efforts have taken many forms: the reclamation of lost Church 
properties, as already mentioned; the restoration or reconstruction of churches that were dam-
aged or destroyed under Soviet rule – most notably, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in 
Moscow146; and the construction of new churches in the traditional Russo-Byzantine medieval 
style. With “Programme 200,” announced in 2010, the ROC set out to significantly increase 
the number of churches in Moscow – by at least two hundred, as the program’s name suggests 
– to improve accessibility for believers; this project, once completed, will leave a noticeable 
mark on the city’s architecture. One should also mention the (re-)establishment of religious 
practices such as processions and pilgrimages (see, e.g., Rock 2014). A speech delivered by 
Patriarch Aleksii II upon the completion of the construction on the Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour highlights the symbolic importance of the “resurrection” of Orthodox landmarks that 
had been lost during the Soviet era: 
The miracle of the resurrection of the Cathedral required several years of concentrated, selfless and loving 
labour. The Cathedral now glorifies Christ and helps our long-suffering people return to their spiritual roots 
– the Holy Faith of their ancestors (Garrard & Garrard 2008: 82. Emphasis added). 
The symbolic and tangible restoration of “Orthodox Russia” complements and supports the 
Church’s aim of political restoration, discussed above.  
Referring to statements made by Patriarch Kirill, Mikhail Suslov argues that there is an in-
herent paradox in the ROC’s “historical imagination,” resulting from its being informed by 
two contradictory metanarratives: one that emphasises the autonomy of Russia as a civilisa-
tion (which is defensive and displays the influence of Slavophile thought) and one that views 
the position of Russia in the world in messianic terms (which is offensive and shows traces of 
Eurasianist thinking) (Суслов 2013). In the skilful hands of Patriarch Kirill, however, Suslov 
asserts, the opposing paradigms merge so that the ROC's array of objectives are deftly com-
bined. As a result, Patriarch Kirill, on the one hand, “emphasises, that Russia’s struggle with 
the external enemy has always borne the character of a fight for its civilisational authenticity 
against the West: in 1612 the Russians defended their faith, in 1812 their culture, [and] in 
1942 their very right to existence” (idem: 144). On the other hand, however, “tying in the 
battles of the past with the war for the spiritual frontiers of Russia that is going on today, 
Kirill outlines the parameters of cooperation with the West in the context of Christian trans-
nationalism” (Суслов 2013: 144). 
                                                 
146 For a detailed account on the history of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour – its founding, destruction and 
reconstruction – see, e.g., Garrard and Garrard (2008): 70-100. 
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Two memorialisation practices deserve particular mention: the canonisation of Tsar 
Nicholas II and his family and the growing cult of the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia. 
Responding to societal sentiments, the ROC went ahead with the canonisation of the imperial 
family in 2000. They were sainted as “passion bearers”: a category that acknowledges their 
religious devotion and their resigned acceptance of their deaths, yet clearly distinguishes them 
from those “martyrs” who lost their lives because of their faith.147 The ROC found it im-
portant to thus differentiate them from those who could have saved their lives by denouncing 
their faith. On the site where the Ipatiev house once stood in Yekaterinburg – where the 
Romanovs were held captive and later killed – the Church on the Blood was erected and con-
secrated in 2003. 
The ROC explicitly placed the canonisation of the imperial family in the context of a sec-
ond, much larger group of new saints, the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia (Garrard & 
Garrard 2008: 125). Since the turn of the millennium, some two thousand individuals who 
were persecuted and killed by the Soviet state because of their religious beliefs – both ROC 
clergy and laity – have been canonised. This newly created memory culture within the ROC 
has been actively affirmed via the commissioning of icons of the new martyrs and the dedica-
tion of numerous churches across the country to their memory (Fedor 2014). New martyrdom 
is of particular significance because it is the only example of a memory practice commemo-
rating the victims of Soviet repression that has been condoned by the state.148 As Julie Fedor 
explains, the inseparable link between the Putin government and the FSB on the one hand, 
and those responsible for the acts of repression on the other, hampers the authorities from 
taking an effective stance on these crimes without questioning their own legitimacy. There-
fore,  
[i]n fulfilling the role of custodian of the memory of Soviet state terror, the ROC MP [Moscow Patriarchate, 
M.W.] is effectively acting as a proxy for the current state authorities, including the successor agencies to the 
Soviet state security organs (Fedor 2014: 129).  
The symbolic assumption of responsibility for the memory of the victims of Soviet repres-
sion is reinforced on the material level by, for example, the transfer of mass burial sites from 
                                                 
147 For an extensive analysis of the development and multifaceted use of the motif of selfsacrifice in Russian 
culture, including the canonisation of Nicholas II, see Uffelmann (2010). 
148 Other attempts to investigate and pay tribute to those who fell victim to Soviet repression, such as the activi-
ties of the Memorial Society, have repeatedly come under pressure from state authorities. More recently, the 
state has signalled a minor shift in its stand on the matter: a monument to commemorate the victims of political 
repression in Russian history, entitled “The Wall of Grief,” is expected to unveiled in Moscow in 2016. 
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the FSB to the Church. This appears to be an attempt to provide closure to the question of 
remembrance:  
by transferring these sites to the church, the state has […] effectively handed over to the church the problem 
of dealing with the Soviet past. The ROC in turn has duly repeatedly declared the historical reconciliation of 
victim and perpetrator, thereby bestowing historical legitimacy upon the current regime (Fedor 2014: 129).  
On another occasion, however, the Church has shown itself surprisingly accommodating 
towards the contemporary heirs to the communist past. In 2014, Patriarch Kirill awarded 
Gennadii Ziuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, with the 
Order of Glory and Honour149 to the third degree (the highest) on the occasion of his 70th 
birthday (“Патриарх Кирилл наградил Зюганова церковным орденом” 2014). 
On a number of occasions, the ROC has involved itself in cultural events and productions 
about episodes in history that it associates itself with. For example, the exhibition about the 
Riurikids, discussed in the introduction, was organised by the Humanitarian Projects Fund. 
This fund was established in 2013 on the initiative of Archimandrite Tikhon to organise a 
five-year exhibition cycle around the theme “My History,” the first of which was dedicated to 
the Romanov dynasty (“Проект ‘Моя история’” n.d.). It works in close cooperation with the 
Moscow Patriarchate, as well as the Ministry of Culture and other federal, regional and local 
authorities. Archimandrite Tikhon curated both exhibitions and serves as chairperson of the 
Fund’s council of experts.  
In the cinematic sphere, Vladimir Khotinenko’s The Priest (Pop, 2009) is a prime example 
of Church involvement in cultural production. The film narrates the story of a group of Or-
thodox priests that was sent to the Pskov region by the Metropolitan of Latvia from 1941 to 
1945 to reopen churches that had been closed by the Soviet authorities. As Pskov was Ger-
man-occupied territory at the time, the successful completion of their mission depended on 
their cooperation with the occupying forces. The ROC has tried to replace the Soviet narrative 
of collaboration with “one in which the priests of the Mission are depicted as saintly men of 
God and true Russian patriots” (Anemone 2010). The Priest made an important contribution 
towards sharing this patriotic reinterpretation with the general public. The Church was closely 
involved in the production of the film. It was made with the blessing of the late Patriarch of 
Moscow and All Russia, Aleksii II, and the first screening took place in the Cathedral of 
Christ the Saviour.150 The Priest received direct and indirect state funding. 
                                                 
149 Орден “Славы и чести.” 
150 Patriarch Aleksii II endowed his blessing on several other films as well, including the documentary The Life 
of Saint Sergius of Radonezh [Житие преподобного Сергея Радонежкого] (Tat’iana Novikova, 2005); Pavel 
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In his review of the film, Antony Anemone interestingly refers to the contemporary 
memory of Nevskii as a means to understand the reinterpretation of the Pskov mission. 
The key to the film’s (and novel’s) ideological meaning is Aleksandr Nevskii, the favorite saint of the hero of 
The Priest and the hero of Eisenstein’s great anti-German movie of 1938. As the patron saint of patriotism 
and Orthodoxy, Nevskii summarizes and suggests one way of solving the historical paradox that stands at the 
heart of the Pskov Spiritual Mission. The problem, brutally stated, concerns the admissibility for Russian pa-
triots of collaborating with the Nazis in order to reintroduce Christianity to those parts of the land of the 
Soviets occupied by the Wehrmacht. As the priest says at one point, neither the Germans, nor the Bolsheviks 
are eternal: only Christ is eternal. Hence, the ultimate goal of serving Christ can never be a mistake 
(Anemone 2010). 
The leniency allowed by this historical model for the sake of pragmatism and compromise 
in the name of the Orthodox faith’s continued existence and future prosperity can indeed ben-
efit Church officials as they seek to adapt their institution to modern society and make the 
most of what it has to offer. 
Another much-debated example is the 2008 documentary The Fall of an Empire: The Les-
son of Byzantium,151 broadcast on Rossiia 1. The documentary was written and narrated by, 
again, Archimandrite Tichon. It draws explicit parallels between Byzantium and contempo-
rary Russia to warn against the corrupting influence of the West. Presented as the “spiritual 
heir” of Byzantium, Russia should emulate the conditions of the Orthodox empire in its 
prime: it was a centralised state headed by a strong government, and an empire, moreover, in 
which Orthodoxy served as a unifying factor and dictated a path of development that was dif-
ferent from those of both the East and the West (Baïdine 2011: 105).  
The memory of Nevskii has become an integral part of the ROC’s “memory vocabulary,” 
both within the observed ecclesiastical canon and in the Church’s media appearances. The 
feast day of Saint Aleksandr Nevskii, traditionally celebrated on 6 December according to the 
Orthodox calendar (23 November before the adoption of the Gregorian calendar), is but one 
element of the saint’s contemporary veneration. The memory has been made to suit the ideas 
on Russian society and state-Church relations supported by the traditionalist wing within the 
ROC, as well as its outlook on the world and on interethnic and interconfessional relations. 
Then Metropolitan and now Patriarch Kirill has personally supported the saint’s memory in a 
way that recognises the complementary resonances of the multiple strands of memory identi-
fication associated with Nevskii – its state-oriented, military and patriotic interpretations, in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Lungin’s The Island [Остров] (2006); and, the animation film Prince Vladimir [Князь Владимир] (Iurii 
Kulakov, 2006) (Norris 2013:178-9, 219). 
151 Гибель империи. Византийский урок. 
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addition to its religious and moral ones. Patriarch Kirill’s appearance on the TV show The 
Name Is Russia, which will be discussed in detail in the second part of this chapter, demon-
strates the ROC’s dedication to the memory of Nevskii, as well as its awareness of the 
potential impact of the medium of television on the historical consciousness of the mass audi-
ence. Building upon the popularity of the TV project, the ROC initiated the travelling 
exhibition “Aleksandr Nevskii – The Name of Russia.” Despite its title, the objects displayed 
– a series of icons produced with a special technique involving powdered (precious) stones 
and artificial crystals, and paintings depicting various aspects of the Russian landscape – bore 
little connection to the show’s televised namesake (“Выставочный проект ‘Александр 
Невский – имя России’ стартовал в Санкт-Петербурге” 2009). 
A recent addition to the material infrastructure of the cultural memory, or its “memory 
hardware” (Etkind 2009), deserves mention. Since 2013, construction had been underway on 
a new church dedicated to St. Nevskii near the Moscow State Institute of International Rela-
tions (MGIMO). Plans for constructing a church at the site were originally developed in 1999 
and received the blessing of Patriarch Aleksii II in 2005, at which point its devotion to 
Nevskii was decided. Yet sufficient funds for its construction were only secured within the 
framework of “Programme 200” (“О храме” n.d.). The church has been erected on the site 
where there had previously been a small brick church, which was closed in the 1930s and 
demolished in 1941. The design of the single-domed, white plastered brick church is very 
traditional, as is the case with many new churches built over the past decades. The church was 
consecrated by Patriarch Kirill in March 2016. 
The Church’s active involvement in the negotiation of Nevskii’s memory, combined with 
its self-appointed role as the moral guardian of the Russian nation, occasioned a minor televi-
sion scandal in 2006. The long-running satirical programme Gorodok, broadcast by RTR, 
dedicated an item to Nevskii on the anniversary of the Battle on the Ice. It shows the moment 
when Nevskii comes up with his ingenious tactic that will win the battle: not only will his 
troops confront the enemy on the ice, they will remove their heavy armaments to gain an ad-
vantage. With a cheeky play on the words “We will show them…”, the soldiers, standing in 
formation clothed only in felt hoods and valenki,152 bare their genitalia as they salute their 
commander. The chairman of the Orthodox-patriotic social movement “Aleksandr Nevskii,” 
Viacheslav Ulybin, lodged a complaint with the procurator of St. Petersburg demanding the 
termination of the show on the basis of a violation of religious sensitivities. According to 
                                                 
152 Traditional Russian felt boots. 
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Ulybin, in the sketch “the feat of Russian soldiers, defending the Fatherland, is filed as some 
sort of action by animal-like imbeciles, and the saintly knight, celebrated by the Orthodox 
Church, as the leader of such [people]” 153  (“Отец Всеволод Чаплин: России нужна 
Антидиффамационная лига” 2006). The vice-chair of the Duma’s Committee on Social 
Unity and Religious Organisations, Aleksandr Chuev, concurred that if the complaint accu-
rately described the show as it was broadcast, this would amount to an insult to national 
saints, as well as a violation of the feelings of Orthodox believers (“Чуев: Сюжету ‘Городка’ 
о ‘Ледовом побоище’ надо дать правовую оценку” 2006). Chuev took the matter very se-
riously: “You can mock everything and subvert any ideals you want, but states in which this 
is permitted and nations who allow themselves to do so, quickly perish”154 (ibidem).155 
When asked to respond to the sketch, the (then) deputy head of the Moscow Patriarchate 
department for external church relations, Vsevolod Chaplin, without having seen the show, 
deemed it to be an example of the harmful tendencies prevailing on Russian television:  
Unfortunately, humoristic programmes that are broadcast during television prime time, in particular on Sat-
urday and Sunday evenings, quite often express derogatory and offensive appraisals with regard to Russia, its 
history and its people. We need something like an anti-defamation league that would monitor such occur-
rences and call offenders to account (“Отец Всеволод Чаплин: России нужна Антидиффамационная 
лига” 2006).156 
After the court refused to open a criminal case against the show’s producers because of a 
lack of corpus delicti, Ulybin turned to President Putin for support of his cause. In an open 
letter, Ulybin challenges the court’s decision and asks, “If [showing] completely naked sol-
diers under the command of a saint, shown on state television, is not considered a sneer at 
sanctity (which, in addition, incites religious enmity) – then what is?”157 (Улыбин 2006). 
Ulybin’s efforts, however, were in vain. 
                                                 
153 “подвиг русских воинов, защитивших Отечество, подан как некое действо скотоподобных дебилов, а 
святой князь, прославленный Православной Церковью, как предводитель таковых.” 
154 “Можно издеваться над всем и ниспровергать любые идеалы, но государства, в которых это допу-
стимо, и народы, которые себе это позволяют, быстро гибнут.” 
155 In a response to the filed complaint, Il’ia Oleinikov, one of the show’s hosts, ridiculed that if indeed their 
item about Nevskii was impermissible because of a violation of the feelings of Orthodox believers, they should 
also be sued by the Ministery of Defence for dishonouring the military, “since in the item they are so poorly 
dressed” (“Верующие ворвались в ‘Городок’” 2006).  
156 “К сожалению, довольно часто в юмористических программах, которые идут в лучшее телевизионное 
время, особенно в субботние и воскресные вечера, в отношении России, ее истории и народа делаются 
уничижительные и оскорбительные оценки. Нам нужно нечто вроде Антидифффамационной лиги, 
которая бы отслеживала такие явления и призывала бы оскорбителей к ответу”. 
157  “Если абсолютно голые воины под предводительством святого, показанные по государственному 
телевидению - не глумление над святынями (которое и разжигает религиозную вражду) - то что тогда 
глумление?” 
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Nevskii as the Founding Father of Russian Foreign Policy 
In 2007, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov commented on the significance of Nevskii 
for Russian diplomacy during a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the “Aleksandr Nevskii” 
programme – a private initiative that will be discussed in detail below. The meeting took 
place at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). According to 
Lavrov, Nevskii focused his attention on two questions, each of which has equally preoccu-
pied the Russian government since the turn of the millennium: the “gathering of the Russian 
lands” – in other words, the reining in of any signs of separatism and the reorganisation of 
federal structures while influence is simultaneously maintained and extended over the “Near 
Abroad” – and the strengthening of the Russian state (“Состоялся Попечительский совет 
программы ‘Александр Невский’” 2007). Apart from the similarities in policy objectives 
between Nevskii and the contemporary Russian state, Lavrov singles out Nevskii’s unique 
contribution to the development of Russian diplomacy as it is still practiced today: 
The activities of Aleksandr Nevskii in the West and in the East laid the foundations of what we call multi-
vector diplomacy. In terms of foreign policy, Russia should orient itself in all directions (“Российские 
дипломаты будут удостаиваться знака св. князя Александра Невского” 2007).158 
In his appreciation of Nevskii’s qualities, Lavrov puts across a multifaceted image yet refrains 
from using religious categories. The image of Nevskii is mobilised to highlight the challenges 
Russia faces in effectively organising its ties and addressing existing tensions among national, 
ethnic and religious communities, both within and beyond its state borders. Nevskii, he states, 
was “a legendary figure, a politician, military commander, diplomat and statesman” 
(“Состоялся Попечительский совет программы ‘Александр Невский’” 2007).159 
During the meeting it was emphasised how the contemporary practice of linking the figure 
of Nevskii to the sphere of diplomacy builds upon on previously established custom – an 
example of reclaiming lost tradition. Anatolii Torkunov, who is a Russian diplomat, rector of 
the MGIMO and member of the board of trustees, explicitly embeds the plans that they are 
discussing for the establishment of an Aleksandr Nevskii distinction for diplomats (znak) in 
historical practice: 
Aleksandr Nevskii is the patron of Russian diplomacy; in the nineteenth century, you could find an Icon of 
Aleksandr Nevskii in every embassy. Peter I already established this tradition. And in the minds of many, 
victories in the diplomatic and military arenas were associated with the name of Aleksandr Nevskii. There 
                                                 
158“Активность Александра Невского на Западе и Востоке заложила то, что мы называем многовекторной 
дипломатией. Россия во внешнеполитическом плане должна работать на всех направлениях.” 
159 “фигурой легендарной, политиком, полководцем, дипломатом и государственным мужем.” 
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are churches in Sofia and Belgrade that bear his name in honour of military victories of the Slavs 
(“Состоялся Попечительский совет программы ‘Александр Невский’” 2007). 
The plans for the distinction were realised, and at the first awards ceremony in 2009 it was 
again emphasised how this builds upon the tradition that Empress Catherine I founded 
through the establishment of the Order of Aleksandr Nevskii in 1725 (“Евгению Примакову 
вручена премия Александра Невского” 2009).  
While Lavrov adheres to the language of foreign policy in his statements about Nevskii, 
politics and religion are continuously interwoven in the recent societal projects initiated in his 
memory. The “Aleksandr Nevskii” programme mentioned above is a good example. The 
Saint Andrew Foundation160 and the Centre of National Glory161 initiated the programme in 
December 2006 with support from the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ural Mining and Metal-
lurgical Company (UGMK). Its aim is to increase societal awareness about this “key figure” 
in the lead-up to the celebration of the 800th anniversary of Nevskii’s birth in 2021 
(“Программа ‘Александр Невский’” 2014). More broadly formulated, the programme’s 
main objective is to stimulate the development of spiritual and moral values in Russian 
society and to foster a worldview that emphasises selfless dedication to one’s country and 
people. Nevskii is perceived as great military commander and protector of the Fatherland, but 
to an even greater extent he is regarded as a man who lived a holy life, as well as a statesman 
and diplomat. 
The programme comprises multifaceted activities. First, it organises a tour of Nevskii's 
relics to cities in Russia and within the dioceses and archdioceses of the ROC (e.g., those in 
Latvia, Belarus and the Czech Republic). Second, facilitated by financial support from 
UGMK, it is involved in the construction of churches dedicated to Nevskii in the borderlands 
of the Russian Federation – e.g., on the island of Sakhalin and in the city of Baltiisk in the 
Kaliningrad region. Third, annual “Aleksandr days” have been organised in several Russian 
cities, including various activities aimed at children. Finally, the programme is active in the 
academic sphere through conferences, fora and the publication of research volumes. 
Since 2009, Patriarch Kirill serves as the honorary chairman of the programme’s board of 
trustees. Its members are governmental representatives, clergy, businessmen and representa-
tives of societal organisations. In addition to the Patriarch, the board is co-chaired by 
Vladimir Iakunin – former director of Russian Railways and the chairman of the St. Andrew 
                                                 
160 Фонд Андрея Первозванного. 
161 Центр национальной славы. 
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Foundation and the Centre of National Glory – and Andrei Kozitsyn, the general director of 
UGMK. 
The programme’s initiative for an Aleksandr Nevskii distinction for diplomats appears 
somewhat remarkable at first glance, given the ecclesiastical background of its founding or-
ganisations. Yet it asserts the mutual advantageousness of state-Church cooperation in the 
foreign policy domain: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strengthens its image by the associa-
tion with a morally superior type of foreign policy exemplified by Nevskii, while the Church 
is able to assert its influence abroad more effectively through its close relations with the min-
istry. Evgenii Primakov, minister of foreign affairs in the years 1996-1998, was the first 
recipient of the award in 2009. The distinction for diplomats is not reserved for members of 
the diplomatic corps and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, Patriarch Aleksii II had been 
chosen as the first laureate but passed away shortly before the ceremony was to take place in 
2008 (“Евгению Примакову вручена премия Александра Невского” 2009). In 2010, the 
golden distinction was awarded to his successor Patriarch Kirill in a ceremony at the 
MGIMO. Later meetings of the board of trustees and the coinciding awards ceremonies have 
taken place at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, for instance in 2014 when Patriarch Kirill 
awarded the Aleksandr Nevskii distinction to Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov. Hence, all 
aspects of the Aleksandr Nevskii distinction affirm the bonds between Russian Orthodoxy 
and official foreign policy – from its concept and its laureates to its awards ceremony locales. 
The 2010 meeting at the MGIMO was also the occasion of the unveiling of a bas-relief 
plaque depicting Nevskii. Patriarch Kirill asserted: “This bas-relief reminds those who study 
here of the fact that active state, diplomatic and military action can be combined with earnest 
Christian ministry”162 (“Патриарх Кирилл: ‘Александр Невский — пример для будущих 
дипломатов’” 2010). The plaque, in combination with the newly constructed church on its 
grounds (mentioned earlier) and the photography exhibition “Aleksandr Nevskii – The Name 
of Russia,” on display next to the bas-relief in December 2011 (“В МГИМО прошло 
открытие фотовыставки ‘Александр Невский — имя России’” 2011),163 testify to a delib-
erate close linkage of the figure of Nevskii and the institution that educates Russia’s future 
diplomats. 
While the government-endorsed image of Nevskii as a statesman and skilful diplomat has 
been most closely associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his name has more recently 
                                                 
162  “Тем, кто здесь учится, этот барельеф должен напоминать о том, что активная государственная, 
дипломатическая и военная деятельность могут быть связаны с ревностным христианским служением.” 
163 The touring exhibition was organised by the “Aleksandr Nevskii” programme and, among others, was exhib-
ited in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, the Pskov kremlin and the Church of All Saints in Yekaterinburg. 
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been quoted within a more militaristic context. Among heightened international tensions in 
the wake of the crisis in Ukraine, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu officially transferred a 
nuclear submarine named after Aleksandr Nevskii to the armed forces (“Владимир Путин: 
До 2020 года в состав флота войдут восемь подводных крейсеров и восемь 
многоцелевых атомных подлодок” 2013). The state has demonstrated its future commit-
ment to the memory of the Prince of Novgorod in yet another way: by presidential ukaz, the 
800th anniversary of Nevskii’s birth will be celebrated in 2021 (Президент Российской 
Федерации 2014). 
The political appropriation of Nevskii as an exemplary figure has been limited, yet the nar-
rative about him has demonstrated its potential to bridge the religious and political spheres 
and establish common ground. This fits with the government’s tendency to “integrat[e] ortho-
dox symbolism and cultural capital into both the construction of its own legitimacy and the 
construction of a viable post-soviet national identity” (Papkova 2011: 189). In conclusion, it 
is worth noting that both the ROC and its associated Orthodox organisations and government 
representatives emphasise that contemporary veneration of Nevskii reaches back to an 
imperial tradition and generally steers clear of anything that would suggest Stalinist or other 
Soviet associations.  
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PART II 
In the years after 2000 very few cultural productions were dedicated to the memory of 
Aleksandr Nevskii. A notable exception is the television documentary series Who Are We? 
Russian Reforms (Kto my? Reformy po-russki, Lev Brodskii, 2000), broadcast by the Kul’tura 
channel, which dedicated an episode to Nevskii. The show sought to counter the prevailing 
image of Nevskii as a military commander and, instead, portrayed him as a political reformer. 
It highlights how Nevskii adapted to the changing geopolitical conditions of his time in order 
to save the “Russian soul” from the dire conditions that Kievan Rus’ found itself in. His defi-
nition of the state’s policy towards the East and the West is earmarked as the essence of 
“Russian-style reform.” But the relative latency of the memory of Nevskii on the big and 
small screens changed dramatically in 2008 when two major productions brought the medie-
val prince back into the public eye: the historical blockbuster Aleksandr: The Neva Battle and 
the TV project The Name Is Russia164 that resulted in Nevskii being elected the greatest 
Russian of all time. 
Aleksandr: The Neva Battle 
Sergei Eisenstein’s image of Nevskii is arguably the most widely known (non-religious) rep-
resentation of the medieval prince. The makers of the historical blockbuster Aleksandr: The 
Neva Battle (Aleksandr. Nevskaia bitva, 2008) avoided any direct comparison with 
Eisenstein’s iconic film by situating their narrative a few years earlier in Nevskii’s life. The 
film positions itself as a prequel to its Stalinist precursor, ending the narrative where 
Eisenstein’s film began. Yet whereas the Stalinist interpretation stressed his might on the bat-
tlefield, the post-Soviet Nevskii is first and foremost a morally superior figure and guardian of 
the Orthodox Russian state. The film was directed and co-produced by Igor’ Kalenov, who 
was making his feature-length film debut. He is also the founder and director of the film’s 
production company Nikola Film.165 The project was very personal to Kalenov:  
I became interested in the personality and deeds of Aleksandr Nevskii when I was still a child after I got the 
wonderful colouring book “The Battle of the Neva.” Thirty-five years later I got the opportunity to realise my 
                                                 
164 The name of the show is often translated as The Name of Russia even though this is gramatically incorrect. 
The choice is understandable since The Name Is Russia (Имя – Россия) is awkward in both English and Russian 
and was, in fact, heavily criticised. 
165 Nikola Film previously produced art house films such as Kira Muratova’s Chekhovian Motifs [Чеховские 
мотивы] (2002) and Passions [Увлеченья] (1994), Aleksandr Sokurov’s The Sun [Солнце] (2005) and Father 
and Son [Отец и сын] (2003), and 1990s cult classic Peculiarities of the National Fishing [Особенности 
национальной рыбалки] (Aleksandr Rogozhkin, 1998). 
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childhood dream of making a film about the Novgorodian prince (“Начались съемки фильма о молодых 
годах Александра Невского” 2007).166 
Furthermore, he felt Nevskii’s story was timely: “I am convinced that our society now 
needs historical examples that show that it is necessary to reach compromises in order to re-
solve global problems” (Рамм 2008).167 
Initially, Aleksei Karelin had been assigned to be director of the project, but during pro-
duction Kalenov decided to part ways with him and take on the director’s role himself 
(Кваша 2008). The film was subsidised by the Federal Agency for Culture and Cinema168 and 
premiered in Russian cinemas on 1 May, in the lead-up to the Victory Day celebrations. 
Despite the favourable release date, its performance at the box office was mediocre, drawing 
just over 577,000 viewers (“Александр. Невская битва” n.d.).169 Its DVD release was more 
successful. Aleksandr topped DVD sales in the last week of May 2008, and was in second and 
fifth position for the preceding and subsequent weeks, respectively (InterMedia 2008a; 
2008b; 2008c). In interviews, Kalenov avoided making direct associations and comparisons 
with Eisenstein’s Aleksandr Nevskii, stating that each director had “shot a different kind of 
film”:170 
It’s not a poster or an epic, but a story about a boy who is entering adulthood and learns to live by the rules 
dictated by politics. Our film is about what it’s like to be alone at the top. And with all that, as a future politi-
cian, a future soldier, he contrives to preserve his mercy and compassion (Рамм 2008).171 
During an interview for the website film.ru, Kalenov was asked why he had decided to 
shoot a historical film and whether it had become fashionable to do so – citing other exam-
ples, such as 1612 and Mongol, that had premiered the year before. Kalenov’s response to this 
seemingly innocuous question is quite telling about the political sensitivities involved in mak-
ing historical cinema. First, he denies being part of a “trend” since in the preceding decade 
just one film, 1612, had been produced on Russian history. He attributes the overall increase 
in historical films produced in Russia to circumstantial factors such as the advancements in 
                                                 
166 “Еще в детстве – после того, как у меня появилась чудесная книжка-раскраска ‘Невская битва’, – я 
заинтересовался личностью и делами Александра Невского. Спустя 35 лет у меня появилась 
возможность реализовать свою детскую мечту – снять о новгородском князе фильм.” 
167 “Уверен, что наше общество сегодня нуждается в исторических примерах, показывающих, что во имя 
решения глобальных задач приходится идти на компромиссы.” 
168 Федеральное агентство по культуре и кинематографии (Роскультура). 
169 With a budget of 8 million dollars, Aleksandr earned 2.9 million dollars in box office returns in Russia 
(“Александр. Невская битва” n.d.). 
170 “мы сняли другое кино.” 
171 “Не плакат и не эпос, а историю о мальчике, который вступает во взрослую жизнь и учится жить по 
правилам, которые диктует политика. Наш фильм о том, каково это - быть одному на вершине. И при 
всем при том, будучи политиком, будучи военным, он умудряется сохранить милосердие и сострадание”. 
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computer technology and the fact that “the political pathos has subsided somewhat now” 
(Кваша 2008).172 Kalenov concludes by emphasising his artistic independence: 
And then they try to accuse me of [fulfilling] some kind of political order. But we are just making a film; 
moreover, we are shooting it not as a historical drama, a historical epic; we produce an ordinary contempo-
rary film, a spy detective (Кваша 2008).173 
Evidently, this particular interview was not the first time the director was confronted with 
the insinuation that Aleksandr was a case of goszakaz. 
The question of goszakaz indeed remains complicated. Even if the government does not 
directly solicit a production, a director or producer is often influenced in his selection of pro-
jects to pursue by a sense of which topics or genres are likely to be funded (Interviewee I). 
Indeed, Kalenov has stated that it is easier to secure ten million dollars for a blockbuster pro-
duction than to raise one million to shoot an intimate story about ordinary people (Рамм 
2008). Therefore, unless a director is dedicated to the realisation of a particular idea and is 
willing and/or able to do so through alternative funding, a measure of (anticipatory) conformi-
ty is likely to arise. 
The film’s narrative relates how Nevskii establishes himself as sovereign of his court and 
becomes married to the daughter of the Prince of Polotsk. Whereas in Eisenstein’s film the 
Battle on the Ice takes centre stage, Kalenov’s film focuses on political intrigues and betrayals 
at the court. The military confrontation with the Swedes serves as a meagre postscript. For the 
battle scene, help was enlisted from historical re-enactment groups, which is common in 
Russian historical film production (Interviewee F). Not only is there the difference in narrated 
events between the films: Aleksandr demonstrates few borrowings from the Eisenstein clas-
sic. The iconic imagery has not been adopted or recontextualised in evident ways. 
The young Nevskii (played by Anton Pampushnyi) is handsome and has a calm but ener-
getic demeanour. The producers deliberately cast a relatively unknown actor in the leading 
role to prevent any external associations with him (Рамм 2008). His most salient features are 
his sense of compassion and overall good morals – which at times verge on the incredible. A 
crucial scene of the detective plotline is the attempt to poison Nevskii at his wedding banquet. 
A ceremonial goblet of wine is passed between the prince and his men to celebrate the holy 
matrimony. The court jester, who has fled under the table after being bullied, notices how 
                                                 
172 “сейчас несколько спал политический пафос.” 
173 “И то меня пытаются обвинить в каком-то политическом заказе. А мы просто кино снимаем, причем 
мы его решаем не в рамках исторической драмы, исторического эпоса, а мы снимаем нормальное 
современное кино, шпионский детектив.” 
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someone puts a few drops of poison into the goblet and then passes it back. The goblet is re-
filled and offered to Nevskii. As he delivers a speech and moves it toward his lips, the jester 
snatches the goblet away, drinks its contents, then slowly succumbs to the poison as Nevskii, 
now aware that a spy has infiltrated his court, holds his hand. The death of the jester, who 
sacrificed his own life to save his monarch, torments Nevskii and keeps him awake at night. 
As the search for the person responsible for the poisoning intensifies, Nevskii is firm that not 
a single innocent death will be permitted. Despite the precariousness of the situation and the 
risks involved in having a spy among his inner circle, Aleksandr overrules his advisers as they 
move to punish those in charge of pouring the wine – just in case. The young prince’s ability 
to act wisely and emphatically in times of crisis demonstrates his innate moral superiority – a 
quality that supports his canonisation by the Orthodox Church. 
The main geopolitical claim the film puts forward is that Novgorod, and the “Russian 
land” in general, were the targets of a concerted Western attack. It is intimated that the Pope 
of Rome, the Teutonic Knights of the Livonian Order (here often referred to as “Germans”) 
and Sweden are conspiring to convert Novgorod to Roman Catholicism and bring it under 
their influence. The opening scene spells out the intentions of Novgorod’s western neigh-
bours. In a voice-over, Andreas von Velven, one of the main spies in the narrative, introduces 
himself as a knight of the Livonian Order who has been sent on a special mission: to increase 
the Order’s influence over the “uncivilised” Slavic lands. Immediately, the scene is set for a 
confrontation that is as much about preserving religious and cultural independence as it is 
about fending off territorial expansion. Von Velven coordinates the efforts to subvert 
Novgorod by obtaining the military intelligence needed to launch an attack through corrupt 
boyars – notably a map of the Neva indicating suitable locations for landing and setting up 
camp – and enlists the military support of the Swedes to carry it out. Christian monks visit the 
court to offer the Pope’s support against the Tatars, though in reality the aim of their visit is to 
collect the map they have commissioned of the Neva.  
The missionaries’ audience with Nevskii exemplifies a recurring motif showing the alleged 
moral superiority of Orthodoxy over Roman Christianity. In addition to delivering the Pope’s 
offer of protection, the monks present Nevskii with a Bible. As he thumbs through it intently, 
the camera repeatedly pauses on miniatures depicting crusaders. The images show the violent 
suppression and murder of heathens and adherents of different faiths. The soundtrack mixes 
Christian hymns and screams of suffering to create the impression that Aleksandr is visualis-
ing the events described in the Bible. Suddenly overcome with resolve, he slams shut the 
book of scripture and reproves the monks for the Pope’s worldly politics. Orthodoxy, he tells 
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them, is respectful of other religions and would never attempt to impose itself on peoples of 
different faiths, let alone force them to convert by military means. He angrily sends the repre-
sentatives away and warns that he will no longer receive them in the future. Just as Nevskii is 
onto the “true” character of Roman Christianity, he also sees through the Pope’s promises. 
Even if we convert, he proclaims, they will not come to our aid when their military assistance 
is needed.  
Novgorod’s enemies in the West take advantage of tensions among Novgorod’s boyars. 
The court is divided about Nevskii’s foreign policy, especially regarding his cooperation with 
the Tatars. His benevolence vis-à-vis the expanding Mongol empire is met with mistrust and 
is perceived as a serious threat to Novgorod’s independence. His reserve in expanding rela-
tions with the West is thought to be unfounded and damaging to trade relations. The 
expansion of their trade interests is indeed the principal motive why the corrupt boyars are 
cooperating with Von Velven. When they meet with him in an underground tunnel, one of 
them proclaims: “We seek the Western way of living” – a phrase with an unmistakable con-
temporary ring to it. 174  When the news comes about Swedish warships approaching the 
estuary of the Neva, the subversive boyars are proved wrong. Not only have they failed to 
recognise the true intentions of their Western trading partners and underestimated the military 
threat emanating from the West, they have wrongfully questioned Nevskii’s diplomatic com-
petence in navigating good relations with the East. 
The motif of betrayal surfaces in multiple contexts. Aleksandr’s closest friend Ratmir vio-
lates his trust by falling in love with his bride and is briefly suspected of attempting to poison 
him. Prince Dmitrii, the son of exiled Prince Iaroslav, infiltrates the Novgorod court and is the 
true culprit. After his cover has been blown, he returns to his father at the Swedish court and 
is sworn into knighthood. In return for his allegiance, the Swedes promise to install him on 
the throne once Novgorod has been taken. The deceptions and betrayals can be read as offer-
ing direct parallels with contemporary political intrigues, as becomes clear from Kalenov’s 
choice of words to describe the “spy detective” component of the narrative: “We have spies 
who ‘muddy the waters’ in Novgorod with the help of local ‘oligarchs’” (Рамм 2008).175 One 
critic took it upon himself to put forward some guesses:  
                                                 
174 “Охоту имеем на западный манер жить.” 
175 “У нас есть шпионы, которые ‘мутят воду’ в Новгороде при помощи местных ‘олигархов’.” 
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You can look for heroes of our time in the film characters: the rogue prince – Berezovskii? The corrupt rebel-
boyars – the accused in the Iukos case? In fact, even without [such] comparisons one is left with extremely 
obvious geopolitics (Лященко 2008).176 
The possibility of drawing such direct analogies notwithstanding, the juxtaposition of 
Nevskii, on the one hand, and the corrupt boyars and Prince Dmitrii on the other serves to 
highlight the difference between those who seek a position of power and those who are actu-
ally worthy of occupying one. And only a person worthy of having and exercising power, 
such as Nevskii, can lead a nation in a wise and morally sound way during times of crisis. 
The film premiered in the wake of increasing tensions between Russia and the Baltic 
states. In Estonia, these tensions escalated in April 2007 following the removal of the “bronze 
soldier,” a monument dedicated to the Soviet soldiers who died in the liberation of Estonia 
from Nazi occupation. The relocation of the statue led to several days of riots in Tallinn and a 
diplomatic row between Estonia and Russia (Bruggemann & Kasekamp 2008). Estonia was 
targeted by an unprecedented cyberattack that caused a shutdown of major governmental in-
formation portals and necessitated a complete cut-off from international data flows to restore 
national access to the Internet (Lesk 2007). The claim of Western countries conspiring against 
Novgorod further resonates with Russia’s contemporary apprehensiveness about the bloc 
formation of, e.g., Poland and the Baltic states within the European Union on policy matters 
pertaining to EU-Russian relations. Nevskii’s accommodating stance on strengthening bonds 
with the Tatar Horde, then, should be read in light of the contemporary rapprochement be-
tween Russia and China. 
Aleksandr was poorly received by critics. One reviewer remarked that the storyline was as 
(un)surprising “as a paragraph in a schoolbook” (Гаврилова 2008).177 “One would have liked 
to see bold historical parallels, and some kind of analysis of events,”178 the critic continues, 
concluding that acclaimed directors no longer dare to take on such material in the way that 
Eisenstein had (Гаврилова 2008). The film critic writing for Kommersant was equally unim-
pressed. In a review humorously named “Aleksandr Iaroslavich doesn’t change confession,” a 
play of words on the Soviet classic on Ivan the Terrible, she states:  
Any ancient battle miniatures, the ones that illustrated chronicles, […] also captivate not with their refine-
ment of lines, their play with light and shadow and psychological depth, but with their blank expression and 
                                                 
176  “Можно искать в персонажах героев нашего времени: князь-изгой – Березовский? Продажные 
мятежники-бояре – обвиняемые по делу ЮКОСа? На самом деле и без сопоставлений получается 
предельно ясная геополитика.” 
177 “история с тем же уровнем неожиданности, что и параграф в школьном учебнике.” 
178 “Хотелось бы увидеть смелые параллели в истории, и какой-никакой анализ событий.” 
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naïve unsophistication, allowing the small yellow circle of a nimbus to be painted around the head of a still 
living Aleksandr Nevskii, galloping on his horse holding a sword, and in that way with a minimum of effort 
in one stroke convey all of the grand meaning of this figure for Russian history (Маслова 2008).179 
A critic for the website Ruskino.ru welcomed the production of historical Russian films 
and praised their potential to contribute to the understanding of history among the younger 
generation (Степнова 2008). While this alone is enough to demonstrate the value of 
Aleksandr, the critic reflects, its execution could have been more convincing. She argues that 
the authors failed to commit themselves to a single characterisation of Nevskii. Their attempt 
to include all aspects of his multifaceted personality results in an unpersuasive sequence of 
events lacking motivational coherence and depth. Unlike the first critic quoted above, she 
feels that one particular historical parallel was actually too explicit:  
And the phrase “There are so many enemies around us” would be more appropriate for a film created in 1938 
– at the height of spy mania – than today. (Although, in the grim Stalinist times, Sergei Eisenstein shot a film 
about a patriot and military commander, and not [a film] about a spy hunt) (ibidem).180 
Those viewers who shared their views online expressed highly diverse opinions, ranging 
from high praise to crushing critique and everything in between. Some questioned the film’s 
historical accuracy by comparing it to the events as they are described in medieval chronicles. 
There are, of course, plenty of absurdities and speculations in the film. It’s strange that from the very begin-
ning, Gavrila Aleksich fights on foot during the battle on the Neva instead of hopping on a horse in pursuit of 
the enemies on the Swedish ship, as is reported in the chronicles. Overall it’s a historically truthful, patriotic 
film. Nowadays, films about the struggle of the Russians with foreigners [inozemtsami] are few and far be-
tween. I’ve had enough of all their ethno political correctness (ценитель истории 2011).181 
Others conceded that the patriotic ideals embodied by the narrative make up for these 
factual shortcomings. 
It’s a terrific film! We watched it with the whole family, very instructive. It’s lively, conveys the historical 
events pretty well. But most importantly the character of Aleksandr is simply delightful – those are the kind 
                                                 
179 “Какие-нибудь древние батальные миниатюры, которыми иллюстрированы летописи, […] тоже ведь 
пленяют не изяществом линий, игрой светотени и глубоким психологизмом, а плакатной экспрессией и 
наивной безыскусностью, позволяющей еще живому, скачущему на коне с шашкой Александру 
Невскому пририсовать вокруг головы желтенький кружочек нимба и таким образом при минимуме 
усилий одним махом передать все грандиозное значение этой фигуры для русской истории.” 
180 “А уж фраза: ‘Вокруг столько врагов!’ - была бы более уместна в ленте, созданной в 1938 году - в 
разгар шпиономании, - чем сейчас. (Однако Сергей Эйзенштейн в мрачные сталинские времена снял 
фильм о патриоте и полководце, а не об охотнике на шпионов).” 
181 “Несуразностей и домыслов в фильме, конечно, хватает. Странно, что Гаврила Алексич в битве на 
Неве с самого начала бьется пешим, а не заскакивает на коне, преследуя врагов, на шведское судно, как 
сообщается в летописях. В целом исторически правдивый, патриотичный фильм. Сейчас фильмов о 
борьбе русских с иноземцами по пальцам пересчитать. Достали со своей этнополиткорректностью.” 
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of leaders we need right now! It is exactly because of such godsend people that Rus’ managed to survive! I 
even cannot believe it’s a Russian film – made with quality! (Taiso4ka 2010).182 
And another example: “We need this kind of film to raise our national consciousness. Bril-
liant work on the part of the director, screenwriters and actors. BRAVO RUSSIA!!!!!...” (zlo 
2008).183 Comments about the narrative’s truthfulness to historic events at times elicited harsh 
responses. For example, the comment “It’s a good film: historically reliable, patriotic. Filmed 
soundly. Watchable”184 (Mario Puso 2008) received the following reply: “You are a fool my 
friend, period! Use your brain!” (meus 2008).185 
 A certain one-sidedness in the depiction of the main hero did not escape viewers’ atten-
tion. 
I didn’t like how they portray Aleksandr in an exclusively positive way and as right about everything (this 
error is made in a lot of films lately). It reminds me of commissioned cinema [zakaznoe kino]. I do not dis-
pute that he was great and all. It’s just that anyone who is in power has to occasionally take tough decisions, 
but they have omitted this and don’t show it (mig-24 2008).186 
Other commenters also criticised the somewhat simplistic patriotism; in the words of one 
commenter: “Depressing flag-waving [ura-patrioticheskaia] agitation, incompetently done 
and without ardour. A waste of time” (tourmate 2008).187 Another commenter complained: 
“Again they take us for cattle. As if no one presses a key [on their keyboards, M.W.] and 
reads the real story about who Aleksandr was on the Internet. A catchpenny print style 
[lubochnaia] story of kvass-patriotism” (Андрей 2013).188 
Aleksandr: The Neva Battle portrays Nevskii as a morally superior leader amidst corrupt 
boyars conspiring with the West. Supported by a small circle of faithful men, Nevskii suc-
ceeds in exposing the collaborators and staves off the Swedish attack. Unlike the boyars who 
conspire with the West to further their personal gains through trade, Nevskii correctly 
                                                 
182  “Потрясающий фильм! Смотрели свей семьей, очень поучительно. Яркий, неплохо передает 
исторические событие. А главное сам персонаж Александра просто восхищает – вот такие руковадители 
нам сейчас нужны! Именно благодаря таким людям от Бога Русь и выжила! Даже не верилось, что фильм 
русский – снят на высоте!” 
183  “Для поднятия национального самосознания нужны такие фильмы. Блестящая работа режиссера, 
сценаристов и акторов. БРАВО РОССИЯ!!!!!!...” 
184 “Хорошее кино: исторически достоверное, патриотичное. Снято добротно. Смотреть можно”. 
185 “Дурак ты батенька и точка! Мозг включи!” 
186 “Не понравилось, что Александра показывают исключительно положительным и правым во всем 
(этим вообще грешат последнее время во многих фильмах). Напоминает заказное кино. Я не спорю, что 
он великий и прочее. Просто любому, кто стоит у власти, периодически приходится принимать суровые 
решения, а это упускают и не показывают.” 
187 “Унылая ура-патриотическая агитка, сделанная неумело и без задора. Потеря времени.” 
188  “Опять нас считают за быдло. Неужели никто не нажмет клавишу и не прочтет в интернете 
действительную историю о том, кем был Александр. Лубочная история квасного патриотизма.” 
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assesses the threat the European powers pose to Novgorod’s political and religious independ-
ence. The confrontation between Novgorod and the West is repeatedly and explicitly framed 
as a struggle to defend the Russian lands against religious expansionism from outside. While 
the advance of the Mongol horde is no less impending, Nevskii demonstrates a remarkable 
ability to negotiate beneficial conditions for Novgorod with Eastern peoples. Since Tatar ad-
vancement poses no direct threat to the princedom’s religious beliefs, unlike with Novgorod’s 
Western enemies, a cooperative approach is deemed to be more fruitful.  
The latter argument to a certain extent echoes Eisenstein’s Aleksandr Nevskii, where 
Nevskii proclaims that the danger from the Germans is more pressing than the threat posed 
the Tatars since it cannot be warded off by paying tribute. Another minor correspondence 
between the two films is a moment when it is rhetorically asked whether one would sacrifice 
the “Russian land” (russkaia zemlia) for the sake of trade opportunities. The major difference 
lies in the importance attributed to religion in the representation of Novgorod and “Russian 
civilisation”; in short, what Nevskii is called to defend. In both films the Western enemy acts 
explicitly in the name of Christianity and seeks to attain its goals through acts of violence. 
Unlike in the Soviet representation, where Russian Orthodoxy is featured primarily as a cir-
cumstantial aspect of the historical setting,189 Kalenov’s Nevskii is devoted to his faith and 
acts explicitly in its defence. His diplomatic and military feats are framed in such a way as to 
bestow upon Nevskii the reputation of not just the defender of the Russian people(s), but the 
defender of Orthodox civilisation as such. 
The Name is Russia  
From May through December 2008, the Rossiia channel organised and broadcast the cross-
media project The Name Is Russia. Through several rounds of online and telephone voting, 
viewers had the opportunity to elect the greatest Russian of all time. After an initial narrowing 
of potential candidates from five hundred to twelve on the basis of votes cast online, the final-
ists were judged on their merits in twelve prime-time broadcasts and a final episode. On 28 
December, Aleksandr Nevskii was announced the winner. The project, which bore the slogan 
“The historical choice of 2008,” followed in the footsteps of international precedents, such as 
the 2002 BBC project 100 Greatest Britons, where Winston Churchill was voted the winner, 
and the Ukrainian adaptation of the format that saw Iaroslav the Wise being elected the great-
est all-time Ukrainian in spring 2008. Several types of interactive media (e.g., online and 
                                                 
189 Mike O’Mahony argues that, despite depicting Nevskii “ostensibly as a secular leader”, the film is “perme-
ate[d]” with religious symbolism and references to biblical scenes (O’Mahony 2008: 168-169). 
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telephone voting, a website forum, a LiveJournal page) were incorporated into the project 
design to stimulate social participation in the election. In addition, the online dimension in-
creased its appeal to the younger generation. As a result, the project should be viewed as “a 
carefully constructed and rigorously manipulated social project that aims to reify and rein-
force Russian national sentiment by offering civic platforms of discussion and presentation” 
(Strukov 2009: 33). 
A jury of notable Russians consisting of politicians, scientists and artists represented the 
twelve finalists. It appears that the final composition of the jury differed somewhat from what 
was originally intended. In an interview published in July 2008, VGTRK Director General 
Anton Zlatopol’skii indicated that Nikita Mikhalkov had given his preliminary consent to host 
the show (Банденко 2008). Aleksandr Liubimov, however, fulfilled the role of presenter in 
the finals and Mikhalkov took a seat among the members of the jury. Liubimov was First 
Deputy Director General of VGTRK at the time and had initiated the project (Strukov 2009: 
32). Some last-minute changes occurred with regard to the members of the jury as well. Ac-
cording to Zlatopol’skii, “Viktor Chernomyrdin will represent Peter the First, Valentina 
Matvienko will speak on behalf of Catherine the Second. And Anatolii Chubais will make his 
appearance with us, and many others…” (Банденко 2008).190 Neither Matvienko, then gover-
nor of St. Petersburg, nor Chubais, who led the process of privatisation in the early 1990s, 
took part in the finals. The finalists and their representatives are summarised below in order of 
broadcast. 
Aleksandr Nevskii Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill 
Peter the Great Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian ambassador to Ukraine 
Iosif Stalin  Valentin Varennikov, Army general 
Dmitrii Mendeleev Sergei Kapitsa, professor; Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences 
Aleksandr Suvorov Sergei Mironov, Chair of the Federation Council 
Fedor Dostoevskii Dmitrii Rogozin, Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO 
Catherine the Great Aleksandr Tkachev, Governor of Krasnodar Krai 
Vladimir Lenin Gennadii Ziuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
Aleksandr II  Andrei N. Sakharov, Director of the Institute of Russian History 
Ivan the Terrible Il’ia Glazunov, artist 
Aleksandr Pushkin Iurii Kublanovskii, poet 
Petr Stolypin  Nikita Mikhalkov, film director 
                                                 
190 “представлять интересы Петра Первого должен Виктор Черномырдин, Валентина Матвиенко будет 
говорить от лица Екатерины Второй. И Анатолий Чубайс у нас появится, и многие другие…” 
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With regard to the representatives, the participation of (then) Metropolitan of Smolensk 
and Kaliningrad Kirill – who thereby represented the ROC on a prime-time TV show – is 
striking (we will return to his motives for doing so later on). It demonstrates that the produc-
ers felt that politicians, artists and scientists would be most authoritative in questions 
concerning national history. The choice of an army general to represent Stalin is informative 
as it affirms the connection between veterans of the Second World War and the memory of 
Stalin. Moreover, it is generally known that Varennikov was implicated in the 1991 coup 
d’état against Mikhail Gorbachev. It is unclear whether the selection of a man with such asso-
ciations was a conscious decision on the part of the producers, or whether the choice was 
solely necessitated by the need to find a person of good social standing who was willing to 
represent the Soviet leader on national television. 
The competition sparked international controversy at an early stage when Stalin topped the 
list in the online voting leading up to the television finals. The programme’s production team 
attributed the apparent popularity of Stalin to the involvement of hackers. They published two 
messages on the website that explained how the voting system fell victim to a so-called 
denial-of-service attack.191 In addition to flooding the computer system with requests that 
caused it to malfunction, “massive voting for I.V. Stalin was organised from several Internet 
sources” (“‘Имя Россия’. FLOOD ATTACK” 2008). About a week after the event, on 17 
July, a list of (user) names appeared on the project website. The twenty-two listed “villains,” 
the post stated, had “turned Stalin into a computer virus” (“ИМЯ РОССИЯ. ‘ТОП 22 
НЕГОДЯЯ’” 2008).192 The user names are nondescript (e.g., “Grom,” “cyber,” “DND”) lead-
ing one to ask what effect was intended by publicising this “list of shame.” Zlatopol’skii has 
commented on the uproar and has denied the allegation that the producers intervened because 
Stalin’s lead in the polling was making them nervous. He stated: 
It would be foolish to argue with the fact that we are talking about one of the most iconic figures in the histo-
ry of contemporary Russia. The appearance of Stalin among the top positions in the rankings did not surprise 
us; we were ready for that, what’s more, we were expecting something to that effect. [But] it’s a different 
story when at some point the technical means of the voting system cannot cope with the increased attention 
from the audience, and we even had to suspend the operation of the computers for several hours because fail-
ures had begun to occur. In part, the interference was provoked by spammers who undertook a coordinated 
attack on our website in order to sow chaos and disable the system. We made it clear that we know the real 
                                                 
191 A denial-of-service attack is an attack aimed at the interruption or suspension of services of a website or net-
work by sending a massive amount of request to a server that causes it to overload. 
192 “превратил Сталина в компьютерный вирус.” 
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names of the attackers and will not let them behave like hooligans with impunity. Perhaps, you mistook the 
harshness of our tone for nerves? (Банденко 2008).193 
The first television broadcast, explaining the selection procedure, foregrounded the hacker 
incident as if to assure the viewers that the results of the selection process were fair. The inci-
dent and the publicity it generated nevertheless undermined the project’s credibility and fed 
into rumours of falsification after the project drew to a close. 
During the televised stage of the election, a conscious effort was made to demonstrate so-
cietal resonance. In short video clips (groups of) individuals explained whom they were 
voting for and why. Thus, the programme created the impression that the project was on the 
minds of the general public and Russian citizens felt personally connected to one or more of 
the finalists. One of these segments contains a rare explicit acknowledgement that Lenin and 
Stalin continue to enjoy popular support in some circles. At the beginning of the episode on 
Catherine the Great, a group of communists in Saint Petersburg is briefly introduced. They 
are planning to cast their votes for Lenin, according to the voice-over. The icon depicting Sta-
lin that hangs on a wall visible behind them, and the fact that they have requested his 
canonisation by the Russian Orthodox Church, however, suggest that they have yet to make 
their final choice. 
The general dynamics of the panel discussions underscores that the question of how the 
Soviet past, including its propaganda and historiography, should be valued has proved to be 
enduring. While the project may have aimed to determine a new national symbol, it largely 
turned out to be an occasion for the public to scrutinise the legacy of Soviet narratives of glo-
rification. Because of the diversity of historical figures who reached the competition’s final 
stage, the jury could not avoid evaluating the contemporary relevance of the Soviet past and 
its heroes (Lenin, Stalin), as well as the Soviet glorification of statesmen from earlier periods 
of Russian history (e.g., Aleksandr Nevskii, Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great). Over the 
course of the discussions, Soviet mythology is deconstructed, the “true” course of historical 
events is supposedly revealed on the basis of extensive quotations, and commonly held beliefs 
                                                 
193 “Глупо спорить с тем, что речь идет об одной из самых знаковых фигур в истории современной 
России. Появление Сталина на верхних строчках рейтинга не стало для нас сюрпризом, мы были готовы 
к этому, более того, ждали чего-то подобного. Другое дело, что технические средства системы 
голосования в какой-то момент не справились с повышенным вниманием аудитории, и нам даже 
пришлось на несколько часов приостановить работу счетчиков из-за начавшихся сбоев. Частично помехи 
спровоцировали спамеры, предпринявшие скоординированную атаку на наш сайт с целью посеять хаос и 
вывести систему из строя. Мы ясно дали понять, что знаем подлинные имена нападавших и не дадим им 
безнаказанно хулиганить. Может, жесткость тона вы приняли за нервы?” 
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about the virtues and vices of these great Russians are challenged so as to establish more “his-
torically accurate” narratives. 
Throughout the series, enduring Soviet characterisations and attitudes towards history are 
called into question. In the episode on Catherine the Great, for instance, it is repeatedly asked 
whether Krasnodar should be re-named Yekaterinodar, its name before the Russian Revolu-
tion. Certain judges, however, most notably Gennadii Ziuganov, defend the continued 
honouring of the Soviet canon’s heroes – a position that is not without resonance among (part 
of) the Russian population. 
While the discussions revolve mostly around facts and their interpretation, members of the 
jury at times demonstrate the need to explicitly position themselves in certain ways with re-
spect to the candidate being discussed. In the cases of Ivan the Terrible and Stalin, some 
jurors appeared uncomfortable with being “forced” to consider these candidates as potential 
winners. The apparent uneasiness was most likely brought forth by the fact that the group of 
finalists could be “split equally” into “builders” and “demons,” as jury member Sergei 
Kapitsa remarks in the first episode.194 
The question is rightly raised how the candidates, especially those from earlier periods, are 
best approached. On the one hand, their actions have to be historically contextualised, viewed 
against the standards and circumstances of their day. Consider, for example, how Il’ia 
Glazunov chooses to defend Ivan the Terrible by pointing out that several European rulers of 
his era were responsible for the deaths of an even greater number of their respective citizens. 
On the other hand, it is argued, such attempts to come to historical understanding should not 
downplay crimes and overt acts of cruelty. The question that forms the guiding thread through 
the project as a whole, therefore, and one that remains unsatisfactorily answered, is: Can a 
tyrant be allowed to be named the greatest Russian of all time? The majority of the jury’s 
members appear to answer this question in the negative, which endows the project with a ten-
sion that is hard to resolve. Because if, through a fair and transparent voting process, the 
audience selects, for instance, Stalin as its winner, then who are these twelve jurors to decide 
that this is not allowed? Then, perhaps it is true that the only difference between a Russian 
dictatorship and a Russian democracy is that in the latter, the people can choose by whom they 
are exploited, as Mikhalkov jokes in the closing remarks on Ivan the Terrible. 
The jury’s members struggle to reconcile their understanding of historical greatness with 
the selection of finalists put before them by the voting audience. With regard to Ivan the 
                                                 
194 “строители”; “бесы.” 
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Terrible, Viktor Chernomyrdin, for example, expresses doubts about whether most of the ju-
rors would cast their votes in his favour. Still, he continues, the Russian people did vote for 
Ivan and this should be respected. The jury’s task, he generalises, is to discuss the individuals 
whom the voters have put before it, not to question the right of any of them to be there. The 
writer Viktor Erofeev has also touched upon the fundamental difference between the Russian 
people’s understanding of history and that of the so-called educated elite with reference to 
The Name Is Russia, addressing in particular the popularity of Stalin:  
Russian [russkoe] popular consciousness managed to prevail in various spheres and for various reasons be-
cause it was not disenchanted by the Enlightenment, and for the elite it was even disadvantageous to free it 
from its illusions. Therefore our Russian [rossiiskoe] popular consciousness reacts entirely differently to his-
torical figures than European [consciousness]. And we, as elites, [react] half this way, half that way because 
we arose from the people – some up to the knee, some up to the waist. […] The popular self-consciousness 
greatly appeals to me: it is built on imagination, on the negotiation of history. But it becomes monstrous once 
we land in our reality (Бунтман 2009).195  
One of the most insightful explanations for Ivan the Terrible’s place (and that of several 
other candidates) among the final twelve is put forward by jury member Sergei Kapitsa. He 
argues that it signals the existence of a “spiritual vacuum” and deep-rooted difficulties with 
the adequate understanding of one’s national history.196 Kapitsa draws attention to the tenden-
cy to impose contemporary value judgements onto the past and to let historiography be 
guided by “historical feeling” rather than by the search for truth.197 In an apparent attempt to 
redirect the course of the discussion, Kapitsa concludes that the jury is guilty of this very ten-
dency in its continuous attempts to somehow justify the fact that Ivan the Terrible had been 
chosen. Mikhalkov’s closing remark that, in judging such a complex historical figure, one 
should trust one’s gut feeling (literally, “inner tuning fork”) demonstrates the accuracy of 
Kapitsa’s observation.198 As the judges repeatedly proclaim that the jury’s task is to try and 
understand why the public voted for these candidates – in other words, as they attempt to 
bridge the gap between their understanding of exemplary historical figures and the under-
                                                 
195 “Русское народное сознание восторжествовало в разных сферах и по разным причинам, потому что 
оно не расколдовывалось Просвещением, да элитам было невыгодно его расколдовывать. Поэтому наше 
российское народное сознание реагирует на исторических деятелей совершенно иначе, чем европейское. 
А мы, вроде бы элита – наполовину этак, наполовину так, потому что вышли из народа – кто по колено, 
кто по пояс. […] Народное самосознание меня очень привлекает: оно построено на воображении, на 
преодолении истории. Но оно становится чудовищным, когда мы попадаем в нашу реальность.” 
196 “духовная пустота.” 
197 “историческое чувство.” 
198 “внутренний камертон.” 
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standing of those who have cast their votes – it becomes all the more obvious how great the 
distance between the public and this particular jury actually is. 
Aleksandr Nevskii 
The television broadcast phase of the project opened with a discussion of the candidacy of 
Aleksandr Nevskii. Eloquently and charismatically, Metropolitan Kirill delivered a plea in 
favour of the Prince of Novgorod in which the challenges of Nevskii’s rule were interwoven 
with considerations of contemporary political and societal issues. In various interviews, he 
has elucidated the motivation behind his participation on the jury. In addition to supporting 
the basic tenets of the project, Metropolitan Kirill felt it imperative to have the Russian Or-
thodox Church represented on the show: 
And, of course, in such a discussion about iconic names in Russian history the voice of the Orthodox Church, 
whose role in the creation of Russian civilisation and Russian culture is eminent and undisputed, should nec-
essarily be heard (“‘Постижение России, или Открытый урок гражданственности’” 2008).199 
Television was familiar terrain for Metropolitan Kirill. Since 1994 he has hosted the pro-
gramme The Pastor’s Word (Slovo pastyria), which continues to be broadcast weekly on 
Channel One. Nonetheless, the Metropolitan felt it necessary to receive the blessing of 
Patriarch Aleksii II before he agreed to participate in The Name Is Russia and represent the 
views of the ROC within a non-religious television format.  
[The Name Is Russia] is a discussion, and upholding my position could well be accompanied by a certain ten-
sion in the dialogue with others. But the Church is called not to divide, but to unite. And therefore I thought, 
do I have the right, as metropolitan, a hierarch of the Russian Church, to enter a discussion that could divide 
people? And, unable to find an answer, I turned to His Holiness Patriarch Aleksii. After he heard me out, he 
answered immediately. His Holiness the Patriarch did not always answer immediately. […] But here, to my 
surprise, he immediately said, with a kind smile: “Lord [Vladyka], you should definitively agree – you have 
to defend Aleksandr Nevskii” (“В преддверии Новолетия и Рождества Христова Местоблюститель 
Патриаршего Престола встретился с радиожурналистами и представителями информационных 
агентств” 2008).200 
                                                 
199 “И, разумеется, в подобной дискуссии о знаковых именах русской истории непременно должен был 
прозвучать голос Православной Церкви, роль которой в созидании русской цивилизации и русской 
культуры является выдающейся и неоспоримой.” 
200  “Это дискуссия, и отстаивание своей позиции могло сопровождаться в том числе и неким 
напряжением в диалоге с другими. А ведь Церковь призвана не разделять, а объединять. И поэтому я 
подумал, а имею ли я право, будучи митрополитом, иерархом Русской Церкви, войти в дискуссию, 
которая может разделить людей. И, не найдя ответа, обратился к Святейшему Патриарху Алексию. Когда 
он выслушал меня, то ответил немедленно. Святейший Патриарх не всегда давал ответы сразу. […] А 
здесь, к моему удивлению, он сразу с очень доброй улыбкой сказал: ‘Владыка, непременно согласитесь –
нужно защитить Александра Невского’.” 
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In addition to his conviction that Aleksandr Nevskii should be named the greatest Russian 
of all time, the saint’s memory appealed to Metropolitan Kirill on a personal level. He had 
spent a great part of his life in St. Petersburg and would often “have recourse to his heavenly 
intercession” in prayer at the Aleksandr Nevskii monastery, where the Saint’s relics are in-
terred (“‘Постижение России, или Открытый урок гражданственности’” 2008). 201 
Furthermore, it was at the St. Petersburg monastery that Metropolitan Kirill received his ordi-
nation to the priesthood. 
Host Aleksandr Liubimov introduces Nevskii as “warrior, ruler, a symbol of courage 
[and] fortitude.”202 The introductory video clip that follows establishes the parameters for the 
discussion that ensues: a clash of (ideologically informed) interpretations of distant history. 
Against a soundtrack of resounding church bells, the voice-over begins: “Everyone knows St. 
Aleksandr Nevskii from Soviet cinema. A noble commander, illustrious warrior…but by no 
means a saint.”203 Accompanied visually by fragments from Eisenstein’s Aleksandr Nevskii, 
the narrator recounts the political realities of the thirteenth century and the real Aleksandr 
Nevskii: this was an era characterised by a battle of all against all, including the Russian rul-
ers themselves. In their rivalry the princes where guided by interests other than attaining the 
ideal of the Orthodox nation. The Battle on the Ice, as the best-known event associated with 
the memory of Nevskii, receives particular attention. Eisenstein’s representation of the battle 
scene is superimposed on the image of a frozen lake smeared with blood. The soundtrack and 
intonation of the narrator build up to create heightened suspense. 
The clip argues that Nevskii’s politics aimed to establish control over the Russian lands in 
order to unite them in a single state. His cooperative stance towards the Horde was based on 
his pragmatic consideration about what was beneficial for Russia, regardless of what he him-
self could stand to gain from the alliance. His willingness to forego opportunities for personal 
benefit influenced the moment when Nevskii assumed the role of monarch: Nevskii’s acces-
sion as monarch only towards the end of his life was not due to any disinclination on his part, 
the narrator asserts, but reflected his reluctance to allow himself to assume such a position of 
luxury. The video segment concludes by asking what remains of the historical figure of 
Nevskii in the various representations and interpretations of his rule that have since devel-
oped. Of greater importance, however, than uncovering the historical truth within these 
narratives of memory, the narrator continues, is an acknowledgement that Nevskii – in all the 
                                                 
201 “прибегать к его небесному заступлению.” 
202 “Воин, символ мужества, силы духа.” 
203 “Святого Александра Невского все знают по советскому кино. Благородный полководец, славный 
воин… но совершенно не святой.” 
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facets of his character – is remembered today. In a somewhat surprising turn considering the 
clip’s opening sentence, the final lines proclaim that the true essence of Aleksandr Nevskii 
lies in his relation to God. A portrait of Nevskii as saint, and a sudden transition from minor 
to major key in the musical score, affirm the divine connotation. 
In his opening plea, Metropolitan Kirill presents Nevskii as “the saviour and builder of 
Russia.”204 A leader, moreover, who does not require rehabilitation or defending – like some 
of the other finalists – since all the stories known to the Russian people about his feats are 
laudatory. Yet, Metropolitan Kirill continues, the challenge lies in bringing across his con-
temporaneity to a modern audience. What sets Nevskii apart is the multifacetedness of his 
persona. The plea summarises his merits as a “supreme strategist” – a politician, ruler, philos-
opher and military commander. 205  In the opinion of Metropolitan Kirill, Nevskii’s 
contribution to Russian history could not have been more decisive; in fact, without him Rus-
sia and its “civilisational code” would not exist today.206 He recognised the imminence of the 
threats posed by expansionary foes from East and West alike but, instead of fighting against 
these adversaries, Metropolitan Kirill argues poetically, he fought for the preservation of na-
tional identity and consciousness. Nevskii succeeded in doing this by adopting a “delicate, 
courageous diplomacy” that sought to accommodate the Tatar Horde rather than take on an 
opponent that was too mighty to conquer.207 He correctly understood that Tatar expansion 
was economically motivated and therefore would have a limited impact on Russian society, 
whereas Western expansion was not just economically but politically and religiously 
motivated. Metropolitan Kirill asserts that with respect to these enemies, whose expansionist 
aims included the subjection of Russian civilisation to their cultural norms, Nevskii allowed 
no compromise. Creating a clear contrast with modern society’s capitalist values, 
Metropolitan Kirill emphasises how the Prince chose to sacrifice wealth in order to preserve 
his people’s fundamental values.208 
Besides saving Russian civilisation from impending ruin, Aleksandr was exceptional in 
strength, wisdom and physical appearance. He was a young, handsome man, Metropolitan 
                                                 
204 “Спаситель и строитель России.” 
205  The denominations he uses here are “величайший стратег”, “политик”, “правитель”, “стратег”, 
“философ” and “полководец.” 
206 “цивилизационный код.” 
207 “тонкая мужественная дипломатика.” 
208 At this point, Metropolitan Kirill invokes the Russian philosopher Lev Gumilev to support his argument. He 
states that the protection of the will of the people was a necessary condition for Gumilev’s “ethnogenesis” to 
take place. On the traces of the philosophical concepts developed by Gumilev that can be found in the views 
expressed by Patriarch Kirill, and in particular how they relate to the concept of “Holy Rus’,” see Suslov (2014).  
 139 
Kirill proclaims, of whom there is no equal in the Bible (v Biblii). Yet Nevskii’s most im-
portant virtue is his sanctity. Indeed, Metropolitan Kirill asserts, if Russian history had seen a 
larger share of saintly rulers, its course would have been markedly different. The plea takes an 
interesting turn when Metropolitan Kirill proceeds to argue that, through his skilful engage-
ment with the East, Nevskii laid the groundwork for a multiethnic society – a claim he 
reasserts later on. The Prince’s policies with regard to international relations and the interac-
tion among ethnic groups formed the basis for Russia’s later development as a large state. In 
other words, it is with Nevskii that the Russian imperial state, with its primacy of Orthodox 
Russians among other peoples inhabiting the same land, finds its origin.209 
When Nikita Mikhalkov, as chair of the jury, asks Metropolitan Kirill to further elucidate 
the contemporary relevance of Nevskii, the latter draws an unexpected parallel between the 
symbolic importance of the Battle on the Neva and current Russian involvement in the mili-
tary conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. Nevskii should be understood as a “post-
Perestroika ruler,” he states, though the Perestroika Nevskii had lived through was far more 
invasive and bloody than its contemporary analogue, involving the complete loss of the 
Russian state. Both then and now, he continues, large states had disintegrated and their peo-
ples had become weakened and demoralised. The sudden appearance of Nevskii, who took on 
the Swedes and managed to defeat them, had a tremendously positive effect on Russia’s con-
fidence in its own strength and ability to defend itself. Metropolitan Kirill then proceeds to 
introduce the contemporary parallel, but fails to make the exact point of comparison explicit. 
He states that in a similar vein, Russia now finds itself in a period when it is accumulating 
potential strength. This amassing of power is aimed not at waging war and pursuing territorial 
expansion but at evolving into a great power. Whereas great power status is usually under-
stood in military and economic terms, here it is equated with being a powerful spiritual 
organisation. A great Russia, Metropolitan Kirill continues, will serve as a centre of civilisa-
tion within the globalising world. 
A second historical parallel is then invoked: the incessant endeavours of representatives of 
Western Christian civilisation to influence, dominate and ultimately destroy Russian civilisa-
tion. Sergei Mironov links the memory of Nevskii to the enduring debates about whether 
Russia should orient itself eastwards or westwards and concludes that European Catholic civi-
lisation has been putting Russia under pressure for centuries and continues to do so today. 
Here, a comparison with the conflict in Georgia is brought forth once more. Ziuganov argues 
                                                 
209 The plea bears resemblance to the concept of “Holy Rus’” which Metropolitan Kirill has since placed at the 
centre of his vision as the Patriarch of the ROC, cf. Suslov (2014). 
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that the Roman popes were deliberately trying to change Russian civilisation. Today, he 
claims, the West continues to act along the same lines. Ziuganov recounts a visit to Stras-
bourg (attending, most likely, a meeting of the Council of Europe) where, he claims, some 
sixty delegates put forward accusations against Russia because the president of Georgia, 
Mikheil Saakashvili, backed by the United States, had initiated a war against Russia. 
These parallels provide an occasion for the judges to reflect on the nature of the Russian 
state and its people, and to ask: Why, in Russian history, have great leaders emerged only in 
times of crisis? Dmitrii Rogozin attributes his answer to national character: for the Russian 
people, crisis is a necessary prerequisite for it to fully express its will and national identity. In 
times of peace, these cohesive structures slacken and the people lose control (chuvstvo 
khoziaina) over their land. The lack of national self-esteem leads to a perception of weakness 
and is the reason why Russia tends to come under attack in times of peace. Mikhalkov disa-
grees and seeks the reason to stem from domestic rather than international causes. He asserts 
that whenever Russia starts to develop itself under normal, peaceful circumstances, a strong, 
monolithic state structure forms, which is then met by a countervailing force (sila) that seeks 
to undermine it. The challenge from within provokes a situation in which heroes come to the 
fore. 
Despite Metropolitan Kirill’s persistent attempts to steer the discussion in the direction of a 
multifaceted but first and foremost saintly memory image, the image of Nevskii as military 
commander is repeatedly emphasised. The established Soviet narrative and its emphatic visual 
portrayal appear to be inescapable, even among a jury of educated men. The discussion ex-
plicitly touches upon the difficulty of separating the man from the myth: Who exactly have 
the viewers voted for, and whose merits should the jury judge? Being furthest removed in 
time, Nevskii indeed shows a greater resemblance to a mythic figure than a flesh-and-blood 
individual – like the Russian bogatyrs, as Aleksandr Tkachev points out.  
Several commentators have claimed that the results of the popular voting were falsified; 
not by hackers, but by the project’s producers themselves. Liubov Borusiak has demonstrated 
how the leaders of the project not only tried to influence online voting in the first stages of the 
competition, but actually manipulated results (by declaring invalid a large number of votes for 
Stalin because of the alleged hacker involvement), as well as selecting and shaping the image 
of Nevskii, the eventual winner, to fit their desired vision of Russian identity (Борусяк 2008). 
Even if the voting results were not falsified, the deliberate way the project was set up (the 
selection of representatives, the programming of the episodes) appears to have affected its 
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outcome. This line of argumentation has been put forward, for instance, by Anatolii 
Golubovskii:  
The viewers, who, from the first programme of the series (Aleksandr Nevskii), were impressed by the rheto-
ric of Metropolitan Kirill, were [merely] waiting for the concluding benefit performance by Mikhalkov 
(Stolypin). They poorly remembered everything that happened in between the first and final programmes. 
[…] They remembered the first hero because he was first, the last one because he was last. Their representa-
tives were Metropolitan Kirill and Nikita Mikhalkov, the most vivid and distinct participants of the project, 
who were the evident leaders among the jury. As a result: Nevskii in first place, Stolypin in second. And in 
third place came Stalin – some kind of compromise to the real leader in public opinion. The sequencing in 
the format worked neatly in this case (Голубовский 2009).210 
In a similar vein, Nikolay Golev and Olga Yakovleva have argued that “the project results 
are not identification of the Russians’ real attitude to a historic character but their attitude 
towards the project and its participants” (Golev & Yakovleva 2012: 1840). The death of 
Patriarch Aleksii II on 5 December 2008, as the project was drawing to a close, may have 
been a further impetus to vote for (Saint) Nevskii. 
The The Name Is Russia project, and the societal questions it represented, sparked discus-
sion in both traditional and new media. Several counterprojects soon emerged online, 
demonstrating both the general appeal of its underlying idea – determining a contemporary 
cultural-memory vocabulary for Russia – and the disappointment with or distrust of such an 
election run by a state TV channel. The website Russia without a Name211 set out to prove 
that the online voting results were manipulated (Strukov 2009: 38).212 Anti-Name of Russia 
used the same preliminary list of 500 names, yet asked people to vote for the biggest antihero 
of Russian history. This resulted in a top three consisting of Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Lenin 
and Iosif Stalin (“Анти имя России” n.d.). The Shame of Russia, created as a negative coun-
terpart to the original project, gave users the option of adding candidates without limitations. 
Its top three names were Vladimir Putin, Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu and 
Berl Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia (“Все кандидаты” n.d.). The Name of Russia – The 
                                                 
210  “Зрители, с первой программы цикла (Александр Невский) находившиеся под впечатлением от 
риторики митрополита Кирилла, ждали заключительного бенефиса Михалкова (Столыпин). Все, что 
было между первой и последней программами, запомнилось плохо. […] Первый герой запомнилось 
потому, что был первым, последний – поскольку был последним. Их представители самые яркие и 
внятные участники проекта – митрополит Кирилл и Никита Михалков, которые были явными лидерами в 
коллеги присяжных. В итоге: Невский на первом месте, Столыпин – на втором. А на третьем месте 
Сталин – некоторый компромисс с настоящим лидером общественного мнения. Тут форматная 
процедура сработала четко.” 
211 Безымянная Россия. 
212 At the time of writing the website was no longer hosted at the original url www.unnamedrussia.com, nor 
available in cache. 
 142 
Historical Choice of Russia213 allowed its users to vote for not one but two categories and 
yielded quite different results, in part because it also listed living persons. The “Glory of 
Russia” category was headed by scientist Viktor Skumin, the former special forces command-
er Cheslav Mlynnik, and Stalin. The category “Shame of Russia” was won by a large margin 
by the president of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, followed by Vladimir Putin and Saint 
Seraphim of Sarov.214 What is particularly interesting is that many names appear on both lists, 
which reflects a lack of societal consensus. Viktor Skumin, for example, also occupies four-
teenth place in the “Shame” rankings, while Saint Seraphim takes seventh place among the 
most glorious persons of Russian history. The administrators described the project as follows: 
“The Name of Russia” is an open project for those who are not indifferent to history, tradition, faith and the 
future of their Fatherland. Today, too many people want to turn Russia into a faceless unity of citizens, con-
cerned with just one objective – the objective of personal enrichment. Acting in this manner, these betrayers 
of their own people attempt to depersonalise Russia. And it would seem there is no possibility to interfere 
with their plans. But we say: Enough! The Name of Russia is Personality and National self-consciousness 
(“Имя России” n.d.).215 
They also expressed the concern that the television project, as well as the politically 
oriented online counterprojects (expressing, e.g., “leftish” views on history) may well serve to 
divide rather than unite society. Finally, the website The Names of Russia – The Historical 
Choice of…216 has produced yearly rankings since 2009. In many ways, it is an unofficial 
continuation of the television project except that there is no predetermined shortlist of names 
and users are free to vote for any person they deem worthy of representing Russia. The result-
ing top 10 is first and foremost a collection of popular cultural figures and professional 
athletes. The 2009 rankings list singer Vitalii Grachev, cultural icon Filipp Kirkorov and 
hockey player Aleksei Cherepanov as its top three (“ТОП-100 рейтинг сайта ‘Имена 
России’ за 2009 год” n.d.). The only politician who made it into the top ten is Dmitrii 
Medvedev, in fifth place. 
In retrospect, it can be said that the project did not succeed in the difficult task of electing a 
new (old) symbol for Russia whilst navigating the difficulties involved in any genuine discus-
                                                 
213 Имя России – Исторический выбор России. 
214 Rankings consulted on 9 October 2014. On the memory of Saint Seraphim of Sarov in post-Soviet Russia, see 
John Garrard and Carol Garrard (2008). 
215 “‘Имя России’ – открытый проект для всех, кому не безразлична история, традиция, вера и будущее 
своего Отечества. Сегодня слишком многие хотят сделать из России некое безликое объединение 
граждан, озабоченных лишь одной целью — целью личного обогащения. Поступая так, предатели своего 
народа, пытаются обезличить Россию. И помешать их планам, казалось бы, нет возможности. Но мы 
говорим — хватит! Имя России – Личность и Национальное самосознание.” 
216 Имена России – Исторический выбор 2009. 
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sion of the many facets of Russian history. Mikhail Morozov argues that, precisely because its 
format eschewed acknowledging the actuality of uncomfortable or painful questions, the pro-
ject should be regarded as “amoral.”217  
The laws of the talk show genre do not suit such a delicate, morally sensitive matter like history, moreover a 
recent history where the victims of Stalinism or their children are still alive. In the broadcast about Stalin one 
of the judges begins: “Stalin was a genius…” – the audience bursts into applause – “a genius of villainy” – 
[and] the applause continues as if nothing happened (Морозов 2009).218 
With the audience and the jury locked in fundamental disagreement, The Name Is Russia 
was unable to puth forth a convincing verdict. 
Yet the project did create an enormous amount of media attention and thereby greatly fa-
miliarised Nevskii to the general public. Metropolitan Kirill has given his view on how the 
outcome of the programme – its election of Nevskii – should be interpreted: 
I viewed this project as the moral orientation of our whole society. We say that we are an Orthodox people, 
an Orthodox country. But how do we define this, how do we identify [ourselves]? I believe that the votes of 
almost 50 million people attested that, miraculously after so many years of godlessness and the destruction of 
sanctities, precisely sanctity remains the dominant value of our people. Indeed, when we call Rus’ holy we 
speak in the first place about a system of values in which sanctity was the characterising moral dominant, 
that prevailed over all other values (“В преддверии Новолетия и Рождества Христова Местоблюститель 
Патриаршего Престола встретился с радиожурналистами и представителями информационных 
агентств” 2008).219 
In a somewhat contrived turn in his argument, he further claimed that people of all faiths 
voted for Nevskii, and that this should be interpreted as a promising sign for Russia’s future:  
                                                 
217 “аморален." 
218 “Законы жанра ток-шоу не подходят для такой тонкой, нравственно чувствительной материи, как 
история, тем более недавняя история, когда еще живы жертвы сталинизма или их дети. На передаче про 
Сталина один из судей начинает: ‘Сталин был гений…’ – публика разражается аплодисментами – 
‘…гений злодейства’ – аплодисменты продолжаются, как ни в чем не бывало.” 
219 “Я воспринимал этот проект как ценностную ориентацию всего нашего общества. Мы говорим, что 
мы православный народ, православная страна. А как это определить, как выявить? Я думаю, что 
голосование почти 50 миллионов людей засвидетельствовало, что именно святость удивительным 
образом после стольких лет безбожия и разрушения святынь в нашей стране осталась ценностной 
доминантой нашего народа. Ведь когда мы называем Русь Святой, то в первую очередь говорим именно 
о системе ценностей, в которой святость была характерной нравственной доминантой, господствовавшей 
над всеми другими ценностями.” 
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Therefore I am thankful for those who supported the name of Aleksandr Nevskii – both Orthodox persons, 
Muslims, adherents of other faiths and atheists – who in their hearts felt that if we elect Aleksandr Nevskii as 
the name of Russia, we will have a future (ibidem).220 
In the opinion of Metropolitan Kirill the project’s importance, therefore, was its contribu-
tion to collective memory formation, since memory is what will bind together the various 
peoples of Russia.  
Conclusion  
The cultural memory of Aleksandr Nevskii has a long and rich history of remediation and 
political appropriation that has culminated in a varied spectrum of memory images. Interpre-
tations of Nevskii as statesman, saint, military commander and so on have ebbed and flowed 
subject to contemporary needs of symbolic state formation. Since Perestroika, the ROC has 
actively stimulated a revival of Nevskii – to be precise, a revival of an Orthodox interpretation 
of the historical figure that draws upon prerevolutionary cultural memory. The saintly image 
of Nevskii aimed to counter his place in Soviet memory culture, which emphasised his mili-
tary achievements. The memory of Nevskii provided a suitable vehicle to historically found 
the idea of Russia as a traditionally Orthodox state and legitimise the increasingly close rela-
tions between the ROC and the Russian state. The ROC has been a driving force behind and 
consistent partner in state-supported efforts to acknowledge the contemporary relevance of 
Nevskii and popularise his memory. In the memory of Nevskii the ROC and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have found common ground to help spread their vision of Russia’s active role 
in a globalised world, in particular with regard to the extension of influence within the so-
called Near Abroad. In official memory culture, Nevskii has come to represent a new strand 
of state patriotism that carries an Orthodox overtone. His memory is connected to an under-
standing of Russia as a civilisational stronghold within a globalising and secularising world, 
and Orthodox Russians as benevolent primi inter pares within the Russian state. The Nevskii 
memory was shaped to engage with the established discourse of distrust of the West and to 
relate to contemporary political issues, such as the challenges posed by the political, cultural 
and confessional accommodation of national minorities. 
Within the cultural domain, 2008 was a watershed year in the (re)popularisation of Nevskii 
with the general public. Analysis of the historical blockbuster Aleksandr: The Neva Battle and 
the much discussed Channel One cross-media project The Name Is Russia has demonstrated 
                                                 
220 “Поэтому я благодарен всем, кто поддержал имя Александра Невского, - и православным людям, и 
мусульманам, и представителям других религий, и тем нерелигиозным людям, которые сердцем 
почувствовали, что, если мы избираем Александра Невского именем России, у нас есть будущее.” 
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the opportunities provided by remediation. Yet it also proved how a history of remediation 
can restrict attempts to change existing historical understandings. Whereas active remediation 
of established visual and narrative elements enhances recognisability, it also creates expecta-
tions. Both productions testify to a deliberate effort to consolidate an understanding of the 
Russian state as traditionally Orthodox. This effort links up with and revives the prerevolu-
tionary tradition of remembrance. Yet this line of interpretation clashes with the persistent 
Soviet memory tradition, as was particularly evident in the panel discussion on The Name Is 
Russia. The visual and narrative components of the Soviet myth as it was shaped on the eve 
of and during the Second World War – including distinctive scenes like the Battle on the Ice – 
continue to inform contemporary understandings of Nevskii’s contribution to Russian history. 
As a result, multiple interpretations coexist, and to a certain extent merge into a composite 
memory that should be viewed as an Orthodox reframing of the predominantly military Soviet 
myth. 
Aleksandr Nevskii has been used to propagate notions of preservation and restoration 
rather than reform and modernisation, as was the case with the memories of Petr Stolypin and 
the Time of Troubles: the restoration, specifically, of the great Orthodox Russian state, tasked 
with protecting Russian (Orthodox) civilisation against Western cultural encroachment. 
Therefore, Nevskii’s recent prominence is a manifestation of the shift to an increasingly con-
servative political orientation that followed Putin’s election for a third presidential term in 
2012. The politically endorsement of the eight hundredth anniversary celebration of Nevskii’s 
birth in 2021 should be viewed in light of these neo-conservative views on the Russian state 
and the dramatically increased stress placed on “traditional,” i.e., Orthodox, societal values 
and on Orthodoxy as a marker of national and state identity. 
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5. The Time of Troubles 




In the run-up to the presidential elections of 2012, a music video by the Tajik singer 
Tolibzhon Kurbankhanov went viral and collected more than 1.5 million views on YouTube 
in less than a month. The song, entitled “V.V.P.” in reference to Putin’s initials, praises the 
accomplishments of Russia’s “saviour.” The lyrics of the song perfectly sum up the central 
message of Putin’s (memory) politics: “VVP – saved the country / VVP – protects / VVP – 
picked Russia up [from its knees] and continues to develop it / VVP – saved the nation / VVP 
– guards / VVP – while in power, he maintains stability.”221 Indeed, the song was such a smit-
ten homage that members of the opposition first thought it was a well-executed parody. The 
clip gave rise to heated online discussion, focused on identifying who was behind the propa-
ganda stunt: the Putin camp or its opponents. In an interview with Izvestiia, Kurbankhanov 
maintained that the song was sincere and that he had recorded it on his own initiative.222 He 
was, in fact, taken aback by the song’s reception: 
I did not expect a negative reaction; I wrote from the soul, what I had on my heart. […] And then they say 
some headquarters [shtaby] paid me money for the clip. I read in your newspaper that someone even filed a 
complaint against me because I defamed Putin. For me this is very insulting to hear! (Маетная 2012).223 
The inspiration for the song, he continues, came from witnessing the street protests in 
Moscow in late 2011.  
I stayed with friends in Moscow in December, watched these meetings of yours on Bolotnaia [Square] and 
[Prospekt] Sakharova and wondered: how can you protest against a person like Putin? He is very wise, mod-
est, behaves with great dignity (ibidem).224 
                                                 
221 “ВВП спас страну / ВВП - он защищает / ВВП поднял Россию и все больше развивает / ВВП спас 
народ / ВВП оберегает / ВВП, когда во власти, он стабильность сохраняет.” 
222 That same year, Kurbankhanov recorded two more songs praising Putin in no less laudatory terms, entitled 
“Thank you, God, for Vladimir” and “Congratulations with your anniversary, Mister President!” 
223 “Я не ожидал негативной реакции - я писал от души, то, что у меня было на сердце. […] А тут какие-
то штабы, деньги, мол, мне за клип заплатили. В вашей газете прочитал, что кто-то даже жалобу на меня 
написал - за то, что я опорочил Путина. А мне это очень обидно слышать!” 
224 “Я был в декабре у друзей в Москве, смотрел на эти ваши митинги на Болотной и на Сахарова и 
удивлялся: как можно идти против такого человека, как Путин? Он очень мудрый, простой, ведет себя с 
большим достоинством.” 
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In an almost overly laudatory, over-the-top way, Kurbankhanov’s lyrics rephrase the es-
sence of what can be called the Putin myth: “Let us remember those years / When he was not 
there – there were only worries / The country in crisis, the people suffered / and at that mo-
ment, God sent him.”225 Memory politics has played an important role in consolidating this 
image of Putin as the national saviour and guarantor of stability. The cultural memory of 
choice for its framing has been the seventeenth-century Time of Troubles, or smuta. As we 
have seen in Chapter 3, the memory of Petr Stolypin was used to support a comparable notion 
during the final stage of Medvedev’s presidency, as the political regime moved from consoli-
dating its position of power towards maintaining it. 
The political appropriation of the memory of the Time of Troubles aimed to turn a period 
in recent history, the 1990s, into a powerful rhetorical tool by framing it in historical terms. 
The political myth that was created represents the Yeltsin era and its political, economic and 
social upheavals as the latest chapter in a historical sequence of recurring systemic crises 
(smuty). The Putin regime could thus characterise the contemporary political situation as the 
end of the Troubles of the 1990s. As Sander Brouwer rightly points out,  
by recycling the narrative of the “Smuta-and-ensuing-liberation-in-1612” the government is not only posi-
tioning itself as the new liberators of Russia (with which you can agree or disagree), but, moreover, is 
presenting a model of history in which its own emergence is presented as predetermined (Brouwer 2016b: 
133). 
The effect of this framing, however, goes beyond attesting to the effectiveness of Putin’s 
political strategy during his first term as president and thus strengthening the regime’s legiti-
macy. The conceptualisation of post-Soviet collapse as a Time of Troubles symbolically 
reintegrates the Soviet period into an all-encompassing meta-narrative of Russian history that 
is characterised by alternating periods of glorious might and turbulent upheaval. In this meta-
narrative, the Soviet period is just one variation on the historical theme, another link in the 
chain of Russia’s cyclical history. As will become clear from the subsequent analysis, the ad 
hoc transformation of this recent period in history into cultural memory was facilitated by the 
rich remediation history of narratives about the Time of Troubles. At the same time, the same 
accumulation of memory texts created access points for the formulation of historically framed 
political critique. 
The memory of the Time of Troubles is typically singled out as the central tenet of con-
temporary Russian memory politics, in addition to the political establishment’s constantly 
                                                 
225 “Давайте вместе вспомним мы те годы / Когда его не было - одни заботы / Страна в кризисе, народ 
страдал / и в это время бог его послал.” 
 149 
shifting attitude towards Stalin and the Soviet past more generally (e.g., Prozorov 2008; 
Laruelle 2009; Vázques Liñan 2010; Hill & Gaddy 2012; Petersson 2013). While this claim is 
correct, these studies have thus far largely ignored two important aspects. First, they fail to 
address how the political usage of the memory has evolved over time and how it relates to 
other circulating memories. Second, they omit the reception of the institutionalisation of the 
memory and its associated cultural products, and insufficiently acknowledge attempts by 
other actors to subvert official memory culture. This chapter aims to address these gaps. It 
first outlines the remediation history of narratives associated with the Time of Troubles from 
the seventeenth century up to the present. Then, it examines the institutionalisation of the 
memory and the documentaries and film produced to support it. The chapter concludes with a 
study of the film Boris Godunov (Vladimir Mirzoev, 2011) as an example of a subversive 
remediation that aims to question official memory culture. 
The Time of Troubles in the Russian Political and Cultural Imagination 
With the death of Ivan the Terrible’s son Fedor in 1598, the ruling Riurikid line came to an 
end. The succession crisis set the stage for a power vacuum to emerge some years later as the 
rule of the elected Tsar Boris Godunov, who had previously served as Fedor’s regent, came 
increasingly under pressure as a result of famines (1601–3) and rivalries among the boyar 
families. While opinions differ about the exact duration of the Time of Troubles, its beginning 
is generally dated to the invasion of the First False Dmitrii in 1604, which presented a serious 
challenge to the legitimacy of Godunov’s rule, and Godunov’s sudden death the following 
year. The period was characterised by anarchy and constant power struggles that had detri-
mental effects on the life, security and well-being of the population. There were numerous 
pretenders to the throne, most notably the three “False Dmitriis,” each of whom claimed to be 
the miraculously saved son of Ivan the Terrible. The young tsarevich had died in 1591 – ac-
cording to the official version, from self-inflicted knife wounds during an epileptic fit, though 
the responsibility for Dmitrii’s death is often ascribed to Godunov. As the political situation 
was constantly changing, the boyar families vied to maintain and expand their political influ-
ence, continually shifting alliances. Finally, the course of events was influenced dramatically 
by political interference from the Swedes and the Poles. The latter eventually succeeded in 
placing Prince Wladislaw, the son of King Sigismund of Poland, on the throne. The (symbol-
ic) end of the Troubles is typically dated to 1612, when a people’s militia led by Prince 
Dmitrii Pozharskii and Kuzma Minin, a butcher from Nizhny Novgorod, succeeded in liberat-
ing Moscow. The following year, 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov was elected tsar by the 
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Zemskii sobor. Since his father was the nephew of Anastasiia Romanova, Ivan the Terrible’s 
first wife, his lineage made Mikhail a highly suitable candidate for the throne. Political and 
social unrest nevertheless continued for several years after the Tsar was crowned. Only in 
1617 was a peace treaty signed with Sweden, and the city of Novgorod returned to Russia. 
Troubled relations with the Poles persisted even longer, including yet another (this time, un-
successful) attempt to seize the throne in 1617.  
The memory of the Time of Troubles supports a cyclical conception of historical develop-
ment because, despite having a revolutionary component, it did not result in actual changes in 
governmental administration. As Maureen Perrie points out, it was a conflict  
fought out under the banners of competing claimants for the throne, rather than of competing types of monar-
chy. Of course the various candidates represented different styles and systems of rule; but they all based their 
claims to the throne on their legitimacy as the ‘true’ tsar rather than on any programme of social or political 
reform (Perrie 2006: 430). 
The symbolic potential of the Time of Troubles has been recognised by many rulers, who 
all sought to employ it to their benefit. Equally, the events have inspired many Russian artists. 
The complexity of the events and the multitude of actors has made the memory of the Time of 
Troubles and the “archive” of its representations highly diverse. It is best described as a 
memory cluster, consisting of multiple, mutually interdependent narratives (see also Chapter 
2). Over time, new narratives have been added, while others went into disuse or were explicit-
ly challenged or rewritten as political and ideological preferences shifted. Within the existing 
accumulation of stories, paintings, statues, literary works and other memory texts on the 
Troubles, three core thematic topoi can be discerned. The first is the struggle between Boris 
Godunov and the False Dmitrii. The second concerns the peasant Ivan Susanin, who sacri-
ficed his life by leading the Polish troops in their search for Mikhail Romanov into the forest 
under false pretences and thereby saved the newly elected Tsar from certain death. In these 
narratives, Susanin was made a symbol of patriotism and devotion to the Tsar. The third line 
of narration describes the popular uprising led by Minin and Pozharskii and the expulsion of 
the Polish-Lithuanian occupiers from Moscow in 1612. This narrative is closely connected to 
the symbolic canonisation of the year 1613 as the founding moment of the Romanov dynasty, 
the anniversary of which was celebrated, e.g., in 1913 and, somewhat awkwardly, in 2013. 
Not long after state order was restored, a commemorative practice to mark the ending of 
the Troubles was established. Pozharskii financed the construction of a wooden church on 
Red Square dedicated to the Virgin of Kazan, to whose icon he had prayed during battle. A 
religious procession was held annually on 4 November, the feast day of the Icon of Our Lady 
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of Kazan. The Kazan Cathedral, as it is now known, was later replaced by a brick church and 
after several expansions and alterations was finally demolished in 1936 as Red Square was 
adapted for the performance of military parades. The church was rebuilt between 1990 and 
1993. The image of the Time of Troubles as a symbolic representation of the survival of the 
Russian state in the face of foreign aggression took definite hold in the first three decades of 
the nineteenth century. While earlier artistic works had been dedicated to, for instance, the 
figure of Pozharskii, Russian involvement in the 1806–7 war with Napoleonic France gave 
the memory effort particular impetus. Artists such as Gavriil Derzhavin, Sergei Glinka, 
Matvei Kriukovskii and Sergei Shirinovskii-Shikhmatov contributed to a body of poem’s and 
tragedies describing the liberation of Moscow. The period started to be viewed as a “key 
event in national history,” gradually eclipsing the perceived importance of the rule of Peter 
the Great (Зорин 2001: 161). 226  Indeed, “[i]n the first half of the 1830s Minin and 
Pozharskii’s march on Moscow and the Zemskii sobor of 1613 were canonised definitively as 
the mythological genesis [vozniknovenie] of Russian statehood” (idem: 161).227  
The most visible monument to the events, the statue of Minin and Pozharskii on Red 
Square, also dates from this period. It was initiated by the Free Society of Lovers of Litera-
ture, Science, and the Arts in 1803. The organisation proposed erecting a monument in 
Nizhny Novgorod, where the people’s militia was formed, to commemorate the 200th anniver-
sary of the liberation of Moscow. In 1808, Tsar Aleksandr I gave his approval for the 
monument, yet, because of the great historical importance of its subject, it was decided to 
erect the statue in Moscow instead. The victory over the Napoleonic army in 1812 imbued the 
statue with even greater patriotic significance. The bronze statue of the two heroes, which 
would become a symbol of the victory in the Patriotic War, was finally unveiled in 1818. On 
the pedestal, there are two relief plaques: one that depicts Pozharskii ousting the Poles on 
horseback, the other the famous scene of citizens donating their possessions to finance the 
military campaign. The statue, as a highly recognisable visual symbol, later appeared on 
banknotes and post stamps (and, more recently, on everything from kitsch paraphernalia and 
posters announcing the Day of National Unity to internet memes). In 1931 the statue was re-
located from its central position on the square opposite the entrance of what is now the GUM 
building, to the side of the Saint Basil’s Cathedral, to make room for the military parades. 
                                                 
226 “ключевое событие народной истории.” 
227 “В первой половине 1830-х гг. поход Минина и Пожарского на Москву и Земский собор 1613 г. были 
окончательно канонизированы как мифологическое возникновение российской государственности.” 
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Troops of the Soviet army passed by the monument before marching off to the war front in 
1941, the symbolism of which is often alluded to. 
Along our first line of narration, which concentrates on the Time of Troubles and Boris 
Godunov, Pushkin’s play Boris Godunov (1831) continues to be one of the most influential 
cultural texts to date. The play had a troublesome beginning. The original version – named 
Comedy about Tsar Boris and Grishka Otrepiev, written in 1825–26 and inspired by the De-
cembrist rebellion – was censored and could not be published until after the death of Tsar 
Nicholas. The 1831 edition, less politically controversial, “hewed more or less to [Nikolai] 
Karamzin’s politically safe view of the Time of Troubles” (Dunning 2010: 243). Modest 
Musorgskii based his opera Boris Godunov (1868-73) on Pushkin’s play as well as 
Karamzin’s (then) authoritative work History of the Russian State. In the opera, the role and 
destiny of the Russian people is emphasised, to such an extent that, according to Burton 
Fisher, it “provides the essence of Russian nationalism in music.” Fisher argues that  
Although tsar Boris, the guilty usurper of the throne, dominates this pageant of Russian history, the principal 
protagonist of the opera is the Russian people, for whom Musorgskii provided a remarkable dramatic pres-
ence through forceful and compelling choral writing” (Fisher 2002: 22).  
The opera was later revised by Nikolai Rimskii-Korsakov, whose version has since be-
come the standard for staged productions.  
With regard to our second narrative theme, the opera A Life for the Tsar (1836), composed 
by Mikhail Glinka, transferred the folkloric tale about peasant Ivan saving the new Tsar to the 
sphere of high culture. Use of the story was suggested to him by Vasilii Zhukovskii. The poet 
also contributed the words for the final chorus. The opera, with its dedication to the Tsar in 
both title and story development, meshed particularly well with the political and cultural cli-
mate under Nicholas I. The Tsar granted his approval of the work and gave the composer a 
ring set with precious stones following its premiere (Brown 1974: 87). The opera was a great 
success, with contemporaries crediting Glinka with having created the first national opera. 
Moreover, “the myth of Glinka as the founding father of Russia’s national music was already 
established among growing numbers by the end of 1836” (Frolova-Walker 2007: 52). 
The memory of the Time of Troubles again appeared in official culture in the late 1930s as 
part of the effort to “[rework] the history of the Russian Empire to create a heroic myth of 
Russian statism” (Gill 2011: 122), together with other evocations of prerevolutionary Russia 
and its heroes, including Aleksandr Nevskii and Ivan the Terrible (see chapters 5 and 7). The 
elements of the memory that were irreconcilable with Soviet ideology – notably the glorifica-
tion of tsarism and Russian Orthodoxy – were played down and the role of the people in 
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overcoming the crisis brought to the fore. In the context of increasing political tensions and 
the imminence of war, two major cultural productions gave shape to the Stalinist reworking of 
the memory. The first was the opera Ivan Susanin (1939), an adaptation of Glinka’s A Life for 
the Tsar. By then several attempts had already been made to revise the successful opera in 
such a way that its glorified monarchy would be replaced with a more suitable object of admi-
ration. Marina Frolova-Walker cites a 1926 production Hammer and Sickle, staged in Odessa, 
with the action set during the Civil War rather than the Time of Troubles; and Minin (1937), 
staged in Baku, in which “all references to the Tsar [were replaced] with references to the 
eponymous Minin” (Frolova-Walker 2006: 200). These early Soviet-era attempts at refurbish-
ing Glinka’s opera, however, did not make it onto the stages of Moscow and Leningrad.  
By 1937, however, the political situation had changed dramatically and, as “Stalin was 
carefully cultivating a new Russian nationalism, a revival of A Life was perfectly suited to the 
new post-revolutionary state that was taking shape” (Frolova-Walker 2006: 201). The opera 
was revised considerably and, most notably, it has Susanin lead the Poles into the forest in 
order to save, not the young Romanov tsar, but Moscow and the Motherland. Interestingly, in 
a feature article on the opera’s premiere in Pravda, B. A. Mordvinov invoked a wider histori-
cal context to justify this particular adaptation. “This treatment of the subject matter is 
completely justified both historically and dramatically,” he writes. “Our historical consultants 
have identified a series of analogous circumstance in the Russian national past – both during 
the period of the Polish intervention and during the Patriotic War of 1812” (Mordvinov 2006 
[1939]: 278). The connection linking the events of 1612, 1812 and the Second World War 
that appears frequently in twenty-first-century public discourse, and to which I will return 
shortly, thus has a Stalinist precursor.  
Remarkably, the opera was presented as a restoration of the composer’s original concep-
tion rather than as a Soviet revision – a move aligned with the Stalinist imagination of Glinka 
as “a man of the people who had to compromise his vision because of Tsarist censorship” 
(Frolova-Walker 2006: 201). By blaming the original librettist, Baron Rosen, of having al-
tered the opera beyond the composer’s intentions, “the Soviet rewriting of the libretto and the 
appropriation of Glinka’s music, which before the revolution had been regarded as a Russian 
national treasure,” was justified (Beam Eggers 2006: 262) The alterations made to the repre-
sentation of the Poles, Susan Beam Eggers suggests, indicate that Ivan Susanin was intended 
to be an anti-fascist narrative, a response to increasing tensions with Nazi Germany.  
In the libretto of Ivan Susanin, the lines between figurative and actual enemy are intentionally blurred. Direct 
and indirect references to Germany, as well as allusions to the thirteenth-century Teutonic invaders, instruct 
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the Soviet audience that the Poles should be seen as representing an aggressive and reactionary Germanic 
culture (Beam Eggers 2006: 268).  
Furthermore, the addition of a reference to Aleksandr Nevskii’s famous Battle on the Ice 
created a connection with Eisenstein’s cinematic epic that premiered the year before and its 
anti-German thrust. 
The other two heroes selected to personify the memory were captured on the big screen in 
Sergei Pudovkin’s Minin and Pozharskii (Minin i Pozharskii, 1939). This film shows the ef-
forts of these men to unify the people against the enemy and includes a scene in which the 
citizens place their possessions on a large pile set before Minin’s feet. This sacrifice on the 
side of the people is mirrored by the depiction of Prince Pozharskii as a self-sacrificing hero. 
In one of the opening scenes, Pozharskii declines a large mug of beer offered by Minin, who 
is noticeably intoxicated, and instead lies down to sleep, seemingly overcome with the suffer-
ing of his people. In the final scene, Pozharskii bows before the gathered crowd, signalling 
their importance in the victory that has been gained. The closing image summarises the moral 
of the film. As the lines are shown on screen, the following text is sung, building up to a 
climax: 
Do not forget, o beautiful Moscow 
How we managed to deal with the enemy 
In harsh times of battle 
Rise, o immortal strength of the people 
Strength of the people!228 
To further substantiate the reinterpretation of the memory, Soviet historiography studied 
the Troubles predominantly as a “peasant war” spurred by class uprisings, a Marxist reading 
that has since been convincingly challenged (Dunning 2001: 3). 
Adaptations of Boris Godunov tend to appear in times of change. Consider, for example, 
the Soviet-era cinematic adaptations dating from 1954 (an opera film directed by Vera 
Stroeva and based on Musorgskii’s work) and 1986, directed by and starring Sergei 
Bondarchuk, one of the most celebrated directors of (historical) film in the Soviet Union. The 
engrained subversive potential of the story is evinced by the fact that, in times of strict politi-
cal control, productions were obstructed or were followed by repercussions for those 
involved. In 1984, for instance, the stage director of the Taganka Theatre, Iurii Liubimov, was 
banned from the stage after producing “a defiant, aggressively modernized production of 
                                                 
228 “Не забудь Москва-красавица / Как с врагом сумели мы расправиться / Через время суровое, походное 
/ Встань бессмертная сила народная / Сила народная.” 
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Pushkin’s Boris Godunov, during which the actors came down off the stage to accuse the au-
dience of political passivity and submission to a series of shabby pretenders” (Emerson 1992: 
547. Italics in original). The close connection between the play and the reigning political 
winds is evinced by the fact that by 1988 Liubimov was allowed to resume the staging of the 
play at the Taganka. The revival of Pushkin’s Boris Godunov subsequently continued 
throughout the 1990s. New theatre and opera productions, partly developed in connection 
with the two-hundred-year anniversary of Pushkin’s birth in 1999, resonated with the funda-
mental cultural shift taking place following the Soviet collapse. According to Nicholas 
Rzhevsky, “Boris Yeltsin, ‘selected by the people,’ offered a historical juxtaposition to his 
tragic namesake as a central figure in the break with old belief systems” (Rzhevsky 2009: 
237). Moreover,  
The fall of the monarch away from God in Pushkin’s narrative served to interpret contemporary history and 
the post-Soviet devaluation of transcendent orientations, whether they concerned religion or the abstractions 
of the Marxist-Leninist creed (Rzhevsky 2009: 237). 
As for the other great opera, the original A Life for the Tsar replaced its Soviet adaptation 
in the first post-Soviet decade. Yet, in concert with the increasingly positive reappraisal of 
Soviet history and culture under Putin, its most acclaimed opera also returned to the Bolshoi 
stage and the “audience can now see the same spectacle that Stalin enjoyed, give or take the 
occasional sprinkling of post-Soviet religious fervour” (Frolova-Walker 2006: 215).  
Institutionalisation of the Memory: The Day of National Unity 
In 2005, the Putin government took advantage of the memorialisation of the 1990s as a Time 
of Troubles as it had already developed in the arts and mass media, as well in political circles. 
The trope fitted the need to symbolically confirm the success of Putin’s first term; with little 
effort, the historical parallel could be used to signify how under the president’s skilful guid-
ance, Russia had finally found its footing on the right path. The narrative’s element of far-
reaching foreign interference now came to express how the “roaring ’90s” had been overcome 
by cutting loose from Western advisers (e.g., the IMF) and, instead, pursuing Russia’s 
“unique path” of development. Moreover, it resonated with two additional issues that figured 
extensively in Russia’s relations with the West at the time: the wave of colour revolutions that 
had swept across the post-Soviet space (and the alleged Western involvement in them) and the 
2004 enlargement of the European Union, which included the accession of the Baltic states. 
As was also the case with the incorporation of Petr Stolypin into official memory culture (see 
Chapter 3), this example of memory politics is best described as reactive rather than proactive 
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in nature. It instrumentalised a mnemonic framework that was already actively circulating in 
public discourse and, in this case, had become embedded in common parlance. The principle 
marker of the institutionalised memory became the Day of National Unity, to be celebrated on 
4 November. The holiday was explicitly framed as a reestablishment of the tsarist commemo-
ration, celebrated annually on 4 November until 1917, of the expulsion of the Polish-
Lithuanian occupation force in 1612. In addition to reclaiming this “lost tradition,” the chosen 
date was significant for yet another reason. It enabled a simultaneous government attempt to 
address the pressing question of repurposing the traditional Soviet-era 7 November holiday 
commemorating the October Revolution. As such, the new holiday was intended to provide “a 
foundation myth for the multinational and multiconfessional post-Soviet Russia” (Brouwer 
2016b: 126). 
The first celebration of the holiday was marked by a ceremonial reception at the Kremlin. 
In the presence of several hundred officials and representatives of cultural and charitable or-
ganisations, Putin gave a speech in which he outlined the meaning of the new holiday. First, 
in line with the holiday’s name, he emphasised the vital importance of national unity. Refer-
ring to the people’s uprising that had liberated the city of Moscow from the foreign 
occupants, Putin stated:  
It was a victory of patriotic forces; a victory of the course towards the strengthening of the state through cen-
tralisation and joining of forces; the formation of a world-power [derzhava] – great and sovereign – began 
with this heroic event (Романенкова 2005).229  
Yet the speech’s most important theme is the merit and longstanding tradition of civic en-
gagement and charitable work, placed in the context of a more broadly defined idea of civil 
responsibility and social cohesion:  
Back then, the people themselves defended Russian [rossiiskuiu] statehood, showed genuine civic spirit [gra-
zhdanstvennost’] and the highest sense of responsibility; not under coercion from above but at the call of the 
heart, people of various ethnicities [natsional’nostei] and confessions united in order to, collectively and in-
dependently, determine their fate and the fate of their Fatherland (Романенкова 2005).230 
In connection with this often-neglected aspect of the initial conceptualisation of the official 
memory, the youth movement Nashi organised a “Day of Good Deeds,” with actions ranging 
                                                 
229  “Это была победа патриотических сил, победа курса на укрепление государства, за счет 
централизации и соединения сил, с этого героического события началось становление державы - 
Великой и суверенной.” 
230 “тогда сам народ отстоял российскую государственность, проявил истинную гражданственность и 
высочайшую ответственность; не по принуждению сверху, а по зову сердца люди разных 
национальностей и вероисповеданий объединились, чтобы вместе и самостоятельно решать и свою 
судьбу, и судьбу своего Отечества.” 
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from cleaning up and painting stairwells, fences and benches to feeding stray animals 
(Виноградов et al. 2005). In 2007, together with another youth movement called Rossiia 
Molodaia, Nashi organised a blood donation campaign in the same vein under the slogan “We 
are all of one blood.” As Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz argue, the donation of blood has 
particular symbolic significance when combined with the holiday’s underlying idea of bind-
ing together a multinational state.  
In the ‘one blood’ motif the spiritualization of the opolchentsy [the People’s militia, M.W.] unifies the origi-
nal act of ‘sacrifice’ in driving the Poles from Moscow, the ‘unity in diversity’ represented by the 
opolchentsy and Orthodox exhortations to give charity, thus embodying Russian’s inherent self-sacrificial 
generosity (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 79. Italics in original). 
The president laid flowers at the statue of Minin and Pozharskii and attended the unveiling 
of a close copy of it, sculpted by Tsereteli, in Nizhny Novgorod. On that occasion, Putin re-
ferred to the “deep historical roots of the holiday” and emphasised how the uprising that had 
come together there had united “representatives of various classes and nationalities” (“Путин: 
История России свидетельствует” 2005). 231  Furthermore, he asserted that the Time of 
Troubles is but one example of civil unity decisively influencing the course of Russian 
history.  
All of Russia’s many-centuries-long history testifies to the fact, that only together, by uniting forces, can we 
adequately respond to the challenges of the time, successfully resolve important, truly fateful problems. And 
the unveiling of this monument pays tribute to our national traditions [and] to the courage of our ancestors 
(ibidem).232 
In response to the official celebrations, a nationalist “Right March” (Pravyi mars) was or-
ganised by the Eurasian Youth Union (Evraziiskii soiuz molodezhi) and the Movement against 
Illegal Migration (Dvizhenie protiv nelegal’noi migratsii) (Виноградов et al. 2005). Several 
thousand people participated in the march that has since become known as the “Russian 
March.”233 
The first celebration was marked with “hesitant media fanfare” (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 
73) that, according to television critic Sergei Varshavchik, was remarkably coherent across 
the major TV channels. News reports and documentaries dedicated to the fourth of Novem-
ber, he notes, all presented a similar narrative about the holiday’s contemporary meaning, 
                                                 
231 “глубокие исторические корни праздника”; “представители разных сословий и национальностей.” 
232 “Вся многовековая история России свидетельствует - только сообща, объединяя усилия, мы можем 
достойно отвечать на вызовы времени, успешно решать важные, по-настоящему судьбоносные задачи. И 
открытие этого памятника - дань уважения нашим национальным традициям, мужеству предков.” 
233 Estimates of the number of people who participated in the original russkii marsh range from two to ten thou-
sand participants (Виноградов et al. 2005). 
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namely that “in our troubled times” a lesson should be drawn from the past about the “mature 
civil initiative originating from below” that emerged in response to the foreign occupants who 
had violated Russia’s national sovereignty (Варшавчик 2005).234While Varshavchik’s as-
sessment is essentially correct, it obscures that the productions were, in fact, markedly 
different – in style and content, and in how they employed the language of cyclical return. 
Moreover, only one of the documentaries explicitly mentions the Day of National Unity. I 
will return to the documentaries that aired on the occasion of the holiday’s inauguration in the 
second part of this chapter, where I also contrast them with a more propagandistic documen-
tary broadcast the following year. 
While the Day of National Unity is often described as simply and solely celebrating the 
ousting of the Poles, the religious component of the tsarist holiday – the feast day of the icon 
of Our Lady of Kazan – was revived as well. To do so was particularly advantageous for the 
state. Hutchings and Tolz are right to argue that “[t]he re-appropriation of Orthodoxy within 
official patriotic discourse provide[d] an opportunity for the sanctification of DNU [Day of 
National Unity, M.W.]” (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 77). It corroborated the illusion that the 
new holiday was actually a long-cherished tradition. The Orthodox celebration was given a 
particular impetus by the return of an eighteenth-century copy of the (presumably lost) icon, 
of which the exact origins are unclear, to Moscow in August 2004. It was gifted by Pope John 
Paul II, who had possessed the icon since 1993 when it was transferred to him from Fátima, 
Portugal. The icon was subsequently moved to Kazan where, since 2005, it has been carried 
in the semi-annual processions that take place on the icon’s feast days of 21 July and 4 No-
vember. The procession itself is a prerevolutionary practice, revived only in the early 
2000s.235  
From the first celebration of the new holiday, the exhibition “Orthodox Rus’” has been or-
ganised annually to coincide with it. 236  In a letter addressed to the participants of the 
simultaneously organised forum, Putin praised the event and made a link between patriotism 
and “spiritual values”:  
It is pleasing that you raise the topical and important questions of preserving the historical, cultural and spir-
itual values of our multinational people, original folk art, [and] the education of the youth in the spirit of 
                                                 
234 “в наше тревожное время”; “зрелому гражданскому почину, идущему снизу.” 
235 The icon of Our Lady of Kazan has since ventured far beyond Russian territory. On 7 April 2011 it reached 
the International Space Station where it was temporarily kept in the Russian section of the vessel. 
236 Exhibitions under the same name were organised by the Russian Orthodox Church in smaller and different 
formats in St. Petersburg, and later Moscow, since 1995. The scope of the event, however, was significantly 
widened and reformulated in 2006. 
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patriotism. Undoubtedly, these are the areas in which it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation of gov-
ernmental, societal and religious organisations (Путин 2006).237 
Despite the exhibition’s explicitly Orthodox name, Putin thus initially framed the event in 
multi-ethnic and, implicitly, multiconfessional terms. Already in 2007, however, Russian Or-
thodoxy received greater emphasis in his address. While he still referred to the importance of 
developing a “constructive interconfessional dialogue,” Putin stressed how “in the history of 
our Fatherland, Orthodoxy has always played a unifying role, has served the high goals of 
fostering patriotism, [and] the strengthening of spirituality and morality” (Путин 2007).238 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the exhibitions have since become very popular, drawing some 
300,000 and 250,000 visitors in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Its content and orientation in-
creasingly manifest the influence of the Orthodox Church.  
The presidential speeches marking the commemorative date have varied in emphasis and 
phrasing. For example, in 2011, Dmitrii Medvedev combined previously established compo-
nents of the political myth with the vocabulary of economic and technological innovation that 
was central to his presidency. He stated: 
Patriotism, civicism, love for the Fatherland – these are the fundamental values that have always bound to-
gether the multinational Russian [Rossiiskoe] state. Even now, they form our moral foundation; a millennial 
heritage yet at the same time one of the symbols of young democratic Russia, a country that is now dealing 
with fundamentally new challenges, such as the formation of a modern and innovative economy, the techno-
logical re-equipment of industry, the modernisation of administration, and even the modernisation of public 
life as a whole (“В России отмечают День народного единства” 2011).239 
It is noteworthy that, contrary to Putin’s speeches, Medvedev shows some restraint in pre-
senting Russia’s history as strictly continuous by suggesting that the state’s current 
development constitutes both a continuation of history and a distinct new stage. 
The memory narrative and the cyclical model of historical development it presupposes 
were picked up by Russian historiography. A joint publication of the academic journal Vlast’ 
                                                 
237 “Отрадно, что вы поднимаете актуальные и значимые вопросы сохранения исторических, культурных 
и духовных ценностей нашего многонационального народа, самобытного народного творчества, 
воспитания молодежи в духе патриотизма. Несомненно, это те сферы, где необходимо укреплять 
взаимодействие государственных, общественных, религиозных организаций.” 
238 “конструктивного межконфессионального диалога”; “В истории нашего Отечества православие всегда 
играло объединяющую роль, служило высоким целям воспитания патриотизма, укрепление духовности и 
нравственности.” 
239 “Патриотизм, гражданственность, любовь к Отечеству – это фундаментальные ценности, которые 
всегда скрепляли многонациональное Российское государство. Они и сегодня являются нашей 
нравственной опорой, достоянием тысячелетий и в то же время – одним из символов молодой 
демократической России, страны, которая сегодня решает принципиально новые задачи, такие как 
создание современной инновационной экономики, технологическое перевооружение промышленности, 
модернизация управления, да и модернизация всей общественной жизни.” 
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and the Sociological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, on the topic of “The Na-
tion and Power during the Russian Smuta” (Марченя & Разина 2010), argued that the history 
of contemporary Russia should be studied in parallel with the other smuty, explicitly referring 
to the early seventeenth century and the Bolshevik revolution.  
In a completely different genre, the gaming industry also hopped on the smuta bandwagon. 
The strategy videogame Empire: The Time of Troubles (Imperiia: Smutnoe vremia, Lesta 
Studio, 2009)240 covers the history of Rus’, Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania between 
1350 and 1650. Its scope, therefore, goes far beyond the Troubles itself. It is a “global strate-
gy game,” as one reviewer describes it, recounting  
the endless internecine bickering of Russian principalities, gradually gathering into a unified kingdom of 
Moscow. In addition to the Russian princes, the Tatars, Germans, Ukrainians, Swedes and all other inhabit-
ants of the eastern edge of the civilized world try to chew off their piece of the Eastern European pie 
(Просвирнин 2010).241  
It is not the first videogame set in the early seventeenth century, though. The first-person-
shooter game Time of Troubles: The Living Dead (Smuta. Ozhivshie mertvetsy, NewCom) 
was released in 1997. Using various weapons, including an axe and a rifle, the player has to 
fight off axe-wielding zombie boyars to escape a subterranean labyrinth (Logos 2011).242 
Players of more traditional games can try their hands at two themed board games. Time of 
Troubles: 1605-1612 (Smuta: 1605-1612, Casus Belli, 2011) is a highly detailed strategy 
board game. Due to its historical “realism,” the game store Mosigra warns, the rules are so 
complicated that the first attempt to play it will take around five hours (Мосигра n.d.). The 
release of the second game, Times and Epochs: Time of Troubles (Vremena i Epokhi: Smuta, 
Геменот, 2012), was timed to coincide with the bicentennial celebration of the liberation of 
Moscow. In addition to the Russian Kingdom and Poland, players can lead Sweden or the 
Crimean Khanate into battle and “write [their] name into history” (Времена и Эпохи n.d.).243 
The memory narrative and, in particular, the holiday created to mark it have resonated with 
the general public only to a limited extent, it seems. According to opinion polls conducted by 
the Levada Centre, the percentage of people who can correctly name the holiday celebrated 
                                                 
240 Released internationally under the name Reign: Conflict of Nations in 2010. 
241 Эта глобальная стратегия […] рассказывает о бесконечной междоусобной грызне русских княжеств, 
постепенно собирающихся в единое Московское царство. Кроме русских князей, свой кусок восточно-
европейского пирога пытаются отгрызть татары, немцы, украинцы, шведы и все остальные жители 
восточной окраины цивилизованного мира […].” 
242 A gameplay video of the game by user “Quarantineism” can be viewed on YouTube: “Smuta. Level 1-2: The 
russian ghostbuster strikes back,” 15 August 2010, accessed 1 March 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3wqfvqUOsI&feature=youtu.be. 
243 “впишите свое имя в Историю!” 
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on 4 November increased from 8 per cent in 2005 to 43 per cent in 2012, but it still did not 
exceed half of those polled (“16% россиян отпразднуют День народного единства” 
2012).244 Interestingly, the poll shows the persistence of the new name given to the 7 Novem-
ber holiday during the 1990s: 25 per cent of respondents answered that 4 November was the 
Day of Accord and Reconciliation in 2012, down from 33 per cent in 2005. Despite the fact 
that the Day of National Unity became more well known, the percentage of respondents who 
planned to actually celebrate the holiday has increased little since its introduction, from 12 per 
cent in 2005 to 16 per cent by 2012. The poll outcomes furthermore demonstrate that the gov-
ernmental effort to provide an alternative to the commemoration of the October Revolution, to 
replace 7 with 4 November, had only limited effect. In 2012, 18 per cent of respondents still 
planned to mark the 7 November holiday (exceeding those who celebrate 4 November by 2 
per cent), a mere 5 per cent drop compared to 2005. It has to be emphasised, however, that the 
majority of respondents (61 per cent in 2012) did not plan to celebrate either date. Eight years 
after its introduction, Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Centre, summarised the public 
understanding of the Day of National Unity as follows:  
They view it as an initiative by the authorities to extinguish the memory of 7 November. The initial ambigui-
ty is disappearing; people agreed with the official name but it does not evoke any emotions. A very small 
proportion [of respondents, M.W.] identifies with this holiday (Гончаренко 2013).245 
The holiday’s failure to become the national celebration of Russia’s “rebirth from the ash-
es,” as was intended, is also in part connected to the (ultra)nationalist Russian March that 
soon overshadowed it (see also Zuev 2013). 
Much earlier, as the government-backed cultural attempts to popularise the memory were 
in full swing (including the release of the blockbuster film 1612 that will be discussed below), 
opposing voices had already manifested themselves in public. The most notable of these can 
be heard in the theatrical play 1612 (2007) written by Elena Gremina, Kshishtof Kopka, 
Maksim Kurochkin and Evgenii Kazachkov for Teatr.doc, the leading company in (experi-
mental) contemporary Russian theatre.246 The play reconstructs historical events, but in an 
unconventional way. The production was staged in cooperation with the Polish theatre com-
pany Ad Spectatores from Wroclaw; the roles of Polish historical figures were played by 
                                                 
244 To his number one could add the 3 per cent of the respondents who answered “Day of the Liberation from the 
Polish-Lithuanian interventionists.” 
245  “Они рассматривают это как инициативу властей для того, чтобы погасить память о 7 ноября. 
Изначальная неопределенность исчезает, люди согласились с официальным названием, но никаких 
эмоций он не вызывает. Очень небольшая часть идентифицирует себя с этим праздником.” 
246 The play was directed by Mikhail Ugarov and Ruslan Malikov. 
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Polish actors and spoken in Polish while Russian characters were performed by Russian ac-
tors speaking Russian. According to Gremina, who is also the co-founder and director of 
Teatr.doc, “in that way we can view it [the historical events, M.W.] from both sides” 
(Винокуров 2007).247 After its premiere in Poland, its Russian premiere took place on 4 No-
vember 2007. In an interview with Radio Svoboda, Gremina explained how the play fitted the 
political-cultural situation at the time:  
Clearly, we are now at a certain point where we have to remember what happened to us, to imagine our histo-
ry, to compose, perhaps, some new myths or reevaluate old ones. And that, of course, is what this holiday is 
about (Винокуров 2007).248 
She points out that, contrary to its intended effect of unification, the holiday has had pri-
marily a divisive effect.  
[T]his Day of National Unity somehow rather divides people; because people, compatriots who live in the 
same country, have completely different ideas about what is happening and what our path is; entirely differ-
ent manifestations of 4 November are taking place (Винокуров 2007).249 
The play she wrote, in fact, is part of this plurality of interpretations.  
Contrary to the oppositional sentiment towards Poland or “the West” engrained in the offi-
cial commemoration of the Time of Troubles, the play is of a conciliatory nature. As a 
reviewer for Rossiiskaia Gazeta put it, the merging of the two languages and the two theatri-
cal companies on stage draws out commonalities between the opposing sides in the conflict, 
rather than their mutual enmity.  
And suddenly it becomes apparent how easily we are able to understand a foreign language, as age-old 
neighbours in time and space; how much you can hear in it that is native [rodnoi] and familiar (Карась 
2007).250  
When asked whether there will be a new Time of Troubles in Russia, Gremina suggests 
that Russia has moved beyond this point – without clearly indicating whether she feels that it 
does not apply to contemporary Russian history or that the latest Time of Troubles has now 
ended (which would be in line with the regime’s interpretation).  
                                                 
247 “таким образом у нас будет взгляд с двух сторон.” 
248 “Видимо, сейчас какой-то такой момент, что мы должны помнить о том, что с нами было, представить 
себе нашу историю, сочинить, может быть, какие-то новые мифы или переоценить старые. Вот, 
наверное, что такое этот праздник.” 
249  “этот День народного единства, скорее, в чем-то разъединяет людей, потому что у людей, 
соотечественников, живущих в одной стране, совершенно разные представления о том, что происходит и 
что есть наш путь, происходят совершенно разные манифестации 4 ноября.” 
250 “И внезапно обнаруживается, как легко дается нам - давним соседям во времени и пространстве - 
понимание чужого языка, сколько в нем слышится родного и знакомого.” 
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It appears to me that we have already passed the moment when it [a new Time of Troubles, M.W.] could 
have happened. But now there is instability… perhaps it is one these processes that can happen in our socie-
ty. I nevertheless believe that we are now going by some other scenario. By which – that will be clear as time 
goes by (Винокуров 2007).251 
Memory Chains 
Notwithstanding the government’s effort to associate itself with the memory of the Time of 
Troubles and its overcoming, the memory soon began to appear in combination with other 
historic dates in official statements. In particular, the pairing of 1612 and 1812 – the year 
marking the victory over Napoleon in the Patriotic War – largely replaced the usage of the 
memory of 1612 on its own. Both historical events were included in the programme of the 
Year of Russian History that was celebrated in 2012. The commemorative year thereby af-
firmed the central position the two dates occupy in official memory culture, as well the 
tendency to combine them. The decision to incorporate 1612 into a memory chain (see 
Chapter 2) can be explained by the memory image’s failure to resonate with the general pub-
lic in the way it was intended, as the opinion polls indicate. Through association with 1812 
the weak memory image was strengthened. Moreover, this could all be done without altering 
or negatively affecting the core idea of the institutionalised memory of 1612 and the holiday 
associated with it. In fact, the memory chain further confirmed the underlying notion that 
Russian history is cyclical in nature. Consider, for instance, the following example. In a care-
fully orchestrated ceremony on 29 August 2012 in the Catherine Hall of the Kremlin, 
President Putin presented state awards to more than fifty “outstanding Russian citizens.” In 
his congratulatory speech, Putin referred to episodes from Russian history to frame the kind 
of patriotism exemplified by the awardees. 
I am certain that you love Russia and that, for you, this feeling is not merely loud, official words but, first 
and foremost, it is the meaning of life. This is exactly how true patriotism has always been understood: as a 
profound awareness of one’s personal involvement in the fate of the country, as civil responsibility and the 
aspiration to dedicate one’s talent to Russia [and] one’s fellow citizens, as the willingness to stand with one’s 
Motherland at all times: in moments of triumph as well as in periods of trial and adversary. The examples of 
this are the heroic events of 1612 that put an end to the Time of Troubles, and the Patriotic War of 1812 (“В 
Кремле вручены государственные награды” 2012).252 
                                                 
251  “Мне почему-то кажется, что момент, когда она могла быть, мы уже миновали. А сейчас 
нестабильность... может быть, она не из тех процессов, которые в нашем обществе могут происходить. Я 
все-таки думаю, что сейчас мы уже идем по какому-то другому сценарию. По какому - будет ясно через 
какое-то время.” 
252 “Уверен, что все вы любите Россию, и для вас это чувство – не просто громкие, казенные слова, а 
прежде всего, это дело, смысл всей жизни. Именно так во все времена понимался настоящий патриотизм: 
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The patriotism of today’s “Heroes of Russia” is placed in a historical tradition that con-
nects contemporary Russia to the Time of Troubles and the war against Napoleon – even if 
the dangers Russia faces today are of a rather different kind. 
The shift from 1612 to 1812 offered yet another major advantage. The victory over 
Napoleon provides opportunities for pairing with the 1945 victory in the Second World War 
as well.253 This association is facilitated, in particular, by the overlapping geographical loca-
tions of important battlefields and remembrance sites. The battlefield at Borodino is a case in 
point. The rolling hills west of Moscow were the site of the famous nineteenth-century Battle 
of Borodino, presented in the official account as a turning point in the war with Napoleon. 
Yet it was also the site of particularly intense fighting against approaching German forces in 
1941. One now encounters, spread out across a territory measuring more than one hundred 
square kilometres, more than three hundred memorial objects. Those commemorating the 
Battle of Borodino were erected in 1839 and on the occasion of its centennial anniversary in 
1912. Most of the monuments dedicated to the 1941 battle date to the 1960s and ’70s. Both 
battles are commemorated annually with historical re-enactments of key battle scenes: the 
battle of 1812 on the Day of Borodino (the first Sunday of September) and the military clash-
es of 1941 during a historical-military festival held on the second Sunday in October.254 
In 2012, Putin attended the re-enactment of the Battle of Borodino. In his speech, Putin 
praised the soldiers who had sacrificed their lives there. At the same time, he foregrounded 
how the memories of the Patriotic War and Great Patriotic War are connected and, at that 
particular location, overlap geographically. In fact, the commemoration of the Battle of 
Borodino was used as an occasion to award the nearby villages of Maloiaroslavets and 
Mozhaisk with the title of “City of Military Honour,” an honorific title generally associated 
with the Second World War. “It is symbolic,” Putin stated, “that precisely here, where ‘Rus-
sians gained the right to be unconquerable’ [a quote from Napoleon, M.W.], the certificates 
conferring the honourable title of ‘City of Military Honour’ will now be awarded to the cities 
                                                                                                                                                        
как глубокое осознание личной причастности к судьбе страны, как гражданская ответственность и 
стремление посвятить России, своим согражданам свой талант, как готовность всегда быть со своей 
Родиной: и в минуты торжества, и в периоды испытаний и невзгод. Примеры тому – героические 
события 1612 года, положившие конец Смуте, и Отечественная война 1812 года.” 
253 With regard to the Time of Troubles, the opportunities for establishing such a direct link with the “Great 
Patriotic War” are limited to and necessarily remediated by means of Stalinist wartime propaganda, including the 
Soviet army parade that marched past the statue of Minin and Pozharskii before heading to the Western front in 
1941, mentioned earlier. 
254 The first re-enactment of the battle of 1812 took place in 1987 as part of the 175th anniversary celebrations. 
Since then, the re-enactment has expanded and professionalised. The military festival commemorating the 1941 
battle was first organised in 1999. 
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of Maloiaroslavets and Mozhaisk” (“Торжества по случаю 200-летия Бородинского 
сражения” 2012).255 The reason for bestowing the honour, he added, lay in the “deeds of [the 
cities’] population and their defenders during the Patriotic Wars” (emphasis added). 256 
Borodino provides yet another example of a reclaimed tradition: at the 2014 re-enactment, the 
speaker repeatedly emphasised how the event not only brought the battle of 1812 back to life, 
but simultaneously constituted a revival of the first re-enactment that had taken place there in 
1912. As the speaker repeatedly proclaimed, it was “a reconstruction of a reconstruction” (au-
thor’s visit, 7 September 2014). The same year, the political instrumentalisation of the 
Patriotic War was affirmed by the erection of a bronze statue of Tsar Aleksandr I next to the 
Kremlin wall in celebration of the 200th anniversary of the war’s conclusion. Confirming how 
1612 and 1812 are inextricably interwoven in the regime’s memory politics, President Putin’s 
speech conveyed the essence of the political smuta narrative by pointing out that in the battle 
against Napoleon “people of all classes, of different ethnicities” rose up to fight (“Открытие 
памятника Александру I” 2014).257 
If we look at how the memory of the Time of Troubles has figured in memory chains in the 
broader public discourse, it becomes clear that it is actually part of two opposed memory 
chains. The first is a positive chain connected by the notion of the restoration of order, which 
corresponds to its governmental usage. In this chain, the end of the Time of Troubles is linked 
to the victory over Napoleon and the rule of Putin in the new millennium. The victory in the 
Second World War, though at times added to the memory chain, does not form an essential 
part of it. At first sight, the frequent omission of the Second World War from this constructed 
chain of victories appears to be somewhat incongruous with the prominent place of 1945 in 
contemporary memory politics. A possible explanation for the absence of one of the primary 
vectors of national pride lies in the emphasis placed on the importance of Russian Orthodoxy 
in uniting the people and gaining victory; in the commemoration of the victory in the Second 
World War, religion is at best a subsidiary aspect. The second memory chain possesses a 
negative connotation and focuses on the Time of Troubles itself, that is, on the condition of 
disorder, anarchy, and suffering during the period. In this chain, the Time of Troubles is con-
nected to the Russian Revolution and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1605-1917-
1991). One also comes across references to the Time of Troubles in connection to the Stalinist 
                                                 
255 “Символично, что именно здесь, где ‘русские стяжали право быть непобедимыми,’ сейчас будут 
вручены грамоты о присвоении городам Можайску почетного звания город воинской славы.” 
256 “за подвиги их жителей и их защитников в период Отечественных войн.” 
257 “люди всех сословий, разных национальностей.” 
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terror and, specifically, the year 1937. The Soviet period, thus, provides very important and 
indelible components of the negative, even traumatic version of the memory chain. 
To demonstrate how these two narrative strategies function in Russian public discourse, let 
us consider the following statement by Patriarch Kirill, which actually combines the two link-
ing strategies: 
I would like to say that what the country went through in the 1990s is comparable to other significant cata-
clysms in the history of our country, with the Time of Troubles of the seventeenth century, the Napoleonic 
invasion, with Hitler's act of aggression and the Civil War, because in each of these cases the very existence 
of the country, the existence of the people, was in question (“Стенограмма встречи” 2012).258 
In Patriarch Kirill’s statement as it is recorded in the official transcript, he thus interweaves 
Soviet and non-Soviet periods and frames all of them in a negative light. The news coverage 
by Channel One, however, edits its coverage of the meeting in which he made this statement 
in an important way. On the channel’s website, the broadcast news coverage is accompanied 
by a written transcript of the video. In the video, the Patriarch’s statement is edited in such a 
way that the historical comparison he puts forward consists only of the Time of Troubles, the 
Napoleonic invasion, and the Civil War. Filtered out is his mention of the Second World War 
in a negative rather than a victorious context. In the transcript, however, the chain of history is 
edited even further to fit the “victory format” of 1612-1812-2012:  
“We would like to have a conversation with you [Vladimir Putin, M.W.] as prime minister, but first of all as 
a candidate for the position of President of our country; what is more, the candidate that has, of course, the 
greatest chance of actualising this candidacy into an actual appointment,” remarked Patriarch Kirill. He com-
pared the events of the ’90s with the Time of Troubles of the seventeenth century, with the Napoleonic 
invasion. “Because in each of these cases the very existence of the country, the existence of the people, was 
in question. I believe, that it is very important to understand that the emergence out of these difficult ’90s 
represents a special page in the many-centuries-long history of our Fatherland,” Patriarch Kirill stressed 
(Лякин 2012).259 
                                                 
258 “Я хотел бы сказать, что то, через что страна прошла в 1990-е годы, сопоставимо с другими, самыми 
значительными катаклизмами в истории нашей страны, со Смутой XVII века, с наполеоновским 
нашествием, с гитлеровской агрессией и с Гражданской войной, потому что всякий раз стоял вопрос: 
быть или не быть самой стране, быть или не быть народу.” 
259 “‘Мы хотели бы провести беседу с вами как с премьер-министром, но в первую очередь с кандидатом 
на пост Президента нашей страны, причем с кандидатом, который имеет, конечно, наибольшие шансы 
реализовать это кандидатство в реальную должность,’ - отметил Патриарх Кирилл. Он сравнил события 
90-х годов со смутой XVII века, с наполеоновским нашествием. ‘Потому что всякий раз стоял вопрос, 
быть или не быть самой стране, быть или не быть народу. Я думаю, что очень важно понять , что выход 
из этих тяжелых 90-х годов был особой страницей в многовековой истории нашего Отечества,’ - 
подчеркнул Патриарх Кирилл.” 
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The relevance for contemporary politics is further emphasised by the placement of the his-
torical comparison directly after the Patriarch’s expression of support for Putin’s presidential 
candidacy, which he had actually made much earlier in the meeting. 
In those cases where the memory of the Second World War is inserted into the victorious 
narrative of emergence from crisis, the frame of the recurring Time of Troubles appears to 
have a neutralising function; it serves to historicise the memory of the war by integrating it 
with previous heroic deeds. Consider, for example, Channel One’s coverage of the state cer-
emony where President Dmitrii Medvedev awarded the cities of Vladivostok, Tver and 
Tikhvin with the title of “City of Military Glory.” The reporter makes the following comment 
about the city of Tver: 
In the course of its history, going back almost nine centuries, the citizens of Tver have more than once come 
to the defence of Russia; that was the case during the Time of Troubles, during the invasion of the Poles, and 
in 1812, when the city formed the first people’s militia (Краснов 2011).260 
As a result, the historical periods that were portrayed under Yeltsin as disparate eras – cast-
ing the post-Soviet as a departure from the Soviet period, or the Soviet period itself as a 
breach in the continuity of the (imperial) Russian state – are reintegrated into a single histori-
cal narrative. The perceived “right” to celebrate all of their victories, from the time of Kievan 
Rus’ up to now, and to consider them one’s own is symbolically reclaimed. All the paradoxes 
and incongruities of Russia’s “1000-year history” are brushed away for the sake of reviving 
the veneration of the Russian state itself.  
                                                 
260 “За свою историю, насчитывающую почти 9 веков, Тверитяне не раз становились на защиту России - 




TV Documentaries on the Occasion of the Day of National Unity 
On the occasion of (the introduction of) the Day of National Unity, several state TV channels 
broadcast documentaries on the Time of Troubles and its contemporary relevance. It is fair to 
assume that these programmes were all produced on the initiative of the state to popularise the 
new holiday. Nevertheless, they diverge considerably in both style and content, and this mer-
its notice. In what follows, I will analyse three documentaries from 2005 and contrast them 
with a fourth documentary from 2006. As will become clear, the latter is markedly more 
propagandistic in nature. The measure of deviation among such “state-ordered” documen-
taries tends to receive little notice. Yet such divergence serves as a valuable reminder that, 
first, the production of (contemporary) television “propaganda” is a highly complex process 
that involves an extensive network of people representing various backgrounds and agendas, 
thereby resulting in varying end products (showing indirect or diffuse top-down control); and, 
second, that conversely this diversity is exactly what is needed to get the message across to 
the various groups that make up the target audience. Generational differences and other fac-
tors influencing viewing preferences are thus taken into account, ensuring the diffusion of the 
core message to the widest possible audience. 
Russian Alarm (Russkii nabat, Sergei Ivanov, 2005), broadcast by Channel One, is a rather 
unsurprising, fact-oriented documentary that simply narrates the main historical events of the 
Time of Troubles. Images of tumbling church bells and whirlwinds introduce the turbulent 
historical episode. At no point in the discussion, however, is direct reference made to a con-
temporary parallel. A ceremonial military parade in the Kremlin, shown at the beginning and 
end of the documentary without commentary or indication of the occasion, is the only element 
that connects past and present. As is the case in many Russian documentaries, the narrator 
takes centre stage. Sitting in a library, leaning over ancient-looking books, Sergei Shakurov 
recounts the Time of Troubles’ main incidents. Shakurov is a well-known Soviet and Russian 
actor, who, in the spring of that year, had played Leonid Brezhnev in an eponymous TV series 
(Brezhnev, Sergei Snezhkin, 2005). The scenes of direct narration are interspersed with frag-
ments from early and late Soviet films and opera recordings. For the most part, the original 
soundtrack of these productions is preserved. The opera sequences, therefore, leave a distinct 
mark on the overall feel of the documentary. As it draws to a close, Orthodox hymns resound. 
Time of Troubles (Smuta, Sergei Skoblin, 2005), broadcast by NTV, is markedly different 
in its argument and style. The opening titles introduce the topic in unabashed terms. A thick 
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red substance – what appears to be blood – slowly spreads across the map of Russia as the 
voice-over summarises the problems at hand: hunger and murder have become the lot of ordi-
nary people; for boyars and other servants of the court, betrayal is now the norm; the 
Muscovite state has lost vast stretches of territory, as well as half its population. This disarray, 
the voice-over states, is what will later be known as the Great Time of Troubles (velikaia 
smuta). The documentary is narrated by Vladimir Menshov, well known for directing the 
Oscar-winning Soviet-era classic Moscow Does not Believe in Tears (Moskva slezam ne verit, 
1979). Menshov immediately makes clear that the term smuta should be used in plural form 
and frames the Time of Troubles as a recurring phenomenon. He claims that Russian history 
has known at least four such Times – and invokes the Tatar Yoke, the Time of Troubles itself 
and the October Revolution. The negative memory chain that was discussed above is thus 
extended back in time, thereby lengthening the perceived timespan of Russian history (ap-
proaching the cliché tysiacheletie). The viewer is left to guess the fourth instance – which 
turns out to be the most recent period – until it is revealed at the end of the documentary. In 
its description of the historical events, the documentary pays particular attention to the topic 
of imposture (samozvanstvo) and the various interests that may have played a role for those 
involved (e.g., the False Dmitrii; Marina Mnishek and her family; and Marfa, the mother of 
Dmitrii who affirmed that the False Dmitrii was her son). A noteworthy aspect of the docu-
mentary is its looking beyond the opposition of Russia and its enemies in Europe. It places the 
confrontation between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian occupiers within a larger geopolitical 
framework that includes the Ottoman Empire. Also, it informs the viewer that Marina 
Mnishek sought refuge from Shah Abbas I of Persia. The Iranian ruler, however, refused her 
request since he did not want to get tangled up in Russian affairs.  
The documentary further asserts that the period following the October Revolution was in 
many ways similar to the Time of Troubles. In fact, as in the early seventeenth century, it ar-
gues, impostors came to power. At this point, historical footage of Vladimir Lenin is shown. 
More generally, the Soviet authorities are portrayed as weak and insecure, all the way through 
the 1930s. One of the reasons the statue of Minin and Pozharskii had to be moved, it is 
claimed, was that those in power feared it would incite a people’s rebellion. Minin’s hand 
raised in the direction of the Kremlin and, more specifically, Lenin’s tomb and the platform 
used by Soviet dignitaries on official occasions would provoke hostile sentiments against the 
establishment. The negative depiction of the first decades of Soviet rule deviates markedly 
from how smuta and the Russian Revolution are typically combined. The term smuta is 
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widely used to denote the societal impact and disruption caused by the Revolution and subse-
quent civil war, but not to negatively portray Lenin or the inception of the Soviet state per se. 
In Time of Troubles, Menshov provides his commentary from historically relevant loca-
tions. His narration is complemented by a separate voice-over. To boost the documentary’s 
credibility, there are interviews with several historians, most with heavily laden bookshelves 
or computers in the background. The documentary includes extensive images of artworks and 
cinematic fragments, as well as historical film footage drawn from various periods. Many of 
these are overlaid with a yellowish filter, which blurs the images and takes away the evident 
differences in origin and period between them. The original sound is omitted. Unlike the pre-
vious documentary, the relation between the images shown and what is recounted by the 
voice-over is not always clear. In fact, because of the filter, it is sometimes difficult to make 
out what exactly the fragments depict. Because of the visual blurring, there is greater empha-
sis on the voice-over narration.  
Hieromonk Feofan, the only non-historian interviewed, reiterates that the meaning of the 
Time of Troubles transcends its seventeenth-century historical origin and that its “message” 
continues to be relevant today. He states that in different times the country has faced different 
enemies; but more important than the identity of the adversary is the overcoming of these 
trials (ispytanie) through the unification of the people. The trial Russia endures at the mo-
ment, he concedes, may be different in nature from that of the earlier episode, yet it requires 
the same national unification. In the conclusion, Menshov returns to the question of the fourth 
Time of Troubles. He asserts that, according to historians, Russia is currently experiencing 
another smuta, which began with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Perhaps, he cautions, 
it is still going on. After naming the symptoms evident in both periods – among them the loss 
of a large part of the state’s former territory – Menshov finally arrives at the state-sponsored 
line of interpretation. It appears, he assures the viewer, that this most recent Time of Troubles 
is coming to an end. This is evinced by the restoration of destroyed monuments and an in-
creasing interest among Russians in national history (here he refers to the great number of 
documentaries shown on TV). Menshov briefly touches upon the criticism that the date cho-
sen for the national holiday bears little actual historical significance, yet emphasises how the 
need for the holiday itself is indisputable: “We need it in order to remember our history and 
take pride in it.”261 Only then, he asserts, can our history evolve from one characterised by 
recurring Times of Troubles into one of development and the unbroken flourishing of the 
                                                 
261 “Он нам нужен. Чтобы вспомнить свою историю и гордиться ею.” 
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state. Interestingly, Menshov thus suggests that the historical pattern characterised by return-
ing cycles of greatness and Times of Troubles can somehow be transcended.  
The documentary The End of the Time of Troubles (Konets smutnogo vremeni, Sergei 
Kraus, 2005), broadcast by Rossiia, concentrates on the final years of the Time of Troubles 
and places considerably more emphasis on the role of Russian Orthodoxy. The events leading 
up to the year 1610, which begin the narration, are recounted in broad brushstrokes. As in the 
previous documentaries, the Time of Troubles is visualised through shots of paintings, etch-
ings, schematic visualisations of military manoeuvres and film scenes from Minin and 
Pozharskii and Ivan the Terrible Part I, often overlaid with dancing flames. In addition, it 
includes extensive re-enacted scenes and shots of landscapes, turbulent skies, churches and 
monasteries. Compelling symphonic music on the soundtrack, rapid cuts and an authoritative 
voice-over provide intensity and suspense at regular intervals. Compared to the other two 
documentaries, it includes more interviews with well-known figures, including painter Il’ia 
Glazunov, who went on to represent Ivan the Terrible in The Name Is Russia a few years later 
(see Chapter 4), and popular historical writer Boris Akunin. Whereas the majority of those 
interviewed see times of troubles as a natural consequence of momentary absences of authori-
ty in Russia’s “traditionally” power-centric structure, Glazunov asserts that these periods of 
turmoil do not arise of themselves but are organised. “Smuta” and revolution are one and the 
same thing, he claims. The documentary reiterates the standpoint that the Time of Troubles 
was overcome because the Russian people united against a common enemy. (Then) 
Metropolitan Kirill further stresses the indispensable role of the Orthodox faith in the survival 
of the Russian state. His position is supported by the manifold shots of Orthodox churches, 
resounding hymns and ringing bells, and by the extensive discussion of the fate of Patriarch 
Germogen and Orthodox monasteries. Historian Igor’ Andreev confirms the importance of 
religion in this period. He summarises the role of Orthodoxy as the “protection of national 
dignity and self-esteem.” In fact, according to Andreev, the Church played a crucial role in 
inspiring the idea of “national liberation.” As the voice-over later points out, the leading role 
of Orthodoxy, however, did not preclude support from other national groups. All nationalities 
– Kalmyk, Tatars, Mari and so on – joined the militia led by Minin and Pozharskii. And those 
peoples who did not take part in the military effort, it is claimed, contributed financially. 
Metropolitan Kirill draws attention to the symbolic importance of the end of the Time of 
Troubles and establishes parallels with other periods in history, in particular with the Second 
World War.  
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We have always fallen victim to outside aggression at times when we lost internal cohesion and strength. 
And, as a matter of fact, Hitler also attacked us, believing that Communist rule had led to the weakening of 
the internal spiritual strength of the people. And that the German forces simply had to come in and, as the in-
ternal wave of resistance to Soviet authority was rising, that everything would fall apart. That was their 
primary estimation.262 
Glazunov similarly invokes the memory of the Second World War, and cites how only na-
tional heroes such as Aleksandr Nevskii and Minin and Pozharskii succeeded in mobilising 
the people. The viewer is then presented with historic footage of the Soviet armed forces 
marching across Red Square, its troops passing the statue of Minin and Pozharskii as they 
leave for the front. Metropolitan Kirill is given the final word and sums up how Russia is 
fated to live through Times of Troubles, but will always return to greatness.  
Russia is a great power [velikoe gosudarstvo]. Russia is a very wealthy state in terms of resources and oppor-
tunities. And she is very attractive [pritiagatel'na] to many. This wealth is very attractive to many. And you 
have to be able to keep and protect this wealth. And it [the wealth, M.W.] is so great that only a great power 
can keep and protect it. Therefore, Russia can only be great, and we must add multinational, or she will not 
be at all.263 
While the documentary presents the historical events so that they translate easily to the po-
litical situation in the present, the parallel with contemporary Russia is left implicit. The three 
documentaries broadcast by the main TV channels on the occasion of the first celebration of 
the Day of National Unity thus differ considerably in terms of style, as well as in the particu-
lar events they recount and emphasise. Still, all three reiterate the motto of the holiday: only 
through the unification of the people can Russia overcome (recurring) Times of Troubles and 
reclaim its natural position as a great power. Since the TV productions were likely initiated 
because of the new holiday, it is noteworthy that only one of them – The End of the Time of 
Troubles – is framed this way. Russian Alarm even lacks explicit references to present-day 
developments. 
The 2006 documentary The Time of Troubles (Smutnoe vremia, Viktor Buturlin), on the 
contrary, is far more explicit in its historical and political claims. As one would expect on the 
                                                 
262 “Мы всегда становились жертвы внешней агрессии когда утрачивали внутреннюю целостность и 
силу, и собственно говоря и Гитлер напал на нас, думая что власть коммунистов привела к ослаблению 
внутренних духовных сил народа. И вот стоила, так сказать только немецким войскам войти и, как 
поднимется внутренняя волна сопротивления советской власти и все рухнет. Это был главный расчет.” 
263 “Россия – великое государство. Россия – самое богатое государство, с точкой зрения ресурсов и 
возможностей. И она очень притягательна для многих. Вот это богатство очень притягательно для 
многих. И это богатство нужно уметь хранить и защищать. И оно такой великое, что хранить и защищать 
его можно только великое государство. Поэтому Россия можно быть великой, добавим 
многонациональной кстати, либо она не будет никакой.” 
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basis of its title, the programme discusses the lead-up to Time of Troubles, followed by the 
unfolding of its crucial events and ultimately its ending. But the narrative takes several de-
tours at important points, suggesting that the topic is but a means to discuss larger issues of 
Russian politics and, in particular, the relation between state and society. Even more so than 
the previously discussed productions, the documentary exemplifies the rhetorical importance 
of (remediated) visual elements, montage and intertextuality for the construction of a persua-
sive memory text. Narrator Mikhail Leont’ev, a television host and political commentator 
notorious for his bold statements, asserts that, for Russia, imposture has become a “chronic 
disease” that has afflicted the country’s historical development and the way it has coped with 
transitions in power. There have been three Times of Troubles in Russian history, it is stated: 
in 1605, 1917 and 1991. Leont’ev thus reiterates the standard negative memory chain. The 
documentary provides explicit comparisons between the seventeenth century and the 1990s in 
both image and narration. The importance of the Orthodox faith for the Russian state is em-
phasised and reinforced by many shots of Orthodox churches. The documentary employs a 
mix of archival and cinematographic moving images taken from different time periods. Some 
are very recognisable, such as scenes from Minin and Pozharskii; others are difficult to place 
in time, such as historical footage of fatally starved children that accompanies the narrative 
about famine during Godunov’s reign. 
The naming of the three periods in Russian history that are deemed to be comparable and, 
to a certain extent, dictated by the rules governing Russia’s historical development leads the 
way to a wide array of alleged historical parallels: the death of Ivan the Terrible and subse-
quent shared political rule by several boyar families is compared to the death of Stalin and the 
system of collective leadership during the Khrushchev period; Boris Godunov is mirrored by 
Khrushchev; the Rule of the Seven Boyars (semiboiarshchina) is equated with the level of 
political influence of the oligarchs in the second half of the 1990s (semibankirshchina),264 and 
so on. A number of these parallels are constructed solely through a montage of moving imag-
es, for example when a voice-over commenting on the death of Ivan the Terrible is 
accompanied by footage of Stalin lying in state. The documentary argues that the crises of the 
1990s and the early seventeenth century share yet another characteristic. The existing power 
vacuum was not only exploited by a small group of political elite to their personal advantage, 
it was exacerbated by foreign (i.e., Western) interference. Images of packets of dollar bills, 
smiling politicians and signs with anti-American slogans (“Yankees, get out!”) indicate West-
                                                 
264 The term “semibankirshchina” was first coined in 1996 in reference to the group of oligarchs that helped 
Yeltsin secure victory in the Presidential elections (Brouwer 2016b: 126). 
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ern influence over the process of democratisation and the transition to a market-oriented 
economy in the (early) 1990s. It is argued that foreign “occupation” temporarily compensated 
for the ruling political elite’s lack of legitimacy. To end a Time of Troubles, and for a strong 
Russian state to re-emerge, the foreign “occupier” has to be expelled and state power restored. 
The Russian state, according to the same logic that has it repeatedly slipping into political 
chaos, also succeeds in eventually overcoming these periods of near-collapse. But, so the 
documentary warns, emergence from a Time of Troubles is a prolonged process. Two factors 
are outlined as decisive for the restoration of political order: the will of the Russian people 
and the Orthodox Church. Also here a parallel is drawn between 1612 and the transition from 
the 1990s to the Putin era:  
Without the spiritual sanction of the Church, which at the time was the only remaining all-Russian legitimate 
institution, just like it was four hundred years later, there would have been nothing on which to found a peo-
ple's militia to restore the country.265 
In these concluding passages, the Soviet parallel that was featured throughout the docu-
mentary remains absent and is also less self-evident. If, indeed, the Russian Revolution was a 
Time of Troubles, then when did it end? Which period in the early history of the Soviet Union 
should be considered as the period of restoration and, consequently, to be in some ways anal-
ogous to the present? This is but one example of instances where the divergent parallels 
drawn between periods and historical leader-figures appear to be incongruous, even mutually 
exclusive. 
All four documentaries discussed above remediate visual memory texts to support and en-
liven their narratives. Yet, whereas in the 2005 documentaries the (audio-)visual materials 
served to visualise the particular event being discussed and, therefore, had an affirmative ef-
fect, in the latter documentary we find a recurrent discrepancy between narration and image. 
Here, rather, remediation is a destabilising factor; it complicates the argument by implicitly 
introducing additional historical parallels. The frequency of these incongruences suggests 
that, first, the documentary is as much about the relation between contemporary Russia and its 
Soviet past and the overarching claim of Russia’s historical continuity as it is about portray-
ing the 1990s as a Time of Troubles. Second, it is clear that the suggestive montage is a 
deliberate strategy that is implemented throughout the entire documentary. Consider, for 
                                                 
265  “Без духовной санкции церкви, оставшейся на тот момент вообще единственным общерусским 
легитимным институтом, как собственно и четыреста лет спустя, не на чем было бы строить народное 
ополчение восстановившуюся страну.” 
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example, the following sequence in which Leont’ev introduces the topic of “legitimate pow-
er”:  
There exists such a concept of “legitimate power”; that is, power that is lawful. Moreover, not only, and not 
so much as in the formal and legal sense, but [as it is understood] in the collective consciousness of the 
people. Only a legitimate power can be stable, only such a legitimate power can endure the trial of crisis, 
only that kind of power has the right to undertake tough actions against its enemies.  
For the narrator, the mentioning of “tough actions” suffices to leave behind the topic of the 
previous passages, Boris Godunov, and to introduce Ivan the Terrible, who is commonly held 
to epitomise this kind of cruelty exercised by the state against its enemies. The narration 
about Ivan is, however, accompanied by scenes taken from the late Soviet film Boris 
Godunov. So, while the narrator recounts how Ivan the Terrible committed filicide, the viewer 
is presented with footage recounting the political repressions of a political leader who reigned 
almost two decades after him.  
The mixing of the two rulers in fact serves as a prelude to the subsequent temporal leap to 
the twentieth century and the introduction of Stalin. Suddenly, and in image only, the narra-
tive presents the viewer with a brief sequence on Stalin and the Gulag. We see historical 
footage of Stalin standing on a ship navigating the Belomor Canal, constructed by forced la-
bour of Gulag inmates, followed by a close-up of the Soviet leader facing the camera and 
looking on with determination. A folkish, old-sounding tune accompanies the black-and-
white images. As the music continues, the documentary shows footage of a group of prisoners 
marching under armed guard. Then, images of a train moving through the snow-covered land-
scape and the felling of large pine trees suggests we are heading east into Siberia. Even 
though the marching prisoners and winding train tracks would have sufficed to indicate the 
topic to the viewer, the shot of prisoners behind bars being transported on the train leaves 
little room for other interpretations. Instead of putting forward a negative appraisal of the 
events shown, the optimistic music continues; the train continues on its way. In the images 
that conclude the Stalin sequence, the viewer again sees him, this time from the back, looking 
forward across the water. The Stalinist intermezzo concludes as suddenly as it began. The 
music ends and the narrator again highlights his central argument: 
Nonetheless, according to the popular consciousness, Ivan Vasilievich was a cruel tsar but [acted] within his 
rights. In popular folklore, there are no examples of a negative attitude towards [Ivan] the Terrible, because 
Ivan was a legitimate [ruler] by the standards of the medieval Tsar, anointed of God.  
As Leont’ev proclaims in the voice-over that Ivan the Terrible was a legitimate ruler, not-
withstanding his exceptional cruelty, one of the most famous scenes from Ivan the Terrible 
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Part I is shown. In this scene, Ivan, who has abdicated the throne because of his mistrust of 
the aristocracy and has left Moscow, is asked by the Russian people to return to the capital 
and reclaim his position as Tsar. Ivan eventually agrees, but only under the condition that he 
be invested with absolute power. The absolute rule of the state leader is presented as a “social 
contract” between the monarch and the people, who have asked for his protection and guid-
ance. As a result, the montage described above places Stalin in the context of returning cycles 
of state violence and repression. 
The argumentative power of (moving) images, as evinced by these documentaries, leads 
me to briefly reflect on how such remediated audiovisual materials interact with both individ-
ual and collective memory, and in what ways it may influence viewer interpretation. As 
demonstrated above, remediated materials are edited and processed in various ways, all of 
which influence their respective meanings and affective effects. They can be used to perform 
many functions, such as: 
1. Fillers (“random” archival footage, period contextualisation, geographical contextualisation) 
2. Character builders (images/audiovisuals of specific persons to visually complement and fill out a charac-
terisation provided by the voice-over or narrator) 
3. Enliveners (added sound effects, acted scenes, scenes from feature films) 
4. Iconic images (images or audiovisuals that have become synonymous with a period or character, e.g., 
Eisenstein’s films, certain paintings). The recognisability of such imagery helps to ease in the message 
and reduces friction in the viewing experience. 
5. Emotive triggers (specific images that have the potential to elicit a strong, emotive effect) 
6. Justifiers (shots of documents or books, specific uses of archival footage) 
7. Cheats (material that has been manipulated for it to perform one of the functions outlined above, e.g., 
manipulation of feature film to appear black-and-white and serve as periodisation (1) or authentic foot-
age (1 or 6). 
All these functions were reviewed in passing as we discussed the four documentaries. Still, 
through montage, a fragment can also become a vital element in a line of argument that trans-
cends its direct content and referents, as was the case with the suggestive sequencing in the 
latter documentary. In the analysis of Vladimir Mirzoev’s Boris Godunov we will come 
across another example of such argumentative juxtaposition of archival footage.  
Which strategies to use, and to what extent they are employed (either consciously or sub-
consciously), are decisions by the director and, to a lesser extent, the editor(s) involved. One 
of the professionals interviewed for this study, an archival editor for the Kul’tura channel, was 
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responsible for locating and selecting suitable video fragments to be included in documen-
taries and other productions (Interviewee A). The initiative in this selection process, the 
interviewee asserted, lies with the director. This does not necessarily mean that the final selec-
tion is entirely intentional on the director’s part. For example, the director’s understanding of 
the different types of available materials may not correspond with reality: the interviewee 
once received a sincere request to supply a director with archival footage (khroniki) of Karl 
Marx. With regard to the editing process itself, and with determining how montage affects the 
meaning and emotive impact of constitutive elements, the director is again decisive. Accord-
ing to Interviewee B, a television video editor, the editor’s role is typically restricted to the 
technical execution of edit cues from the director, with little or no personal input allowed. 
While, for a director, archival footage and (dated) feature film may simply be a cheap and 
effective means to visually fill out a documentary, the potential affective effect of including 
such material on the viewer is significant. Indeed, when “contemporary screen-representations 
of these historical periods make use of visual material from well-known films of the Soviet 
period,” as Sander Brouwer argues with respect to two of the documentaries discussed above, 
such use “filter[s] the ‘cultural memory’ of these distant events through the prism of the 
Soviet ‘collective memory’” (Brouwer 2016b: 123). How exactly the affective structure is 
influenced by the inclusion of these materials differs (greatly) from one particular example to 
the next and defies theoretical generalisation. Indeed, as we have seen, the practice of remedi-
ation can work to either neutralise the opposition between the different periods in Russian 
history (for instance, the filter overlays in Skoblin’s Time of Troubles; the Ivan-Stalin se-
quence in Buturlin’s The Time of Troubles) or, on the contrary, it can reinforce the 
differences. 
1612 
Vladimir Khotinenko’s blockbuster historical film 1612: Chronicles of the Time of Troubles 
(1612. Khroniki smutnogo vremeni, 2007) made a considerable contribution to refreshing 
Russians’ memory about this turbulent episode in national history. It makes extensive use of 
Hollywood stylistics, incorporates fantasy elements (among other things, a unicorn) and is 
overflowing with special effects. 1612, therefore, had far greater appeal and, consequently, 
potential impact than the documentaries discussed above, especially on the younger genera-
tion. As with the documentaries, the film is generally presumed to be a goszakaz, a production 
commissioned by the Kremlin to explain the events commemorated on the Day of National 
Unity. As the reviewer for Kommersant put it, it was a “kinopodarok” to the authorities, a 
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cinematic gift (Маслова 2007). A glance at the parties involved in the production appears to 
confirm close links to the powers that be. 1612 was co-produced by Nikita Mikhalkov (see 
also Chapter 3), Leonid Vereshchagin (director of Mikhalkov’s production company TriTe) 
and Viktor Veksel’berg, a patriotic oligarch involved in “the business of blockbuster history” 
(Norris 2012: 255). The production was backed by the commercial bank VTB and the power 
holding company Unified Energy System of Russia,266 and was subsidised by the Federal 
Agency of Culture and Cinematography. In addition, Veksel’berg reportedly contributed four 
million dollars to the production budget (ibidem). The date of the release, 1 November 2007, 
coincided with the holiday celebrations and conveniently preceded the parliamentary elections 
that took place on 2 December that year. In an interview with Izvestiia, Khotinenko argued 
that the Time of Troubles is one of the most important periods in Russian history. Moreover, 
he stated, it provides an essential historical parallel for understanding the post-Soviet devel-
opment of the country: “I am talking about the period after Perestroika. We lived in another 
Time of Troubles for a long time. It even coincided with the one in the 17th century in dura-
tion” (Рамм 2007).267 According to Khotinenko, the post-Soviet Troubles thus ended soon 
after Putin took office.  
As was the case with the film Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (see Chapter 4), the production 
explicitly diverges from its iconic Soviet predecessor to avoid coming across as a remake. In 
fact, unlike in Minin and Pozharskii, the two heroes who liberated Moscow play only minor 
roles in 1612. The main protagonist is an ordinary man, an enslaved serf named Andrei (Petr 
Kislov). When first introduced, Andrei is sold to a Spanish mercenary on his way to join the 
Polish troops. When the Spaniard is killed, Andrei assumes his identity and, together with his 
Tatar friend Kostka (Artur Smolianinov), plays a decisive role in the military defence against 
the Poles. In the end, Andrei is crowned Tsar as Mikhail Romanov, based on a fictional gene-
alogy drawn up by the boyars who elected him. Andrei’s motivation to take up arms in the 
first place is highly personal. He wants to save Godunov’s daughter, Kseniia, with whom he 
has been in love ever since his childhood at the Godunov court. She is held captive by the 
Polish lord Osina, who plans to use her to make a claim on the Russian throne. This fictional 
dramatisation of Kseniia’s life is a pivotal element in the storyline. In effect, Kseniia becomes 
the female personification of a Russia held hostage by the Poles. Osina forces her to give up 
                                                 
266 The company, headed by Anatolii Chubais, effectively had a monopoly on the Russian electricity market at 
the time but has since been reorganised. 
267 “Я говорю о постперестроечном периоде. Мы с вами долго жили в очередном смутном времени. Даже 
по длительности с XVII веком совпадает.” 
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her native language and convert to Catholicism, mimicking the (supposed) attempts to assimi-
late Russia under Polish rule. Despite the ordeals she has to endure, Kseniia fights to stay true 
to her Russianness and her Orthodox faith. As her male counterpart, Andrei then comes to 
personify the Russian people who rise up to the challenge of liberating her. The appearance of 
Minin and Pozharskii is slightly awkward, as they do not take part in the actual action. In the 
words of a reviewer for Russkii Zhurnal, “Why do we need Minin and Pozharskii when we 
[already] have Andreiko and his unicorn?” (Малер 2007).268 Yet the fact that they are includ-
ed at all affirms their iconic importance. The two heroes who stand immortalised on Red 
Square continue to be the most recognisable personifications of the Time of Troubles. As 
such they are an effective memory trigger. The brief appearance of the two heroes suffices to 
integrate the film into the intertextual web of associations connected to the memory. The rep-
resentation of the Time of Troubles reiterates the core elements of memory established by 
previous mediations. In contrast with the products of Soviet memory culture, 1612 presents 
the Orthodox faith as the unifying force behind the Russian nation and as the keeper of 
Russia’s spirituality (dukhovnost’) in times of political turmoil. 
Khotinenko plays fast and loose with the historical facts; any illusions one might have 
concerning the film’s historical accuracy are soon shattered. Indeed, the take-home history 
lesson boils down to a rather simplistic message along the lines of “there once was a Time of 
Troubles and it ended in 1612 when ‘we’ kicked out the Polish interventionists.” In compari-
son with Minin and Pozharskii, 1612 places more emphasis on the distinction between the 
opposing sides in the conflict. For example, in the Soviet film all characters speak Russian, 
including the Poles. In 1612, members of each nationality speak their own language. 
Moreover, Kseniia’s speaking Polish with Osina is explicitly portrayed as a betrayal of her 
Russian roots. Second, the conflict’s religious aspect is foregrounded; the Russian side has to 
wage battle to preserve its religious independence. Here it is suggested that the Poles, in turn, 
are influenced by the Pope. In the end, however, so the film tells us, the concerted efforts of 
Russia’s Western enemies to subjugate Orthodoxy fail and, thanks to the victory over the 
Polish-Lithuanian occupiers, Orthodoxy continued to form a central element of Russian iden-
tity. We came across a similar conspiracy of European states aiming to convert and culturally 
subjugate Russia in Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (see Chapter 4). There is one exception to the 
strict opposition of religions and cultures: Tatar Kostka is portrayed as a true Russian who is 
willing to fight for his Motherland yet, at the same time, adheres to his own cultural practices 
                                                 
268 “Да и зачем нам Минин с Пожарским, если у нас есть Андрейко с единорогом?” 
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and beliefs. For example, when Kostka decides to marry a Russian girl, the marriage is per-
formed according to the rules of his community through the public proclamation “Wife, wife, 
wife!” Kostka, thereby, becomes the poster boy of Russian tolerance and singlehandedly es-
tablishes the Russian Empire as a multinational polity. 
Khotinenko has denied the allegation that the Russian authorities commissioned the film. 
“If there was [a state directive],” he stated, “then it was completely imperceptible to me.”  
I discussed the goals of the film with the general producer Nikita Mikhalkov. Together we looked at the ma-
terial, discussed it, he made some comments. But he was extremely delicate in this. We reasoned like this: 
“1612” is shot for a contemporary young audience, so the story has to be entertaining and humorous. There 
were no other goals (Рамм 2007).269 
While talking about his intentions for the film, however, Khotinenko repeatedly gets tan-
gled up in his own formulations. As he tries to articulate his vision in a way that would 
circumvent any admission of government involvement, he nonetheless ends up explaining 
how the film’s style is aimed at bringing across the new holiday’s message.  
I could have shot a quasi-historical austere film, but then a very limited number of viewers would have 
watched it. And I would not have fulfilled my task. No, not a directive from the Kremlin, but my own crea-
tive task, that is more important to me. I really wanted as many people as possible to learn about this period. 
So they know it is not just an arbitrarily named holiday in commemoration of an age-old victory over the 
Poles. It is not about the Poles at all. It is our concern [nashe delo], our history (Рамм 2007).270 
As a result, his denial lacks credibility. Arif Aliev, the writer of the script, concedes more 
in his answer and grants that “[p]robably there was an order to produce it.” He then hurries to 
downplay the negative connotations associated with accepting state directives by pointing to 
historical precedents.  
But if you visit Luxor [Egypt] and get to the bottom of how ancient Egyptian architecture was built, you’ll be 
astonished to discover the strict frameworks within which the architects created their buildings. All temples 
were created by government decrees. And yet they are rational, harmonious, and emotional. So the strict 
framework helped the artist. If there is no framework at best you get the Black Square. This would be the 
death of audience-friendly cinema (quoted in Norris 2012: 262. Italics in original). 
                                                 
269 “Если и был, то совершенно неощутимый для меня. Задачи фильма обсуждались с генеральным 
продюсером Никитой Михалковым. Мы вместе смотрели материал, обсуждали, он сделал кое-какие 
замечания. Но был при этом максимально деликатен. Мы с ним думали так: ‘1612’ снимается для 
современной молодежной аудитории, потому повествование должно быть увлекательным и с юмором. 
Других задач не было.” 
270 “Я мог бы снять квазиисторический суровый фильм, но его бы посмотрело очень ограниченное число 
зрителей. И я бы не выполнил свою задачу. Нет, не заказ Кремля, а собственную творческую задачу, что 
для меня важнее. Мне очень хотелось, чтобы про это время узнало как можно больше людей. Чтоб они 
знали, что это не просто какой-то условно назначенный праздник в честь стародавней победы над 
поляками. Вообще не в поляках дело. Это наше дело, наша история.” 
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It is interesting, in this respect, that not much in the film actually informs the audience 
about the historical events or, for that matter, the intended meaning of the holiday. Moreover, 
the remainder differs little from other recent (Hollywood) fantasy action films in everything 
from its narrative structure to its character development, to its visuals and humorous inter-
ludes. Indeed, one reviewer criticised the film because he felt the fantasy aspect 
overshadowed its educational aim.  
As a result, while watching you get the impression that you are watching […] a bad version of “Lord of the 
Rings” […]. You get the suspicion that they wanted to film another fantasy story on alternative history, like 
“Volkodav” [Wolfhound of the Grey Hound Clan, Nikolai Lebedev, 2006, M.W.] but then even more unreli-
able [nedostovernee], but then the opportunity arose to turn it into a historical film under goszakaz; therefore 
we now have a Spanish cavalier alternating with unicorns in the fairy-tale forest of indeterminate ancient 
Rus’ [neopredelenno-drevnei Rusi]. But what has the year 1612 got to do with it? How is this about the na-
tional holiday? (Малер 2007).271 
Notwithstanding its initially lukewarm reception by viewers and reviewers alike, 1612 has 
since become a new staple representation of the Time of Troubles. In the years after its re-
lease, the major TV channels included broadcasts of the film in their programming to mark 
the Day of National Unity and, on one occasion, Defender of the Fatherland Day (23 Febru-
ary).272 
What, then, can the film tell us about the aims, intended message and style of films pro-
duced in close rapport with the state in this period? Andrei Archangel’skii convincingly 
argues that 1612 is in many ways an exemplary product of contemporary Russian goszakaz. 
Lacking underlying ideological convictions or values, he asserts, these films aim to propagate 
the particular type of patriotism that has been actively fostered since Putin first took office: 
patriotism that invests primary importance in the state for securing the well-being of its 
citizens.  
The cult of stability, and essentially the cult of power, is not a value, not an idea. Today, goszakaz does not 
seek to change the individual [since] it understands the futility of this task in an open society. All efforts are 
aimed at the instillation of a single thesis: that the concepts of “current life” and “power,” “power” and “pat-
riotism,” “power” and “Motherland,” “power” and “Russia” are inseparable, equal, identical. And therefore 
                                                 
271  “В итоге во время просмотра складывается ощущение, что ты смотришь […] дурную версию 
‘Властелина колец’ […]. Возникает подозрение, что хотели снять очередной фантазийный сюжет на тему 
альтернативной истории, типа ‘Волкодава’, только еще недостовернее, но появилась возможность 
подстроить его под госзаказ на историческое кино, вот мы и имеем в итоге испанских кабальеро 
вперемежку с единорогами в сказочном лесу неопределенно-древней Руси. Только при чем здесь 1612 
год? При чем здесь национальный праздник?” 
272 Reruns of the film were broadcast by Channel One on 4 November 2008 and 4 November 2009; by NTV on 
23 February 2009 and 4 November 2010; and by Channel Five on 4 and 10 November 2013. 
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the state is sacral and constitutes an a priori value. With the help of goszakaz, the state now, first of all, pro-
tects itself, tries to imbue [the viewer with the notion] that it is more important than the individual, even 
though it claims the opposite in words (Архангельский 2013).273 
State patriotism as a body of thought, then, allows itself to be woven quite subtly into all 
kinds of stories and genres, ranging from historical entertainments such as 1612 to documen-
taries, TV series and even talk-show formats (as we have seen in the previous chapters). It 
provides a core motivational structure for the narrative, beyond which there can be a great 
measure of differentiation in execution and style. The secondary emphases may differ – for 
example, the stress on the importance of national unity with regard to the Time of Troubles, 
or exceptional leadership and the managing of oppositional forces in the case of Petr Stolypin 
– but in the end, they all invariably claim primacy for the state. In the 2011 TV series on Peter 
the Great (Vladimir Bortko, broadcast on Rossiia 1) Peter Rollberg discerns a similar pattern. 
“Peter the First: The Testament makes it abundantly clear what the tsar is fighting against, 
but not what is he fighting for.” As a result, Rollberg argues, “[s]tate stability and continuity 
are consistently invoked as values per se, needing no further legitimisation” (Rollberg 2014: 
353. Italics in original). In 1612, the glorification of the state security apparatus is further re-
inforced by the casting in several of the supporting roles. For example, Mikhail Porechenkov, 
who plays Pozharskii, was generally known at the time as a national security agent in popular 
Channel One TV series such as The Storm Gates (Grozovye vorota, Andrei Maliukov, 2006) 
and the sixth season of Lethal Force (Uboinaia sila, Sergei Snezhkin, 2005). For the role of 
Minin Andrei Fedortsov was cast, an actor who had played leading roles in the film Russian 
Special Forces (Russkii spetsnaz, Stanislav Mareev, 2002), its successor TV series Russian 
Special Forces 2 (Spetsnaz po-russki 2, Stanislav Mareev, 2004) and all six seasons of Lethal 
Force. The casting creates (yet another) direct connection between, on the one hand, the Time 
of Troubles and those who succeeded in safeguarding the state back then and, on the other 
hand, contemporary national security organs. 
Furthermore, the film demonstrates how the state has attempted to “efficiently [constrain] 
debate of such sensitive topics as imperial collapse” (Condee 2008: 182) through its memory 
politics. The internalisation of this narrative of collapse is highly paradoxical. As Nancy Con-
                                                 
273 “Культ стабильности, а по существу культ власти — это не ценность, не идея. Госзаказ сегодня не 
пытается менять человека, понимая всю бесперспективность этой задачи в условиях открытого 
общества. Все усилия направлены на внушение единственного тезиса: понятия ‘нынешняя жизнь’ и 
‘власть’, ‘власть’ и ‘патриотизм’, ‘власть’ и ‘родина’, ‘власть’ и ‘Россия’ неотделимы, равноценны, 
тождественны. А посему государство сакрально и является априорной ценностью. С помощью госзаказа 
государство сегодня в первую очередь защищает себя, старается внушить, что оно важнее отдельного 
человека, хотя на словах утверждает обратное.” 
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dee rightly argues, productions such as 1612 and the TV series Death of the Empire (Gibel’ 
imperii, Vladimir Khotinenko, 2005) offer evidence of how “patriots of today are licensed to 
address, among other topics, Russia’s vulnerability to periodic collapse” (ibidem). Yet per-
mission to show Russia’s weaknesses is granted only in order to effectively argue the 
contrary: 
A simulacrum of risk, this institutionalization of crisis strategically undergirds and strengthens precisely the 
myth of imperial continuity over the centuries, at the behest of a highly centralized, statist production 
structure (ibidem).  
The implicit and explicit references to the primacy of the state and its security forces, 
which abound in the TV series mentioned by Condee even more explicitly than in the film, 
further affirm the myth.274  
Boris Godunov 
In contemporary Russian memory culture, memory clusters provide important entrance points 
for the formulation of alternative and/or critical memory narratives (see Chapter 2). Shifting 
attention from one figure or narrative in the cluster – here, the end of the Time of Troubles – 
to another associated memory – in this case, Boris Godunov – mobilises the subversive poten-
tial engrained in the dynamic nature of cultural memory. This chapter’s final case study aims 
to elucidate how this subversiveness is enacted. It examines how the memory of Boris 
Godunov was employed to provide a counter-narrative to the state-sponsored interpretation of 
the contemporary significance of the Time of Troubles as it has been outlined above. A dis-
cussion of the film Boris Godunov (2011) directed by Vladimir Mirzoev forms the core of the 
analysis. The film builds upon and adds another chapter to the long tradition of artistic repre-
sentations of the reign of Boris Godunov. As will become clear from the analysis that follows, 
Mirzoev’s contemporary cinematic interpretation constitutes a decisive turning point in the 
political significance of Godunov’s memory in contemporary Russia. Yet he was not the first 
(art-house) director to address the topic in post-2000 Russia. Acclaimed film director 
Aleksandr Sokurov ventured beyond his familiar terrain to direct a modern adaptation of 
Musorgskii’s opera for the Bolshoi Theatre in 2007. Contrary to established tradition, 
Sokurov took the rarely performed 1871 version of the opera as the point of departure. Ac-
cording to a reviewer for Nezavisimaia gazeta: 
For Sokurov, “Boris Godunov” is yet another occasion for reflection on the themes “power and personality,” 
[and] “father and son” that are central to his work. To him, “folk drama” (in the style of Musorgskii) takes 
                                                 
274 For an analysis of Death of the Empire, see Condee (2009). 
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second place; it rather becomes a context that helps to uncover the characteristics of a person, of his personal-
ity, his actions and their consequences (Гайкович 2007).275 
In an interview with Izvestiia, Sokurov confirmed that the play fits in particularly well with 
his tetralogy on power, which includes the films Moloch (1999), about Adolf Hitler, and 
Taurus (2001), portraying Vladimir Lenin (Бабалова 2007). In Sokurov’s interpretation, 
Boris is not a madman – as he is often portrayed – but a man who realised his dream of be-
coming tsar. This, in turn, affects the general tendency of the play: 
We are not creating a depressing performance; we are not doing a performance, where you should be in tears 
after the death of Boris. Our Boris is a strong person. All of our characters are strong. It is a story about 
worthy opponents, [about] different yet very strong people. Godunov accepts death without fear. Perhaps, 
with some sadness, but without fear (Бабалова 2007).276 
Mirzoev’s Boris, instead, draws upon the theatrical tradition and directly contests the polit-
ical use of the Troubles memory. More specifically, it contests the claim that the post-Soviet 
Troubles have come to an end under Putin. Mirzoev takes Pushkin’s theatrical classic and 
transposes it to present-day Russia. As the actors pronounce lines from the original text, the 
skyscrapers of Moscow-City provide the contemporary backdrop for its tale of political in-
trigue. The temporal transposition makes it evidently clear that the questions the narrative 
puts forward are no less valid today than they were at the time of Pushkin’s writing. This is 
also why many interpreted it as a film critical of the state, despite Mirzoev’s denial that it 
was. The film premiered on the Day of National Unity and was screened in just one movie 
theatre in a Moscow suburb. Already at the time of its release it was suggested that the film’s 
distribution had been deliberately hindered because of its potential political resonance. For 
instance, in an interview with the director on TV channel Dozhd’, an interviewer asks why the 
film was screened in only one out-of-the-way cinema (“Владимир Мирзоев: ‘Бориса 
Годунова’ никто не запрещал” 2011). She interprets the film’s not being shown in other 
(art-house) cinemas as a clear sign of top-down obstruction. Mirzoev’s reply is telling. He 
emphasises the pragmatic, economic concerns that informed their decision to opt for a limited 
screening and aim for a television broadcast or DVD release instead. As it is highly unusual to 
                                                 
275 “‘Борис Годунов’ для Сокурова – еще один повод для размышлений на актуальные для его творчества 
темы ‘власть и личность’, ‘отец и сын’. Для него ‘народная драма’ (по Мусоргскому) отходит на второй 
план, становится скорее контекстом, который помогает раскрыть особенности человека, личности, его 
поступков и их последствий.” 
276 “Мы не делаем депрессивный спектакль, мы не делаем спектакль, где после смерти Бориса надо 
заливаться слезами. Борис у нас сильный человек. У нас все персонажи сильные. Это история достойных 
противников, разных, но очень сильных людей. Годунов без страха принимает смерть. Может быть, с 
грустью какой-то, но без страха.” 
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earn back production costs through box-office ticket sales, he states, it would be senseless to 
spend yet another one million roubles on the advertising campaign necessary to get people to 
go and see the film in theatres. When a second interviewer again insists that there must be a 
link between the film’s “sharp political statement”277 and its limited distribution, Mirzoev re-
plies that he and the others involved with the film did not intend to produce a political satire. 
Instead, they sought to explore the effect of clashing time periods, of the seventeenth century, 
Pushkin’s time, and the present; to explore “denotations, associated with autocracy, absolute 
rule, imposture, [that] turn out to be very relevant to us up to this day.”278 It must be noted 
here that uploads of the film were quickly posted to YouTube and Vkontakte, which allowed 
anyone who was interested in the film to easily see it regardless of whether its cinematic dis-
tribution had actively been obstructed. 
The delivery of Pushkin’s (well-known) nineteenth-century lines in a completely modern-
ised setting has two contradictory effects. The easy merger of both worlds – visual and verbal 
– reveals the continuing relevance of the story and its underlying questions, and how the Putin 
regime is perhaps less “post-” than it would like to appear. There are a few instances, howev-
er, where the narrative feels (intentionally) awkward. The scene where Godunov accepts the 
throne in the presence of the Patriarch and boyars is the most explicit example of such an 
effect. Godunov speaks laconically and without conviction. His declaration sounds “fake,” in 
stark contrast with actor Maxim Sukhanov’s persuasively passionate performance throughout 
the rest of the film. How to interpret this moment, where what you see and what you hear are 
“unlinked,” is determined, I would suggest, by the scene’s recognisability. A comparable im-
age of a long table, presided over by the head of state who is flanked by state officials in 
business suits and the Patriarch, appears frequently on the Russian news. The intertextual ref-
erentiality – from film to news image and back – enables a similar transposition of the feeling 
of awkwardness from “historical” fiction onto contemporary political reality. By making the 
viewer experience the “fakeness” of political speech, such statements are exposed as being 
merely part of a modern façade disguising the age-old driving forces that, in reality, continue 
to motivate Russian governance. 
In addition to its modern setting and strict adherence to Pushkin’s original lines, the film 
stands apart from previous adaptations in two important ways. First, Godunov is not simply 
tormented by feelings of guilt but is actually haunted by the ghostly appearance of Tsarevich 
                                                 
277 “остром политическом высказывании.” 
278  “Смыслы, связанные с самодержавием, с самовластием, с самозванчеством, до сих пор для нас, 
оказывается, очень актуальны.” 
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Dmitrii, for whose death he is allegedly responsible. As a memory text, the film therefore is 
yet another example of the pervasiveness of “ghostware” (Etkind 2009) – vampires, ghosts 
and other uncanny apparitions – in post-Soviet Russian culture. As Alexander Etkind argues, 
these “uncanny” appearances are symptomatic of the lack of acknowledgement for the crimes 
committed by the Soviet authorities against their own population. “In a land where millions 
remain unburied,” he writes, “the dead return as the undead” (idem: 182). While Etkind’s 
conceptualisation of ghostware is primarily based on the (ghostly) return of victims of the 
Gulag, the Tsarevich’s outfit and haircut reveal that Mirzoev is speaking to yet another trau-
matic event. Dressed in a marine costume, the ghost of Tsarevich Dmitrii evokes memories of 
that other murdered tsarevich, Aleksei, who was often pictured that way. The death of this 
heir to the throne in 1918, Mirzoev appears to suggest, came at the beginning of another Time 
of Troubles: the Russian Revolution and subsequent Civil War. If we follow Etkind’s line of 
argument, Aleksei’s return as an “uncanny” presence can be interpreted as a reflection of the 
fact that members of the murdered Imperial Family did not receive proper burials until the 
late 1990s. The remains of the Tsarevich and one of his sisters were located and exhumed 
from a forest near Yekaterinburg only in 2007. In addition, the apparition points towards the 
ongoing problematic nature of public condemnation of the crime. For example, in November 
2015 the inhabitants of Moscow voted against a proposal to rename metro station 
Voikovskaia, named after one of the organisers of the execution Petr Voikov, in an electronic 
referendum (“Москвичи проголосовали против переименования ‘Войковской’” 2015).  
The allusion to Tsarevich Aleksei forms an important element in the second distinctive fea-
ture of the film as well: the merging of temporal layers goes beyond establishing a connection 
between the Time of Troubles and today’s Russia. The citation of Pushkin, of course, subtly 
introduces a nineteenth-century subtext. More importantly, however, is a sequence that rein-
forces the evocation of the early-twentieth-century history by the ghostly appearance of 
Tsarevich Aleksei. As the False Dmitrii marches on Moscow, shots of the actors fighting 
from trenches are interspersed with archival film footage of an unidentified battlefield, likely 
dating from the First World War. The footage shows charging groups of foot soldiers, the 
firing of cannons and machine guns, and tanks and explosions. The explanation for including 
these images can, of course, be simply budgetary. Unlike Bondarchuk’s 1986 production of 
Boris Godunov, which features extensive battle scenes with cavalry and plenty of foot sol-
diers, Mirzoev had to work with a minimal cast and an equally limited budget. The archival 
footage, then, is an effective substitute for these indispensable, but budget-wise unattainable 
shots of battlefield action. The highly dated visual materials, however, suggests there was 
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more informing the selection than simply practical concerns. Moreover, it has a highly signif-
icant effect: since the images are obviously from neither then (the seventeenth century) nor 
now (the twenty-first), the battlefield becomes an abstract, de-temporalised space. Without 
recognisable features, it can be whenever and wherever. As a result, memories of other, more 
recent wars and their (documentary or fictional) visual representation are drawn into the nar-
rative (e.g., the Chechen wars and the Russian military intervention in Georgia). On the 
contrary, the grand battle scene in Bondarchuk’s Boris, showing outdated fighting techniques, 
was obviously placed in the past and thereby created temporal distance for the viewer. 
That the film was not actually banned top-down from reaching a wide audience becomes 
clear from its being aired in 2013 by one of the major state TV channels, Channel One, albeit 
just after midnight. It was part of the programme Private Screening (Zakrytyi pokaz).279 The 
format of the show begins with a brief introduction of a film and its director, followed by the 
film’s full-length broadcast, which is then discussed by a panel of specialists in the presence 
of the director and members of the cast. The panel is divided into two groups, those in favour 
of the film and those against it. As can be expected of any panel of Russian experts discussing 
a cinematic interpretation of a Pushkin play, they are mostly concerned with whether it is a 
correct rendering of Pushkin’s original. But, interestingly, this programme on state television 
also provides an example of the film being perceived as a reflection, rather than as critique 
alone. The show’s host, Aleksandr Gordon, puts forward the opinion that Mirzoev is an “anti-
romantic”: he does not adhere to the romantic worldview, which interprets reality in terms of 
absolute laws, patterns and divine harmony. Instead, he highlights the absence of such laws, 
and therefore the impossibility of judgement – the impossibility of differentiating between 
right and wrong. According to Gordon, Mirzoev does not paint a distorted picture of the pre-
sent. Rather, he holds up a mirror to the viewer, who is then confronted with the fact that 
there are no absolute principles by which to interpret the meaning of his direct reflection. 
Mirzoev appears to agree with this analysis and connects it to the film’s central topic of autoc-
racy. He states:  
                                                 
279 The programme aired on 31 May 2013 at 00:15 hours. A full version of the broadcast can be viewed here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LMqwOn1j0X4 (accessed 1 July 2016). 
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If we acknowledge that the world is now fundamentally heterogeneous, polyphonic, polysemantic and so on, 
then how can one person, […], even a great person […], be the absolute focal point of the history and fate of 
a vast country? This is unrealistic.280 
It is clear that Mirzoev’s observation implicitly refers to Putin. Still, the subtlety of the 
clash of time periods indeed points towards a reflexive intention, an intention to transcend the 
immediate political context and contemplate persistent patterns in Russian governance. The 
eagerness of critics, of conservative and oppositional orientations alike, to read political cri-
tique into the film partly obscured this aspect. Also, it testifies to the polarised nature of the 
public debate as tensions increased in late 2011. 
The continuing power of the film was more recently acknowledged at a conference on the-
atrical adaptations of literary classics held on 31 March 2015 by the Likhachev Research 
Institute of Cultural and Natural Heritage.281 Examining the merits of so-called experimentalist 
interpretations, Mirzoev’s film was put forward as an example of an adaptation straying too 
far from the original. According to Aleksandr Uzhankov, a professor of the Literary Institute, 
Pushkin is nowhere to be found in Mirzoev’s rendering. He states:  
[Mirzoev] seems to take a historical layer, the same characters, but [suddenly] there appears some boy in a 
sailor suit, implying that this is already not the 17th century, but the 20th, an allusion to the revolution. And 
Boris Godunov is not the one who came to the throne, and not an allusion to Yeltsin, but already an allusion 
to some “New Russian” who, by principle, cannot rule the whole world (ТАСС 2015).282 
Other recent theatrical productions based on Pushkin plays receive equally condemnatory 
judgements. The experts conclude that, while directors cannot be coerced to relate to their 
subject matter “like Pushkin, with love for Russia” because that would be a form of censor-
ship, they strongly advise the Ministry of Culture to finance only those productions that “do 
not destroy tradition, but, instead, contribute to the upbringing of a generation” (ТАСС 
2015).283 
                                                 
280 “Если мы признаем, что мир принципиально сейчас разнообразен, полифоничен, полисемантичен и 
т.д., то как один человек […], даже прекрасный человек […], как он может быть абсолютным фокусом 
истории и судьбы для огромной страны? Это нереально.” 
281 This organisation was founded in 1992 to further the protection of UNESCO World Heritage sites in Russia. 
Affiliated with the Ministry of Culture, its tasks have more recently (in 2013) been expanded to include, among 
other objectives, the study of contemporary art and its perception by professional and mass audiences. 
282 “Он (Мирзоев – прим. ТАСС) вроде бы берет исторический пласт, тех же героев, но появляется 
некий мальчик в матроске, значит это уже не XVII век, а XX, аллюзия с революцией. А Борис Годунов – 
не тот, который пришел на царство, а не аллюзия с Ельциным, а уже аллюзия на какого-то нового 
русского, который в принципе не может владеть всем миром.” 
283 “как Пушкин, с любовью к России”; “не разрушают традиции, а ведут к воспитанию поколения.” 
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One of the plays that gave particular offence to the experts was a contemporary interpreta-
tion of Pushkin’s Boris Godunov directed by Konstantin Bogomolov, which premiered at the 
Lenkom Theatre in Moscow in 2014. In many ways, it builds upon the aesthetics developed 
by Mirzoev and employs similar tactics: collapsing historical time, modernising the stage set-
ting and incorporating the visual aesthetics (and here, also the language) of the mass media 
(author’s visit, 29 September 2014). Contrary to what Mirzoev does, Bogomolov’s play at 
times deviates freely from Pushkin’s lines in both language and narrative content. Large 
screens on either side of the stage are used to make implicit historical parallels unmistakably 
clear. For instance, as Boris Godunov places the Monomakh Cap on his head, images of the 
presidential convoy on its way to Putin’s inauguration ceremony are shown on screen; when 
Ivan the Terrible is mentioned, the screens light up with an image of Stalin; at the mention of 
Andrei Kurbskii, the boyar who betrayed Ivan the Terrible by defecting to Lithuania, the au-
dience is presented with a picture of Boris Berezovskii. The play actively engages the 
audience in such a way that it creates tension. When Boris Godunov, played by acclaimed 
theatre actor Aleksandr Zbruev, appears on stage, a person from the audience yells 
“Aleksandr Viktorovich, aren’t you ashamed of yourself for taking part in such postmodernist 
nonsense?”284 In response, Zbruev draws a pistol and shoots the man, who, it is then revealed, 
is part of the show; the shooting is a simulation, not an actual assassination. Another moment 
of noticeable discomfort among audience members occurred as the “people” await the arrival 
of their tsar. The scene’s spatial organisation invites the audience to associate itself with the 
people. In a painfully protracted scene, the screens repeatedly show the lines “The people are 
stupid cattle” and “The people patiently wait to be told what will happen next.”285 Whereas 
the play is more direct and radical in its execution than Mirzoev’s film, its political argument 
largely coincides with the latter’s. Placing equal emphasis on the cyclical nature of historical 
development in Russia, it paints a grim picture of the prospects for actual political change in 
the near future. 
Mirzoev’s perceptiveness about political mythmaking is confirmed by a play he directed 
for the controversial theatre company Teatr.doc in 2013. The play Tolstoi – Stolypin. Private 
correspondence is based on a script written by Ol’ga Mikhailova. It embeds historical docu-
ments – the correspondence between Stolypin and Tolstoi – within a fictional narrative 
framework that has the two men come together in the city of Penza to aid a peasant woman 
put on trial. There, they engage in a polemic “about private property, the court, the role of the 
                                                 
284 “Александр Викторович, вам не стыдно участвовать в таком постмодернистском бреде?” 
285 “Народ – тупое быдло”; “Народ терпеливо ждет, когда ему скажут, что дальше.” 
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state in man’s life, matrimony and violence” (Матвиенко 2013: 96).286 The play approaches 
its topic in a way comparable to Mirzoev’s film: it draws out points of historical convergence 
and enduring socio-political tensions, yet its authors are reluctant to provide their audience 
with conclusive take-home answers to the fundamental political questions posed.  
Mirzoev, with his love for transformations, leaves the message implicit [and] multi-faceted. The story, which 
gravitates, it would seem, to an unequivocal conclusion, becomes blurred by the changeable nature of his di-
recting. And this, as a result, reconciles some with the bitter fate of the peasant woman, who is protected by 
neither justice, nor even Tolstoi and Stolypin, and others with the untimely death of the reforms that were not 
fated to gain a foothold in the fertile Russian soil (idem: 97).287 
The topic and timing of the production, staged shortly after the state efforts to promote 
Stolypin peaked in 2012, testifies to Mirzoev’s continued willingness to provide a counter-
narrative to such state-supported memories. 
Conclusion 
In 2014, Putin was presented with a secondary school history textbook entitled The History of 
Russia 2014-2045 at the infamous Seliger patriotic youth camp.288 The publication, published 
in “2045,” was prepared by scholars of the People’s Friendship University of Russia and de-
scribes (or forecasts, if you will) Russia’s near future. In its rosy depiction of what lies ahead, 
the textbook reiterates the central elements of the official political and national identity dis-
course. Yet it deviates on one meaningful point. The Constituent Assembly, it writes, 
confirms the end of “the third Time of Troubles” in 2019 (Воронин et al. 2014: 14-15).289 
Why does this evidently Kremlin-loyal publication place the end of this third smuta in the 
                                                 
286 “о частной собственности, суде, роли государства в жизни человека, супружестве и насилии.” 
287  “Мирзоев с его любовью к превращениям делает месседж неявным, разновекторным. История, 
которая тяготеет, казалось бы, к однозначному выводу, размывается в изменчивой природе его 
режиссуры. И это в итоге примиряет одних с горькой судьбой крестьянки, не защищенной ни 
правосудием, ни даже Тольстым со Столыпиным, а других – с безвременной смертью реформ, которым 
так и не суждено было закрепиться на плодородной российской почве.” 
288 The Annual International Youth Educational Forum at Lake Seliger has been organised by youth movement 
Nashi since 2005. For a detailed description and analysis of the Seliger camps, see Mijnsen (2014); Hemment 
(2015). 
289 The passage in which the authors refer to the end of this third Time of Troubles reads as follows: “В начале 
2019 г. ОНФ выступил инициатором Общероссийского Учредительного Собрания, которое прошло 
летом этого же года. В Москву съехались несколько тысяч человек со всей страны, представители 
бизнескругов, науки, здравоохранения, культуры. На Учредительном собрании был констатирован конец 
‘третьей смуты’ Российской истории и было решено ‘учредить новую Россию’, созданную и 
выстроенную нынешним Президентом, а также ‘народа Путина’, в который превратилось за минувшие 
годы ‘путинское большинство’. Таким образом, была обозначена исходная точка истории нового, 
возрожденного государства.” 
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future, moreover at a five-year distance? What ever happened to the claim that Putin has al-
ready succeeded in overcoming the Troubles of the 1990s in his first presidential term? 
With the establishment of the Day of National Unity, the Russian government had tried to 
capitalise on the (by then, established) practice of interpreting the turbulent 1990s as a Time 
of Troubles. The cultural memory and its underlying cyclical conception of historical devel-
opment were used to symbolically ground the contemporary Russian state in history and 
undergird Putin’s legitimacy on the basis of his success in delivering Russia from its latest 
return to chaos. To underscore the claim of historical continuity linking the prerevolutionary, 
Soviet and Russian periods, the “invented tradition” of 4 November was explicitly introduced 
as a “reclaimed tradition,” as re-establishing a tsarist commemorative practice. As Sander 
Brouwer correctly points out, “[b]ehind the Smuta-talk there really is the Empire-talk, a form 
of statehood presented as peculiarly Russian – so as to include the Romanov as well as the 
Soviet period, plus the modern Russian Putin regime” (Brouwer 2016b: 138). It is an attempt 
to foster an understanding of patriotism that grants primacy to the state. Moreover, it is an 
effort, at times awkward and contrived, to reconcile a multi-ethnic (imperial) ideal of state 
governance with the attribution of a privileged status to and leading role for Russian (Ortho-
dox) culture within that state. As time progressed, the balance between these seemingly 
opposing ideals increasingly favoured the primacy of Russian culture, language and heritage, 
which has, more recently, come to dominate the political and mainstream media discourses.  
As a tool for political rhetoric, the mnemonic framework of the Time of Troubles works 
two ways: it can either assert that stability has been restored and Russia has once again 
emerged as the great power it is destined to be, or it can be used in a cautionary sense to warn 
that, in Russia, there is inevitably a constant risk of revolution and a return to chaos, such that 
anyone who rocks the boat and threatens to upturn the status quo should be repressed. While 
the usage of the memory typically combines both aspects, the emphasis gradually shifted 
from affirmative to cautionary over time. That the fictional history textbook places the defini-
tive end of the “third Time of Troubles” in 2019 fits this pattern: against the backdrop of 
upcoming presidential elections in 2018, the second aspect of the memory is invoked to cau-
tion that the Russian state can only fully re-emerge if the regime is given sufficient time to 
deal with the foreign and domestic enemies who seek to undo its accomplishments. 
As one of the main tenets of the regime’s memory politics, this instrumentalisation was at 
once successful and unsuccessful. It was unsuccessful in the sense that the initiative failed to 
gather popular support. Opinion polls demonstrate that, by 2012, still only a small proportion 
of the population could correctly name the holiday and even fewer actually celebrated it. 
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Moreover, the celebration was soon overshadowed by the nationalist marches that negatively 
affected its reputation. The regime’s acknowledgement of this fact is evident from the shift 
towards integrating “1612” into a memory chain with “1812” (and, in some cases, “1945”). 
The linking of the victories was affirmed by their parallel celebration in the Year of Russian 
History in 2012. The simultaneous marking of the 1150th anniversary of Russian statehood 
further emphasised how the new pantheon is dedicated to glorifying state patriotism, not 
national patriotism. Even as Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian nation have increasingly 
become central to the state’s conception of post-Soviet identity, it continues to be formulated 
in terms of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional “imperial” state structure. The holiday and 
its narrative of “unity in diversity” may largely have failed to take hold and, in fact, often did 
more to expose inter-ethnic tensions than to remedy them (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 73-96), 
but the intended political effect was nonetheless achieved: the consolidation of Putin’s image 
as the bringer and guardian of stability, the able protector of the Russian state (and its peo-
ple[s]) against foreign enemies and their Russian accomplices who aim to plunge Russia back 
into the vortex of troubled times. Therefore, on a more abstract level, it succeeded in realising 
its main goal, which was to consolidate the regime’s position of power. 
With regard to the mediation of memory politics and its societal dynamics, this case study 
shows a significant degree of variation within the initial media campaign. The documentaries 
and film that were part of the “smuta-propaganda” range from factual to insinuating and em-
ploy a wide range of stylistic approaches. Notwithstanding the variation in execution, style 
and content, all adhered to the central components of the smuta myth (and by extension, the 
Putin myth). In addition, the case study has shown that there were, in fact, counter-narratives, 
e.g., in theatre and cinema, that were enabled by the cultural memory’s remediation history 
and the rich cluster of associated memory narratives. The memory of Boris Godunov in par-
ticular was used to frame political critique and question the state’s memory politics. The 
question remains, of course, how great the reach of these critical productions is, since they 
typically appeal to the liberally oriented, educated elite. With a limited audience, can such 
niche productions affect public opinion in a way that translates into real-world political con-
sequences? In this respect, it is useful to recall that it was the educated middle class who took 
to the streets in the winter of 2011 and shook the political system. Also, it is no coincidence 
that since Putin’s re-election in spring 2012, alternative cultural productions have increasingly 
been obstructed or targeted by harassment. With regard to theatre, the repeated evictions of 
Teatr.doc is the best-known example (a similar tactic was employed against oppositional TV 
channel Dozhd’). With regard to cinema, indirect measures affecting, among other things, 
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financing and distribution now make sure that producing critical films has become considera-
bly more difficult or even impossible. These measures include the 2014 profanity law that 
forbids swearing in cinema, theatre and other media and the law against Nazi “revisionism” 
and spread of “false” information about the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War 
(I will return to these measures in the Conclusion). They reveal that the authorities recognise 
and fear the subversive potential of alternative cultural productions, as their outspoken or 
sometimes, on the contrary, highly subtle critique threatens to burst the imaginary bubble of 
stability created by the Putin regime. 
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On 21 June 2012 a memorial plaque dedicated to Ivan the Terrible was unveiled on one of the 
central streets in Arkhangelsk, a city founded during his reign (ИА REGNUM 2012). The 
plaque features an engraved image of the famous statue by Mark Antokol’skii of the tsar 
seated on the throne that is on display in the Tret’iakov Gallery. The inscription reads: 
To the founder of Arkhangelsk, Great Prince of Moscow Ivan IV the Terrible, the first Russian tsar, initiator 
of the democratic reforms of the 16th century, patron of book printing in Rus’, from the grateful people of 
Arkhangelsk.290 
The plaque is the first and sole public monument to Ivan the Terrible in Russia. The lack of 
public remembrance of the ruler who succeeded in massively expanding the territory of the 
Russian state indicates the controversial nature of his memory. Few tsars are as heatedly de-
bated as Ivan, whose legacy never fails to divide an audience (a quality shared by, most 
notably, Peter the Great and Stalin). Such discussions revolve around the question of whether 
his geopolitical triumphs should outweigh his reputation as a tyrant. The memory carries a 
particularly intense emotional charge because of its close connection with the memory of 
Stalin. The latter included Ivan in his pantheon of national heroes in the 1940s. Yet Stalin 
himself was and continues to be condemned for the repressions he orchestrated through a 
comparison with Ivan’s historical image. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Russian 
government has shied away from associating itself with the Terrible Tsar. 
The praise of Ivan’s “democratic reforms” on the memorial plaque unavoidably seems a 
strained interpretation of events. Indeed, to apply the concept of democracy to developments 
in sixteenth-century Russia is problematic in and of itself. Yet the claim illustrates how Ivan 
the Terrible is one of the prime subjects for writers of “alternative history,” a line of revision-
ist thinking that contests the veracity of established historiography. As a “misrecognised” 
ruler with a record of historical documentation that leaves ample room for creative interpreta-
                                                 
290 “Основателю Архангельска, великому князю московскому Ивану IV Грозному, первому русскому 
царю, инициатору демократических реформ XVI века, покровителю книгопечатания на Руси, от 
благодарных архангелогородцев.” 
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tion of the facts, Ivan has attracted the attention of various marginal groups who use his 
memory to propose alternative types of governance for contemporary Russia. As this chapter 
will demonstrate, the memory of Ivan has proved to be the historical framework of choice for 
those at the extremes of the political spectrum who seek to challenge existing state structures. 
Ivan the Terrible in the Russian Historical and Political Imagination 
Ivan IV (1530-1584) succeeded to the throne at the tender age of three, after which the boyar 
families at court struggled for power and his mother Elena Glinskaia acted as his regent until 
her death in 1538. Crowned Tsar of All Russias in 1547, Ivan was the first ruler to carry the 
imperial title. As a statesman, he is most noted for the territorial expansion he achieved, in-
cluding the conquests of the khanates Kazan and Astrakhan in the 1550s and the expansion 
into Siberia. In addition, he is credited with administrative and judicial reforms. Despite his 
early successes, the protracted Livonian war, which aimed to push the Russian state westward 
and gain access to the Baltic Sea, was eventually lost. In 1565, following the defection to 
Lithuania of Prince Kurbskii, one of the Tsar’s closest boyars, and motivated by his increas-
ing suspicion that the boyars who remained were treasonous, Ivan divided the country in two 
by establishing the oprichnina: a part of the state’s territory placed under the Tsar’s direct 
control and administered by the oprichniki, Ivan’s elite guard. The remainder of the state, 
referred to as the zemshchina (the “land”), Ivan left to be ruled by a council of boyars. Until 
the disbanding of the system in 1572, the oprichniki terrorised the state’s residents by using 
exceptionally cruel methods to suppress any form of (suspected) resistance. The massacre of 
the inhabitants of Novgorod, thought to be conspiring with the king of Poland, stands as a 
particularly brutal episode in the reign of terror conducted by Ivan during this period. As an 
exceptional type of state organisation (as well as because of its conspicuous cruelty), the con-
cept of the oprichnina has gained symbolic significance that exceeds far beyond its original 
historical context. Interpretations of its nature still vary widely. While for some, the 
oprichnina signifies the (necessity of the) use of strong means by the state to create unity, for 
others it represents state terror directed against one’s own population and the aristocracy or 
political elites. 
As Maureen Perrie shows in her study on the image of Ivan the Terrible in Russian folk-
lore, the popular appreciation of the Tsar was for the most part favourable. While the folkloric 
narratives acknowledge the state’s acts of cruelty committed during his reign, his involvement 
in such acts is justified by shifting the blame from the Tsar onto his entourage: 
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Alongside the “good tsar” motifs are descriptions of Ivan’s cruelty not only towards treacherous boyars and 
corrupt officials, but also towards innocent victims. Yet Ivan is not criticized for this: the blame lies not so 
much with the tsar himself as with the evil informers who have led him unwittingly to commit injustice. [...] 
Ivan’s image in folklore, therefore, is a generally sympathetic one. […] Yet the paradox remains, that his im-
age in folklore is much more favourable than his historical reputation would seem to warrant (Perrie 1987: 
114). 
What is, perhaps, even more surprising is how pervasive these very motifs continue to be 
in twenty-first-century memory discourse. We will come across similar lines of reasoning in 
the television and film productions that are discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
The foundational text for later representations of Ivan the Terrible is Nikolai Karamzin’s 
History of the Russian State (1816-1826). This early-nineteenth-century depiction of Ivan 
proved both novel and enduring. As Kevin Platt points out in his study on the interconnected 
myths of Ivan and Peter the Great as symbols of terror and greatness in Russian culture,  
to the eighteenth-century Russian historical imagination, Ivan had been known as a severe but pious ruler, 
who had earned much glory by his conquests. Karamzin, relying on previously little-known sources, created 
the modern tradition in which Ivan’s name was synonymous with unbridled despotism (Platt 2011: 22). 
The figure of Ivan thus became emblematic of tyranny in the nineteenth century. In addi-
tion to painting a gruesome picture of the Tsar’s personal involvement in torture of various 
kinds, Karamzin’s work gave rise to the “good tsar – bad tsar” motif: the division of Ivan’s 
rule into benevolent and malevolent periods, with the transition from the former to the latter 
marked and motivated by the death of Ivan’s first wife, Anastasiia. As the intellectual debates 
between the Westernisers and the Slavophiles unfolded in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, new aspects of Ivan were highlighted. While, on the one hand, the “Asiatic” charac-
teristics of Ivan’s personality were explored, some Westernisers, such as the historian 
Konstantin Kavelin, “interpret[ed] Ivan’s reign as a concerted but ultimately unsuccessful 
effort to reform [Russia’s] archaic social principles,” namely the fundamental conflict of in-
terests between the state (in the figure of the grand prince) and the boyars (idem: 70). In this 
view, the violence of Ivan’s rule is interpreted as a necessary evil dictated by the forces of 
historical progress; or, to rephrase this in terms of contemporary political discourse, Ivan em-
ployed repressive measures for the sake of modernisation. 
Two well-known artistic representations of Ivan date to the last decades of the nineteenth 
century: the statue of the seated Tsar sculpted by Mark Antokol’skii (1871) mentioned earlier, 
and Il’ia Repin’s painting Ivan and His Son Ivan, 16 November 1581 (1885), which dramati-
cally depicts the moment when the Tsar realises he has (accidentally) killed his son by 
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striking him on the head with his sceptre. Repin painted the work as an allegorical response to 
the assassination of Tsar Aleksandr II in 1881 and the public executions of those held respon-
sible. Through historical association, the painting places the reactionary policies implemented 
by Aleksandr III in response to the assassination in the context of the tragic murder that had 
taken place exactly three hundred years earlier. Thereby, Repin “condemns violence and calls 
for a reconciliation” to avert further bloodshed, as this could endanger the future existence of 
the state (Platt 2011: 114). According to Platt, by choosing the act of filicide to frame his po-
litical commentary, the painter furthermore hinted that the “root cause of the bloodshed of the 
present is to be found not in the rebellious conspiracies of terrorists but in the age-old, reflex-
ive violence of the autocracy” (ibidem). During the fin the siècle, the perception of the 
medieval tsar shifted once more. Now, the ambivalence towards the figure of Ivan, and the 
“ironic amalgamation of terror and greatness” engrained in his historical myth, became the 
primary prism through which to view his legacy (Platt 2011: 132). The duality found in Ivan 
came to be seen as indicative of the opposing forces shaping the development of Russian col-
lective identity. 
Much of the complexity in the contemporary usage of the memory of Ivan lies in its con-
tinuously being intertwined with the remembrance of Stalin. Indeed, “reference to Stalin and 
his era is pre-loaded into any contemporary representation of Ivan” (Platt 2010). The link be-
tween these rulers was gradually established from the 1930s onwards. The state-sponsored 
rehabilitation of Ivan, part of the wider revival of patriotic narratives in Stalinist Russia, de-
veloped “with input ‘from below’ as well as ‘from above’” (Perrie 2001: 196). 
Historiographical and artistic representations and re-evaluations of Ivan began to appear as 
early as the 1930s. The rehabilitation was then affirmed by the state in 1940-1941, when 
Sergei Eisenstein and Aleksei Tolstoi, both of whom had previously proved their skill at 
adapting historical figures to current ideological needs, 291 were commissioned to produce a 
film and a play on the topic. The image of Ivan sought by Stalin in these productions was “an 
analogue of his own self-image as a heroic and far-sighted ruler,” and in both cases he was 
personally involved (idem: 194). It was not, at this point, the intention to justify Stalinist re-
pression. In fact, the rehabilitation campaign took pains to place the cruelty of Ivan’s rule into 
historical perspective by pointing out how the norms governing state conduct were different 
in his time. Therefore, “a more apologetic stance (i.e., using Ivan’s bloody rule as a 
                                                 
291 Namely, Eisenstein with the film Aleksandr Nevskii and Aleksei Tolstoi with the novel Peter I. 
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legitimating precedent for the Stalin era’s excesses) was not part of the officially sanctioned 
line” (Brandenberger & Platt 2006: 166). 
It was within the context of this Stalinist effort at patriotic mobilisation that Sergei 
Eisenstein created the epic depiction of the Terrible Tsar in the film classic Ivan the Terrible 
(Ivan Groznyi, 1945). As German troops approached Moscow, a large part of the film indus-
try were evacuated to Alma-Ata. The preparations for and the shooting of the film (intended 
to be part of a planned trilogy) therefore took place in Kazakhstan. Part I finally premiered in 
January 1945 to positive reviews and was awarded the Stalin Prize. Part II, however, met the 
opposite fate. Following the official screening, the film was heavily criticised and its release 
was put off. Eisenstein was allowed to continue working on it so as to address the criticisms 
Stalin had raised about its depiction of Ivan and his oprichniki. But as a result of Eisenstein’s 
severe health problems the project was never finished. Part I contains direct references to the 
ongoing war against Nazi Germany. For example, Ivan’s suggestion that the English trade 
ships sail to the White Sea instead of approaching Moscow through the ports in the Baltics 
mirrors “the importance of Great Britain’s Arctic convoys during the Second World War” 
(O’Mahony 2008: 179). Ivan is shown to have a darker side, yet even in committing sins he 
acts for the sake of uniting Russia and warding off domestic and foreign enemies. The depic-
tion of the Tsar’s personality and motives is markedly grimmer in Part II, where it is 
suggested that “Ivan’s cruelty has been driven less by political necessity than by his child-
hood traumas and a continuing desire to maintain personal authority” (idem: 183). It is this 
aspect that most likely impeded the film’s release. As Mike O’Mahony concisely states, “[i]n 
the wake of the Purges of the late 1930s and the new post-war campaign to re-impose Stalin’s 
authority, such a presentation of tyranny was, at best, a high-risk strategy, and it is hardly sur-
prising that the film was banned” (ibidem). The figures of Ivan and Stalin remain inextricably 
connected to this day, in the form of a mnemonic parallel that had already taken shape during 
Stalin’s lifetime. Indeed, as Maureen Perrie remarks, “[s]o intertwined have the reputations of 
the two rulers become that it is difficult to see how any future rehabilitation of Ivan can avoid 
being received as an attempted apologia for Stalin or as a justification for a latter-day strong-
man” (Perrie 2001: 196). 
The image Eisenstein created of Ivan is equalled in familiarity only by the Soviet comedy 
Ivan Vasil’evich Changes Profession (Ivan Vasil’evich meniaet professiiu, Leonid Gaidai, 
1973), based on Mikhail Bulgakov’s play written in the mid-1930s but published only in 
1965. In the film, engineer Aleksandr Timofeev is building a time machine in his Moscow 
apartment when he creates a time vortex. Accidentally, he sends the building’s warden Ivan 
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Vasil’evich Bunsha and the petty burglar George Miloslavskii to the sixteenth century. Tsar 
Ivan the Terrible, for his part, gets transported to the twentieth century. Since Bunsha is the 
spitting image of the Tsar, he disguises himself as the medieval Ivan Vasil’evich while 
Timofeev works to repair the time machine. 
The most radical interpretation of Ivan’s rule has been proposed by the mathematicians 
Anatolii Fomenko and Gleb Nosovskii as part of the “New Chronology.” According to this 
theory, the reigning chronology of history is fundamentally incorrect and results from centu-
ries of falsification. The different stages in Ivan the Terrible’s reign can be explained, they 
claim, by the “fact” that Ivan IV is actually a composite of four subsequent rulers. It was the 
third “Ivan” (according to the theory, Ivan IV’s son Ivan Ivanovich) who established the 
oprichnina under the influence of his pro-Western relatives, the Zakhar’in-Romanovs. The 
proponents of the New Chronology assert that several members of the oprichnina, including 
Maliuta Skuratov, were actually “anti-oprichnina activists” (Halperin 2011: 8). The 
Romanovs are responsible not only for the establishment of the oprichnina but for the later 
falsification of historical events to cover up their tracks. As Charles Halperin explains, this act 
of falsification is central to the “logic” of the four Ivans theory: 
To hide the Romanov role in the oprichnina the Romanovs rewrote the reign of Ivan IV as a single ruler who 
was responsible for the terror. In the process they vilified anyone who had opposed the Zakhar’in faction dur-
ing the reign of “Ivan IV.” Thus Skuratov and [Vasilii] Griaznoi became oprichnina thugs, reversing their 
actual opposition to the oprichnina propagated by the Zakhar’ins (idem: 9). 
While the New Chronology has been fiercely criticised by academics from various disci-
plines and is commonly branded pseudo-history, publications propagating its line of thinking 
can be found in most Russian bookstores and have proved remarkably popular.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, political elites steered clear of any association 
with Ivan, a tendency that largely continued into the 2000s (except for certain more marginal 
groups that will be discussed below). In the cultural and, in particular, historiographical do-
mains, competing images of the Tsar flourished, albeit with “enormous interpretational 
looseness” (Platt 2011: 261). The most notable development was the call for Ivan’s canonisa-
tion as an Orthodox saint in the context of the religious revival in the late 1990s, to which I 
will return shortly. 
One of the best-known mobilisations of the memory of Ivan in contemporary Russian cul-
ture is Vladimir Sorokin’s dystopian novel Day of the Oprichnik (Den’ oprichnika, 2006). In 
direct response to political developments, and in tune with far-right political discourses that 
will be addressed below, Sorokin remediated the oprichnina myth to “challenge the neo-
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traditionalist political and cultural discourses that […] moved into the mainstream during the 
Putin era” (Lipovetsky & Wakamiya 2014: 273-274). Set in a near future when the Russian 
Empire has been restored and is protected by a great wall along its borders, the narrative de-
scribes a day in the life of an oprichnik. Much like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the 
Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962) had described the painful reality of life in the Soviet labour 
camps, Day of the Oprichnik delivers its most potent political critique through the apparent 
normalisation of the cruelty it exposes. When combined with the historical framework of the 
oprichnina, this business-as-usual attitude reveals the inherent dangers of historicising politi-
cal action. As Mark Lipovetsky and Alexander Etkind assert: 
Without fail, historical explanations of political processes remove responsibility from those who take and 
implement decisions in the present. [Andrei] Komiaga, the oprichnik of the 21th century, practises state ban-
ditism, not because someone in the very same place practiced the same activities five hundred years earlier. 
He pillages, rapes and kills because his superiors order him to, and because they taught him to do so at the 
history department, and also because he simply is a bastard. In this elementary sense, the depth of historical 
explanations only distracts from direct political, ethical and legal judgements (Липовецкий & Эткинд 
2008).292 
Therefore, the novel should be considered a critique of the Putin regime’s memory politics 
and its increasingly authoritarian political course. 
Sorokin openly acknowledged that the novel was intended to comment on current political 
developments, though even he could not have imagined how prophetic his vision would prove 
to be. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Sorokin remarks that in terms of the relation between 
the state and its people and, in particular, the “sacred willingness to make sacrifices” 
demanded by the state of its citizens, Russia continues to function according to the state struc-
ture developed by Ivan the Terrible (Doerry & Schepp 2014 [2007]: 278): 
In my book, I am searching for an answer to the question of what distinguishes Russia from true democra-
cies. […] Germans, Frenchmen, and Englishmen can say of themselves: “I am the state.” I cannot say that. In 
Russia only the people in the Kremlin can say that. All other citizens are nothing more than human material 
with which they can do all kinds of things. […] In our country there are special people who are permitted to 
do anything. They are the sacrificial priests of power. Anyone who is not a member of this group has no clout 
with the state. One can be as pure as can be – just as magnate Mikhail Khodorkovskii was – and still lose 
                                                 
292 “В любом случае исторические объяснения политических процессов снимают ответственность с тех, 
кто сегодня принимает — и осуществляет — решения. Комяга, опричник XXI века, занимается 
государственным бандитизмом не потому, что пятьсот лет назад кто-то в том же месте занимался тем же. 
Он грабит, насилует и убивает потому, что так приказало его начальство, и потому, что этому его учили 
на истфаке, а также потому, что он и сам по себе подонок. В этом элементарном смысле глубина 
исторических объяснений лишь отвлекает от прямых политических, этических и юридических 
суждений.” 
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everything in a flash and end up in prison. The Khodorkovskii case is typical of the “oprichnina” – the 
system of oppression I describe (idem: 278-279). 
Sorokin’s novel illustrates how Ivan’s oprichnina can function as a persuasive mnemonic 
framework to criticise the state’s encroachment on societal freedoms. The mere mention of 
the word oprichnina within any discussion of current affairs will commonly be understood to 
imply condemnation, particularly among the educated elite. Yet, as we see below, the oppo-
site attitude – that is, praise of a strong hand in political affairs, prompted by the same 
memory image – also has its adherents. The divide between the opposing sides typically mir-
rors (and is understood to be implicitly connected to) the positions taken with regard to the 
appreciation of Stalin.  
According to opinion polls conducted by the Levada Centre, Ivan continues to appeal to a 
particular segment of Russian society. When asked to name five to ten of the most successful 
persons of all time drawn from all countries in 2008, five per cent of the respondents men-
tioned Ivan IV (a slight increase from four per cent in 1991, 1994 and 1999) (Гудков 2010: 
39). In the election of the greatest Russian of all time on The Name Is Russia the same year, 
the medieval ruler took tenth place (see Chapter 4). The positive reappraisal of Ivan the 
Terrible and the application of his memory to frame a conceptualisation of Russian statehood 
are most prominent among two groups. First, there are the Orthodox fundamentalist patriotic 
groups who seek, among their other political objectives, to canonise Ivan. Second, the legacy 
of Ivan is utilised in ultranationalist circles to formulate a radical political agenda that, if im-
plemented, would undermine existing state structures. It is to the latter group of philosophers, 
historians and politicians that I turn first. 
The Concept of “Novaia Oprichnina” 
In contemporary Russia, the memory of the oprichnina has been used both to criticise the 
increased authoritarianism and the silencing of the opposition under Putin, and to advocate an 
even stronger vertical political structure. The idea of establishing a new oprichnina in Russia, 
referred to as novaia oprichnina or neooprichnina,293 has been proposed in earnest by a group 
of contemporary political thinkers and publicists. They argue that the oprichnina represents a 
truly Russian way of modernisation and is the only available means to overcome the vices of 
the current political system – most notably, corruption. As we will see, this concept’s main 
proponents are not minor figures. Although these individuals long operated on the margins of 
political discourse, their thinking has more recently been adopted in parts of the mainstream. 
                                                 
293 Novaia oprichnina, neooprichnina and new oprichnina are used interchangeably from hereon. 
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Before exploring two conceptualisations of how the oprichnina should be implemented in 
contemporary Russia as a political system, it is useful to sketch three distinct dichotomies that 
characterise the term’s usage in public debate. First, novaia oprichnina is used either as a fig-
ure of speech or as an actual model for emulation. For example, back in 1998, the chair of the 
Russian Agrarian Youth Union used it to frame the organisation’s objective: “Let our union in 
some way be a new oprichnina for Russia, a peasant oprichnina, ruthlessly sweeping all that 
impedes the peasant to live out of our house!” (Желенин 1998).294 An article by RBK Daily 
under the headline “Putin’s new oprichnina” was a response to a statement by President Putin 
that, after the 2008 elections, a group of new people will come to power (“Новая опричнина 
Путина” 2007). Here, in a more politicised application of the term, oprichnina denotes a “ro-
tation of the political elite” – that is, a moment when the current elite is replaced by a new 
ruling elite. Such a rotation can occur gradually through individuals’ upward political 
mobility, or it can come about through a revolutionary change. The article claims that the ro-
tation forecast to come after the 2008 presidential elections has precursors: the original 
oprichnina under Ivan IV, the forced “rotation of elites” that took place both under Peter the 
Great and Stalin and, finally, the replacement of leading officials by individuals from Putin’s 
St. Petersburg network of trustees at the beginning of his first presidential term. 
Second, the term is used either as part of a cautionary expression or with the aim to mobi-
lise. The journal Russian Entrepreneur, for instance, employed the term in 2002 in its 
assessment of the goals and strategies of the newly founded United Russia party. The estab-
lishment of a “mass parliamentary party,” it asserts, is a logical and – based on global 
experience – necessary step to ensure the survival of a federal type of government and to cen-
tralise control. Yet, referring to the case of United Russia, “here it in fact concerns a kind of 
‘silent oprichnina,’ within the framework of which an immense part of the political sphere is 
placed under the control of ‘appanage [udelnykh] princes’” (Лутомин & Сергеев 2002).295 
On the mobilising end of the spectrum we find, among others, Aleksandr Dugin, who advo-
cates the creation of an extra-systemic “Russian order” modelled as a new oprichnina to 
fundamentally change the political structure of the Russian state (I will return to this point 
shortly). 
Third, in articles that use the term in the cautionary sense and that tend to be located on the 
liberal side of the political spectrum, oprichnina is often equalled with other (Russian and 
                                                 
294  “Пусть наш союз в чем-то явится для России новой опричниной, крестьянской опричниной, 
безжалостно выметающей из нашего дома все то, что мешает крестьянину жить!” 
295 “По сути дела, здесь речь идет о своеобразной ‘тихой опричнине’, в рамках которой огромная часть 
политического пространства выводится из-под контроля ‘удельных князей’.” 
 204 
Soviet) state security organisations, such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Peo-
ple’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). For example, in a radio interview, the 
opposition journalist Oleg Kashin uses the term in response to the tightening of political con-
trol following Putin’s re-election in 2012. Listing the groups of “extremists” who have 
managed to secure their place within the top echelons of power, he states:  
[T]he new security officers [siloviki], [and] also the, as they say, “new middle class,” […] people, who con-
stitute a substantial power base nowadays, a gigantic number of people and then, you know, the MVD 
[Ministry of Internal Affairs, M.W.], FSB, other special forces, FSO [Federal Guard Service, M.W.], the fed-
eral taxation service, and so on, and so on, they are a kind of new oprichnina altogether (Дымарский & 
Ларина 2012).296 
Much earlier, and in a markedly different context, an article from September 1991 had 
used the term to denote and conceptualise the Communist Party as a social institution in the 
wake of the August coup-d’état by communist hardliners (Коржавин 1991). As we will see, 
articles that use the term in an effort to mobilise, on the contrary, tend to adhere to nationalist 
and/or conservative political orientations. Here, the oprichnina is conceptualised as an organi-
sation that still has to be founded and that will operate outside the existing state structure. 
Eventually, it will undermine and transform the state’s very foundations. Thus we have two 
competing understandings of the oprichnina concept as it pertains to contemporary Russian 
politics: first, as a means of state repression (from a liberal, oppositional perspective) and, 
second, as an extra-governmental means to fundamentally alter the existing political structure 
(as invoked by right-wing nationalist and conservative groups).  
The permeation of these ideas into the mainstream media was and remains limited, 
however. A survey of the major print-media outlets using the Integrum World Wide media 
database returns a mere 34 hits for “novaia oprichnina” and just one mention of the term 
“neooprichnina” within the twelve-year period from 2000 to 2012.297 Moreover, in the major-
ity of these articles the term is used in a cautionary sense. A notable exception is its use in the 
                                                 
296 “новые силовики, тоже как говорят ‘новый средний класс’, […] люди, которые являются реальной 
опорой власти сегодня, гигантское количество людей, и, ладно, там, МВД, ФСБ, другие спецслужбы, 
ФСО, налоговая, и так далее, и так далее, тоже они такая новая опричнина вполне.” 
297 I used the Integrum World Wide media database to quantitatively analyse the number of times the relevant 
terms were mentioned in the central printed press (dataset “СМИ: Центральная пресса”). The query was per-
formed on 18 March 2016 for the intervals corresponding to the presidential terms (1: 31.12.1999-06.05.2004; 2: 
07.05.2004-07.05.2008; 3: 08.05.2008-06.05.2012; 4: 07.05.2012-31.12.2012). The query returned the following 
results in absolute numbers: “новая опричнина”: respectively 4/11/15/4 mentions; “неоопричнина”: respec-
tively 0/0/1/0 mentions. By comparison, during Putin’s third presidential term (up to the date of query) the terms 
were mentioned twelve times and twice, respectively. An initial survey of the results using the query terms 
“опричнина” and “опричник” revealed predominantly historical, factual usage of the terms, which undermines 
its value as a quantitative indicator. 
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weekly newspaper Zavtra, an oppositional and increasingly nationalistic publication. In addi-
tion to Zavtra, the circulation of these concepts takes place in conferences, lectures and round 
tables, through book publications and, increasingly actively, online. Anyone with an interest 
in the topic can listen to hours of lectures and interviews on the oprichnina and related themes 
on YouTube, Vkontakte and other video-sharing platforms. 
Aleksandr Dugin appears to have first used the term novaia oprichnina in 2000.298 In an 
article in Zavtra, Dugin speaks of creating a new “KGB”: a “new cast [or] social stratum” that 
should be formed outside of party structures, the bureaucracy and business circles and have 
the aim of “[t]ransferring the country onto the track [relsy] of patriotism, the preservation 
(and strengthening) of territorial integrity and sovereign development along its own national 
path” (Дугин 2000).299 The members of this still-to-be-formed “continental KGB” will make 
up the “backbone of a Eurasian Renaissance” in the struggle against American domination in 
global affairs.300 Here, the term “new oprichnina” appears in a more or less metaphorical 
sense towards the end of the argument:  
[T]he Eurasian secret services will inevitably be something completely new – conservative, on the one hand, 
and revolutionary, on the other… It has to be a kind of “new oprichnina.” Especially in the first and most dif-
ficult phase when the citadel of strong agents of influence, entrenched in the essential sectors of our society, 
has to be crushed. This new class has to be delegated powers in the same proportion as during the conduct of 
military operations (ibidem. Italics in original).301 
In addition to its political purpose, Dugin’s oprichnina is thus a military force operating 
outside of existing state structures. By 2005, the term had become a central element of his 
doctrine and political agenda. Dugin now calls for the creation of a “Russian order” (russkii 
orden), which he equates with a new oprichnina. In an article published in Ogonek, Dugin’s 
phrasing of the issue directly appeals to the political tensions that arose in the wake of the 
colour revolutions and, in particular, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The opening 
paragraph thus formulates the necessity of a new oprichnina: 
                                                 
298 Dugin used the word “oprichnina” before this date, in particular to describe certain aspects of Bolshevik rule. 
Yet, these examples do not imply the creating of a “new oprichnina,” nor do they amount to a mobilising usage 
of the word. See, for example, Дугин (1998). 
299 “Перевод страны на рельсы патриотизма, сохранения (и укрепления) территориальной целостности и 
суверенного развития по собственному национальному пути требует новой касты, нового социального 
слоя.” 
300 “хребтом евразийского Возрождения.” 
301 “евразийская спецслужба неизбежно будет чем-то совершенно новым – консервативным, с одной 
стороны, и революционным, с другой... Это должно стать своего рода ‘новой опричниной’. Особенно на 
первом и самом сложном этапе, когда предстоит сокрушить цитадель крепкой, засевшей в важнейших 
секторах нашего общества, агентуры влияния. Полномочия этому новому классу надо делегировать в тех 
же пропорциях, что во время ведения военных действий.” 
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The Russian oprichnina is both a historical and a meta-historical phenomenon. […] In contemporary Russia 
the oprichnina has become manifestly unavoidable. The situation is similar to the 16th century: external 
threats (onset from the West, expansion of NATO, “orange processes” in the CIS) and domestic decay of the 
vertical of power (a hitherto unimaginable level of corruption, moral decline, alienation, incapacity of the 
elite) (Дугин 2005a).302 
Since “Putin is no [Ivan] the Terrible,” the oprichnina will gather behind “Holy Rus’, 
which lies hidden underneath the rubble and sediments of history” (ibidem).303 
The commitment to the term oprichnina was confirmed at the founding congress of 
Dugin’s youth movement, the Eurasian Union of Youth, that same year. The congress took 
place at Ivan’s former residence in Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda, the “birthplace” of the 
oprichnina, and framed its members as “new oprichniki” whose mission is to counter the 
spread of the “orange plague” in Russia (“Евразийская опричнина восстановит в России 
сакральную власть” 2005). The Eurasian Union of Youth continued to use the term, for ex-
ample during their “Easter imperial march” on 8 April 2007, when they carried large banners 
with the slogan “Hail the oprichnina!” (Козенко 2007). During the congress, Dugin presented 
a paper on the “metaphysics of the oprichnina,” his most detailed exposition of the concept. 
This lengthy document dwells extensively on the multi-layered (and in Dugin’s rendering, 
mystic) symbolism associated with Ivan’s oprichnina as well as later emulations of the mod-
el, in particular with regard to Stalinism. Ivan, as the “tsar of the Eurasians,” is presented as a 
direct model to emulate.  
[Ivan] the Terrible began to bring Russian Byzantism to its full realisation in conjunction with the Horde 
covenant of empire-building of Genghis Chan. He modernised Rus’, but it was modernisation without West-
ernisation (Дугин 2005b. Emphasis added).304 
Here, with Dugin, we thus find a conceptualisation of a “Russian” approach to state mod-
ernisation that is simultaneously complementary to the state’s memory politics in its anti-
Western stance and in direct conflict with the regime’s primary interests as it seeks to under-
mine the power that be.  
According to Dugin, the members of the oprichnina dedicated themselves not to the state 
or to their own interests but to a higher purpose, which he refers to as the “sacrality” 
                                                 
302 “Русская опричнина – явление и историческое, и сверхисторическое. […] В современной России явно 
назрела опричнина. Ситуация похожа на XVI век: внешние угрозы (натиск с Запада, расширение НАТО, 
‘оранжевые процессы’ в СНГ) и внутреннее разложение властной вертикали (немыслимый доселе 
уровень коррупции, моральный упадок, отчуждение, недееспособность элит).” 
303 “Святая Русь, скрытая под завалами и наносами истории.” 
304 “Грозный стал реализовывать в полной мере русский византизм в сочетании с ордынским заветом 
имперостроительства Чингизхана. Он модернизировал Русь, но это была модернизация без 
вестернизации.” 
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particular to Ivan the Terrible’s rule (groznaia sakral’nost’). To serve this sacrality (which, in 
short, amounts to a Eurasian interpretation of the Orthodox messianism we saw in Chapter 4), 
the oprichnina has to bring about a rotation of the elites, a term we came across earlier in the 
overview of the public debate. If necessary, this process has to be enforced through violent 
repression: 
If there are ways of raising new fresh people from the bottom to the heights of power, that is a good thing, 
but if not, then [these ways] have to be artificially created. In rigid [zhestkikh] societies, repressions serve this 
purpose. The oprichnina, in this sense, was a chord in the rotation of the elite in Russian society. Moreover, 
this sociological function was subordinate to its geopolitical function – the strengthening of tsarist power – 
and its metaphysical [function] – the service to “terrible sacrality.” Here the parallel with Stalin again sug-
gests itself (Дугин 2005b).305 
In this quote, Dugin puts the common association between Ivan and Stalin as repressive 
rulers to good rhetorical use. The brief sentence invoking Stalin suggests the existence of a 
universal rule concerning “elite rotation.” And by thus justifying the violent acts committed 
by these two heads of state on the grounds of “geopolitical” necessity, Dugin suggests that, 
when conditions so dictate, the same principle should apply to present-day politics. Indeed, 
Dugin asserts that the oprichnina’s task – “passionate service to the sacred Motherland, the 
Absolute Motherland, its unity, its greatness, its might” – is equally relevant today as at any 
point in the past (Дугин 2005b).306 The “neooprichnina,”307 therefore, is the “model for a 
Eurasian conservative revolution” that should and will necessarily take place, even if the ma-
jority of Russian citizens are against it (“Motherland Rus’ goes above all else”), or if it would 
require a direct confrontation with the powers that be (ibidem).308 In case the ruling elite un-
derstands the necessity of structural change and chooses to work towards its implementation, 
the new oprichnina will serve as a “conservative-protective force” to safeguard the process 
(ibidem).309 
A competing operationalisation of the concept was proposed by Andrei Fursov, Maksim 
Kalashnikov and Vitalii Aver’ianov in The New Oprichnina, or Russian-style Modernisation 
                                                 
305 “Если существуют формы подъема новых свежих людей снизу к высотам власти, хорошо, но если нет, 
то их приходится создавать искусственно. В жестких обществах этому служат репрессии. Опричнина в 
этом смысле была аккордом ротации элиты в русском обществе. Причем эта социологическая функция 
была подчинена функции геополитической – укреплению царской власти и метафизической – служению 
‘грозной сакральности’. Здесь снова напрашивается параллель со Сталиным.” 
306  “пассионарного служения священной Родине, Абсолютной Родине, ее единству, ее величию, ее 
могуществу.” 
307 Dugin switches from “novaia” to “neo-” at this point. 
308 “неоопричнина это современная модель русской евразийской консервативной революции”; “Родина 
Русь превыше всего.” 
309 “консервативно-охранительной силой.” 
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(Фурсов, Калашников & Аверьянов 2011).310 The publication was prepared for the Institute 
of Dynamic Conservatism, an organisation established in 2009 as a neo-conservative think 
tank that merged into the Izborsk Club in 2012. The latter now unites the most “prominent 
conservative right-wing intellectuals of modern Russia” and propagates the belief that “post-
Soviet identity has to encompass both the technocratic Soviet element and the mystical 
Orthodox one” (Engström 2014: 361). All three authors have established reputations. Fursov 
is a prominent historian and sociologist. Kalashnikov, whose real name is Vladimir 
Kucherenko, is a publicist and nationalist political writer. In his books, with titles such as 
Towards USSR 2.0 (2003), he praises the Soviet Union and criticises the current Russian re-
gime. Finally, Aver’ianov, the director of the Institute, is an Orthodox writer and philosopher. 
The book in many ways is a collection of various writings, building upon the previous works 
of the contributing authors that are also referenced throughout, and it contains some previous-
ly published material. For example, the chapter “The Innovative Oprichnina of Lavrentii 
Beriia” had been published the year before by Kalashnikov as a paper entitled “We Need a 
New Beriia” in Zavtra (Калашников 2010).  
The book offers an extensive discussion of the oprichnina as a historical phenomenon 
(with overt contemporary political connotations) as well as the various groups and individuals 
who have been responsible for the “misrepresentation” of Ivan and the oprichnina. The image 
of Ivan in historiography, the authors assert, is not simply incorrect; it even conflicts with 
common sense. The primary explanation for this distortion of historical facts lies in Western 
attempts at falsification. 
In the case of Russia, the West and especially Latin Rome start to employ a new method of struggle from the 
16th century onwards: psychological propagandistic warfare. The public opinion in Europe during the Li-
vonian war was formed by means of manifold “flying leaflets” that pictured Tsar Ioann as a monster and the 
Russians as aggressors and fiends. But the propaganda was not limited to this, of course. Because of the his-
torical and political circumstances, Ioann the Terrible came under heavy fire in a new type of war. 
Discrediting him became a matter of honour to the enemies of Russia, both during his lifetime and after his 
death. He messed up the plans [sputal karty] of the Western strategists, the Roman missionaries, Livonian 
knights, Polish and Swedish aggressors (yet another characteristic that connects him with Stalin). But the 
                                                 
310 In 2011, Mikhail Deliagin published a book titled The Path of Russia: The New Oprichnina, or Why You Do 
not Have to “Get out of Russia” (Путь России: Новая опричнина, или Почему не нужно “валить из 
Рашки”). Despite the direct reference to the oprichnina in the title, the author appears to use the term mostly as a 
rhetorical ploy and its development as a political concept is superficial compared to the two (groups of) author(s) 
I discuss here. 
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particularity of this propagandistic war is the fact that it does not diminish [deaktualiziruetsia] over time 
(Фурсов, Калашников & Аверьянов 2011. Bold in original).311 
The claim that the alleged disinformation campaign against Ivan has not diminished fits 
within the accusations of information warfare that have since come to dominate mainstream 
media (and that, vice versa, European countries accuse Russia of waging, with good reason). 
Among the Russian names that are mentioned as accomplices in the mistreatment of Ivan’s 
memory are Nikolai Karamzin, who is described as a “fabulist” with a liking for gothic narra-
tives, and Vladimir Sorokin and Pavel Lungin (the director of the 2009 film Tsar), who are 
both accused of entertaining “particular sentimental-intimate relations with Western coun-
tries” to account for their negative appraisals of Ivan (Фурсов, Калашников & Аверьянов 
2011).312 In other words, anyone who voices criticism of Ivan is not a true patriot. 
The diagnosis here of the problem of contemporary Russian politics is largely identical to 
what Dugin proposes – namely, corruption. The oprichnina, able to cleanse the political sys-
tem in a way that the system itself cannot, can move the state from its current state of 
degradation and stagnation towards innovation. Here we again find a direct reference to the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine to demonstrate the need for exceptional measures: 
The most dreadful thing is that the governmental apparatus of the [Russian Federation] can no longer inde-
pendently cleanse itself of total corruption. Avaricious beings have firmly lodged themselves in it, and do not 
allow honest and competent ones to enter. “Anti-selection” was and is going on. The sad experience of the 
“orange revolution” in Ukraine (which, in effect, is the same kind of society [sotsium]) has shown that no 
liberal-democratic procedures can eradicate corruption or the omnipotence of the criminalised “elite” 
(Фурсов, Калашников & Аверьянов 2011).313 
In comparison to what Dugin imagines, the vision put forward by Fursov, Kalashnikov and 
Aver’ianov is less militant and more technocratic, and lacks Dugin’s mysticism. Since the 
                                                 
311 “В случае с Россией начиная с XVI века Запад и в первую очередь латинский Рим применяет новый 
метод борьбы – психологическую пропагандистскую войну. Общественное мнение Европы во время 
Ливонской войны формировалось с помощью многочисленных ‘летучих листков’, изображавших царя 
Иоанна монстром, а русских – насильниками и извергами. Но этим пропаганда, конечно, не 
ограничивалась. Иоанн Грозный в силу исторических и политических обстоятельств попал под 
шквальный огонь войны нового типа. Его дискредитация стала делом чести врагов России как при его 
жизни, так и после смерти. Он спутал карты западных стратегов, римских миссионеров, ливонских 
рыцарей, польских и шведских агрессоров (еще одна черта, роднящая его со Сталиным). Однако 
специфика этой пропагандистской войны состоит в том, что она не деактуализируется с годами.” 
312 “в особых сентиментально-интимных отношениях с западными странами.” 
313 “Самое же ужасное – в том, что государственный аппарат РФ уже не может очиститься от тотальной 
коррупции самостоятельно. Алчные существа крепко в нем засели, не пуская в него честных и 
компетентных. Шел и идет ‘антиотбор’. Печальный опыт ‘оранжевой революции’ на Украине (тот же, по 
сути, социум) показал, что никакие либерал-демократические процедуры не уничтожают ни коррупции, 
ни всевластия криминализованной ‘элиты’.” 
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publication is a collection of varied writings rather than an argumentative whole, there is no 
unified vision of how exactly Russia should be structured in the future. The most detailed 
description of Russian society during and after the proposed establishment of a new 
oprichnina can be found in the chapters written by Kalashnikov. He envisions the oprichnina 
as a fully developed parallel system of governance that in a true and distinctively Russian 
way, he claims, will be democratic in serving the interests of the state and the people, rather 
than those in power. While the oprichnina will have at its disposal a secret security service 
and a small army, these resources form only a part of a much wider system of “structures of 
innovation”: 
The central concept is simple: it is necessary to establish a dictatorship of honest, patriotic people, who stand 
above the government. People, who are devoid of self-seeking motives, who are preoccupied with the great-
ness of the country and safeguarding the people. They have to construct a closely knit society capable of 
controlling the state apparatus, of moving their people to key leadership positions, [and] shaping the judici-
ary, the prosecutor’s office, secret services and top administration of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
M.W.]. […] It is a kind of corporation of “stern judges.” Stern, but fair. What is more, it should be based on 
the structures of civil society and local self-government, cooperating with them. Such a corporation should 
recruit individuals from all layers of society, selecting those who combine intelligence, patriotism and self-
lessness in their service to the common cause. And the selection of worthy candidates is performed by the 
wise, strong and incorruptible members of the corporation (Фурсов, Калашников & Аверьянов 2011).314 
Contrary to the territorial division into oprichnina and zemshchina established under Ivan, 
the new oprichnina will give rise to a parallel system operating throughout the entire territory 
of Russia. This network of advanced cities (futuropolisy), the author clarifies, will be similar 
to the system of closed cities of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Kalashnikov attaches 
great importance to advances in psychology and information technology to establish this neo-
Soviet “democratic dictatorship.” Modern psychotechnologies, he claims, make it possible to 
select “thousands of absolutely [kristal’no] honest and noble-minded individuals” to fill the 
ranks of the oprichnina.315 As a result, those who are deceitful, who strive for power for the 
sake of power or have sadistic inclinations will be filtered out. Modern technology, he 
                                                 
314 “Стержневой замысел прост: необходимо создать диктатуру честных, патриотических людей, стоящих 
над государством. Людей, лишенных своекорыстных мотивов, одержимых идеей величия страны и 
сбережения народа. Они должны составить сплоченное сообщество, способное контролировать 
госаппарат, выдвигать свои фигуры на ключевые руководящие посты, формировать судейский корпус, 
прокуратуру, спецслужбы и руководство МВД. […] Это – своего рода корпорация ‘суровых судий’. 
Суровых, но справедливых. При этом она должна опираться на структуры гражданского общества и на 
местное самоуправление, взаимодействуя с ними. Такая корпорация должна рекрутировать людей из 
всех слоев общества, отбирая тех, кто сочетает ум, патриотизм и бескорыстие в служении общему делу. 
Причем отбор достойных ведут сами члены корпорации умных, сильных и неподкупных.” 
315 “тысячи кристально честных и благородных людей.” 
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concludes, will thereby help avoid the pitfalls of the oprichnina as established both by Ivan 
and Stalin. 
While this plan is no less rich in anti-Western sentiment than Dugin’s writings, the opposi-
tion with the West is not solely confrontational in this case. The West, in particular the United 
States, is depicted as a separate civilisation that harbours a negative attitude towards Russia. 
At the same time, however, it is recognised and at times emphasised that both are subject to 
the same detrimental global trends that have to be overcome (among them corruption and 
other vices of capitalism). The combination of these two lines of thinking (eternal opposition 
and common problems) results in the view that the current race between Russia and the US 
will be decided by which nation succeeds in decisively addressing these issues first. To do so 
in Russia, the authors assert, the new oprichnina is the only available means.  
Both conceptualisations of the new oprichnina thus attack the state-supported notion that 
stability is a necessary requirement for development, a premise central to official memory 
politics. Instead, it is argued that the corruption of the ruling political system is pronounced 
enough to jeopardise the future existence of the Russian state. (Conservative) modernisation 
is essential, yet it can be achieved only through a fundamental reform of the system 
undertaken from outside the established power structures. Thus, reform must still be a top-
down initiative, but one not instituted by the Kremlin. In rather vague (and in the case of 
Kalashnikov, somewhat naïvely optimistic) terms, a truly Russian type of democracy is envi-
sioned as the end goal. The authors behind these two conceptualisations of a new oprichnina 
are among the “founding fathers” of the so-called conservative turn in Russian politics since 
2013 (Engström 2014), along with television journalist Mikhail Leont’ev (see Chapter 5), 
archimandrite Tikhon (see Chapter 4) and Sergei Kurginian, whose activities will be dis-
cussed towards the end of the current chapter. 
The memory of the oprichnina has been used to critique political developments in a non-
mobilising manner as well, as we have already seen with regard to public discourse and to 
Sorokin’s dystopian fiction. To conclude this section, I would like to offer another example. 
The oppositional art collective Voina, from whose ranks Pussy Riot later emerged, has drawn 
upon the oprichnina concept in their performance art. They targeted Mikhail Leont’ev’s res-
taurant Oprichnik in Moscow (now closed) in an art action named “The dogs’ heads of 
Russia, or The gold fish.”316 On the night of 28 December 2008, the doors to the restaurant 
                                                 
316 “Песьи головы России, или Рыбка золотая.” Oprichnik was a restaurant serving “old Russian” cuisine in a 
luxuriously decorated space, complete with dog’s heads, brooms and other oprichina-themed decorations. 
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were welded shut with metal plates, locking the customers inside.317 As the action was un-
folding, members of the collective shouted various slogans, such as “Give us the Iron 
Curtain!” “No to the oprichnina!” “We will strike Russia on its dogs’ heads with an electric 
welder” and “Canonise Ivan the Terrible! Misha Leont’ev – to the stables!” (plucer 2008).318 
In line with Voina’s usual postmodern eclecticism, the action was defined as a protest against 
“oprichnina, glamour, wild boar in raspberry wine and personally against the union of Misha 
Leont’ev with Ivan the Terrible.”319 Art activist Oleg Vasil’ev interpreted the action in a more 
directly political sense. Addressing President Dmitrii Medvedev in a blog post published on 
31 December 2008, Vasil’ev drew a parallel between Ivan’s temporary abdication of the 
throne to Simeon Bekbulatovich in 1575 and Putin’s handover of power to Medvedev in 
2008. He asks whether Medvedev will return the throne to its “rightful owner,” as 
Bekbulatovich had before him: 
Art group “Voina” gives Dmitrii Anatol’evich the chance to become the real president of all of Russia; art 
group “Voina” closes the symbol of a connection between ages and situations, the symbol of the return of the 
oprichnina. Just like the army of the Crimean khan Devlet Girai [1551-1577, M.W.] that brought an end to 
the history of the first oprichnina, art group “Voina” closes the restaurant “Oprichnik,” owned by “journalist” 
Mikhail Leont’ev, one of the principle dogs of the Putin oprichnina. […] Dmitrii Anatol’evich, on the eve of 
the New Year the group “Voina” gives you the chance to put an end to the new oprichnina, another shameful 
episode in Russian history. Will you seize it? (Эпштейн 2011).320 
The comparison to Bekbulatovich was widely made during Medvedev’s presidency. For 
example, in the online petition “Putin has to go,” first posted in March 2010 and signed by 
more than 150,000 people, Medvedev is referred to as an “obedient locum tenens” and “the 
contemporary Simeon Bekbulatovich” (“Путин должен уйти” 2010).321 As became clear in 
2011, Medvedev’s occupation of the presidential “throne” was indeed temporary: Putin re-
turned to power in 2012. 
                                                 
317 A recording of the action can be found on YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=GfCTdH_AsyI (accessed 19 April 2016). 
318 “Даешь железный занавес!”; “Нет опричнине!”; “Ударим электросваркой по песьим головам России!”; 
“Канонизируем Ивана Грозного! Мишку Леонтьева - на конюшню!” 
319 “Мы протестуем против опричнины, гламура, кабана в малиновом вине и лично против союза Миши 
Леонтьева с Иваном Грозным.” For a further analysis of the action and its interpretation, see Эпштейн (2011). 
320 “Арт-группа ‘Война’ дает шанс Дмитрию Анатольевичу стать настоящим президентом всея Руси – 
арт-группа ‘Война’ закрывает символ связи времен и ситуаций, символ возвращения опричнины. Арт-
группа ‘Война’, подобно войску крымского хана Девлет-Гирея, завершившему историю первой 
опричнины, закрывает ресторан ‘Опричник’, принадлежащий одному из главных псов новой, путинской 
опричнины – ‘журналисту’ Михаилу Леонтьеву. […] Дмитрий Анатольевич, группа ‘Война’ дает вам в 
канун нового года шанс покончить с новой опричниной – очередным позорным эпизодом русской 
истории. Воспользуетесь ли вы им?” 
321 “послушного местоблюстителя”; “современного Симеона Бекбулатовича.” 
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Ivan the Terrible and Orthodox Fundamentalism 
In addition to the renewed interest in the concept of the oprichnina within nationalist and neo-
Soviet circles, Ivan espouses particular appeal to certain marginal groups adhering to funda-
mentalist conceptions of Russian Orthodoxy. These adherents of so-called 
Tsarebozhnichetsvo “sacralise the Russian sovereigns as divine recruits, chosen by God to 
ensure for Russia the realisation of her messianic destiny as the protectress of Orthodoxy on 
earth ” (Кноппе 2006).322 One of their objectives has been to push for the canonisation of 
Tsar Ivan IV. The “extremist, populist, and imperialistic elements” within the Russian Ortho-
dox Church, where this initiative originated, assert that all accusations against Ivan are simply 
false; they are the result of incorrect interpretations of available historical sources combined 
with slander voiced by Ivan’s contemporaries and enemies (Bodin 2009: 101). As Per-Arne 
Bodin points out, the argument in favour of Ivan’s canonisation “demonstrates […] a highly 
conspirational way of thinking [that is] characteristic of Russian popular political discourse” 
(idem: 100). So much so that Bodin labels the accumulation of materials in favour of Ivan’s 
sanctity and the exposure of purportedly false accusations against him as the creation of a 
“counter-history” (idem: 101). The canonisation bid was rejected by the ROC in 2004, along 
with a similar proposal regarding Grigorii Rasputin. Canonising Ivan, it was argued, was out 
of the question due to Ivan’s persecution of the Church. Indeed, the main obstacle to canoni-
sation is that it would sanctify a person held responsible for the death of a saint (Metropolitan 
Filipp). Hypothetically speaking, so the ROC reasoned, canonising Ivan would require the 
canonisation of Filipp to be undone. Another complicating factor is that the debate on Ivan 
tends to interweave itself with the perhaps even more controversial debate surrounding the 
canonisation of Stalin (Bodin 2009: 106). 
Within these fundamentalist Orthodox circles, Ivan is lauded as the first tsar of the Russian 
Empire and praised for his contribution to the development of the Russian state, his military 
victories and territorial expansion. In addition, and this is what sets them apart from national-
ist movements, they glorify autocracy and (God-ordained) violence. Their political views tend 
to be anti-establishment, with regard to both the ROC and the state. As they do not recognise 
the position of the Patriarch, these Orthodox communities exist on the fringes or outside of 
Church structures and many are considered splinter sects by the ROC. Anti-Putinist rhetoric is 
a common though less essential element. As such, their political position corresponds to how 
                                                 
322  “Царебожничество сакрализует русских правителей именно как божественных призванников, 
избранных Богом к тому, чтобы обеспечить России реализацию ее мессианского предназначения как 
охранительницы православия на Земле.” 
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Kathy Rousselet characterises the attitude of local, patriotic religious groups towards the state 
more generally:  
They are often very critical towards the social and economic situation of Putin’s Russia, but they do not nec-
essarily question the established status quo. Many reject any form of political action in the partisan sense of 
the term. However, they call for a moralisation of the country. Although morality is part of the Soviet herit-
age, it seeks to overturn its original foundations. The patriotism of believers is multifaceted: while this same 
patriotism echoes official calls, in some respects it also diverges from these calls (Rousselet 2015: 66). 
Here it has to be emphasised that, in their glorification of empire and “strong and cruel” 
leadership, the patriotism of such groups typically is openly anti-Semitic and xenophobic 
(Bodin 2009: 106). 
Various Orthodox brotherhoods worship Ivan the Terrible across Russia. The social organ-
isation of these communities (characterised by, e.g., seclusion from society, glorification of 
the head of the brotherhood) appears to support their designation as religious sects. A notable 
example is the “Oprichnoe brotherhood in the name of the blessed Tsar Ioann the Terrible,” 
an Orthodox community located in the city Liubim and the nearby village of Kashcheevo, 
some 100 kilometres northeast of Yaroslavl. The community, which consists of several fami-
lies and is supposedly structured after Ivan’s oprichnina, is led by a man named Andrei 
Shchedrin. Writing under several pseudonyms, Shchedrin actively agitates against both the 
Patriarch and the state in a leaflet (“Oprichnyi listok”) that the “oprichniki” hand out and cir-
culate across the country. Their starkly anti-Semitic ideology sees the President and the 
Patriarch as servants of the antichrist.323 In 2005, the local administration in Liubim decided 
to erect a statue of Ivan as the city’s founder. As was reported in the press, its representatives 
approached the famous sculptor Zurab Tsereteli with a commission to design the sculpture 
(Радулова 2005). Whether Shchedrin was involved in the initiative is unclear. The plan elic-
ited criticism from the Yaroslavl eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The archbishop of 
Yaroslavl and Rostov Kirill addressed a letter to the governor, procurator and the head federal 
inspector of the region to warn against the possible negative consequences of the planned 
monument, citing the presence of the Oprichnoe Brotherhood in the locality as an aggravating 
factor.  
[T]he initiative by the head of the Liubim local branch, Koshkin A.V., to erect a monument to Tsar Ivan the 
Terrible in Liubim can have very unpredictable consequences. Please note that the controversy surrounding 
the figure of Ivan the Terrible and the possibility of his ecclesiastical veneration is one of the destabilising 
factors of the “near-Orthodox” [okolopravoslavnoi] community. The erection of a monument in the city of 
                                                 
323 For a detailed analysis of the “ideology” propagated by Shchedrin, see Дворкина (2004). 
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Liubim will lead to the settlement of a great number of mentally unstable persons in the city, which will un-
doubtedly worsen the crime situation in the district. In the city of Liubim, its vicinity and the Pervomaiskii 
district the totalitarian sect “Oprichnoe Brotherhood,” whose unlawful acts were subject of investigation by 
the prosecutor’s office and the FSB, already operates (ИА REGNUM 2005).324 
It is unclear whether the Archbishop’s appeal resulted in any action on the federal level to 
overrule the decision by the local administration of Liubim. The statue, in any case, was never 
erected.  
Soviet-era Estrada singer Zhanna Bichevskaia is one of the public figures who strive for a 
positive reappraisal and canonisation of Ivan in various media. She has dedicated several 
songs to “Saintly Ioann,” in which she sings to his glory and comments on the contemporary 
lack of positive appraisals of him.325 According to Aleksandr Dvorkin, an expert on sectarian-
ism in contemporary Russia, Zhanna Bichevskaia acts as the “vocal cords” of the alternative 
Orthodox groups who see the monarch as the head of the church (Скойбеда 2013). The song 
“The Terrible Tsar,” for example, reiterates the notion that the monarch is created by God and 
answers to Him only (“The Tsar does not belong to the earthly court / he is answerable to God 
alone”).326 The lyrics recall Ivan’s rule as a period of glory, whose memory has been made 
murky by “boyar thieves” (“In admiration of the Tsar, the people pray / the Tsar is frightening 
to the thief-boyars / and in the byliny songs [Ivan] the Terrible appears / as a righteous sover-
eign”).327 The final verses emphasise the link between respect for Ivan and patriotism: 
I am proud of the achievements of our ancestors 
The decisive moment has come for the Russians 
Tsar Ioann the Fourth the Terrible 
Among the saints, is praying for Rus’ to God.328 
Another song called “Tsar Ioann” pictures Ivan’s submission to serve God and “the native 
land.” The final verses again address the listener and spur them to remember, “in this wicked, 
                                                 
324 “инициатива главы Любимского МО Кошкина А.В. по установке в Любиме памятника царю Ивану 
Грозному может иметь самые непредсказуемые последствия. Обращаем Ваше внимание на то, что споры 
вокруг личности Ивана Грозного и возможности его церковного почитания являются одним из 
дестабилизирующих факторов ‘околоправославной’ общественности. Установка памятника в городе 
Любиме приведет к поселению в городе большого количества лиц с нестабильной психикой, что 
несомненно ухудшит криминогенную ситуацию в районе. В городе Любиме, его окрестностях и 
Первомайском районе уже действует тоталитарная секта ‘Опричное братство’, противоправные действия 
которой были предметом расследования со стороны прокуратуры и ФСБ.” 
325 The lyrics are written by Gennadii Ponomarev, Bichevskaia’s husband. 
326 “Царь суду земному не принадлежит / Он ответчик только Богу.” 
327 “На Царя любуясь, молится народ / Страшен царь ворам-боярам / И в былинных песнях Грозный 
предстает / Справедливым государем.” 
328 “Подвигами наших предков я горжусь / Час пробьет для русских звездный / Во святых у Бога молится 
за Русь / Царь Иоанн Четвертый Грозный.” 
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most dangerous hour,” how the “God-anointed Tsar Ioann […] defended and saved our 
faith.”329 While her views support the centralisation of power, Bichevskaia is by no means a 
Putin supporter. Rather, she advocates the restoration of the monarchy under a direct de-
scendant of the Romanovs (Собакин 2012). 
Another public figure who has come out in defence of Ivan is the businessman and societal 
actor Vasilii Boiko, who renamed himself Boiko-Velikii (which translates as Boiko the Great) 
in 2009 by adopting his mother’s maiden name (Velikaia).330 A strict adherent of (fundamen-
talist) Orthodox principles, Boiko is an eccentric figure who typically dresses in a “Russian” 
costume consisting of a decorated caftan (predominantly in white, blue or red, the colours of 
the Russian flag) and elegant boots. In 2010 his (at that time) extreme views on Russian so-
ciety sparked public outrage when he enforced a series of religiously derived rules of conduct 
on the employees of his dairy concern Russian Milk. Among other measures, these rules stip-
ulated that employees who have had an abortion or who facilitate the termination of a 
pregnancy would be dismissed (Новоселова 2010).331 Boiko-Velikii openly criticised Pavel 
Lungin’s film Tsar in an open letter published in Izvestiia, in which he accuses the director of 
blasphemy and of insulting the Russian people (I will return to Boiko’s criticisms later on). 
He was also one of the main signatories of an open letter addressed to the Minister of Culture 
and the director of the Tret’iakov Gallery demanding that Il’ia Repin’s painting Ivan the 
Terrible and His Son Ivan be taken down and locked away in the gallery’s storage room. In a 
clear reference to the legislation protecting the sensitivities of religious believers that was 
adopted in June 2013,332 the signatories claimed that the painting falsifies history (since, they 
assert, Ivan did not kill his son) and “constitutes blatant slander of not just Tsar Ivan, but also 
of the Russian Orthodox Autocracy [russkoe Pravoslavnoe Samoderzhavie], of the entire 
Russian people” (Мильштейн 2013).333 The director of the Tret’iakov Gallery, Irina Leb-
edeva, refused to comply, stating that art is not intended to be an “illustration of history” but 
rather is an expressive act.  
                                                 
329 “В этот лукавый опаснейший час / Вспомни поруганный мир христиан / Как защитил нашу веру и 
спас / Божий помазанник Царь Иоанн.” 
330 I want to thank Birgitte Pristed for bringing Boiko-Velikii to my attention. 
331 To avoid violating the law, the “dismissal” would technically take the form of declaring the position held by 
the employee redundant. 
332 The bill to “counteract the insulting of religious convictions and feelings of believers” was signed into law by 
president Putin on 29 June 2013. 
333  “является неприкрытой клеветой не только на Царя Иоанна, но и на русское Православное 
Самодержавие, на весь русский народ.” 
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Boiko-Velikii was, in addition, the force who initiated the consecration of a small chapel in 
honour of (the non-canonised) Tsar Ivan the Terrible in December 2011. The chapel is located 
on the premises of an auto repair factory in Moscow that is owned by an investment company 
headed by Boiko. In his speech at the opening ceremony, Boiko-Velikii claimed that Ivan had 
performed a miracle on the factory’s grounds. On 15 December 2009 the factory was attacked 
by raiders who sought to seize the property, Boiko-Velikii recounts – but then he prayed to 
Ivan and the seizure was miraculously averted (“В Москве освящена часовня в честь св. 
блгв. Царя Иоанна Грозного” 2011). The Russian Orthodox Church has distanced itself 
from the veneration of Ivan by pointing out that the cleric who performed the consecration, 
Aleksei Aver’ianov, does not officially belong to the Church. In a letter to Boiko-Velikii, ob-
tained by the information agency Interfax, Metropolitan Ilarion stresses that Aver’ianov was 
stripped of his status as priest in 1996. According to the agency, Aver’ianov stands at the 
head of the Orthodox community to which Boiko-Velikii belongs (“В Церкви напоминают о 
неканоничности клирика” 2012). The Orthodox eccentric has since founded the political 
party “People’s movement ‘Holy Rus’” (Narodnoe dvizhenie “Sviataia Rus’”). Contrary to 
the fundamentalist Orthodox groups discussed earlier, Boiko-Velikii does not necessarily aim 
to undermine the political regime. In fact, he is the recipient of multiple state awards and, as 
conservatism has more recently become part of the political mainstream, finds himself in-
creasingly close to the powers that be. 
The contemporary debates employing the memory of Ivan the Terrible discussed above 
draw out a number of unpleasant and controversial aspects of Russian society: from the anti-
Semitism of Ivan’s Orthodox proponents, to the inextricable connection to (the glorification 
of) Stalin and the racist contexts in which his name is at times used. For example, during a 
hockey match in Magnitogorsk in 2007 against the Kazan club “Ak Bars,” supporters of the 
local club Metallurg held up banners with the slogans “We will not disgrace Ivan the 
Terrible,” “Ivan captured Kazan, and we will capture it” and “1380,” the date of the Battle of 
Kulikovo Field.334 The supporters also chanted “Beat the Tatars!” (“Расистский инцидент на 
хоккейном матче в Магнитогорске” 2007). Both circles discussed above, who propagate 
the memory of Ivan and the oprichnina out of different sets of convictions, can be considered 
socially marginal. Yet, as some additional examples below will confirm, some of the propo-
nents of these views have had significant access to the public domain through various media. 
Moreover, several of them (e.g., Dugin, Kurginian) and the ideologies they represent have 
                                                 
334 “Не посрамим Ивана Грозного”; “Иван брал Казань, и мы возьмем.” 
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since moved considerably closer to the mainstream of political debate in Russia, in particular 




In the period 2000-2012, the domains of cinema and television made a considerable contribu-
tion to the remediation of the memory of Ivan the Terrible, including its inherent 
controversies and politically subversive potential. The remainder of this chapter discusses 
three examples that show the variation among these productions. The first, the historical TV 
series Ivan the Terrible, was produced for state television. The feature film Tsar, by contrast, 
targeted both national and international audiences with a more artistic depiction of Ivan’s rule. 
Finally, The Trial of Time is a particularly insightful example of the prolific talk-show genre. 
The analyses affirm how reinterpretations of Ivan’s rule are taken to imply direct commentary 
on current political affairs and rarely fail to cause a stir. 
Ivan the Terrible 
The television series Ivan the Terrible (Ivan Groznyi, 2009), consisting of sixteen episodes, 
was broadcast by Rossiia in May 2009. The film recounts the story of Ivan from before he 
was born up to his death. The series was directed by Andrei Eshpai, who also oversaw the TV 
adaptation of Anatolii Rybakov’s famous Children of the Arbat (Deti Arbata, 2004). The pro-
ducer, Vladimir Dostal’, has been involved in numerous historical television productions, 
including the TV series Stolypin…The Undrawn Lessons discussed in Chapter 3. The director 
of the latter TV series, Iurii Kuzin, states on his LiveJournal blog that Dostal’ initially ap-
proached him for the Ivan project in 2006. Kuzin provided him with his director’s 
interpretation of the script and published fragments from this document on LiveJournal in 
November of that year (Кузин 2006). The collaboration, however, did not work out. In a blog 
entry posted on 20 May 2009, after the TV series was first broadcast, Kuzin severely criticises 
the final result and appears to place the blame for it on Dostal’: 
How could it happen that TV Channel “Rossiia,” […] thought it possible to broadcast a series of such ques-
tionable quality? In 2006, by the way, Vladimir Nikolaevich Dostal’ invited me to work on this project and 
even asked me to write an explication of the scenario by Aleksandr Lapshin, which I did, offering my con-
ception of the tyrant’s personality: “Ivan the Terrible – A Bastard on the Throne.” The conditions under 
which I agreed to work on the series did not suit V.N. Dostal’ since they required the producer to provide 
what he is unaccustomed to give: a qualitative scenario! Qualitative editing! Qualitative production! All of 
this, alas, I was deprived of [when working on] “Stolypin” [Stolypin…The Undrawn Lessons, M.W.] and I 
can only sympathise with Andrei Eshpai (Кузин 2009).335 
                                                 
335  “Как случилось, что Телеканал ‘Россия’ […] счел возможным выступить в эфир сериал такого 
сомнительного качества? В 2006 году, кстати, Владимир Николаевич Досталь предложил мне работу над 
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The project was, indeed, a difficult one for Eshpai because of the nature of its subject mat-
ter as well as the scope of the production. Yet, as the director remarks in an interview, the 
effort was worth it to him: 
I think that we did not go through all of this in vain: [I have] the impression that the appearance of the film 
was conditioned by time itself. Ten years ago it could not have been made – even from a material point of 
view. Neither now, in times of crisis. That means we chose the most opportune moment for looking into the 
past and understanding our present (Хлобыстова 2009).336 
As is often the case in such interviews, the director is (intentionally) vague concerning the 
particular contemporary developments illuminated by such a turn to the past. The specific 
aspect of Ivan’s character that sparked the director’s fascination provides us with an important 
clue here. According to Eshpai, what sets Ivan apart from other oppressive rulers in Russian 
history (and history in general) was his propensity to repent later in life: 
Not one of the tyrants started to have doubts before passing away; neither Peter I, nor Stalin, nor Caligula. 
But with Ivan this was the case. He perceived the death of his son [Tsarevich Dmitrii Ivanovich, M.W.] as 
punishment. It convinced him that he was doing something wrong. The letters, death bills in which he com-
memorates all who had been murdered, and of course also his own pains and illness started to tell him that he 
was not God. He started to question himself. Exactly in that moment, when I understood this, I became inter-
ested in analysing his deeds (Хлобыстова 2009).337 
Eshpai, in fact, frames the project as an exploration of human nature itself, which also has 
direct implications for understanding contemporary political reality. In our souls, he asserts, 
we all harbour both the magnificent (prekrasnoe) and the uncanny (zhutkoe). The only differ-
ence between then and now is that we are now conditioned not to give in to our passions. To 
glimpse into the past, therefore, can help us reach a greater understanding of ourselves – the 
heights to which a person can climb and how far one can fall: “After all, humanity is so often 
                                                                                                                                                        
этим проектом и даже просил написать экспликацию к сценарию Александра Лапшина, что я и сделал, 
предложив свою концепцию личности тирана: ‘ИВАН ГРОЗНЫЙ – БАСТАРД НА ТРОНЕ.’ Условия, на 
которых я согласился работать над сериалом, не устроили В.Н. Досталя, поскольку потребовали от 
продюсера того, чего он не привык давать: Качественного сценария! Качественной редактуры! 
Качественного производства! Всего этого, увы, я был лишен в ‘Столыпине,’ и могу лишь 
посочувствовать Андрею Эшпаю.” 
336 “я считаю, мы не зря прошли через все это: такое впечатление, что появление фильма обусловило 
само время. 10 лет назад он не мог быть снят - даже с материальной точки зрения. И сейчас, в дни 
кризиса, тоже. Значит, мы выбрали самый подходящий момент заглянуть в прошлое и разобраться в нас 
настоящих.” 
337 “Да потому, что никто из тиранов, уходя, никогда не впадал в какие-то сомнения – ни Петр I, ни 
Сталин, ни Калигула. У Ивана же это было. Смерть сына он воспринял как наказание. Это убедило его, 
что что-то он не так делает. Письма, синодики, в которых он поминает всех убиенных, и, конечно же, 
собственные боли и болезнь стали говорить ему, что он не Бог. Он вопросы стал себе задавать. Именно в 
тот момент, когда я это понял, мне стало интересно анализировать его поступки.” 
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mistaken acting upon their beliefs, and that is a very sad thing” (Хлобыстова 2009).338 Ac-
cording to Eshpai, the aim of revisiting history should ultimately be to learn from historical 
mistakes and overcome our inner propensity for evil: 
If we understand where we erred, understand to what we are entitled and to what we are not, if we repent – 
that would already be a big step forward. Otherwise we will commit even more terrible mistakes than before. 
And this is particularly frightful when it concerns those in power. You understand perfectly well what would 
happen in that case… (Хлобыстова 2009).339 
The allusion to the crimes committed by Stalin’s regime in this remark is unmistakable. 
Yet, in equal measure, this call for self-reflection and the overcoming of historical patterns 
clearly alludes to twenty-first-century politics. 
The TV series contains many violent scenes, some of which are uncomfortable to watch. 
Throughout the series, and particularly in the episode on the oprichnina, the characters en-
gage in various types of torture, (mass) murder and rape, all of which are depicted fairly 
explicitly. Already as a teen, Ivan is involved in the abduction and rape of young women and 
on a few occasions the Tsar personally takes part in torturing suspects and convicts. While the 
series in no way excuses these violent acts, it offers a framework to understand the Tsar’s acts 
of cruelty against his allies, enemies and citizens. Shortly before he assumes the throne, 
Metropolitan Makarii, a close advisor to Ivan, endows the young Tsar with a higher mission. 
Reminding him of his glorious descent – from the Roman emperor Augustus, Riurik, and the 
emperors of Byzantium – Makarii asserts that in Ivan, as in the Russian princes before him, 
the two historical Romes are united: the Rome of the Caesars and Byzantium. “Byzantium has 
fallen under the Turkish yoke but,” the Metropolitan states with a meaningful pause, “the city 
[grad] of Moscow remains. The Third Rome! And as the last remaining [ruler] you must pre-
serve it!”340 Ivan protests that he is not ready to take on such a responsibility, but Makarii 
insists: 
Byzantium passed the beacon [ogon’] of faith on to us. We are the last to preserve her flame [svet]. And the 
tsar is like the highest igumen [abbot, M.W.]. Understand, grand prince, that this is not about you, but about 
Christianity, [it is about] how the apostles, martyrs and saints preserved it. The most simple person, the very 
last, can live freely because they bear responsibility only for themselves before God. But you…you are re-
                                                 
338 “Человечество ведь так часто ошибается в вере в свои идеи, и это очень грустно.” 
339 “Если мы поймем, где заблуждались, поймем, на что мы имеем право, а на что нет, если покаемся - 
это уже будет большое движение вперед. Если же нет – мы будем совершать еще более жуткие промахи, 
чем раньше. А это особенно страшно, когда дело касается власть предержащих. Сами понимаете, что за 
этим следует…” 
340 “Пала под турецким игом Византия но есть… есть град Москва. Третий Рим! И последним ты беречь 
его должен!” 
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sponsible for all of the people. […] Understand, lord, that the Russian state cannot exist without a monarch. 
[…] because we are the heirs of Greek Orthodoxy, which Byzantium has now betrayed under pressure from 
the Ottoman yoke.341 
Ivan’s actions, he urges, will decide the fate and survival of both the Russian state and the 
Orthodox faith. It is only upon Makarii’s insistence that Ivan agrees to ascend the throne. 
Throughout his life, he perceives the crown to be a burden and on repeated occasions asks 
rhetorically to be released from his predestined duty. His self-sacrifice for the sake of the 
state’s survival and his purported lack of power-seeking behaviour at first resonate strongly 
with the myth that has formed around Putin’s ascension to power and his selfless acceptance 
of the “burden” of state leadership. 
The series reiterates the standard narrative’s division of Ivan’s rule into distinct phases: the 
good tsar, the cruel tsar and the repentant tsar. The endorsement of Karamzin’s characterisa-
tion of Ivan is affirmed by the concluding shot of the series, where the historian is quoted. 
Ivan’s somewhat troubled youth is presented as a formative phase, contributing to the behav-
iours he adopts later in life. His exposure to violence and the behavioural patterns he picks up 
from observing court life shine through during the German language lessons the young boy 
receives from his mother. When she asks him to translate the verb “to hang,” Ivan replies 
“Hang whom?” In a similar vein, the boy wonders whether the object of the verb “to cut” 
(rubit’) would be a cabbage or a head. Another telling moment is when Ivan fails to remem-
ber the German word for “goodness,” but is able to instantly offer translations for “evil,” 
“state” and “power.” The word “European” (evropeets) prompts the boy to think about Rus-
sia’s identity and somewhat confused, he asks, “Mama, and who are we then? Asians?” She 
replies, reassuringly, that they are Russians (Rusi): “Also Europe, but [a] different [Europe]” 
(Tozhe Evropa, no drugaia). Growing up, the relationship with his regent, Ivan Shuiskii, 
whom he perceives as oppressive, is particularly problematic. Ivan’s first wife, Anastasiia, on 
the other hand, has a pronouncedly positive effect on his mental calm and actions. Despite the 
serious difficulties they encounter in raising an heir to the throne (two of their children die at 
a young age), their marriage is portrayed as a union of love. When Anastasiia dies as a result 
of poisoning, Ivan is heartbroken and his character takes a turn for the worse. Apart from 
Anastasiia, the portrayal of all female characters is markedly negative. Driven by their lust for 
                                                 
341 “Византия нам огонь веры передала. Мы последние ее свет храним. А царь это уж как верховный 
игумен. […] Пойми, Великий князь, не о тебе сейчас речь, а о христианстве, каким сохраняли ему 
апостолы, мученики, святые люди. Самый простой человек, самый последний может быть свободен 
потому, что только сам по себя ответственность несет перед богом. А ты: ты ответишь на весь народ. 
[…] Пойми, государь, без монарха русскому государству не быть […] потому что мы наследователи 
греческого православия, которое ныне Византия предана под давлением османского ига.” 
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power, they manipulate their environments and, time and again, turn out to be the driving 
force behind conspiracies and crimes committed by men. 
The transition between the phases – from troubled youth to benevolent ruler during his first 
marriage, and ultimately to the outright cruel despotism that follows his wife’s death – is mir-
rored by changes in his entourage. In visually comparable scenes, the viewer sees his closest 
circle of advisors change in composition: the boyars and clergy at the beginning of his reign 
yield to the new oprichniki who come to make up half of his advisors; then the council con-
sists solely of oprichniki only to revert, finally, back to a small group of boyars. The 
appearance of Maliuta Skuratov in particular signals a turning point. As Ivan’s main execu-
tioner, Maliuta is depicted as having a twofold negative influence. First, Maliuta advocates an 
alternative moral standard to that of forgiveness, which he had adhered to under the influence 
of metropolitans Makarii and Sylvester and his first wife. Under the sway of Maliuta, Ivan 
soon adopts the executioner’s motto “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” Second, 
Maliuta implements a system of intelligence collection that exacerbates Ivan’s paranoia. As 
reports on alleged conspiracies against the Tsar continue to mount, Ivan becomes over-
whelmed and starts to distrust even his most loyal advisors. The intelligence Maliuta gathers, 
however, in reality constitutes systematic disinformation: on several occasions it is suggested 
that accusation letters are false (for example, because they are not signed) and that the oprich-
niki have planted incriminating materials on innocent suspects to warrant taking repressive 
action against them.  
In addition to the influence of his entourage, a second factor affecting Ivan’s behaviour is 
the “heavenly response” to his actions. Medieval Russia is portrayed as a society guided by 
superstition, signs, premonitions and heavenly signs in the clouds. When the city of Moscow 
burns down, Ivan interprets the calamity as a punishment for sinful behaviour. Conversely, 
acts of benevolence are rewarded with the conquest of Kazan and the birth of an heir to the 
throne. While Ivan and various other characters are routinely shown praying, the notion of 
“the repenting tsar” features only in the episode on Metropolitan Filipp. The issue of (exces-
sive) confession and repentance is made explicit once, when Filipp remarks that Ivan has 
turned confession into a habit. His repentance, therefore, lacks substance. As long as Ivan 
fails to change his actions – the sign of actual repentance – Filipp refuses to pronounce his 
blessing. 
Proponents of Ivan typically cite his education, eloquence and desire to develop his coun-
try intellectually; therefore, he could not have been a complete madman or outright tyrant (see 
the analysis of The Trial of Time towards the end of this chapter for examples of this 
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argument). The topic of his intellectual sophistication appears in the TV series in a slightly 
forced manner. As a young man, Ivan demonstrates interest in books, and his knowledge of 
many languages is mentioned. Moreover, he is complimented on his writing. But the motif of 
Ivan’s educated nature largely disappears as soon as he ascends the throne. A second narrative 
line, connected to this argument, concerns the deacon Ivan Fedorov who is sent to Cracow to 
study and establish a print yard upon returning to Moscow. The printing of religious books 
encounters stark resistance from the Church, which seeks to prosecute Fedorov and his fel-
low, Petr Mstislavets. After the print yard has burned down as a result of arson, Fedorov asks 
the Tsar for assistance and protection. Notwithstanding Ivan’s support for the printing prac-
tice (recall how Ivan is called the “patron of book printing” on the memorial plaque in 
Archangelsk), Fedorov and Mstislavets flee to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to escape 
persecution. 
The episode in which Ivan abdicates and retreats to Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda, iconically 
depicted in Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, is rewritten to follow the historical account more 
closely. Instead of agreeing to return to Moscow upon the request of the Russian people (as 
the Stalinist interpretation had it) the entire episode is presented as a clever political play to 
force the boyars into submission. Unable to exert control over the citizenry in the Tsar’s ab-
sence, the boyar envoy agrees to grant the ruler absolute power. In its representation of the 
oprichnina that is established upon the Tsar’s return, there are no traces of the “new 
oprichnina” discourse described earlier. The oprichnina is but a means for absolutism and, 
above all, for carrying out state terror. After its establishment, stories of betrayal dominate the 
narrative. While some conspiracies are real, many more are false – based on contrived allega-
tions. As mentioned, the stream of intelligence reports (often of doubtful accuracy) intensifies 
Ivan’s paranoia. Therefore, while on the one hand it is evident that Ivan acts violently against 
loyal state servants (and their innocent families), the portrayal of his involvement in the sys-
tem of intelligence gathering, to a certain extent, places the blame beyond him. He acts upon 
the information he is given, information that – the viewer knows – is incorrect. It is interest-
ing to note that “arch-traitor” Prince Andrei Kurbskii is portrayed as loyal. The series 
suggests that the motivation for defecting to the enemy lies in the atmosphere of (false) alle-
gations and conspiracies at court. As even the loyal boyars, one after the other, suffer the 
wrath of Ivan and his oprichniki, Kurbskii is convinced he will be next. To the viewer, the 
case of Kurbskii can be read as a reference to more recent examples of those who have fallen 
out of favour with the regime or have chosen refuge in the West, such as Boris Berezovskii 
and Mikhail Khodorkovskii. 
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The depiction of Russia’s foreign policy, in particular, suggests contemporary parallels. 
Russia’s relations with the West and the East as they are depicted in the series are based on 
opposed logics. The countries beyond its western border – in particular Lithuania, Sweden 
and Germany – are seen as enemies who are seeking to expand their influence eastward (cf. 
the eastward expansion of NATO). The countries to the east, on the contrary, are perceived as 
not as enemies but as targets for Russia’s own expansionary policy. In addition, there is a 
measure of differentiation with regard to the group of Western states, as becomes clear when 
Ivan’s court is visited by foreign envoys dispatched by Queen Elizabeth of England and, on 
another occasion, the Pope of Rome. The contrast in their visits’ purposes, as well as in Ivan’s 
response to their requests, echoes the polarised depiction of court envoys in Aleksandr: The 
Neva Battle (see Chapter 4). The English envoy seeks to establish trade relations, primarily to 
obtain the natural resources needed for the construction of a naval fleet, a proposal the Tsar 
gladly endorses. Yet, as the troubled journey of the delegation to Moscow confirms, there are 
political obstacles to overcome: since the Swedes and “Germans” obstructed naval passage 
across the Baltic Sea, the delegation was forced to take the hazardous northern route, and two 
of its vessels were lost (an echo of Eisenstein’s Ivan). As the envoy points out, they share 
interests and enemies, as England aspires to expand to the east and Russia to the west. Under 
the pretext of trade relations, Ivan thus forms a strategic alliance in support of his effort to 
gain access to the Baltic Sea. The strategic pragmatism of the arrangement resembles 
Aleksandr Nevksii’s negotiations with Tatar delegates.  
The envoy from Rome, to the contrary, is portrayed as deceitful. While ostensibly offering 
assistance in Ivan’s military pursuits, his true aim is to convert the Russian people. Ivan is not 
deceived, however, and refuses to abandon the religion of his ancestors. In a telling confronta-
tion, the envoy argues that while Russia strives to be part of Europe, it will never be treated as 
an equal because its people live “in barbarity.” Enraged, Ivan counters the accusation by 
pointing out that is it the Catholics who engage in barbaric acts and seek to (violently) subject 
the whole of Europe to their control. Aleksandr Nevskii, in a similar vein, cited violence and 
expansionism to express the (moral) superiority of Orthodoxy over Roman Catholicism. The 
two Western envoys represent opposing foundations for Russo-European relations in the 
twenty-first century. The first is a type of pragmatic relationship, in which Russia is treated as 
an equal partner. This is the scheme that the Kremlin would like to see realised. The second 
envoy, on the contrary, epitomises the attitude that the regime accuses the West of adopting in 
its stead, and that is perceived by the Kremlin as threatening: a Europe that imposes its belief 
system on Russia and refuses to accept the country as its equal. 
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Television critic Sergei Tsyrkun correctly points out that the series is a radical departure 
from previous cinematic interpretations in how it represents Ivan’s character: neither confi-
dent nor mad, Eshpai’s Ivan is first and foremost tormented by doubt and self-questioning. In 
Tsyrkun’s reading, this doubt originates from the Tsar’s frustrated desire to change Russian 
society: 
You get the impression that it is not the belief in his own strength, but the feeling of powerlessness in relation 
to the cycle of life surrounding him that evokes some kind of panicked aggression in the tsar. […] We are not 
used to seeing Ivan this way. The Terrible Tsar is usually depicted as sublime (velichestvennym) and self-
confident, as Nikolai Cherkasov played him [in Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, M.W.]. However, in reality, 
there were other sides to him as well. […] The authors of the film succeeded in laying bare the human quali-
ties of Ivan the Terrible by turning him into a conversation partner for the viewer. In one of the scenes he 
suddenly asks his fiancée Anastasiia: “Do you pity me?” This questions appears to be directed to the viewer 
(Цыркун 2009).342 
The dependence on guidance from his entourage noted earlier is clearly linked to the fear 
and uncertainty Tsyrkun highlights in his review. As a result, the TV series chips away at the 
Stalinist image of Ivan, while simultaneously adopting a somewhat apologetic stance with 
regard to the excessive violence he inflicted. In this respect, it is important to remind the 
reader that this position echoes the government’s positive reappraisal of the legacy of Stalin 
during the period when the series was produced (see Introduction). At the same time, 
however, by showing the excesses to which autocratic rule can lead, the series also makes an 
(admittedly modest) argument against the concentration of power and its far-reaching conse-
quences. As we will see, the film Tsar, released the same year, introduces yet another 
reinterpretation of Ivan’s personality and motives by focusing on Ivan’s eschatological beliefs 
that, in a way, express the same innate fear highlighted by the TV series. Unlike the series, 
however, the latter production clearly formulates a political critique. 
According to TNS Gallup Media, Ivan the Terrible was the third most popular TV series in 
Russia during its first week. Some 19.5 per cent of the total viewing audience tuned in to the 
episode broadcast on 13 May (“Телерейтинги” 2009a). The final episodes attracted a mark-
edly lower number of viewers: an absolute drop from 6.9 to 5.6 per cent of the sample group, 
                                                 
342 “Складывается впечатление, что не уверенность в своей силе, а ощущение беспомощности перед 
круговоротом окружающего бытия вызывает в царе какую-то паническую агрессию. […] Мы не 
привыкли видеть Ивана таким. Грозный царь представляется обычно величественным и уверенным в 
себе, каким сыграл его Николай Черкасов. Однако в действительности в нем было и другое. […] 
Создателям фильма удалось раскрыть человеческие качества Ивана Грозного, сделав его собеседником 
зрителя. В одном из эпизодов он внезапно спрашивает свою невесту Анастасию: ‘ты жалеешь меня?’ 
Этот вопрос, похоже, обращен к зрителю.” 
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representing a mere 16.7 per cent of the total number of viewers during primetime on 21 May 
(“Телерейтинги” 2009b).343 Online viewer comments on the websites Kinopoisk, Ruskino, 
Kino-teatr and Imkhonet show a mixed audience response. Some commenters greatly appre-
ciated the series. For example, “Diadia Patrik” remarks “Great series. The few historical 
mistakes do not harm it at all” (Дядя Патрик 2010).344 Another commenter concludes, “Here 
you have everything in one…Classic Russian historical cinema! It has it all: and drama, and 
beauty and love…Wonderful!!!!” (akini 2009).345  
The review of comments reveals that many viewers approached the series as a film about 
history and therefore set out to assess whether or not it depicts Ivan “correctly,” rather than as 
an exploration of character – the more likely intention of the series. For example: 
The filmmakers [kinoshniki] made a heinous lampoon about Russian history. Their Ivan is a hysterical alco-
holic, whose intellectual level corresponds to the average goat butcher [drunk] on beer and vodka. But the 
real Ivan was a poet and composer, he had a wonderful library, and generally he was a wise ruler who ex-
panded the borders of Russia further than any other. […] All accusations from the side of the westerniser 
Karamzin and his less articulate followers are founded on the letters of traitor Kurbskii and other resentful 
persons. And that is like writing the history of the Patriotic War on the basis of the books by [Viktor] Rezun-
Suvorov [Russian historical revisionist writer, M.W.], ignoring other available sources (Гость_Владимир 
Пантелеев 2009).346 
The author of the comment continues by placing the TV series in the context of a continu-
ing anti-Russian smear campaign orchestrated by the West.  
All nations constantly emphasise their historical achievements, albeit out of a feeling of self-conservation, 
but only our socialist traitors, led by the West that is deadly afraid of us, not only pull out the most problem-
atic episodes in our history, but even cover them generously with their unsophisticated speculations and 
outright lies. It is understandable, when various pugs in the Baltics, Georgia and so on do such things, but 
                                                 
343 TNS Gallup Media provides two markers of popularity: rating and share. Rating refers to the percentage of 
participants of the survey who watched the programme. Since the sample size is static, it is an absolute figure 
that can be used to compare programmes broadcast at different times. Share is the percentage adjusted for the 
total number of viewers at time of broadcasting, which indicates the programme’s relative popularity in relation 
to shows broadcast at the same time. 
344 “Отличные [sic] сериал. Несколько исторических ошибок его никак не портят.” 
345 “А вот это все в одном…Классическое русское историческое кино! Все в нем: и драмма [sic], и 
красота и любовь…Замечательно!!!!” 
346 “Киношники сделали гнусный пасквиль на русскую историю. Их Иван – это истеричный алкаш, 
интеллектуальный уровень которого соответствует среднему забивателю козла под пиво с водочкой. А 
реальный Иван был поэтом и композитором, у него была замечательная библиотека, и вообще он был 
мудрым правителем, расширившим границы России более, чем кто либо. […] Все обвинения западник 
Карамзин и его менее членораздельные последователи строят на посланиях изменника Курбского и 
других обиженных. А это то же самое, как если бы, проигнорировав имеющиеся источники, писать 
историю Отечественной войны по книгам Резуна-Суворова.” 
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when an openly anti-Russian film is shown on channel ‘Rossiia’ it is bitter and offensive (Гость_Владимир 
Пантелеев 2009).347 
The revisiting of darker periods in Russian history and the humanisation of Ivan are thus 
seen to be aspects of an “anti-Russian” act driven by the West.  
What is particularly relevant with regard to my analysis is that commenters indicate vari-
ous parallels between the TV series and other historical events, as well as with older cultural 
productions. For instance, one commenter was simultaneously reminded of multiple phases in 
the development of Soviet cinema.  
The actor who plays Vasilii, the father of Ivan, looks very much like a secretary of the partkom [Party Com-
mittee, M.W.] or the director of a kolkhoz in Soviet films of the likes of “The Eternal Call” [1973-1983 TV 
series, M.W.]. And the actor who languidly plays Ivan as an adult looks like [Igor] Tal’kov [Soviet singer, 
M.W.]… His hair and beard are cut in a contemporary style and he does not look like Tsar Ivan but like some 
boy-majeure [son of well-to-do parents, M.W.] in an ’80s film, spoiled by his wealthy parents (Frigirifico 
2009).348  
Particularly noteworthy is the following remark: “The duet between Maliuta and the tsar 
smacks of the duet between Beriia and Stalin,” referring to the balance of power between the 
Soviet leader and the head of the NKVD (vitalyklichko 2009).349 The comment is unsurpris-
ing given the longstanding tradition of conflating Ivan and Stalin, which I noted earlier. Yet it 
would be problematic, of course, if the authors indeed intended Ivan and Maliuta to be read as 
an allusion to Stalin and Beriia. It would mean that, in parallel with the series’ depiction of 
Ivan and Maliuta, a similar shift of responsibility for the systemic violence from “tsar” to “ex-
ecutioner” would apply to Stalin. If the suggested parallel holds, Stalin should then be seen as 
being duped by the web of misinformation created by Beriia. While some viewers may have 
read parallels with Putin’s Russia into the depiction of Ivan as well, the picture that would 
emerge is complex, and not necessarily positive: while, on the one hand, certain acts of 
                                                 
347 “Однако все народы, хотя бы из чувства самосохранения, постоянно подчеркивают свои исторические 
достижения, и только наши социал-предатели, идя на поводу у смертельно боящегося нас Запада, не 
только вытягивают самые проблемные эпизоды нашей истории, но и обильно поливают их своими 
нехитрыми домыслами и откровенной ложью. Понятно, когда этим занимаются разные моськи в 
Прибалтике, Грузии и т.д., но когда откровенно антирусский фильм идет по каналу ‘Россия’, то 
становится горько и обидно.” The same comment, but without the final sentence quoted here, was also posted 
under a similar username on Kino-Teatr some two weeks earlier (Пантелеев 2009). This could indicate that the 
comments were posted not by an actual viewer but by a bot or an individual seeking to influence the online dis-
course using a fake username, see Stähle & Wijermars (2014). 
348 “Актер, играющий Василия, отца Ивана очень похож на секретаря парткома или директора колхоза из 
советских фильмов типа ‘Вечная зова’ […]. А вот актер, томно играющий Ивана-взрослого и похожий на 
Талькова… У него по-современному подстриженные волосы и борода и похож он не на царя Ивана, а на 
какого-то мальчика-мажора из фильма 80-х годов, забалованного богатенькими родителями.” 
349 “Дуэт Малюты и царя сильно смахивает на дуэт Берии и Сталина.” 
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repression are excused by placing the blame on Ivan’s entourage and, in particular, Maliuta, 
the personality of the Tsar as it is depicted in the series is quite the opposite of the image that 
has been cultivated of Putin as the head of state. Therefore, as a (pro-Kremlin) political state-
ment, the series is ambiguous at best.  
To conclude, two matters deserve mention. First, the suggestion that Dostal’ was already 
working on the project in 2006 gives us an important clue about the initial incentive for the 
TV series. This would mean that the production was initiated directly in the wake of the first 
peak of oprichnina discourse (associated with, in particular, Dugin) and within the context of 
policy changes instituted in response to the colour revolutions. This is also around the time 
when Sorokin published his anti-utopian novel Day of the Oprichnik. Second, when viewed in 
light of the year in which it was eventually broadcast, the TV series largely echoes the core 
elements of official memory politics at that time, as well as the regime’s foreign policy objec-
tives. Still, as the online discussions about the TV series demonstrate, the memory of Ivan 
does not easily lend itself to political mobilisation, even if the state would indeed have in-
tended it to. The sheer divergence of opinions and interpretations, and the varying viewing 
strategies they reveal, testify to the complexity of the memory, as well as the lasting impact of 
previously mediated images on the appreciation of later representations. 
Tsar 
That same year, on 4 November, Pavel Lungin’s feature film Tsar (2009) had its Russian 
premiere. The film competed in the Un Certain Regard section of the Cannes Film Festival in 
2009 and was generally well received internationally. In 2010, it was awarded two Nika 
awards350 for “Best male role” (Oleg Iankovskii) and “Best art direction” (Sergei Ivanov), and 
was nominated in two more categories, including “Best film.” Unlike the TV series, the film 
concentrates on a particular episode during Ivan’s rule: the period when Filipp served as 
Metropolitan of Moscow and defiantly criticised the Tsar’s violent repressions via the oprich-
nina. The moral and, by extension, political confrontation between Ivan and Filipp stands at 
the heart of the narrative. By isolating the conflict with Filipp, the director takes the notion of 
“multiple Ivans” out of the equation; because the evil he exposes is not counterbalanced by 
earlier successes or stints of nobler behaviour, it has to be taken at face value. To Lungin, 
Ivan symbolises the recurrence of state-sponsored violence, as well as the “somewhat 
                                                 
350 The Nika Award is Russia’s most important film prize, awarded annually by the Russian Academy of Cinema 
Arts and Science. Since 2002, the Russian Academy of Cinematic Arts has hosted a competing awards ceremony 
- the Golden Eagle Award – for cinema and television productions. 
 230 
masochistic love” that dictators such as Ivan and Stalin continue to receive in Russia 
(Шигарева 2008).351 
In general, [Ivan the] Terrible is one of the key themes to our country because precisely he changed the entire 
history of Russia. His ghost looms over us to this day; sometimes drawing closer, at other times receding. 
Currently it is receding, thank God. But there were times, when it flew up very close. Ivan the Terrible is 
Russia’s eternal temptation (Шигарева 2008).352 
Lungin’s perception that the ghost of Ivan is receding is highly significant for the evalua-
tion of the film’s political intention. 
Lungin’s depiction of Ivan, who is played by the actor and singer Petr Mamonov, sparked 
harsh criticism from various groups in society. As the reviewer for Novaia gazeta noted: 
Not just the Orthodox and deputies are arguing about the film, which touches upon the metaphysical layers of 
national history, but also serious scientists, philosophers, clergymen. The main stumbling block is the repre-
sentation of Ivan Vasil’evich. In the film, the tsar is compared with the Antichrist, with a Caesar breaking 
faith, [or] even a vampire: he is frightening, with a single tooth glistening, falling from the ecstasy of prayer 
into the ecstasy of murder (Малюкова 2010).353 
Lungin indeed presents a terrifying image of a tsar driven by apocalyptic religious beliefs 
and paranoia (though the description “vampire,” perhaps, does not do justice to the complexi-
ty and depth of Mamonov’s performance). Metropolitan Filipp, played by Oleg Iankovskii, 
one of Russia’s most famous actors, who passed away shortly before the premiere, functions 
as his negative image; he grasps reality, is composed, acquiescent and morally superior. In a 
way, the film is as much about (Saint) Filipp as it is about Ivan, which is confirmed by the 
fact that Iankovskii sought the blessing of Patriarch Aleksii II for playing the role. By depict-
ing Filipp’s martyrdom, the film acts almost as a twenty-first-century hagiography. Filipp’s 
composure and actions are saintly in every way: he is unyielding in his moral beliefs, unfazed 
by direct confrontations with evil that threaten his life. He even performs a miracle shortly 
before he gets killed. Filipp’s ability to act without political intent is thus markedly different 
from the at times pragmatic ways in which the ROC has defined its relation to the state in 
post-Soviet Russia. Notwithstanding the pervasive Orthodox overtones and the ROC’s official 
                                                 
351 “немного мазохистскую любовь.” 
352 “Вообще тема Грозного - одна из основных для нашей страны, потому что именно он изменил всю 
российскую историю. Призрак его витает над нами до сих пор, то приближаясь, то удаляясь. Сейчас, 
слава богу, отдаляется. А бывало, подлетал очень близко. Иван Грозный - это вечное искушение России.” 
353  “О фильме, затрагивающем метафизические пласты отечественной истории, спорят не только 
ортодоксы и депутаты, но и серьезные ученые, философы, священники. Главным камнем преткновения 
стал образ Ивана Васильевича. Царя в фильме сравнивают с антихристом, вероломным кесарем, даже 
вампиром: он страшен, сверкает единственным зубом, впадая из экстаза молитвы в экстаз душегубства.” 
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support, the production was fiercely contested in certain Orthodox circles, as will later be dis-
cussed in greater detail. 
The confrontation between tsar and metropolitan plays out against the backdrop of rela-
tions triangulated among ruler, entourage (boyars, oprichniki, clergy) and the people. The film 
thereby engages with three current political matters of great significance: first, the 
increasingly close relations between the state and the ROC; second, the struggle between the 
president and the oligarchs; and finally, the concentration of power in the figure of Vladimir 
Putin and the question of popular support. The film can be seen as a critique on all three 
counts. With regard to the latter issue, the subjugation of citizens and their dependence on the 
ruler’s guidance is epitomised in a scene that makes a direct reference to Eistenstein’s Ivan 
the Terrible. The scene is set shortly before the Tsar summons Filipp to his court to replace 
the previous candidate for the metropolitan throne, whom he rejected for his criticism of the 
oprichnina. Ivan publicly laments that there is no metropolitan in Moscow and is joined by 
his subjects in a long procession. As the Tsar is pulled across the snow on a carpet, the people 
form a winding line behind him. The image Lungin creates is reminiscent of the procession 
gathering at Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda to beg for the Tsar’s return in Eisenstein’s classic de-
piction of subjection to the monarch. The visual quotation reinforces the contradictory 
message. As Kevin Platt vividly asserts: “[W]hile the original shows the common people 
longing to submit to the order of their tsar […] Lungin’s remake shows the Russian people 
being swept along with Ivan in his foam-at-the-mouth madness” (Platt 2010). When read as a 
critique of current political issues, the recasting of the relation between ruler and subjects, as 
one based not on a “social contract” but rather on the exploitation of dependency and emo-
tion, would directly challenge the Putin myth (see Chapter 5).  
As was the case in the TV series, Ivan is significantly influenced by his entourage. The dy-
namic between the Tsar and his closest group of oprichniki at times resembles that of a gang 
of young men, here dressed in black and dark-blue with their hoods pulled down, provoking 
one another to make the next moves in their tyrannical game of violence. Filipp tries his best 
to counteract this spiral of violence but Ivan is past redemption. As the struggle between ruler 
and metropolitan unfolds, it becomes ever more clear that Ivan has lost all touch with any 
moral sense. Reinforced in his paranoia by Maliuta, he is unable to objectively reflect on his 
actions. Lungin allows for a hint of tragedy, as Ivan appears to be yearning for guidance but, 
when given counsel, is unable to accept it. The Tsar masks his overruling of Filipp’s advice 
by quoting the scriptures and in other ways undermining the position of the metropolitan as a 
moral authority. Here we can see a clear reflection of the one-sided pragmatism with which 
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the Russian government has long approached its relations with the ROC, seeking closer ties as 
far as it has suited its domestic and foreign policy ends (see Chapter 4). As tsar, Ivan main-
tains, he is accountable to God alone, not to His worldly servant. He furthermore 
differentiates between how he should be judged as a man and as ruler. The condition of ex-
ceptionality Ivan creates for himself refutes the moral restrictions on his behaviour suggested 
by Filipp. More generally, his perception of the world around him is selective and made to fit 
his preconceptions. Ivan thus creates his own truth, in particular with regard to the tortures 
and murders committed by the oprichniki. For example, whenever the Tsar benevolently 
grants mercy to a suspect, Maliuta and his squad execute the order not by returning him to 
freedom but by killing him. And as Ivan acts upon confessions obtained “without torture,” 
these have, in reality, been extracted through violent intimidation. Ivan’s pretence of igno-
rance concerning (the excesses of) the rampage led by Maliuta is shown to be a self-induced 
delusion. 
Whereas in the TV series Ivan was firmly in control of the political game, albeit growing 
increasingly volatile and paranoid, in Tsar he often appears to have completely disconnected 
from reality. Withdrawn into his mind and absorbed in his obsessive mental ramblings, Ivan 
is seemingly unaware of what goes on around him. In one of the scenes, he sits outside in the 
courtyard. As he reads out loud from the scriptures, people are being chased and assaulted 
around him. Immersed in his reading, Ivan is seemingly unaware of the ongoing brutalities. 
Filipp enters the courtyard and is appalled by what he sees; here, he acts as witness to the sys-
tematic cruelty that Ivan no longer is able or willing to take notice of. At times, Ivan even 
appears to be hallucinating. After granting mercy to one of his boyars (who was granted free-
dom via death) the Tsar wakes up in the middle of the night and starts talking to himself, 
acting out both sides of a conversation with his victim. The nightmare of guilt is a clear indi-
cation that, in reality, Ivan is well aware of how Maliuta executes an order of purported 
benevolence. 
I agree with Kevin Platt that the film’s political message is both self-evident and contradic-
tory. On the one hand it “debate[s] the relationship between subjects and state and the legacy 
of despotic authoritarian politics in Russia today,” and should be regarded as “a manifesto on 
contemporary society and politics” (Platt 2010). At first glance, the unforgiving depiction of 
Ivan “would appear to unite it with other anti-tyrannical representations of Ivan and Stalin, 
such as Sorokin’s Day in the Life of an Oprichnik, which warn against a possible resurgence 
of tyranny” (ibidem). While the film unmistakably warns against the concentration of power 
in the hands of a single individual, Lungin’s remark about the receding ghost of Ivan’s 
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tyranny, quoted earlier, suggests that his criticism of the regime was less pronounced than, for 
instance, Sorokin’s (or that Lungin was optimistic about the changes brought about by the 
presidency of Medvedev). At the same time, however, as Platt points out, Lungin’s “critique 
is also aimed at the anarchy, amorality and spiritual emptiness of the present”:  
In this latter aspect, it participates in the current backlash against the excesses and anarchy of the 1990s and 
resonates with the longing for traditional patriotic values and order that dominates much political rhetoric in 
Russia these days – tendencies that have supported the consolidation of power in Putin’s “sovereign democ-
racy” (Platt 2010). 
Lungin has indeed noted that the resemblance between contemporary Russia and the latter 
stages of Ivan’s rule lies in how the lack of a sense of purpose (smysl) has brought society to a 
breaking point: 
On the basis of some complicated calculations, the year 1566 somehow rhymed with the number of the Dev-
il, 666, to them [Russian society at that time, M.W.]. And the whole country was firmly convinced their final 
days were approaching. And, in a strange way, this feeling of the end of the world, of Doomsday, the feeling 
that, in expectation of the Last Judgement all is permitted, is very familiar to us. Evidently, today, just like 
almost five centuries ago, we are once again reaching a low point. And after this we will start to ascend; 
towards a life, full of some kind of meaning (Шигарева 2008).354 
The film thus simultaneously challenges and reiterates the central tenets of the regime’s 
political discourse; it acknowledges that Russian society is in need of a cure, but disapproves 
of the treatment it has been given. 
As mentioned earlier, the film elicited harsh responses. The journalist and historian 
Viacheslav Maniagin, who has published extensively on Ivan the Terrible’s reign, even ad-
dressed an open letter to President Medvedev demanding that the film be taken out of 
cinemas. He argued that it maligned the founder of the Russian state and falsified history.355 
The choice of words here is hardly coincidental since a copy of the letter was also sent to the 
Commission against the Falsification of History. According to Maniagin, allowing the “false” 
depiction of Ivan the Terrible to circulate freely would be not just undesirable but harmful to 
Russia and especially to her image abroad: 
But if you believe that the founder of our state was such a tyrant, then it is also possible to believe that con-
temporary Russia, as they say in the West, is a stronghold of totalitarianism, tyranny, an antidemocratic, 
                                                 
354 “Путем каких-то сложных расчетов 1566 год каким-то образом рифмовался у них с числом Зверя - 
666. И вся страна жила в полной уверенности, что приходят последние дни. И вот это чувство конца 
мира, конца света, ощущение, что в процессе ожидания Страшного суда все позволено, оно странным 
образом нам близко. Видимо, сейчас мы, как и почти пять веков назад, вновь доходим до нижней точки. 
А потом начнем подниматься вверх - к жизни, наполненной каким-то смыслом.” 
355 For an analysis of the historical and historiographical sources Lungin’s film draws upon, see Halperin (2013). 
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antipublic [antinarodnym] state, ruled by inadequate individuals [ne sovsem adekvatnye lichnosti] 
(Малюкова 2010).356 
Maniagin is not the only public figure to take offence at the film. In an open letter pub-
lished in Izvestiia on 13 January 2010, Boiko-Velikii, who was already introduced above, 
accused Lungin of falsifying history and committing blasphemy. In the letter, he enumerates 
each point where, he claims, the storyline of the film is not supported by historical evidence. 
For instance, he argues that the depiction both of Ivan’s character and of the oprichnina itself 
is faulty and deceptive: 
The oprichniki did not drench the country in blood. The oprichnina was aimed at eradicating boyar treason 
and the Heresy of the Judaizers and concerned only individual boyar families, part of the clergy that had 
lapsed into heresy and those representatives of the capital, Tver and Novgorod “elites” who were willing to 
cooperate with catholic Rome. The Russian people preserved the memory of Tsar Ivan as a just Tsar in their 
chronicles, songs and byliny (Бойко-Великий 2010).357 
In the opinion of Boiko-Velikii, the offence committed by Lungin through his interpreta-
tion of the events at Ivan’s court is exceptionally grave – even graver, he claims, than the 
betrayal by Prince Andrei Kurbskii: 
Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich Groznii was already slandered during his lifetime: by the traitor and deserter Andrei 
Kurbskii and many others, and after his life a flood of defamations descended upon him. But Pavel Lungin, 
Aleksei Ivanov, Petr Mamonov and others who were involved in the scenario and creation of this film have 
exceeded, in our opinion, all slanderers and villains that have accumulated over the course of five centuries 
(ibidem).358 
Boiko’s strong response exemplifies how Ivan’s contemporary proponents counter any 
form of critical assessment of his legacy by labelling it an anti-patriotic act (a type of rhetoric 
that has become problematically pervasive during Putin’s third presidential term).  
Some weeks later, there was an incident at the award ceremony for “Person of the Year 
2009,” organised by information agency RBK, where Lungin received an award for his 
                                                 
356 “А если поверить в то, что основатель нашего государства был таким тираном, то можно поверить и в 
то, что современная Россия, как говорят на Западе, является оплотом тоталитаризма, тирании, 
антидемократичным, антинародным государством, которым правят не совсем адекватные личности.” 
357  “Опричники не заливали страну кровью. Опричнина была направлена на искоренение боярской 
измены и ереси жидовствующих и коснулась лишь отдельных боярских родов, части впавшего в ересь 
духовенства и тех представителей столичной, тверской и новгородской ‘элиты’, готовых к 
сотрудничеству с католическим Римом. Россия же тогда была страной в основном крестьянской. Русский 
народ в летописях, песнях и былинах сохранил память о Царе Иоанне как о справедливом Царе.” 
358 “На Царя Иоанна Васильевича Грозного клеветали и при жизни: предатель и перебежчик Андрей 
Курбский и многие другие, и после жизни на него обрушились потоки клеветы. Но Павел Лунгин, 
Алексей Иванов, Петр Мамонов и другие, причастные к сценарию и созданию этого фильма, по нашему 
мнению, превзошли всех клеветников и негодяев, скопившихся за пять столетий.” 
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contribution to the development of Russian cinema. Boiko-Velikii, who was also among the 
awardees for his contribution to developing a tradition of Orthodox maecenatism, seized the 
opportunity to criticise Lungin’s film in his acceptance speech. According to a reporter for 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, Boiko urged contemporary sponsors of culture to reconsider the types of 
projects they were investing in, stating that “Lungin is a good director, but Tsar is an awful 
and unreliable film” (Волчкова 2010).359 For one of the actors, the criticism had personal 
consequences. Ivan Okhlobystin, a popular actor and (since 2001) Orthodox priest who 
played the role of court jester Vassian, asked Patriarch Kirill to release him from his priestly 
vows in response to the critique the film and he himself had received. He felt he could no 
longer credibly combine both aspects of his life (“Отец Иоанн Охлобыстин хочет оставить 
служение священника” 2009). 
Nikolai Uskov, a medieval historian and (then) the editor-in-chief of the Russian journal 
GQ, commented on the flood of criticism in an opinion piece for Nezavisimaia gazeta. In a 
highly critical piece, he challenges the “self-proclaimed patriots” who were attacking Lungin 
by arguing that “[Ivan], of course, was white and fluffy, murdered very few people and did so 
solely for the sake of the greatness of Russia” (Усков 2009).360 Uskov argues that no “think-
ing person” would voluntarily support the state-centred, destructive type of patriotism 
espoused by these individuals. In fact, the admiration for figures such as Ivan the Terrible, he 
claims, is indicative of fundamental issues that continue to hamper the development of Russia 
into a modern society. To do credit to Uskov’s argument, I quote him here at length. The po-
sition that Uskov sketches in the first few lines corresponds to the core message of the state’s 
memory politics and its supporters. 
Ancient people said: “Our motherland is there, where life is good.” Our patriot has begotten something para-
doxical: “Our motherland is there, where life is bad.” From his point of view, the worse, like in the times of 
Ivan the Terrible or Stalin, the better. The thinking individuals […] induce panic, they say Russia can disap-
pear, that domestic and foreign enemies will rip her apart, will tear her into pieces. To prevent this, all of us 
have to stand with our pants pulled down as well. I always wanted to object to these thinking individuals. 
Perhaps, just let that kind of country [takaia strana] disappear. Perhaps, after centuries of forcing the people 
to stand with their pants pulled down and contriving all sorts of theories about the sublime mission of ex-
traordinary ghouls [vydaiushchikhsia upyrei] it has been enough. Because I believe that no one is threatening 
Russia; who needs our problems, except for us? In these times, we have to remember one thing: that, in your 
motherland, life has to be good. In the globalised world, countries compete with each other for human capi-
tal, for the most highly educated, energetic, creative people. The individual does not exist for the government 
                                                 
359 “Лунгин – хороший режиссер, но ‘Царь’ – фильм ужасный и недостоверный.” 
360 “Он, конечно, был белым и пушистым, погубил совсем мало людей и исключительно ради величия 
России.” 
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but the government exist for the individual – that is the foundational principle of modern society. Otherwise, 
the little men [liudishki], as Ivan Vasil’evich would put it, will run away. Of course, in such a system it will 
be considerably harder for thinking individuals to pass their own interests off as mystical ones and, generally, 
will have to work and not just nag. But, gentleman, that is exactly why you are thinking individuals (Усков 
2009).361 
Uskov’s appeal to the “thinking people” to break the repetitive cycles characterised by the 
repressive submission of the Russian people to the needs of the state appeared at a time when 
memory politics activity was peaking in Russia. Indeed, his plea should be read as a direct 
response to and critique of its core elements. The heated debates surrounding the film expose 
mounting tensions regarding the state’s patriotic rhetoric, in particular among the cultural 
elite. While the increasing reliance on patriotism and the historical justification of politics was 
criticised by some as being merely a façade to legitimise an authoritarian system of govern-
ance – the opinion expressed by Uskov – for others such as Boiko-Velikii, the regime, on the 
contrary, remained insufficiently conservative and traditionalist. 
The Trial of Time 
The sharp polarisation of opinions about Ivan’s legacy, and how these standpoints are as-
sumed to reflect one’s political orientation, are most evident in the final example I want to 
discuss. The talk show The Trial of Time (Sud vremeni) aired in the second half of 2010 on 
Channel Five, which at the time was a TV channel with a distinctly liberal orientation. Mim-
icking the format of a court of law, the show put historical personalities and events on trial. 
The political relevance of the historical questions under discussion was heightened by the 
evident political leanings of the show’s hosts – the well-known television journalist and histo-
rian Nikolai Svanidze in the role of judge, and journalist Leonid Mlechin and political figure 
and theatre director Sergei Kurginian as prosecutor and defence attorney. What is particularly 
                                                 
361 “Древние говорили: ‘Где хорошо, там и родина’. Наш патриот породил парадоксальное: ‘Где плохо, 
там и родина’. Чем хуже, как во времена Ивана Грозного или Сталина, тем, с его точки зрения, лучше. 
Думающие люди […] пугают, дескать Россия может исчезнуть, внутренние и внешние враги разорвут ее, 
растащат на куски. Чтобы этого не случилось, надо всем так же стоять со спущенными штанами. Мне 
всегда хотелось возразить этим думающим людям. Может быть, пусть уже исчезнет такая страна. 
Может, хватит веками заставлять народ стоять со спущенными штанами и придумывать всякие теории о 
высокой миссии выдающихся упырей. Я вот считаю, что никто России не угрожает – кому нужны наши 
проблемы, кроме нас самих? Только по нынешним временам следует помнить – на родине должно быть 
хорошо. В глобальном мире страны конкурируют между собой за человеческий капитал, за наиболее 
образованных, энергичных, креативных людей. Не человек для государства, а государство для человека – 
таков основополагающий принцип современного общества. Иначе разбегутся людишки, как выразился 
бы Иван Васильевич. Конечно, при такой системе думающим людям будет значительно труднее 
выдавать собственные интересы за мистические и вообще придется работать, а не только пилить. Но, 
господа, на то вы и думающие люди.” 
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insightful about this case is that a telling discrepancy soon became apparent between the re-
sults of the studio-audience vote – siding with the liberally inclined Mlechin – and the opinion 
of viewers at home as expressed through online and telephone voting – supporting the “pro-
Soviet” conservative views of Kurginian. Whereas typically the discussions about history are 
the object of societal commentary, here it was the voting dynamics that triggered debate. So 
much so, in fact, that the producers felt compelled to dedicate a special broadcast to the issue. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, dedicated in its entirety to the show’s revealing pro-
duction history, this broadcast, which was appropriately named “The Trial of The Trial” (Sud 
nad Sudom), set out to discuss the “incorrect” (i.e., anti-liberal) voting of the home audience 
and how it should be interpreted. Why was the audience of a liberal TV channel not siding 
with the liberal standpoint represented by Mlechin?  
The talk show was cancelled after only a few months, despite its popularity and evident 
societal resonance. In part, this was the direct result of a managerial takeover and rebranding 
of the channel (I demonstrate how Channel Five was thus “brought in line” with state interests 
in Chapter 7). But in a surprise turn of events, the show made a comeback on state-owned 
Channel One. I will return to “The Trial of The Trial” special broadcast and the show’s can-
cellation and reappearance in the next chapter since it shows the politics of television 
programming at work. Also, The Trial of Time is a rare case where it is actually possible to 
directly trace the interaction among the levels in memory politics, namely those of the state, 
political and cultural elites, media and audiences. Within the context of the current chapter, 
however, my discussion of the programme limits itself to the three-part episode about Ivan the 
Terrible. 
To fully appreciate the significance of the show and its discussions, it is important to point 
out that Kurginian has since used the popularity of The Trial of Time as a springboard to cre-
ate his own political platform. After the show was cancelled, he launched a series of online 
video lectures on history (in particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union) and associated polit-
ical matters under the name “The Essence of Time” (Sut’ vremeni). In Russian, the difference 
in name is but one letter and the two words (sud vs. sut’) sound very similar. The online 
community that formed around the lectures soon developed into an offline social movement 
under the same name, complete with weekly newspaper and regular participation in rallies. In 
2012, Kurginian published the book The Essence of Time: The Philosophical Rationale of 
Russian Messianic Pretences in the 21th Century,362 which outlines the foundations for the 
                                                 
362 Суть времени. Философское обоснование мессианских претензий России в XXI веке. 
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movement’s political agenda. He is one of the driving forces behind contemporary Russian 
messianism, which increasingly influences the state’s political discourse. The Trial of Time, 
as well as its successor that will be discussed in the next chapter, proved to be suitable plat-
forms for one of the “godfathers of post-Soviet conservatism” to mediate his views on Russia 
– past and present – and rally support for his view of Russia’s future, which Maria Engström 
has summarised as “The Soviet Union 2.0.” (Engström 2014: 359). 
Ivan the Terrible 
As already noted, the debate about Ivan the Terrible on The Trial of Time illustrates the polar-
isation of views on his legacy in contemporary Russia. Pitching liberal against conservative 
understandings of his rule, the show revolves around the question of the permissibility of re-
pression and state violence under exceptional circumstances. The confrontation between 
Kurginian and Mlechin reflects a fundamental difference between state-aligned and opposi-
tional memory politics. As I indicated briefly in the introductory chapter, state-aligned forces 
tend towards the opinion that certain restrictive measures are necessary to safeguard stability 
and stave off revolution. Those holding oppositional views, to the contrary, turn this black-
and-white opposition between order and chaos inside out and recast such enforced, top-down 
stability as repression. The debate thereby points towards a fundamental point of contention 
between liberal and conservative views on the role of the Russian state. Here it has to be 
stressed, however, that Kurginian’s position is significantly more extreme than that of the 
central government at the time. 
In the programme, in response to the central question “Ivan IV: bloody tyrant or successful 
political actor?” three main issues emerge as the debate develops. The first two reflect key 
aspects of the memory politics debate: whether modernisation must go hand in hand with au-
thoritarianism, and to what extent violence can be justified by exceptional circumstances. 
Regarding the issue of modernisation, the question is posed whether is it possible to carry out 
substantial reforms without increasing state control and enacting (excessive) violence. 
Kurginian argues that this is, indeed, an unavoidable fact of historical political development. 
Mlechin, on the contrary, asserts that this is only partly the case. To carry out fundamental 
reforms, a certain measure of authoritarianism may indeed be required; yet, he argues, one has 
to take into consideration the cost exacted by such progress. In particular, Mlechin feels that 
certain excrescences of authoritarian rule, such as waging war against one’s one people, are 
unnecessary and can harm state interests. Such unwarranted acts of violence should therefore 
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be condemned rather than condoned or rationalised. His argument clearly refers to contempo-
rary attitudes towards Stalin as well as Ivan. 
The second dominant issue concerns the historical contextualisation of Ivan’s rule and, in 
particular, how his actions compare to those of other, equally bloody medieval rulers. Was 
Ivan an exceptionally violent ruler, or was he simply a product of his time? For example, after 
enumerating the number of victims of sixteenth-century state repression in England and 
France, Kurginian concludes that Ivan acted in accord with the norms of the era; therefore, 
any claims about extreme cruelty are fictitious “fantasy” (fentezi). His line of argument mir-
rors how Il’ia Glazunov chose to defend Ivan on The Name Is Russia (see Chapter 4). 
Moreover, he argues that the oprichnina (and, by extension, all acts of cruelty associated with 
Ivan’s reign) should be viewed as an historical anomaly. Displaying a clear disregard for the 
crimes committed by the Soviet state, Kurginian maintains that the oprichnina was a unique 
deviation from the “special Russian path, which is particularly peaceful, particularly human-
istic, [and] in which atrocities never occurred.” 363  Mlechin does not go along with the 
reductionism of the proposed logic. In the discussion of tyranny, the inevitable comparison 
between Ivan and Stalin is eventually raised. For instance, the film director Pavel Lungin, 
who is called as a witness by Mlechin because of his work on Tsar, comments: “We can talk 
about tyrants. We can talk about Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. But no one asserts that Iosif 
Vissarionovich went into some cellar and personally took part in tortures. [But] he [Ivan the 
Terrible, M.W.] personally performed tortures.”364 The comparison between Ivan and Stalin is 
not explored in detail, however, and appears to be purposefully circumvented by both 
Mlechin and Kurginian.  
The final issue that is repeatedly raised is the enduring question of whether Ivan suffered 
from mental illness. The debate revolves around the argument, introduced by Kurginian, that 
Ivan’s intellectual and artistic talents would refute allegations of insanity (though he leaves 
open the possibility that Ivan was schizophrenic). Kurginian’s lyrical praise of Ivan’s “mas-
tery of the word” and “almost encyclopaedic” knowledge evokes a stark response from 
Svanidze: 
                                                 
363 “нашему особому русскому пути, который особо мирный, особо гуманистический, в котором никогда 
не было каких-либо злодеяний.” 
364 “Мы можем говорить о тиранах. Мы можем говорить об Иосифе Виссарионовиче Сталине. Но никто 
не скажет, что Иосиф Виссарионович ушел куда-то туда в подвал и лично принимал участия в пытках. 
Он пытал лично.” 
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The talents of Ivan the Terrible are beyond doubt. […] But, you know, it so happens that Hitler was a pretty 
good artist. Stalin wrote poetry. Mao Zedong wrote poetry. Pol Pot studied at a French university. They were 
all very bright, creative individuals.365 
That Ivan possessed exceptional intellectual and artistic capacities, therefore, says little 
about his mental stability, nor does it prove “ethical adequacy.” In Kurginian’s propagandistic 
style of reasoning, however, rhetorical effect takes precedence over logic. What is particularly 
alarming, then, is the home audience’s unfaltering support for Kurginian’s position. 
At several instances, the discussion goes beyond an analysis of the past and the exploration 
of subtle historical parallels and evolves into a direct commentary on present-day socio-
political issues. For example, as he addresses the question of waging war against one’s own 
people, Kurginian links the topic directly to the danger posed by separatism and terrorism to 
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation today. Such “separatist hotbed[s],” he 
claims, typically end in the break-up of a state. To underscore his argument, Kurginian evokes 
with evident exaggeration the traumatic experience of the dissolution of the Soviet Union:  
You have already seen this happen once, when the break-up of the Soviet Union caused millions of deaths, 
about which simply no one speaks. You already saw how these separatist tendencies ended in – of course not 
the [actual] burning of people at the stake – but with chopping of heads with blunt grub axes.366  
Here he refers to his personal experience when visiting the Central Asian cities of Fergana 
in Uzbekistan and Osh in Kyrgyzstan. Yet, he warns, this potential contagion could all too 
easily spread to Russia as well.  
And you see that the Russian Federation crumbles as well. A place you should fight for as if it were the last 
stronghold. A place where you understand that further disintegration will be final. And [you understand] that 
you simply give away your state and your civilians to the delight of whichever terrorist gangs. You start to 
fight a war. That is horrible. It is tragic. It should not be glorified. But isn’t it a historical necessity?367 
His argument echoes the rhetorical opposition between stability and collapse that forms the 
foundation of governmental memory politics, but amplifies it to the extreme. 
                                                 
365  “Таланты Ивана Грозного несомненные. […] Но, знаете, как получается, Гитлер был неплохой 
художник. Сталин стихи писал. Мао Цээдун писал стихи. Пол Пот учился во французском университете. 
Все – очень яркие творческие личности.” 
366 “Ты уже увидел однажды, что распад Советского Союза породил миллионы погибших людей, о 
которых просто никто не говорит. Ты уже увидел, как эти сепаратистские тенденции оборачиваются тем, 
что, конечно, не сжигают на кострах, но мотыгами тупыми рубят головы.” 
367 “И ты видишь, что так же распадается Российская Федерация. Место, за которое ты должен бороться, 
как за последний оплот. Место, в котором ты понимаешь, что дальше распад оказывается 
окончательным. И что ты просто отдаешь свое государство и своих граждан на потеху любым 
террористическим бандам. Ты начинаешь воевать. Это ужасно. Это трагично. Это даже нельзя 
восхвалять. Но разве это не есть историческая необходимость?” 
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Kurginian’s emotional appeal is one of several instances where past and present are inter-
laced. Lungin even directly refers to the contemporary debate that frames the oprichnina as a 
typically Russian way of modernisation that I discussed earlier. He summarises the argument 
as follows: “Fortunately, we do not have [Ivan] the Terrible [Groznogo], but we do have the 
oprichnina. It is a norm of life in Russia! This is our modernisation.”368 Lungin disagrees, 
however. “Wrong!” he says, “Russia is not that kind of country!”369 Lungin’s final verdict 
about the Tsar is emphatically negative: Ivan is “the author of the Time of Troubles.”370  
Kurginian’s rhetorical methods deserve particular attention. In the debate with Mlechin, as 
well as in his interaction with the experts invited as “witnesses,” he habitually adopts a cyni-
cal stance. When the historian Igor’ Pavlovskii, a professor at the Moscow State University, 
points out that Russia was in a state of “moral decline” under Ivan the Terrible, Kurginian 
undermines Pavlovskii’s credibility by ridiculing the sources this claim is based on. “How can 
we quantitatively demonstrate the moral decline of the people in this period? With focus 
groups? Sociological questionnaires? Neurolinguistics?” Kurginian asks.371 The enumeration 
of objective-sounding sociological research methods, all of which are of course unavailable to 
the medieval historian, has the desired effect: the fact that Pavlovskii has based his estimation 
on period memoirs now comes across as speculative and unreliable. On other occasions, 
Kurginian takes the logic underlying the opposing party’s position and pushes it to the ex-
treme. For example, Mlechin criticises Ivan’s waging of war against his own population, 
which was not, moreover, in the service of direct state interests. He argues that Ivan’s impli-
cation in the resulting deaths should, therefore, be viewed as a particular kind of serial killing, 
rather than as the unfortunate but inescapable by-product of medieval state conduct. 
Kurginian then connects the question of a war waged against one’s people to the American 
Civil War. Should, then, the generals involved and the actions taken to counter the secession 
of the Southern states also be denounced as “not humane”? It was, after all, “a civil war in the 
super democratic United States” (emphasis added).372 He ends such “logical” arguments with 
a series of rhetorical questions:  
                                                 
368  “Грозного, к счастью, нет, но опричнина-то есть! Она есть норма жизни России! Это наша 
модернизация.” 
369 “Неправда!!! Россия не такая страна!!!” 
370 “автор Смутного времени.”  
371 “Чем количественно можно доказать падение нравственности народа в указанный период? Фокус-
группами? Социологическими опросами? Нейролингвистикой?” 
372 “гражданская война в супердемократичных Соединенных Штатах.” 
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But exactly from this, contemporary America was born. And now let’s ask ourselves the question. But what 
if it had not happened? Then there would be no state. And what would have come in its place?373 
The aim of such logical interventions is to suggest that the liberal position is overly opti-
mistic or even naïve about the recurrence and necessity of violence in historical development. 
Such accusations exacerbate the negative image of liberalism in Russia resulting from the 
experiences with neoliberal “shock therapy” reform during the 1990s. Here, Kurginian also 
accuses Mlechin of applying double standards and, consequently, of violating scientific 
norms. Russia is judged harshly while similar violent episodes in other countries are glossed 
over, so he claims. While Kurginian’s appeal for adhering to scientific standards finds little 
actual cause in Mlechin’s argumentation, the accusation is no less rhetorically persuasive. 
Both sides agree that, to reach a final conclusion on Ivan’s rule and legacy, the outcomes 
of his rule should be a principal factor. Their perceptions of the outcomes are, however, radi-
cally opposed. To Mlechin, the two phases of Ivan’s period of power represent two paths of 
development. The first, the “establishment of a normal system of life,” merits emulation while 
the second, “war against one’s own people,” has to be rejected. The end result of Ivan’s rule, 
Mlechin concludes, was “monstrous for Russia.”374 For Kurginian, the hackneyed cliché of 
territorial expansion is sufficient ground to judge the outcomes positively. The Tsar who “uni-
fied Siberia,” captured Kazan and Astrakhan and “in fact, thereby established the state”375 
should necessarily be considered successful. Kurginian refers to other historical leaders with 
complex legacies to argue that their “plusses and minuses” are a fact of history that has to be 
accepted; acts of violence, he asserts, do not preclude political greatness. In fact, it would be 
“absurd” to characterise “he, who won the Battle of Poltava and defeated Sweden” (i.e., Peter 
the Great) and “he, who did some other things [kotoryi sdelal chto-to eshche] and won the 
Great Patriotic War” (i.e., Stalin) as tyrants.376  
I despise tyranny no less than those, who exclaim their hatred of it here! And precisely to prevent tyranny we 
need our history in its entirety. We need to return to our own history! To understand it and recognise that we 
have a lot of great historical figures, great politicians. Outstanding [figures] with their plusses and minuses. 
                                                 
373 “Но ведь это родило современную Америку. А теперь зададимся вопросом. А если бы этого не было? 
То не было бы государства. А что было бы на его месте?” 
374 “создание нормальной системы жизни”; “война с собственным народом”; “чудовищный для России.” 
375 “фактически, тем самым, создал государство.” 
376 “Человек, который победил под Полтавой и победил Швецию”; “Человек, который сделал что-то еще 
и победил в Великой Отечественной войне.” 
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And as we understand and relive this [history] we will find our path! We will rise to our feet. We will no 
longer be a country with a broken historical backbone.377 
The voting results are unsurprising. While the majority of the studio audience (73 per cent) 
believes Ivan the Terrible was a “bloody tyrant,” the overwhelming majority of viewers (87 
per cent) deems him a “successful political actor.” In his concluding remarks, Svanidze com-
ments on the positive appreciation of Ivan in folk songs and tales, including in those 
originating in Novgorod where the repression was particularly merciless. “Nowadays,” he 
remarks, “this would be called Stockholm syndrome,” referring to the psychological condition 
where a hostage develops sympathy for his captor. Moreover, he adds in evident reference to 
contemporary debates regarding the need for a strong hand in politics, it is a condition which 
periodically repeats itself in Russia. 
Conclusion 
Around the time when the TV series and feature film about Ivan were released, various 
memes began to circulate online in which a photoshopped version of Repin’s painting Ivan 
the Terrible and His Son Ivan shows the Terrible Tsar “killing” all kinds of persons and, in 
particular, other artworks. In these memes, the distressed Tsar pressing his son’s lifeless body 
against him becomes a vampire-like figure, sucking the life out of whatever he gets his hands 
on: from Ivan Kramskoi’s Portrait of an Unknown Woman to Kuzma Petrov-Vodkin’s Bath-
ing of the Red Horse and Vladimir Malevich’s Black Square.378 More recently, the motif 
reappeared in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. This time, it is the nation of Ukraine – 
depicted via the country’s outline in yellow and blue – that suffers the Tsar’s wrath (JoyReac-
tor 2014). The meme illustrates the versatility and recognisability of the figure of Ivan, as 
well as the complexity and extremely politicised nature of his memory. While for some Ivan 
stands for the might and supremacy of the Russian state (or, indeed, of Russia as a Eurasian 
Empire), for others he symbolises the atrocities committed by this very state and the extreme 
toll that Russian imperial greatness has taken on its population throughout history. As this 
chapter has shown, the meanings attributed to the oprichnina are contradictory. What the 
groups and individuals who mobilise this particular cultural memory have in common, how-
ever, is their highly critical stance towards the political establishment. Taking various 
                                                 
377 “Я ненавижу тиранию ничуть не меньше, чем те, кто здесь восклицает о ненависти к ней! И именно 
для того, чтобы тирании не было, нам нужна наша история – во всей ее полноте. Нам надо вернуться в 
собственную историю! Понять ее и признать, что у нас много великих исторических деятелей, великих 
политиков. Выдающихся – с их плюсами и минусами. И когда мы это поймем и переживем – мы найдем 
свой путь! Мы станем на ноги. Мы перестанем быть страной со сломанным историческом хребтом.” 
378 For a compilations of examples, see meme database JoyReactor (2010). 
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political, ideological and religious beliefs as points of departure, they employ the memory of 
Ivan and his oprichnina to challenge or undermine the current regime and the political system 
in which it operates. As a cultural memory with a particularly subversive potential, the figure 
of Ivan allows itself to be exploited for divergent political agendas, from re-establishing the 
Orthodox monarchy or creating a Soviet Union 2.0. to demanding democratisation and re-
spect for fundamental civil rights.  
The complexity of the memory, which is the direct result of its remediation history and the 
memory chain it invokes, makes it highly unstable. The conflation of Ivan and Stalin further 
exacerbates this volatility. Whereas, in the cases of the Time of Troubles and Aleksandr 
Nevskii the fact that the memory of each had been mobilised as part of Stalinist propaganda 
had a somewhat positive effect on its employability in the interests of the regime, the opposite 
is the case for Ivan. Why this is the case parallels in many ways the state’s paradoxical atti-
tude towards the memory of Stalin. To be able to benefit from the powerful patriotic 
symbolism of the victory in the Second World War, governmental memory politics has at-
tempted to separate Stalin, the commander of the Red Army who secured victory in the war, 
on the one hand, from the Stalin who orchestrated terror against his own population, on the 
other. While the memories of the end of the Time of Troubles and Aleksandr Nevskii are re-
lated to the positive former aspect of the memory of Stalin, it is to the second image of 
tyranny that the memory of Ivan is inescapably bound. Therefore, as long as the conflicting 





7. The Trial of Time 
 
The previous chapter introduced the talk show The Trial of Time and discussed the tensions 
between liberal and conservative views on Russian statehood revealed by the debate on Ivan 
the Terrible. In this final chapter I take the programme’s production history as my point of 
departure to examine state interference in television programming about history. What con-
clusions can be drawn about the developments within state television during the second half 
of Medvedev’s presidency on the basis of the talk show’s cancellation and its subsequent 
“upgrade” to Channel One? The case is of particular significance to the overall aim of this 
study since it illustrates how media outlets, in this case Channel Five, have been “brought into 
line” with state interests. In addition, the show is a rare case where the different levels of 
memory politics – those of the state, elites, media and the general public – come together. 
The Trial of Time premiered on Channel Five in the summer of 2010 as one of several 
shows to debut during the off-season. It replaced the talk show Freedom of Thought (Svoboda 
mysli), presented by Kseniia Sobchak, who would go on to become one of the faces of the 
protest movement in the winter of 2011, and was recorded in the same studio with little or no 
changes to the set. Mimicking the format of a court of law, the show put historical personali-
ties and events on trial. As we have seen, history is almost by definition perceived to be 
political in contemporary Russia. In this particular case, the relevance of the historical ques-
tions under discussion was heightened even further by the evident political dispositions of the 
show’s hosts – Nikolai Svanidze in the role of judge, and Leonid Mlechin and Sergei 
Kurginian as prosecutor and defence attorney. While many off-season programmes fail to be 
renewed for following seasons, The Trial of Time soon proved popular. In addition, the socie-
tal divisions it appeared to uncover stirred heated discussions: while Channel Five had a 
distinctly liberal profile at the time, the show’s viewers at home were voting in support of the 
conservative “pro-Soviet” views of Kurginian, instead of those expressed by the liberally 
inclined Mlechin. At the same time, the members of the studio audience were voting 
“correctly” – that is, they sided with Mlechin. According to Vera Tsvetkova, writing for 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, viewers and television critics alike found the show’s “intellectual dis-
cussion” to be emotionally captivating:  
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Some even believe “The Trial of Time” is more than just a show; in any case, this talk show has become the 
television [event], and perhaps even the societal event of the summer (Цветкова 2010).379 
Sergei Muratov, in his annual review of Russian television for Iskusstvo Kino, also praised 
it as “the most poignant, controversial and, in my opinion, one of the best shows of the dec-
ade” (Муратов 2011).380 
The objectives of The Trial of Time reflect the image of Channel Five as a critical alterna-
tive to Channel One and other state-aligned channels. According to producer Natal’ia 
Nikonova, the show’s principal aim was to “find the truth” and rid it of “mythological layers” 
(Дыховичный 2010). To clarify the project’s objectives, Nikonova juxtaposes it with the 
2008 project The Name Is Russia that was discussed in Chapter 4: 
So if we differentiate it from the programme “The Name is Russia,” [the latter] was truly a grand project that 
singled out something primary for Russians, something important. That is, it did not delve into details and 
detailed elaboration was not important; what was important was to clarify what is essential in the present, 
which person, which hero is important for Russians. Our program is sufficiently detailed and reconstructs in 
detail the event that is important to the program and tries to reveal the truth. I realise that it is a principally 
different project; it is a completely different framework of analysis (ibidem).381 
Vladimir Khamynia, the general director of National Media Group Television (NMG), 
Channel Five’s majority shareholder, agreed that countering existing “myths” about Russian 
history should be one of the show’s main objectives. 
We turn to history in order to understand our contemporary self […] The first challenge is […] to peel away, 
if not to remove the outer shell of all kinds of myths, stereotypes, clichés, [and] labels that have been at-
tached to this or that person in our history, to this or that event [or] this or that decision during various 
periods of our lives. After all, even in my lifetime […] the appraisal of [various events in Russian history] 
changed multiple times. I am not even talking about people who are older; they already [encountered] several 
of such, so to say, opposite [poliarnykh] appraisals of one and the same historical event (ibidem).382 
                                                 
379 “Кое-кто даже считает, что ‘Суд времени’ - это больше, чем передача; во всяком случае, это ток-шоу 
стало телевизионным, а возможно, и общественным событием лета.” 
380  “И, наконец, возникла самая острая, спорная и, по моему мнению, одна из лучших передач 
десятилетия — ‘Суд времени’.” 
381 “То есть если мы отталкиваемся от программы ‘Имя России,’ это, действительно, был грандиозный 
проект, который вычленял нечто главное для россиян, нечто важное. То есть там не копались в деталях и 
не важна была детализация, а важно было прояснить, что же сейчас важно, какой персонаж, какой герой 
важен для россиян. Наша программа – она достаточно подробно и детально восстанавливает важное для 
этой программы событие и пытается прояснить истину. Я понимаю, что это принципиально другой 
проект – это совершенно другая рамка для анализа.” 
382 “Мы обращаемся к истории для того, чтобы понять нас сегодняшних […]. Первая задача […] это 
отслоить, что ли, убрать шелуху всякого рода мифов, стереотипов, штампов, ярлыков, которые 
навешивались на тех или иных персонажей нашей истории, на те или иные события, на те или иные 
решения в различные периоды нашей жизни. Ведь, вот, даже за мою жизнь различные события 
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The show’s hosts were known to have outspoken political views, and the assignment of 
opposing sides on the topic under discussion was directly related to their political disposi-
tions. As a result, the debates conflate past and present in two respects. First, historical 
parallels are drawn out and the subject is often placed explicitly within the context of current 
affairs. Then, these pseudo-historical debates are organised along evidently political lines 
(liberal vs. conservative) and, at times, revolve entirely around a discussion of the present. 
The potential for the show to function as a platform for political and not just historical discus-
sion in this way was enhanced by its strategies for viewer engagement. The participation of 
viewers through Internet and telephone voting, in addition to the (most likely carefully 
screened) studio audience, significantly influenced the show’s dynamics and societal reso-
nance. The voting results, without fail, demonstrated a clear-cut opposition between the home 
and studio audiences. Consider, for example, the response to the question of whether the 
Bolsheviks saved or destroyed Russia. The results of the online vote were 88 per cent in fa-
vour of “saved.” In similar fashion, 72 per cent of the telephone votes supported the positive 
appraisal of the Bolsheviks. Of the studio audience, on the contrary, 71 per cent was of the 
opinion that the Bolsheviks destroyed Russia.  
The Trial of The Trial of Time 
To discuss the “incorrect” (i.e., anti-liberal) voting of the home audience and how it should be 
interpreted, a special broadcast was aired, appropriately entitled the “Trial of The Trial” (Sud 
nad Sudom). On 7 October 2010, the special episode was broadcast in which the talk show 
judged itself rather than Russian history. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this remarka-
ble act of self-reflection on television occurred in direct response to the uproar caused by the 
talk show’s debates and, in particular, its voting practices. As occasional host Nika Strizhak 
summarises in her introduction: 
[t]he forum went out of its mind, the telephones went crazy, viewers starting calling us, [and] critics started 
to scorch us. Some accused us of enforcing liberal ideas, [while] others said we trampled liberal ideas. They 
were even saying that we have somewhat incorrect viewers and that the channel has the right to, you know, 
to cheat somewhat and to alter the [results of the] voting somewhat (“Стенограммы суда времени. 24” 
n.d.).383 
                                                                                                                                                        
российской истории, оценка этих событий менялась не раз. Я уж не говорю о людях, которые старше, - 
там таких полярных, что ли, оценок одного и того же события в истории было уже несколько.” 
383 “Но здесь сошел с ума форум, сошли с ума телефоны, нам стали звонить зрители, нас стали ругать 
критики: одни нас стали обвинять в том, что мы насаждаем либеральные идеи, другие стали говорить, 
что затаптываем либеральные идеи. Стали даже говорить, что у нас какие-то неправильные зрители и что 
канал-то имеет право, знаете, что-нибудь подмухлевать и что-нибудь в голосовании там поменять.” 
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The special broadcast aimed to examine these voting patterns, to explain them and draw 
the necessary conclusions about how the programme should continue. During the special 
broadcast, emotions ran high. According to someone at the taping, some of the more heated 
clashes were even cut from the final edit (Ларина 2011). What is particularly significant to 
the overall aim of this study is that the discussion touches on the social function of television 
and, in particular, of Channel Five as a liberally oriented channel; on the importance of histo-
ry in contemporary Russia and what the attitudes towards the Soviet past say about the 
“success” of post-Soviet democratisation and liberalisation; and on the perceived divide be-
tween the “intelligentsia” and the general public. The explanations put forward by the invited 
guests and experts underline why it is essential to take public opinion into account when ex-
amining memory politics. Otherwise, it is not possible to assess the reception or impact of the 
political mobilisation of history. At the same time, the discussion also demonstrates the inher-
ent limitations in reliably assessing popular sentiments. Can the voting results of The Trial of 
Time indeed be interpreted as a valid representation of public opinion and, moreover, as a 
direct reflection of its viewers’ political preferences? 
According to one line of interpretation, the voting results prove that a gap exists between 
the more liberally inclined metropolitan “elite” – represented by the studio audience – and 
“ordinary people” – the viewers at home. Iurii Poliakov, the editor-in-chief of Literaturnaia 
Gazeta, for instance, argues that the studio audience consists for the most part of “representa-
tives […] of the Moscow intelligentsia or future Moscow intelligentsia, mostly oriented on 
liberal values or closer to these values. And their views differ greatly from the views of 
Russia.” Here, a liberal political disposition is thus equated with anti-Soviet views, while a 
positive appraisal of the Soviet era is thought to correspond to a conservative political out-
look. Daniil Dondurei, the editor-in-chief of Russian cinema journal Iskusstvo kino, further 
argues that the voting results showcase how little actual change has occurred in people’s 
thinking over the last two decades. He asserts that it shows that 
[t]he reforms haven’t started yet. That the majority of the population does not even live in the year 1991 but 
sometime considerably earlier. That in our country the overwhelming majority does not accept the regime 
described in the Constitution.384  
Assuming the same equation of an anti-Soviet stance on Russian history and liberal political 
views, a connected argument sees the voting results as proof that liberal-democratic thinking 
                                                 
384  “Реформы еще не начались. Что большинство населения не живет даже в 1991 году, а где-то 
значительно раньше. Что в нашей стране подавляющее большинство населения не принимает тот строй, 
который описан в Конституции.” 
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has failed to take hold in Russia. Yet, as Ekho Moskvy radio commentator Vitalii Dymarskii 
remarks, a 25 per cent share in support of the liberal ideal actually signals quite a significant 
change: “And if this 25 per cent, these voters in favour of the liberal idea, would have the 
opportunity to vote for this liberal idea not only on television, then it would not even be that 
bad,” he adds.385  
Others question whether it is correct to make such far-reaching assumptions on the basis of 
the voting results, and with good reason: lacking proper systemic execution, the polls can 
hardly be regarded as a scientifically reliable sociological indicator. Among other things, the 
“sample group” is insufficiently large to be representative of the population (in particular, the 
studio group) and was not collected randomly. Also, the questions were suggestively phrased 
and one could vote multiple times. The experts in sociological research who were present in 
the studio agree that there are some methodological reasons to take issue with conclusions 
drawn from the process; the voting was simply not intended to be a sociological survey. 
However, when the voting results are compared to formal opinion polls on similar questions, 
the latter show tendencies that clearly overlap with the home voting results. The main differ-
ence is that the formal polls are somewhat less polarised because they include a third option – 
“difficult to say.” 
After it has been established that the trend suggested by the voting results confirms certain 
sociological findings, a number of additional questions must be raised. For instance, it is sug-
gested that the voting results also point to fundamental fault lines between age groups in 
Russian society. According to this argument, telephone voters tend to be older viewers, online 
voters are more likely to belong to the younger generation, and the studio audience would 
largely be of working age. The latter group, then, would be more liberally inclined, while the 
older and younger generations, it is argued, tend to have a more positive stance on the Soviet 
past. This claim, again, appears to be confirmed a poll conducted by Fond Obshchestvennoe 
Mnenie that is cited on the show. When asked a similar question about the outcomes of the 
Bolshevik takeover, the responses, when split into age brackets, show that the oldest age 
group views its impact positively. The age group of 40-to-50-year-olds interprets the 
Bolshevik legacy negatively, while the younger generation (including the “Putin generation”) 
is undecided.  
The latter outcome has important implications pertaining to the state’s efficacy in employ-
ing memory politics in support of its legitimacy. It means that the polarisation of society on 
                                                 
385  “И если бы эти 25% этих голосующих за либеральную идею имели бы возможность за эту же 
либеральную идею голосовать не только на телевидении, то было бы не так плохо.” 
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matters of history along political lines, as the show’s voting patterns appeared to indicate and 
which all the experts featured on the show agreed to be the case, had at that time not yet taken 
root among the younger generation. On the one hand, the undecidedness of this generation 
can be taken as a positive sign with regard to the possibility that a truly diverse public debate 
may develop in Russia (in other words, that a functioning civil society will emerge and 
evolve). That the largest anti-governmental protests in recent Russian history took place not 
long afterwards affirms this potential. On the other hand, however, it also points towards the 
existence of a very large group whose opinions could still be shaped. The regime’s emphasis 
on patriotic education demonstrates its recognition that its potential to influence views on 
history and, by extension, politics, was greatest within this group. With the benefit of hind-
sight, we now know that the balance shifted in favour of increased polarisation rather than 
increased diversity of public discourse. 
Finally, the special broadcast highlights the role played by media, and in particular televi-
sion, in shaping the political views of their audiences. Some of the guests point out that the 
difference between the studio and home audiences may be connected to the audience mem-
bers voting at the end of the programme – that is, after they have listened to the debate in its 
entirety; viewers at home (could have) started voting as soon as the show begins. Therefore, 
they assert, the home vote is more likely to be based on predetermined preferences instead of 
a careful consideration of the arguments. In other words, the viewer’s opinion depends on the 
host they identify most strongly with. Indeed, as is evident from the vote count shown on 
screen, viewers started voting even before the topic was introduced. The large majority of 
these votes were in support of Kurginian. Here it is worth recalling that in the case of The 
Name Is Russia (discussed in Chapter 4), the popularity of the representatives also appeared 
to have been a significant factor influencing the voting results. Irina Petrovskaia, a television 
critic, argues that this effect was exacerbated by differences in presentation style. Kurginian’s 
expressive debating method, she claims, appeals to viewers more strongly than Mlechin’s 
more rational appearance of composure. 
Sergei Kurginian operates in the style of a soapbox orator, of a rally type of person, who is more likely to ap-
pear at rallies or on squares with the corresponding use of all such methods. He often shouts; he gets wound 
up. I once saw a show where he promised to hit one of his opponents in the face. This is a highly advanta-
geous position and is almost always happily accepted by the majority of our population. Because, perhaps, 
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people often do not even hear what they are saying. This aesthetics is near to them; this manner of behaving 
is near to them.386  
The actual argumentation, then, is only of secondary importance. That Mlechin was no 
match for the propagandistic style of argumentation in which Kurginian excels, even on a 
show broadcast by a liberal TV channel, corroborates this conclusion. 
Cancellation and Reappearance 
Notwithstanding the intensity of the debate just described, the format of The Trial of Time 
remained unchanged up until the talk show was cancelled at the end of the year. According to 
the official account, The Trial of Time fell victim to Channel Five’s management takeover and 
subsequent rebranding. The channel’s general director, Arkadii Solov’ev, was replaced by 
Aleksei Brodskii, who was brought in from Channel One.387 The apparent reason for the 
change in management was the channel’s continued profitability issues (“‘Пятый канал’ 
возглавил топ-менеджер ‘Первого’” 2010). Here it is worth mentioning that NMG, Channel 
Five’s majority shareholder, also holds 25 per cent of the shares of Channel One.388 The Trial 
of Time was indeed not the only show to get the axe. The show Oil Painting (Kartina 
maslom), hosted by the outspoken public intellectual Dmitrii Bykov, for example, suffered the 
same fate, as did journalist Svetlana Sorokina’s Program Guide (Programma peredach). 
Nikonova was dismissed and the shows she produced were terminated. This production and 
others were part of a brand-new slate of programming that had been launched only months 
before in March 2010.389 Sorokina dismissed allegations that the decision to terminate her 
programme was politically motivated (Бочарова & Бахарев 2011). The change in manage-
ment simply coincided with the decision not to prolong her contract, which, she stated, was a 
mutual agreement: “My programme was not political but a retro programme. They (the new 
                                                 
386  “Сергей Кургинян работает в образе такого площадного трибуна, митингового, т.е. человека, 
выступающего скорее на митинге или площади с соответствующим использованием всех также приемов. 
Он часто кричит, он перебивает. Однажды вот я видела программу, он обещал кому-то из оппонентов 
дать в морду. Это крайне выгодная позиция и крайне всегда радостно воспринимается большинством 
нашего населения. Поэтому люди даже, может быть, часто не слушают, что они говорит. Им близка вот 
эта вот эстетика, им близка эта манера поведения.” 
387 At Channel One, Brodskii served as the vice-director of informational programs. 
388 The other shareholders currently are the Russian state (51%) and Roman Abramovich (24%). 
389 General director Aleksandr Rodnianskii, brought in from STS-Media in 2009, was in charge of the change in 
programming. His efforts to improve the performance of the channel followed substantive rebranding attempts 
that had been carried through by his predecessors Vladimir Troepol’skii (brought in from VGTRK in 2008) and 
Marina Fokina in 2004. For a discussion of the programs mentioned here and, more broadly, the new image of 
Channel Five they were thought to introduce, see Качкаева (2010). 
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management) are now considering what they want to do with the channel. Why would they 
automatically prolong the contract?” (Бочарова & Бахарев 2011).390 
While the termination of individual shows may, indeed, have been economically rather 
than politically motivated, the managerial “takeover” appears in equal measure to have been 
directly related to Channel Five’s content. In fact, there is sufficient reason to believe that the 
takeover aimed to bring the channel in line with state interests. According to Svanidze, for 
example, the “actual director” of the channel is Konstantin Ernst, the general director of 
Channel One, who through the rebranding sought to leave his mark (pocherk) on it (Бочарова 
& Бахарев 2011). A source cited by Gazeta.ru as a “manager close to the channel” directly 
links the channel’s liberal profile to the takeover:  
The new management has its ideas about what would be great and is realising them. Now they decided to 
change the system. Above all, taking into account the production capacities and resources of Channel One. 
The last year was a continuation of what the team of Troepol’skii (the previous channel director) found there; 
the channel was intelligent, informative, with a Petersburg touch. It focused on history, reflection, [and] dis-
cussion; “living history” became its main hero. But now “Golden gramophones” and “Old songs about the 
main thing” made their appearance there (ibidem).391 
The latter title refers to a popular series of music shows, developed by Ernst, that capital-
ised on nostalgia for the Soviet era. That these programmes, which were originally 
commissioned by Channel One, were now broadcast as reruns on Channel Five raises ques-
tions since there was no official association between the two channels at the time. Another 
source associated with NGM is quoted as saying that the “most important criteria” in the deci-
sion-making process were “not business, not the media, but the relation to those in power 
[sviaz’ s vlast’iu] and the desire not to offend anyone” (Бочарова & Бахарев 2011).392 In an 
article with the telling name “Channel № 5: The New Fragrance from Konstantin Ernst,” 
Marina Naumova directly links the rebranding to Channel One’s general director.  
                                                 
390 “У меня программа была не политическая, а ретропрограмма. Они (новое руководство) сейчас будут 
думать, что они хотят делать с каналом. Зачем им автоматически контракт продлевать?” 
391  “У нового руководства есть представление о прекрасном, и оно его реализует. Сейчас решили 
изменить систему. Прежде всего с учетом производственных возможностей и ресурсов Первого канала. 
Последний год был продолжением того, что было найдено командой Троепольского (бывшего 
руководителя канала), канал был интеллигентным, познавательным, с петербургской нотой. Он был 
сосредоточен на истории, размышлениях, дискуссиях, главным героем там стала ‘живая история’. А 
сейчас там появились ‘Золотые граммофоны’ и ‘Старые песни о главном’.” 
392 “Но главными критериями являются не бизнес и не медиа, а связь с властью и желание никого не 
обидеть.” 
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Such a replacement [of management, M.W.] is explained by interlocutors of Slon.ru in unanimous fashion: 
the government has given Ernst the task to turn Channel Five into a political instrument; Ernst will now work 
on this part-time, without detracting from [Channel] One (Наумова 2011).393 
Sources cited by Delovoi Peterburg likewise claim that Channel One’s top management 
was directly involved in the management change and rebranding at Channel Five (“‘Пятый 
канал’ возглавил топ-менеджер ‘Первого’” 2010).  
Set against the background of the alleged direct involvement of Channel One’s manage-
ment in Channel Five’s overhaul, the reappearance of The Trial of Time on Channel One as 
The Historical Trial (Istoricheskii protsess) from August 2011 to June 2012 appears to sup-
port this claim. It also gives rise to two possible scenarios to explore. The first scenario would 
be the (political) approval of the show and its transfer to Channel One, despite the pro-
gramme’s “liberal roots,” in order to save it. The second possible scenario would involve the 
recognition of the format’s potential to engage the general audience (that is, to serve as “a 
political instrument”) as the motivating factor behind its renewal. The nature and extent of 
changes to the format, which I will discuss shortly, appear to support the latter scenario.  
The new project was again produced by Nikonova. Having worked for Channel Five for 
less than a year, she thus returned to Channel One, where she had previously been director of 
the studio for special projects (“Наталья Никонова с ‘Первого канала’ стала генеральным 
продюсером ‘Пятого’” 2009). While instantly recognisable as the continuation of the origi-
nal, The Historical Trial adopted a format that was different from its predecessor in two 
respects. First, one of the original hosts, Leonid Mlechin, did not return to the show.394 His 
role was taken up by Svanidze. In the new set-up, Svanidze and Kurginian went head-to-head 
without a judge or host serving as an intermediary.395 Second, the topics under discussion 
were formulated more broadly and explored diachronically. Instead of discussing a single 
event or historical figure, the show scrutinised a given phenomenon or issue as it had ap-
peared throughout Russian history. For example, “Legal security: from the Stalinist 
exceptional troika’s to the Magnitskii case”396; “Political prisoners: from the Decembrists of 
Senate Square to the ‘Decembrists’ of Bolotnaia”397; and, “The state and private life: from the 
                                                 
393 “Такую замену собеседники Slon.ru объясняют одинаково: власть поставила перед Эрнстом задачу 
сделать из ‘Пятого канала’ политический инструмент; теперь Эрнст будет заниматься этим part-time, не 
отвлекаясь от ‘Первого’.” 
394 In media reports it is suggested that Mlechin’s participation in the show was precluded by his position as one 
of the faces of the channel TV Tsentr. 
395 Kurginian was later replaced by Dmitrii Kiselev. 
396 “Правовая защищенность: от сталинских чрезвычайных троек до дела Магнитского.” 
397 “Политические заключенные: от декабристов Сенатской площади до ‘декабристов’ Болотной.” 
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Soviet law on homosexuality to today’s anti-gay law.”398 As a result, the links to contempo-
rary political and social problems were reinforced. The change of broadcast channel and 
alterations to the format had little effect on the viewers’ voting; the home audience continued 
to side with Kurginian.399 
What direct effect was exerted by the move to Channel One on the topics the show touched 
upon is a complicated matter. For example, The Historical Trial did not avoid politically sen-
sitive issues. Its fourth episode, for instance, on the accumulation of capital, directly 
addressed the Iukos case and the trial of Mikhail Khodorkovskii. In fact, whereas The Trial of 
Time remained firmly embedded in historical examination, its successor moved significantly 
closer to current affairs. Television critic Irina Petrovskaia noted the following: 
History is absolutely a pretext to discuss current issues. And the show about Khodorkovskii, in particular, 
showed that they only use it as a springboard and subsequently the conversation is absolutely about what’s 
contemporary and current. This is very important, because even on shows that regularly claim to be about 
themes that are either social or close to the political this is not the case. They do not manage to [address cur-
rent affairs, M.W.] exactly because, clearly, there are a lot of these barriers, [dictating] what is not allowed, 
where you cannot go. But in this case I have the feeling that in the process of this discussion people are still 
relatively free and apparently even the editorial scissors do not mangle it much. Otherwise this would have 
been obvious and noticeable to all (Ларина 2011).400 
How, then, should we interpret the fact that the Khodorkovskii case – talk of which had 
been long taboo on state television – could be openly discussed on the show? Petrovskaia 
suggests that it would be mistaken to take the discussion of Khodorkovskii, while remarkable, 
as proof of a loosening in policy; it is unlikely that it resulted from a desire to contribute to 
public opinion about the man or the case. Rather, she rightly argues, it shows that 
Khodorkovskii was no longer seen as a threat. By allowing the case to be discussed, the chan-
nel accommodated a (liberally oriented) minority in society concerned with human rights. 
                                                 
398  “Государство и частная жизнь: от советской статьи за гомосексуализм до антигейского закона 
сегодня.” 
399 The Levada Centre conducted an opinion poll about the show among 1600 respondents in 45 regions of the 
country. The poll showed that 6 per cent of the respondents watched The Historical Trial regularly, while 20 per 
cent tuned in occasionally and 73 per cent never watched the show. When asked which side they supported most, 
22 per cent answered Kurginian and 33 per cent Svanidze, while 20 per cent supported both in equal measure, 14 
per cent answered “neither side” and 10 per cent found it difficult to answer (Левада-Центр 2011). 
400 “Абсолютно история повод для того чтобы поговорить об актуальном. И программа о Ходорковском в 
частности показала, что только оттолкнуться от этого, а дальше идет разговор об абсолютно 
современном и актуальном. Это очень важно, потому что этого нет даже на тех программах, которые 
часто заявляют какие-то темы или социальные или близко к политическим. Но с этим не справляются 
именно потому что, видимо, очень много этих барьеров, чего нельзя, куда нельзя ходить. А здесь у меня 
ощущение, что в процессе этой дискуссии все-таки люди относительно свободны и по всей видимости 
даже редакторские ножницы не очень это корежат. Иначе это было бы очевидно и заметно всем.” 
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Kseniia Larina, journalist for Ekho Moskvy, places the Khodorkovskii discussion in the con-
text of the other little-discussed topics addressed on The Historical Process. She makes an 
important and, I would argue, largely correct observation about the show's political orienta-
tion: 
I believe there is also some kind of rather primitive hidden intent behind this. To once again demonstrate to 
the public and our leaders that the liberal share of our population is negligible. That it is unnecessary to fear 
them; that it is unnecessary to worry about this. The people are on the other side; the people are on the side of 
Kurginian and his companions. I believe that, among other things, the program was supposed to demonstrate 
this. You have the negligible numbers siding with Svanidze and those who can say something in defence of 
Khodorkovskii; and on the other side you have this people’s tribune, the mouthpiece of public anger, that is 
designed to once again deliver a crushing blow to liberalism and these derelicts (Ларина 2011).401 
The “hidden intent” signalled by Larina is difficult to prove. Yet I think that the explana-
tion for the continuation of the show can indeed be found in the particular way it functioned 
as a political platform. Despite its origins at “liberal” Channel Five that, it appears, was re-
branded partly on the basis of political concerns, the format allowed proponents of liberal and 
conservative views to clash with each other in a controlled environment. Thereby, it could 
contribute towards creating the suggestion of open discussion on Channel One and towards 
enhancing the “democratic image” of Russian state television in general. Since the voting 
results consistently demonstrated that the home audience sided with the conservative stand-
points put forward by Kurginian, this was a safe bet. Moreover, the changes in format 
reinforced Kurginian’s dominance on the show. With the departure of Mlechin, the pro-
gramme’s truly liberal face disappeared. Also, the lack of a judge to organise the flow of the 
discussion meant that greater preparatory coordination among the hosts was necessary, thus 
stifling the spontaneity of discussion. More importantly, it gave the expressive and emotional 
Kurginian even more opportunities to expound his showmanship. With no judge to restrain 
him when emotions ran sky high, with no one enforcing limits on speaking time, Kurginian 
was given almost free rein. Protracting his own pleas as long as possible, objecting visibly 
and vocally to the arguments of the opposing party, and making interjections at every turn, 
Kurginian clearly ran the show. One could even ask whether the programme’s alterations in 
                                                 
401 “Мне кажется, что в этом тоже есть такой тайный умысел достаточно примитивный. Лишний раз 
продемонстрировать общественности и нашим властителям, что либеральная часть населения ничтожно 
мала. Что бояться их не нужно, не нужно по этому поводу тревожиться. Народ на другой стороне, народ 
на стороне Кургиняна и его товарищей. Я думаю, что эта программа в том числе и это должна была 
продемонстрировать. Эти ничтожные цифры у Сванидзе и тех, кто может какое-то слово сказать в 
защиту Ходорковского, а с другой стороны этот трибун народный, рупор народного гнева, который по 
идее должен быть нанести сокрушительный удар в очередной раз по либерализму и по этим 
отщепенцам.” 
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his favour were even necessary, since, as soon as the show’s opening titles ran, the telephone 
voting count shown on the screen started to climb frantically in support of his position.  The 
talk show, as a controllable simulation of genuine public debate, was perfectly suited to sup-




Let us return to where this story began: in the Alexander Gardens. In addition to the restored 
Romanov memorial obelisk, there have been two more recent additions to this well-tended 
garden of state symbolism. Combined, the three monuments constitute the final affirmation 
and closing act of the regime’s memory politics as it developed between 2000 and 2012. The 
first is a statue to commemorate Patriarch Germogen, who died as a martyr in 1612 and is 
often thought to have inspired the people’s uprising that brought an end to the Time of Trou-
bles. The statue’s history, like that of the obelisk, reveals much about the constant struggle 
over political symbolism in Russia. Twice, initiatives to erect a monument to Patriarch 
Germogen failed: first in the 1810s, in the wake of the war against Napoleon, when the statue 
of Minin and Pozharskii was erected in reference to the events of the seventeenth century, and 
later in the period around the time of Germogen’s canonisation by the Russian Orthodox 
Church in 1913. In the latter case a competition was held to design the statue but the realisa-
tion of the monument was prevented by the advent of war in 1914. The initiative for the 
current statue was taken in 2008 as memory politics peaked and the objectives of the ROC 
aligned with those of the state. In 2012, the Year of Russian History, Patriarch Kirill laid the 
foundation stone; the bronze sculpture was unveiled in 2013.  
The second recent addition to the Gardens is a statue of Tsar Aleksandr I, already briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 5, erected in 2014 in commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the 
victory over Napoleon – in itself, a peculiar afterthought to the state’s elaborate celebrations 
that had marked that occasion a mere two years earlier. The bronze bas-reliefs that are mount-
ed on a separate monument across from the statue of the Tsar are a clear attempt to cover up 
the apparent inconsistency of celebrating a similar anniversary in nearly consecutive years: 
they show the 1812 battles of Borodino and Berezina, the 1813 Battle of Leipzig and the 
Tsar’s triumphal entry into Paris in 1814. The primacy of the two cultural memories – the end 
of the Time of Troubles and the victory over Napoleon – was thus symbolically affirmed. The 
casting in bronze of these dominant narrative lines of memory politics also marks a turning 
point. In response to Putin’s return to the presidency and, more importantly, the Ukraine con-
flict and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, both the tenor and the images of the 
state’s engagement with history have started to shift. The case studies examined here have 
revealed some of the non-governmental origins of this “conservative turn” in Russian politics 
since 2012 (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2014) as well as of the strands of contemporary Eurasian 
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thought – aptly characterised by Dina Khapaeva as “post-Soviet neo-medievalism” (Khapaeva 
2016) – that inform it. In fact, the monument to Tsar Aleksandr I – who, after a brief infatua-
tion with liberalism, was a markedly conservative ruler – also marks the definitive end of the 
pseudo-liberal discourse under Medvedev and the return of a strong hand to the Kremlin. 
As in a historical film based on a true story, this study can only conclude by summarising 
how its protagonists have fared after 2012. Also, before turning to my main conclusions, I 
must offer some brief remarks on the impact of the recent dramatic (geo)political develop-
ments on the political use of cultural memory in Russia. With regard to the memory of “1612” 
the most significant event – the statue of Patriarch Germogen – has already been mentioned in 
the introductory paragraphs. The animated film The Fortress: With Shield and Sword 
(Krepost’: shchitom i mechom, 2015, Fedor Dmitriev) deserves mention since it adapts the 
Time of Troubles myth to a young audience. Supported financially by Fond Kino, the film 
recounts the adventures of a young boy who helps defend the city of Smolensk to prevent the 
advancement of Polish troops to Moscow. While the argument of restored stability, which the 
memory of the Time of Troubles served to symbolise, continues to occupy a central position 
in the regime’s claim to legitimate power, it now predominantly takes the form of its negative 
image. The regime has pressed on with the shift towards cautionary warnings about “revolu-
tion” looming on the horizon and the impending loss of the stability the government claims to 
have achieved, which I signalled in the chapter on Stolypin.  
Meanwhile, the concept of (neo-)oprichnina continues to pop up from time to time in pub-
lic discourse, in both its cautionary and mobilising capacities. For instance, upon the 
announcement that the government was establishing a National Guard in April 2016, com-
menters were quick to draw parallels with Ivan’s oprichnina. The head of the new internal 
security corps, Viktor Zolotov, was referred to as the contemporary incarnation of Maliuta 
Skuratov. 
In Volgograd, work has begun on the reconstruction of the Aleksandr Nevskii Cathedral. 
The six-domed chapel will closely resemble the original church that was torn down in 1932. 
The “restoration” has met with significant societal resistance and, in a way, the construction 
echoes the restoration of the Romanov obelisk. The church was consecrated only in 1918; the 
period of its absence following its demolition now far exceeds the number of years it actually 
was a recognisable part of Volgograd’s architecture. Apart from the planned celebration of the 
800th anniversary of Aleksandr Nevskii’s birth in 2021, his role as the principal “Orthodox” 
national figure within governmental memory politics appears to have been taken over by 
Prince Vladimir. The shift is directly related to the annexation of Crimea. Indeed, as part of 
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the justification of the “reintegration” of the peninsula into the Russian Federation, Russian 
media have framed the ancient Crimean city of Khersones, where Vladimir the Great was 
baptised, as the cradle of the Orthodox Russian nation. The unveiling of a statue of Vladimir 
bearing a sword and a cross near the Kremlin is planned for 4 November 2016.  
Finally, even if Stolypin may have failed to win the hearts of the general public, the politi-
cal mobilisation of his memory continues. For instance, paraphrasing Stolypin, the quote “We 
do not need great upheavals, we need a great Russia” was adopted as the slogan of the Anti-
Maidan Movement. The movement, formed in January 2015, was initiated by, among others, 
the nationalist writer, politician and influential blogger Nikolai Starikov and Aleksandr “the 
Surgeon” Zaldostanov, the president of the Kremlin-loyal Russian motorcycle club the Night 
Wolves. The movement formulates its aim as the prevention of “‘colour revolutions,’ street 
riots, chaos and anarchy” (“Манифест” n.d.).402 The press conference related to its founding, 
hosted by RIA Novosti, was covered by all major television stations. A second example is the 
exhibition series “My History” that we came across in the case studies and which has now 
found a permanent home at the VDNKh complex in Moscow. It advertises the section cover-
ing the period 1917-1945 with the headline “From Great Upheavals to a Great Victory” and 
features a portrait of Stolypin in its advertisements.403  
A particularly important development, and one which suggests that Stolypin’s name will 
linger on in coming years, is the establishment of the Stolypin Club. The group presented its 
programme “The Economics of Growth” in October 2015 and aims to become an expert plat-
form on economic reform for the formulation of the government’s strategy for 2025 
(Николаева 2015). The club includes individuals wielding direct political influence, such as 
Adviser to the President Sergei Glaz’ev. Their weight is such that a commentator for 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta characterised the discussions in the Presidential Economic Council re-
garding the 2025 strategy as a debate between “Stolypinites” and “Kudrinites” – those who 
side with the vision proposed by Aleksei Kudrin, former finance minister and now vice-
chairman of the Council (Башкатова 2016).404 
In general, there has been a pronounced intensification of memory politics on the part of 
the state and state-aligned actors. The opening ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympic Games 
in 2014, as the apex of public diplomacy during this period, testifies to the regime’s continued 
effort to place itself within an extended, unified historical narrative. As the quintessential 
                                                 
402 “не допустить ‘цветных революций’, уличных беспорядков, хаоса и анархии.” 
403 “От великих потрясений к великой победе.” 
404 “столыпинцы”; “кудринцы.” 
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event for the display of a state’s vision of itself to the world, the ceremony focused squarely 
on Russian history and its achievements in the cultural sphere. Directed by Konstantin Ernst, 
the director of Channel One, the spectacle reiterated the symbolic continuity of Russian 
history in broad sweeps of retro-pop showmanship. It later became known that Ernst had orig-
inally planned to include a minute of silence in the ceremony to commemorate the Soviet 
soldiers who died during the Second World War (Колесников 2014). The section of the cer-
emony would have had members of the audience – that is, sport fans from all over the world – 
hold up portraits of fallen Soviet soldiers. This element had to be cut after the International 
Olympic Committee objected to its evident political connotations. The idea indicates how the 
heightened attention to history in Russia since 2012 has centred on the memory of the Second 
World War. The shrinking of the public sphere and a dramatic increase in restrictions on the 
freedom of expression and the freedom of press in recent years mean that there is now less 
room for alternative voices in memory politics to be heard. With regard to the Second World 
War, in particular, the peak in the political mobilisation of the memory has gone hand in hand 
with restriction of public debate on the topic. In a clear break with previous practices, the state 
has moved from a reliance on self-censorship to the implementation of legal measures to curb 
undesirable interpretations of history. In April 2014, for instance, the Duma passed a law 
criminalising the “rehabilitation” of Nazism as well as the spreading of “false information” 
about the conduct of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. 
The importance the Russian government continues to attribute to cinema is clear from one 
of the Kremlin’s first measures to “reintegrate” Crimea following its annexation: to invest in 
its film industry and organise local film festivals (“Russia Will Revive Crimean Film Indus-
try” 2014). Since the appointment of Vladimir Medinskii as Minister of Culture in 2012, there 
has been an overall increase in government meddling in cinema production. On the one hand, 
the state is more outspoken about the types of films it seeks to finance, and its preferences are 
more politically motivated than before. For example, whereas in 2011, the annual call of the 
Ministry of Culture for films to compete for funding included the rather general theme of 
“films of historical, military and patriotic content, developing a sense of pride in one’s coun-
try” (Министерство культуры Российской Федерации 2011),405 the calls from 2013 to 
2016 formulate multiple specific historical themes. The call for 2015, for instance, welcomes 
submissions for films on “Crimea and Ukraine in the thousand-year history of the Russian 
                                                 
405 “темы фильмов исторического, военного и патриотического содержания, воспитывающие чувство 
гордости за свою страну.” 
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state” (Министерство культуры Российской Федерации 2015). 406  On the other hand, 
Medinskii himself harshly criticises films he deems “anti-historical,” “anti-Russian” or “anti-
patriotic.” For example, he publicly denounced the film My Good Hans (Milyi Khans, 
dorogoi Petr, 2015, Aleksandr Mindadze), about the friendship between a German and a 
Soviet man on the eve of the Second World War, and “tried (unsuccessfully) to shut down its 
funding” (Muchnik 2015). Foreign films thought to present an “incorrect” rendering of histo-
ry have been banned from Russian cinemas. For instance, the distribution of Child 44 (2015, 
Daniel Espinosa) was prohibited on grounds that it was Russophobic. With regard to televi-
sion, a parallel development has taken place to obstruct those oppositional media outlets that 
remain. Most notably, the oppositional TV station Dozhd’ was targeted for an opinion poll it 
conducted about the siege of Leningrad. The poll asked whether the Soviet Union should have 
surrendered Leningrad to the German army to save the lives of the city’s inhabitants. As a 
result of the political backlash created by the poll, all major Russian television providers dis-
continued their broadcasting of the channel, and Dozhd’ was forced to move online. 
 
The aim of this study has been to look beyond the Kremlin walls and explore how various 
groups in Russian society, including the state, have mobilised cultural memory to legitimise, 
question or challenge the political regime and propagate their vision of Russian statehood. In 
my analysis, I have paid particular attention to 1) which cultural memories have been em-
ployed, by whom and to what end; and 2) how these actors have drawn upon existing 
interpretations and representations of various cultural memories to shape their contributions to 
the debate on history and political legitimacy. Based on the evidence provided by the case 
studies, the answer to these questions falls into four parts. First, the state has quite successful-
ly relied on memories with rich histories of cultural representation and political 
instrumentalisation to portray itself as traditional. The government actively aimed to support 
and expand its legitimacy by stimulating the development of a type of patriotism connected to 
the state. While this state patriotism is essentially present-oriented, the historical dimension is 
vital to its strengthening, showing it to rise above ideological breakpoints and to emphasise, 
instead, the unity of the historical development of the Russian state.  
The guiding logic of state-sponsored memory politics in the period 2000–2012 was to 
claim the existence of a typically “Russian” type of governance. In his Address to the Federal 
Assembly in December 2012, Vladimir Putin, in fact, literally stated that “Russia is 
                                                 
406 “Крым и Украина в тысячелетней истории государства Российского.” 
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characterised by a tradition of a strong state” (Putin 2012). Russian memory politics was 
shaped, furthermore, by the purported reclaiming of lost commemorative traditions dating 
back to both tsarist and Soviet times. Within this unitary concept of the Russian state, the re-
gime departed from the premise that Russian history is characterised by, first, cycles of 
stability and revolution and, second, a continuous threat emanating from groups in society 
that seek to undermine the stability of the state, typically supported or guided by external, and 
in particular Western, forces. The institutionalisation of the memory of Petr Stolypin forms an 
exception to the rule since it could only draw upon cultural representations from recent years, 
most notably Stolypin’s inclusion among the finalists of The Name Is Russia. The case study 
in that instance made it evidently clear why this is a disadvantageous circumstance. Despite 
substantial symbolic investment on the part of Vladimir Putin and cultural heavyweight 
Nikita Mikhalkov, it has proved difficult beyond certain political circles to counter the nega-
tive image of Stolypin that had been established by Soviet historiography. 
Second, I have found that the regime’s memory politics should in some cases be character-
ised as reactive rather than proactive – it co-opts existing societal and cultural initiatives – and 
that it is adaptive rather than static – that is, it is continually revised in response to changing 
(geo)political circumstances and domestic needs. All acts involving memory politics by the 
state, however, give evidence of the same strategy: to keep popularity ratings up, on the one 
hand, while keeping the general public passive, on the other. The anti-mobilisational purport 
of the political mobilisation of memory has gone hand in hand with an increasing reliance on 
conspiracy theories in state-aligned media and other strategies of inducing fear, uncertainty 
and overall confusion. 
Third, my analyses have shown that the state is far from the only player involved in the 
circulation of political claims through historical narratives. Instead, we can speak of a com-
plex, interactive process of memory negotiation that takes place on multiple levels – from the 
state to social and religious organisations, and from state-aligned and (semi-)independent 
media to cultural actors and individuals who have access to public discourse and succeed in 
generating national media exposure for themselves. Opposing and alternative voices existed 
and continue to exist. For most of the period under discussion in this study, these voices could 
also be heard, albeit mainly through channels outside of the mainstream. Although the subject 
of the Soviet past has not been covered directly in this study, I want to emphasise here that the 
relative freedom to express divergent opinions did not apply to efforts to examine and com-
memorate the crimes committed by the Soviet state (e.g., there has been a continuous 
obstruction of the work of the human rights group Memorial).  
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With regard to the representations of the selected memories in state-aligned television and 
cinema productions, I have found a considerable measure of deviation. The variety in inter-
pretations should not be mistaken as a sign of full authorial freedom, however. Such 
deviations from the official line tend to be more extreme, conspirational and propagandistic, 
which has a double effect and a clear function. First, they suggest a greater measure of autho-
rial freedom than is actually the case. And second, such sensational and at times absurd 
narratives actually make the regime’s uses of history come across as unassuming and sensi-
ble. By allowing these extremes to exist, the government actually reinforces the credibility of 
its claims. 
Fourth, it is evident from all the case studies that remediation – including the particular 
forms of remediation that I have named memory chains and memory clusters – is both a ubiq-
uitous and highly significant element of the strategies employed in Russian memory politics. 
In particular, the remediation of (iconic) visual elements plays a vital role in framing histori-
cal analogies and facilitating the circulation and transfer of preferred interpretations. 
Recognisability is key, as it helps to bridge the gap between collective and individual 
memory. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the lack of remediation history is one of the primary 
reasons why the government’s efforts to sponsor the memory of Stolypin failed to catch on 
with the general public. On the other hand, as I have demonstrated on the basis of the example 
of Vladimir Mirzoev’s Boris Godunov, the accumulated meanings of these memories also 
greatly increase their potential to be used in politically subversive ways. To appreciate why 
this is the case, it is important to remember that memory politics in many ways resembles 
mythologisation. If we follow Roland Barthes’ classic definition of myth, the aim of mythol-
ogisation is to normalise and eternalise history through simplification (Barthes 1973). 
Remediation, memory chains and memory clusters interfere with this process of simplifica-
tion. Thereby, they provide access points for formulating historically framed political critique. 
As in the example of Boris Godunov, a simple transposition of memory frames can serve to 
challenge the official line and undercut the purported naturalness and timelessness of the re-
gime’s mythical claims. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the combination of case studies has also allowed me to 
reflect specifically on the relevance of Soviet preconfiguration. Already in 2006, Kevin Platt 
and David Brandenberger made the following observation:  
Many of the watchwords and catch phrases of present-day mythmaking were last deployed as politically sig-
nificant symbols under Stalin. Today’s enthusiasts of the pre-revolutionary past no doubt imagine themselves 
reaching back to the roots of the Russian political tradition – to a “true” wellspring of Russian national pride 
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that predates the Soviet era. Yet in reality, this dialogue with the past – ostensibly conducted “over the 
heads” of seven decades of Soviet history – borrows heavily from the cultural norms of the Stalin period. 
[…] Clearly, the Stalinist celebration of the Russian national past must be seen as an important link in the 
genealogy of current nationalist rhetoric (Platt & Brandenberger 2006: 8).  
My study adds a nuance to this argument by demonstrating that the reappropriation of ele-
ments of Stalinist propaganda was by no means complete – e.g., the relative absence of Peter 
the Great – nor was it unproblematic. The holiday commemorating the end of the Time of 
Troubles, for instance, was soon co-opted by nationalists and steadily lost symbolic ground, 
while the memory of Ivan continues to be so volatile that only those on the margins of the 
political debate dare employ it. 
The case studies have also shed light on the extent to which state-dependent film and tele-
vision productions about history reiterate state-sponsored lines of interpretation; in other 
words, whether it is appropriate to speak of systemic “patriotic propaganda.” I agree with 
Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz that, despite evident pressure from the government, state-
aligned television demonstrates “a level of dialogic exchange which, although tame by west-
ern standards, belies [its] image as a mere purveyor of Kremlin propaganda” (Hutchings & 
Tolz 2015: 4). In an opinion piece for Vedomosti, Russian journalist Andrei Babitsky has 
suggested that television should rather be seen as an “open market for patriotic trash than a 
factory for propaganda”: 
National television creates something like a stock exchange, where different persons and businesses can sell 
timely patriotic content to the state. […] The system is perfectly liberal in its contours: it’s not central plan-
ning, but a stock exchange open to anyone to come sell their goods and earn a paycheck. […] It’s undeniable 
that this market’s structure, despite the high price, has many advantages. The buying and selling all happens 
in one place, you don’t have to pay for anything before it’s ready, and most importantly you don’t need to try 
all that hard. Because Russian television deals in price tags, not placards (Babitsky 2015).  
In other words, the state has “outsourced” part of its patriotism campaign. While I strongly 
disagree with Babitsky’s characterisation of this “patriotic market” as “open to anyone,” he is 
correct to point out how self-interest and self-censorship have long been sufficient means to 
control the medium, including its role in memory politics.  
The film The Descendants (Nasledniki, Vladimir Khotinenko, 2015) can be seen as a re-
flection on how the societal system of memory politics I have described in this study works. 
The apparent paradox is that, although the film appears to uncover the truth behind the “patri-
otic propaganda machine,” the production was financially supported by the Ministry of 
Culture and directed by Kremlin loyalist Vladimir Khotinenko (director of, e.g., 1612). The 
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setting for the film is a TV show about the memory of Sergii of Radonezh, one of the most 
venerated saints of the Russian Orthodox Church, who pronounced his blessing on Dmitrii 
Donskoi before the fourteenth-century Battle of Kulikovo Field. Unmistakably modelled on 
The Name Is Russia and similar programmes, Khotinenko uses the television format as a mi-
crocosmos to explore the intersection of politics, religion and history in contemporary Russia. 
The guests on the show represent the leading actors of memory politics: the state politician 
(rumoured to be based on Medinskii), the patriotic publicist, the Orthodox cleric, the histori-
an, the celebrity (a look-alike of singer Alla Pugachova) and, of course, the popular television 
host himself. Two young brothers in the audience personify the general public at the receiving 
end of it all. When the host discovers that his show will be cancelled, he sets out on an act of 
sabotage aimed at exposing the truth behind the spectacle of prime-time patriotism. His plan 
backfires, though, which makes it all the more painfully clear that, at the end of the day, each 
of the groups represented on stage has to resign themselves to the role it has been assigned to 
play. 
The alternative approach to memory politics that I have developed in this study has 
demonstrated the importance of non-state actors in memory politics. Still, a number of related 
issues remain that my approach has not been able to fully address. First, I have taken only 
modest steps towards assessing the reception of memory politics in Russia. The impact and 
effectiveness of the political uses of the past, however, remains an understudied but vital as-
pect of memory politics. In addition to assessing the ways that memory politics affects 
popular perceptions of governance, further research in this direction could also shed light on 
whether state-produced memory narratives work differently in this respect than those 
circulated in the media and/or as entertainment. Also, such reception studies – employing, for 
instance, focus groups, or delving more deeply into online memory discourse – can provide a 
better understanding of the extent to which certain (entertainment) genres are more or less 
likely to affect political preferences, and how state-aligned media take advantage of these 
differences.  
Second, further research is required into the role of professional historians. Such an eami-
nation should also take into account the activities of historians beyond their profession (e.g., 
media appearances) and the ways that historians facilitate or counteract the restrictions on 
public debate on history increasingly imposed by the state. A related and equally important 
issue is the question of history education. Finally, further research is needed into online 
memory discourses. The Internet is the most significant remaining platform where alternative 
and opposing views on memory politics can be expressed. At the same time, the state 
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increasingly interferes in these online debates and, more recently, has started to restrict online 
freedom of expression. The dynamics of these online memory discourses, how they relate to 
offline discourses, who the various actors of online memory politics are and how they interact 
with one another: these questions have yet to be addressed. 
 
In December 2016 twenty-five years will have passed since the Soviet Union ceased to exist. 
For the fifteen former republics that (re)gained their independence, the collapse of the Soviet 
state necessitated the rewriting of their respective collective histories. In retrospect, we can 
see that, at the same time, it had been precisely such a critical revisiting of the past that con-
tributed to the Soviet Union’s demise. Indeed, the experience of the Perestroika testifies to 
how, in authoritarian states, “change often starts when the past is challenged” (Johnson 2016). 
For the Putin regime, having founded its legitimacy on historical narratives, controlling the 
past has become vital to its survival. In fact, a clear pattern emerges if we look back on the 
development of governmental memory politics since 2000: the intensity of the regime’s ef-
forts in the memory domain peak whenever it feels that its legitimacy is threatened. It relied 
on the mobilisation of history to strengthen its position and to discredit its opponents follow-
ing both the wave of colour revolutions of the early 2000s and the Russian protest movement 
that developed in response to the rampant electoral fraud in the Duma elections of December 
2011. With the next round of Duma elections coming up in September 2016, the state has 
once again turned to the familiar remedy to mitigate the perceived political threat: it has 
intensified its memory politics, simultaneously restricting public debate. Evidently, it believes 
that if the past cannot be challenged, regime change will also be averted. But the severity of 
the legal measures it has now put in place demonstrates that the regime fears the subversive 
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List of Interviews 
 
All interviews were conducted in Moscow in the fall and winter of 2014-2015. None of the 
interviewees requested anonymity. Yet, I have decided against identifying them by name to 
prevent them from encountering any possible negative consequences from their participation 
in this study. 
 
Interviewee A 
Former editor of video archives for a state television channel, worked at several national TV 
channels 
Interviewee B 
Video-editor for television productions 
Interviewee C 
Cameraman for national and regional television 
Interviewee D 
Independent documentary maker, high-ranking position in an industry representational body 
Interviewee E 
Expert on Russian film and television industry, former governmental advisor on film policy 




Employee at a major film festival 
Interviewee H 
Documentary producer at a state television channel 
Interviewee I 




Herinneringspolitiek in hedendaags Rusland: televisie, film en de staat. 
Sinds Vladimir Poetin aantrad als president in 2000 wordt de Russische politiek in 
toenemende mate gekenmerkt door retorisch gebruik van geschiedenis. Door middel van 
historische referenties in toespraken, de oprichting van monumenten en andere vormen van 
staatssymboliek heeft de Russische overheid ernaar gestreefd haar legitimiteit te onderbouwen 
en een historische grondslag te bieden voor de centralisering van de macht die zij heeft 
doorgevoerd. Historische analogieën werden ingezet om het Poetin regime neer te zetten als 
verantwoordelijk voor de terugkeer van stabiliteit, voorspoed en internationaal aanzien na de 
crisis van de jaren ’90. De Russische geschiedenis, zo luidt het officiële adagium, ontwikkelt 
zich volgens een patroon van afwisselende periodes van stabiliteit en chaos. Onder Poetin was 
Rusland er eindelijk in geslaagd de staat van chaos, ontstaan na het val van de Sovjet-Unie, 
achter zich te laten. 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de ontwikkeling en maatschappelijke dynamiek van deze 
herinneringspolitiek in de periode 2000-2012. Ik ontwikkel een alternatieve methode voor de 
bestudering van het politiek-symbolisch gebruik van geschiedenis, waarbij ik 
herinneringspolitiek herdefinieer als een maatschappelijk proces van duiding van het 
verleden, in plaats van een louter politiek proces, zoals gangbaar is. Dit maakt het mogelijk 
om enerzijds een beter beeld te krijgen van de uiteenlopende manieren waarop de Russische 
overheid haar herinneringspolitiek voert (bijvoorbeeld de rol van staatsmedia), en anderzijds 
recht te doen aan tegengeluiden en kritiek op het politieke gebruik van geschiedenis. Om de 
rol van zowel statelijke, niet-statelijke als culturele actoren te kunnen te kunnen analyseren 
hanteer ik een casestudiebenadering. In vier thematische casestudies onderzoek ik, ten eerste, 
hoe verschillende actoren culturele herinneringen hebben gemobiliseerd teneinde zich 
daarmee politiek te positioneren en, ten tweede, de verbeelding van deze herinneringen in 
film- en televisieproducties. De analyses richten zich in het bijzonder op de verspreiding van 
ideeën over wat “traditioneel Russische” staatsvoering inhoudt, welke verhouding er zou 
moeten bestaan tussen staat en volk en in hoeverre (democratische) vrijheden zouden mogen 
worden beperkt in het belang van deze staat. 
De volgende onderzoeksvragen staan hierbij centraal: Op welke wijze hebben de Russische 
staat en uiteenlopende maatschappelijke actoren culturele herinneringen gemobiliseerd om het 
politieke regime te legitimeren, ter discussie te stellen of te bekritiseren? Welke specifieke 
culturele herinneringen zijn gebruikt, door wie, en met welk doel? Hoe hebben deze actoren 
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gebruik gemaakt van bestaande interpretaties en verbeeldingen van deze culturele 
herinneringen om hun bijdrage aan het debat over geschiedenis en politieke legitimiteit vorm 
te geven? 
In de inleiding schets ik de voornaamste ontwikkelingen in de Russische 
herinneringspolitiek sinds het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie in 1991. Daarnaast geef ik een 
overzicht van de trends in historische televisie- en filmproducties en de ontwikkelingen die 
hebben plaatsgevonden in overheidsbeleid met betrekking tot de film- en televisie-industrie. 
In hoofdstuk 2 zet ik vervolgens het theoretisch kader van het onderzoek uiteen. Ik neem 
Aleida en Jan Assmanns conceptualisering van het cultureel geheugen hierbij als 
uitgangspunt. Voortbouwend op het concept remediation (Astrid Erll en Ann Rigney), of 
hermediëring, ontwikkel ik een dynamisch model van herinneringspolitiek. 
De daaropvolgende hoofdstukken behandelen de vier thematische casi, ieder gewijd aan de 
mobilisering van een specifieke culturele herinnering. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft het politieke 
gebruik van de herinnering aan Pjotr Stolypin, minister van binnenlandse zaken en later 
minister-president tussen 1906 en 1911. Ik laat zien dat, naast enkele maatschappelijke 
organisaties, cultureel zwaargewicht Nikita Michalkov en president Poetin de voornaamste 
“sponsoren” zijn geweest van deze herinnering. Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert hedendaagse 
opvattingen over de dertiende-eeuwse prins Aleksandr Nevskij. Het hoofdstuk biedt inzicht in 
de herinneringspolitiek van de Russische Orthodoxe Kerk en het Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de herinnering aan de zeventiende-eeuwse Tijd der 
Troebelen. De volksopstand die in 1612 een einde wist te maken aan deze periode van 
politieke instabiliteit en Poolse overheersing vormt de kern van de officiële 
herinneringspolitiek. Ik analyseer de institutionalisering van deze herinnering en de 
tegenreacties die dit heeft opgeroepen. Hoofdstuk 6, tenslotte, betreft de herinnering aan Ivan 
de Verschrikkelijke. Zijn figuur is aangewend door groepen in de marge van politieke arena 
om politieke visies te formuleren die doorgaans de legitimiteit van het regime ondermijnen. Ik 
onderscheid hierbij twee groepen: fundamentalistische orthodoxe groeperingen enerzijds, en 
ultranationalistische denkers die een buitensystemische staatshervorming voorstaan door 
middel van een nieuwe oprichnina anderzijds.  
Het proefschrift wordt afgesloten in hoofdstuk 7 met een concrete casus: het tv-programma 
De Rechtbank der Tijden (2010). Aan de hand van de productiegeschiedenis van de show 
probeer ik inzicht te verkrijgen in de interactie tussen de maatschappelijke lagen die deel 
uitmaken van het proces van herinneringspolitiek, zoals deze in de voorafgaande casestudies 
aan bod zijn gekomen: de staat, politieke en culturele elites en het algemene publiek. 
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Daarnaast laat deze casus zien hoe aan het einde van 2010 een managementovername de 
liberale televisiezender Kanaal Vijf onderwierp aan de belangen van de staat. 
Op basis van de casestudies formuleer ik vier conclusies. Ten eerste laten mijn analyses 
zien dat de staatsautoriteiten actief de ontwikkeling van “staatspatriotisme” hebben 
gestimuleerd om daarmee hun legitimiteit te ondersteunen en te vergroten. Om een 
traditionele identiteit te creëren heeft het regime daarbij tamelijk succesvol culturele 
herinneringen ingezet met een rijke traditie van artistieke verbeelding en politiek gebruik. 
Hoewel dit staatspatriotisme gericht is op het heden is de historische dimensie essentieel voor 
het versterken van de huidige politiek: het laat zien dat dit hedendaagse patriotisme de 
ideologische breekpunten in de geschiedenis van Rusland overstijgt en het bevestigt de 
(veronderstelde) eenheid in de historische ontwikkeling van de Russische staat. Om deze 
eenheid te bevestigen werden ook herinneringstradities uit zowel de tsaristische tijd als de 
Sovjetperiode nieuw leven ingeblazen. De herinneringspolitiek van de staat was erop gericht 
zijn bevolking ervan te overtuigen dat er een typisch Russische staatstraditie bestaat, namelijk 
die van de sterke hand (de zogenaamde strong state) en gecentraliseerd leiderschap. 
Ten tweede wordt geconcludeerd dat de herinneringspolitiek van de Russische staat in 
sommige gevallen beter getypeerd kan worden als reactief dan proactief – het regime speelt in 
op bestaande sociale en culturele initiatieven of neemt deze over – en het een adaptief 
karakter kent – de herinneringspolitiek wordt voortdurend herzien en aangepast in reactie op 
veranderende (geo-)politieke omstandigheden en verschuivende binnenlandse behoeftes. Ten 
derde komt uit de analyses naar voren dat de staat niet de enige actor is die verhalen over het 
verleden gebruikt om politieke standpunten te verspreiden. Er bestaat een complexe 
wisselwerking tussen actoren op meerdere maatschappelijke niveaus – van de staat tot 
maatschappelijke en religieuze organisaties, en van Kremlinloyale en (semi-)onafhankelijke 
media tot culturele actoren. Tegengeluiden en alternatieve interpretaties konden voor het 
grootste deel van de onderzochte periode ook gehoor vinden – zij het met name via kanalen 
die buiten de zogenaamde mainstream media vallen. 
De vierde conclusie, tenslotte, luidt dat remediation een wijdverspreid en zeer belangrijk 
aspect is van de Russische herinneringspolitiek. Met name het gebruik van (iconische) visuele 
elementen speelt een cruciale rol bij het vormgeven van historische analogieën. Het 
vergemakkelijkt de verspreiding en de overname van interpretaties doordat het de 
herkenbaarheid vergroot. Aan de andere kant zorgt de opeenstapeling van (soms 
tegenstrijdige) politieke interpretaties van culturele herinneringen ervoor dat de mogelijkheid 
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